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ABSTRACT
This is an epistemological study, in which measure­
ment is taken as a paradigm of perceptual recognition - a 
notion in which perception is joined with judgment as a 
factor in understanding. Hence it has proved necessary 
to give an analysis of such recognition in general, with 
metric contexts as a special case. This has been done in 
terms of a very weak fundamental form of 'theory’, as a form 
of basic comprehension, in which language (as part of the 
theories analysed) is not essentially involved, but treated 
as a special development.
One type of theory is given thorough formal 
analysis: those 'récognitive theories' whose elements are
taken, in the theory itself, to be recognized directly from 
perception, or extrapolated as in principle recognizable. 
Another type consists of 'substantive theories', seen as 
constructed to provide deeper understanding of the reality 
underlying recognized structures, but essentially involving 
elements not taken to be recognizable: this type receives
only informal treatment, in terms of its associations with 
the first (especially in measurement).
Special consideration is (unusually) given to 
attention and neglect,not in psychological terms, but as 
theory-guided selection from total experience. Neglect is 
seen not merely as negation of attention, but often a posi­
tive strategy (in measurement, strictly determined).
Part I introduces the basic concepts, distin­
guishing the general approach from other relevant traditions:
Ill
foundational studies in measurement (Suppes et al.); 
linguistic analysis; some epistemologies (e.g., Goodman); 
philosophy of science. Part II sets up the formal 
analysis. Part III applies this analysis to contexts of 
measurement, with examples (only distance is fully treated, 
others only in synopsis). Probability assessment is ana­
lysed as distinct from measurement. Part IV examines 
consequences for wider philosophical questions: language-
based problems of knowledge and meaning; Wittgenstein's 
'private language': and theory-based considerations of
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A STUDY IN EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE:
THE PRECONDITIONS AND STRUCTURE OF MEASUREMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Field of Study
This study looks at measurement as a specialised 
form of perceptual recognition, or observation, with the 
aim of discovering reasons for its powerful status as a 
basic component of many branches of human understanding.
The search involves consideration of the role of perceptual 
recognition in the structure of understanding in general.
My use of the term 'recognition' (whose definition will 
become progressively sharper) reflects these senses, given 
in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary under 'recognize': "to
acknowledge by special notice, to treat as valid, as having 
existence or as entitled to consideration, to take notice 
of in some way; to know again, to perceive to be identical 
with something previously known; to know by means of some 
distinguishing feature, to identify from knowledge of 
appearance or character; to perceive clearly, to realize." 
Thus it carries strong connotations of attention, identifi­
cation, and characterization, going beyond the bare notion 
of perception. (The word is, of course, also used in non- 
perceptual senses; the qualification 'perceptual' is to 
be understood here, unless explicitly cancelled.) It is
very close to ’observation', as used in expressions like 
'observation sentence' (e.g. by Quine) or 'observation 
theory' (e.g. by Lakatos). But 'observation' tends to 
be restricted to cases falling within a framework of expli­
cit, often previously given, rules, whereas some forms of 
recognition tacitly make up their own rules as they go 
along. Some kinds of measurement are improvised in this 
way, though most qualify strictly as cases of observation, 
in these senses.
The ground covered - though not large in itself 
- overlaps the territories of four established traditions 
of academic enquiry (using a broad classification), three 
entirely philosophical, and the fourth with strong philo­
sophical implications: epistemology, philosophy of science,
linguistic analysis, and the mathematical foundations of 
measurement. The perspective induced by my own interest 
turns out to differ fairly widely from any I have found in 
these traditions, though I hope to draw support, at least 
as often as I find myself in conflict, at points of mutual 
concern. Precise statements about these points of support 
and conflict must await the construction of a language 
and a framework of theory in which they can be formed.
They will therefore appear at the end of this study. But 
brief suggestions must be made at the outset, to forestall 
misunderstandings from confusions of perspective. I shall 
discuss the fourth tradition first.
Mathematical Foundations of Measurement
Current developments in this field employ a 
variety of hypothetical structures, assumed to be given 
by observation, consisting of systems of empirical entities 
exhibiting relations with respect to some chosen attribute 
(which may or may not be physical). Functional corres­
pondence between these systems and appropriate structures 
consisting of numbers and known mathematical relations is 
claimed to be plausibly assertible, with the aid of sophis­
ticated formal argument. (These developments, using a 
terminology and theoretical framework mainly traceable to 
Suppes (1962), have their fullest expression to date in 
Foundations of Measurement, by Krantz, Luce, Suppes and 
Tversky, Academic Press, 1971, to which I shall have reason 
to refer quite frequently, and will therefore abbreviate 
as 'KLST'. Only vol. 1 of this work is at present to 
hand.) They proceed by increasingly restricted axiomati­
sations of these assumed 'empirical relational structures' 
(ers), from each of which arrays of theorems are derived, 
whose main thrust is to demonstrate how the supposed func­
tional correspondences between these and the associated 
'numerical relational structures' (nrs) are preserved under 
various systematic mathematical operations; in such a way 
as to facilitate the use of numerical structures and mathe­
matical logic in theories of the more intractable empirical 
structures (mostly in the human sciences).
KLST starts from a demonstration that the axio­
matic basis of the weakest (most general) of their hypo­
thetical ers - the 'weak order' - yields, as a simply- 
proved theorem, that a homomorphism exists from this 
weak order into the real numbers, as ordered by the familar 
relation ' ^  ' (i.e., a functional correspondence with a sub­
set of these numbers); and so onto any chosen nrs which 
is just a chosen set of numbers so determined and ordered 
(Theorem 1, p. 15). This fundamental "result", however, 
merely formalises their intuitive characterization (ib., 
p. xxiii), of the ordering relation'll*for the 'weak order' 
itself in terms precisely of the numerical relation*^*.
Similarly, and crucially for this study, the most 
fundamental of all types of hypothetical empirical operation, 
that by which two elements of any ers are 'concatenated' - 
or taken together to form a single element - is equally 
frankly modelled on the operation of arithmetical addition; 
with only quite cursory consideration of how such an oper­
ation might be realised in actual ers (ib., p. 2, 82-91, 155) 
The discovery, or construction, of actual cases of ers 
exhibiting these features (and all others considered by this 
means) is generally left for the practical investigator: 
for whom what is provided is a variety of axiomatic systems 
to guide his/her testing of whether a particular numerical 
structure is appropriate or not for a theory of a particular 
empirical context. The methods or conditions of testing 
(other than mathematical) are outside the scope of this 
kind of analysis, and receive scant mention in KLST. The
boundaries of shared interest with this study lie, there­
fore, in the question of how and where empirical relational 
structures which might satisfy axiom-systems of all, or 
some, of the types offered may be found, or constructed; 
and what restrictions, if any, are placed on the variety 
of available structures by the nature of the world, and 
our experience of it.
The result of this enquiry will, in fact, be to 
put in question the notion of an ’empirical relational 
structure' as an a priori system whose own theoretical basis 
is not subjected to independent scrutiny. It will attempt 
to clarify some aspects of the theoretical status of these 
analyses of mathematical foundations - not their validity 
as logical structures, but their epistemological status as 
theories, in a larger framework. It will be argued that 
they are not so much parts of the theory of measurement 
per se, as formal schemata for the formulation in numerical 
language of theories about empirical structures, so that 
these theories can be tested by measurement. This testing 
turns out to require a distinct theoretical basis of its 
own.
Hblder (1901) adopted, for physical measurement, 
the basic assumption of an empirically-determined relational 
structure isomorphic to a numerical structure, on which so 
much has since been built; N.R. Campbell (1928) being per­
haps the last major writer in that field not to be directly 
influenced by it. By many, indeed, the problems of the
foundations of physical measurement came to be considered 
solved for ever by Helmholz and Hblder - ignoring the uncer­
tainties introduced by relativity and quantum theories 
(see, e.g., Pfanzagl (1968) p. 11). But Holder's assump­
tion (which will be questioned here) was too strong, and 
its demands on the investigator too rigorous, to accommodate 
more recent pressures for the authentication of measurement 
procedures in non-physical disciplines. The project of 
retaining the intuitive commitment underlying Holder’s 
formulation, while weakening its formal structure from 
isomorphism to homomorphism, probably began with the psycho­
logist S.S. Stevens at least as early as his (1936). But 
the further development of the mathematical formalism, up 
to and including KLST, has been so continuously associated 
with the name of Suppes that I shall call it, for short, 
the Suppes tradition. A paper by Kanger (1972) shows how 
much of this earlier work can be roughly reinterpreted as 
somewhat naïve versions of restricted parts of modern 
foundational analysis. But insights can also be found in 
these earlier writers which are relevant to this study, and 
which do not fall within any such reinterpretation.
My concern here with recognition will lead also, 
especially in the context of non-physical measurement 
(Section IIl.R) , to an interest in the parallel work on 
scaling theory, especially by J.C. Nunnally, C.H. Coombs 
- and S.S. Stevens , who has made important contributions 
here too. The principal topics in this context are the
validation and reliability of particular procedural systems. 
One aim will be to offer a firm general rationale for this 
field, which seems so far to be lacking. This will 
involve a rather deep analysis of the theory of probability, 
especially as it is used in measurement contexts.
Epistemology
The theory of knowledge is a vast region which 
for many is still the primary concern of philosophy (see, 
e.g., Quine in Guttenplan (1975) p. 67). But (apart 
from its use in contexts of linguistic analysis) the label 
'epistemology' seems to have become specifically attached 
recently to a group of theories which look for the grounds 
of knowledge in some proposed analysis of the fundamental 
constituents of experience. Following roughly the system 
of J.J. Ross (1967), recent theories of this kind can be 
ordered in a number of ways on different criteria, of which 
one is the size or complexity of what are taken to be "given" 
as the fundamental constituents, and another - which does 
not yield the same ordering of the theories - the level of 
size or complexity at which our understanding of what we 
perceive achieves the greatest clarity, certainty or justi­
fiability (the degree of supposed corrigibility being yet 
another ordering criterion). The size-or-complexity
scale (to use a measurement metaphor) ranges from the whole 
interrelated field of experience, through the "natural"
objects, classifications and relations of a common-sense 
reading of perception, to some minimal, irreducible system 
of units of sensation which can be loosely classed as 
'sense data'. These last have in practice proved elusive 
in themselves, and hard to organize into coherent accounts 
of ordinary experience.
All these epistemologies are suspicious of 
'inference' as a prevalent source of error with respect to 
the chosen structure of superior certainty - though there 
are differences about where inference operates in the system, 
and how conscious or verbally explicit it need be. Ross 
himself takes the view - also that of R.M. Chisholm - that 
many kinds of structure of different levels of size and 
complexity are given in perception without inference - or, 
at least, conscious or explicit inference: though he
refuses to follow Chisholm in assigning special certainty 
to any particular level.
Another kind of multi-level account of experience 
may be taken to underlie analyses in terms of structures of 
parts and wholes, as in the 'mereology' of Lesniewski 
(Luschei, 1962), or the essentially set-theoretical 'Struc­
ture of Appearance' of Goodman (1951), which do not assign 
epistemological priority to any particular level in the 
conceptual organization. These have proved more amenable 
to interpretations in terms of actual recognizable struc­
tures than have sense data theories. But the search for 
universal primitive components from which whole entities may
be built up (either in appearance or in reality) has turned 
out not to yield, of itself, any principle of composition 
by which the part-structure of any particular whole is 
determined. Indeed, Lesniewski's mereology (a theory of 
whole/part composition) is a distinct structure, using a 
different form of "class" or "set", from his ontology (a 
logical theory of predication). Luschei and Kotarbinski 
insist that this last is a "true ontology" or "theory of 
being"; but it has no commitments of its own to the exis­
tence of any particular kinds of entity, composed of parts 
or not. Leonard and Goodman's "calculus of individuals", 
designed as a simplified version of Lesniewski's theories 
(but rejected as such by Luschei), also lacks a principle 
of composition. Lesniewski's systems will be briefly con­
sidered, in more detail, in Part IV.
The perspective of this study compels a multi­
level account, which accommodates at least all the scales 
at which observation is found possible in measurement con­
texts. It seeks to impose a manageable order on this 
account, not by according priority to any level of concep­
tual organization, but by attempting to provide a theoreti­
cal framework for the structure of attention, by which, it 
will be argued, we actually organize our understandings 
of the many levels and aspects of experience. The task 
turns out to be less problematic than it may sound. 
Understanding, according to this view, is made up of an 
indefinite number of more or less interdependent conceptual 
frameworks, each constituting a partial theory of some 
aspect of the whole, selected by the faculty of attention
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in accordance with interest from time to time, shifting 
from one theory to another, maintaining their coherence 
through shifts of attention with the help of memory.
No psychological theory of attention, or memory, 
is involved. Using a simple primitive analysis of the 
concept of a 'theory’, it has been found possible to con­
struct a highly generalized account of the structure of 
attention, readily interpretable for ordinary contexts of 
perceptual recognition, which I shall call 'concrete con­
texts '. Measurement is then analysed as a special class 
of such contexts. Inference is seen as taking place not 
in perception itself, but within one or other theory of 
the context in which it occurs - however vague and tacit, 
or explicit and sophisticated, the theory may be.
Certainty, as a property of empirical theories, is regarded 
as a purely contingent matter - which does not mean that 
no certainty is available.
Philosophy of Science
Karl Popper was clear from the outset that the 
enterprise he launched belonged to the theory of knowledge, 
or 'epistemology', though current academic usage seems, as 
I said, to keep this term mainly for the class of theories 
just described. He took the central epistemological 
problem to be that of the 'growth' of knowledge, and scien­
tific theories as the best - though not the only - exemplars 
of this growth (see especially the Logic of Scientific
11
Discovery, introduction to the English edition, 1959, 
p. 15). With the field of enquiry chosen so high in the 
'size-or-complexity' scale, all the then traditional 
notions of certainty or ultimate justification were not 
merely abandoned, but explicitly rejected as misconceived. 
Scientific theories, each with its own specific system of 
inference (the 'hypothetico-deductive' principle) were 
boldly classed as competitive 'conjectures', the expert 
jury of current scientific opinion being accepted as 
judges of the resulting competitions - with some guidance, 
or interpretation, offered by the philosopher.
There is much common ground between this approach 
and that of this study,* the most fundamental difference 
being the attempt, here, to formulate a primitive analysis 
of theoretical structure (just mentioned) in such a way that 
it can be generalized to include the simplest possible con­
ceptual frameworks within which experience is understood. 
Philosophers in the Popperian tradition do not seem to 
have thought it desirable, or perhaps even possible, to 
set up a general metatheoretical analysis of empirical 
theories. But by showing how this can be done at a basic 
level for measurement systems, as special cases of con­
texts of perceptual recognition, this study may hope to
There turns out to be much common ground, also, with a 
quite different approach to scientific theory-building 
recently presented by van Fraassen (1980), and called by 
him 'constructive empiricism'. This ground will be 
briefly explored at the end of the study (Section IV.8).
13
reveal a common underlying structure. Lakatos (espe­
cially in his (1970), pp. 98-9, 109) stressed the impor­
tance for philosophy of science of 'observational' 
theories (the cautionary quotes are his), but without 
attempting a general analysis in which they can be distin­
guished from other theories. His remarks on this subject 
will be further considered at the end of this study.
Popper himself always insisted that the prin­
ciples of his analysis - including a somewhat loosely 
conceived notion of 'theory' - informed all levels of 
human understanding, and even that of some animals. Other 
followers of his tradition do not seem to have pursued this 
line of thought. The more rigorous analysis of theory 
used here is not explicitly considered in relation to 
animals. But it leads to the view that, as the size and 
sophistication of the group of persons involved in a 
theoretical context decreases, from Popper's "scientific 
jury" to a single individual organizing his/her under­
standing of some everyday context of experience, the impor­
tance of language as a vehicle for comprehension or commu­
nication declines, and that of unverbalised perceptual 
recognition increases.
Linguistic Analysis
The last remark suggests a radical difference 
of perspective on language from that of the development
14
in this century of linguistic analysis as a philosophical 
method. At the end of this study, I shall argue that 
these perspectives are complementary rather than conflicting; 
and suggest ways in which the present analysis is relevant 
to the actual structures of language. But little use will 
be made of the standard concepts of linguistic analysis 
in the main exposition. These concepts have mainly been 
developed within the study of particular languages, 
'naturally' developed or formally constructed. The 
aspects of these languages which have attracted most 
attention have been their grammatical or syntactic struc­
tures; in terms of their relevance to the logical or 
truth-functional properties of sentences, or structures 
defined in terms of the truth of sentences, such as truth- 
values, truth conditions, propositions or possible worlds.
In demonstrating that truth is to be understood, not as a 
metaphysical principle, but rather as a property of sen­
tences, Tarski emphasized that its definition must be made 
relative to a particular language in each case (recursive 
procedures being carried out within each language for which 
the definition is specified*). In the tradition of
A recent new departure in model theoretic semantics, due 
to Hans Kamp, in which truth is defined for a fragment 
of discourse not only in terms of the language of that 
discourse, but of a functional embedding of a represen­
tation of that discourse in a real-world model, is expli­
citly distinguished in Part IV. In its present form, 
it remains specific to discourse in a given language.
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semantics developed from this seminal insight and those 
of Davidson, theories of meaning have equally been rela­
tivized to particular forms of natural or formal language, 
for which meanings are supposed given - in the case of 
natural languages by the shared knowledge of a speech- 
community, and in formal languages by definition. In 
general, the development of the method owes its persuasive­
ness to an underlying intuition, most explicit in the work 
of Wittgenstein, that problems of philosophical analysis 
can only be coherently stated, let alone solved, in terms 
of the structures of language in which they are expressed: 
that any attempt to discuss the nature of our experience 
of the world otherwise than in terms of its conventional 
linguistic expression is doomed to circularity or meaning­
lessness. The effect is to exclude from analysis all 
non-linguistic structures involved in meaning.
This study seeks to escape the fundamental res­
triction on the scope of philosophical analysis, imposed 
by acceptance of this intuition. A technical device in 
the realm of metatheoretical analysis is introduced below, 
which is claimed to permit a distinction, in the language 
of metatheory, between elements of an instantiating theory 
which are elements of a language of that theory, and others 
which are not. Using this device, it has been found 
possible to produce a more precise account of the role of 
language in concrete contexts. It turns out to be less 
central than has often been thought.
16
Operationalism
A fifth philosophical interest - now hardly 
discernible in the field of study - must be briefly dis­
tinguished as having special relevance to measurement. 
Operationalism, associated primarily with Bridgman, is 
the doctrine that the ultimate significance of observation 
statements, and of theories constructed on them, is 
given by the (physical) operations carried out in deter­
mining their truth. It can be seen as a special appli­
cation of the general doctrine of verificationism, implicit 
in all positivism and explicit in the early work of 
Wittgenstein: that the meaning of any statement is given
by its actual or potential means of verification, and that 
no other ground of meaning is ultimately available.
I shall certainly pay more attention to the 
structure of measurement operations (in the sense of con­
crete procedures) than do, say, the followers of the 
Suppes tradition of foundational analysis - and so risk 
being mistaken for an operationalist. This would be 
unfortunate, since the position has properly become dis­
credited in recent times, as being far too rigid and 
particularised to permit fertile theoretical development. 
But I hope it is already clear, and will become clearer, 
that from the perspective of this study the meaning of 
operational procedures is to be sought in the theory under 
whose commitments they are carried out, and not vice versa. 
Examples will be given where more than one theory can be
17
applied to an operation (in this sense) so as to assign 
different, mutually exclusive, meanings; and, even more 
crucially, where a theory will assign equivalent meanings 
to two or more recognizably different operations.
In view of these marked differences of perspec­
tive from those of many previous lines of enquiry, it 
seems wise to provide a few preliminary notes on certain 
key concepts which are shared, to a greater or less 
extent, between all perspectives: namely theory, context,
property, set, entity and relation.
B. Notes on Key Concepts
Theory and theoretical status
Before specifying the content of these notions 
for the present analysis, I want to reject what I take to 
be excessive restrictions which are often tacitly, some­
times explicitly, placed on their use. The first is that 
theoretical commitments, at least in empirical contexts, 
are confined to those which are speculative or doubtful, 
in some way that prevents them forming parts of knowledge 
in any valid sense. I claim that we know that the earth 
rotates once a day and orbits the sun once a year, and 
that our commitments to these beliefs as knowledge remain
theoretical in just the way they were four centuries ago, 
when they were not merely thought speculative, but spiri­
tually and politically dangerous. Alternative theories 
remain available - no doubt there are still flat-earthers 
living somewhere - but they are no longer seriously 
entertained. If I see that old table in front of me,
I don’t think of this recognition of involving a theore­
tical commitment, unless and until somethings happens to 
create conflict in my reading of current perception; 
for instance, if someone appears to walk straight through 
the space occupied by the table. I then cast around for 
alternatives to the theory that I see the table and the 
person because they are where they appear to be; I may 
think of mirrors, hypnotism, incipient lunacy or some 
form of Berkeleianism. These alternatives would have 
been present, even without the anomalous event that made 
me think of them. It is always one of several possible 
theories that we know things are where we see them, when 
we see them and as we see them, just by seeing them. The 
prejudice that theory is only present (rather than only 
attended .to) when things go wrong, is merely the converse 
of the prejudice that theory is always doubtful.
Within the field of empirical theories I find, 
intuitively, a continuous spectrum of certitude, from the 
belief that there is a sheet of typed paper in front of me, 
to theories of the British economy, and possibly even 
beyond. The commitment that some empirical proposition
19
is known is itself metatheoretical - involving the pro­
posal that any empirical theory on which it is founded 
forms part of what is accepted as knowledge (by whatever 
individual, society or group, at whatever historical 
juncture).
The second, and more difficult, prejudice I 
wish to reject, is that theoretical commitments necessarily 
form parts of some relatively sophisticated structure, 
which must at least be framed in a properly constituted 
and fully conscious system of language.
The constituents of a theory, as the notion is 
used here, are:
A. A system of sets of supposed elements which are held 
to exist for the theory, and constitute its subject- 
matter (or its ontology).
B. A system of primitive structural relationships under­
stood, in the theory, to hold between items of A.
C. A system of commitments of the theory, constituting a 
regular structure of dependence understood to obtain 
between items of B, such that some such relationships 
are understood to be dependent on others (essentially, 
a system of inferential commitments).
D. A system of logical connections and operations 
governing the understanding of items of B and C in 
combination.
The elements (A) of the theories which will be 
the main subject of this study will be those elements in 
experience taken to be perceptually recognized, or in
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principle recognizable. The broad general assumption 
will be made that non-verbal recognition of such elements 
is prior to any use of language to draw attention to 
them, describe them, or make statements about them; and, 
to a large extent, independent of such use of language.
(The word ’language' will be restricted in this study to 
structures using words, or conventional symbols such as 
numerals or algebras combined with words in a single 
system of discourse in any context. Full discussion of 
the distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic 
structures, and the relationships between them, must be 
left to the end of the study.)
The notion of a theory constituting some under­
standing of non-verbal recognition involves that of a non­
verbal logic governing this understanding (under head D 
above). This notion will be explored in some depth. To 
recognize that chair x is in room y , and room y in house z, 
is to recognize that chair x is in house z. Though I
must use words to invoke it here, it will be argued that 
such an inference may be (and frequently is) reached 
independently of any use of language (in thought or other­
wise) . To discuss a logic governing wordless inferences 
of this kind (which may take quite sophisticated forms) 
we cannot use the language of the inference itself, where 
there is none. I shall therefore introduce a formal 
language for the theory of this study, which I shall call 
a general theory of concrete contexts, or C-theory. This 
language of C-theory will contain distinctive expressions
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for linguistic and non-linguistic elements of récognitive 
theories, (or R-theories), in terms of which the general 
structure of these theories will be analysed. So C-theory 
is a metatheory of R-theories: part of its language will
constitute a metalanguage, in Tarski's sense, for the 
linguistic components of R-theories, but the major part 
will be used to describe their non-linguistic structures.
Though this formal construction is necessary to 
articulate fully and rigorously the reasoning leading to 
certain conclusions about the theoretical structure of 
recognition in general, and measurement contexts in 
particular, both reasoning and conclusions are also dis­
cussed and illustrated in informal language: most of the
reasoning in Part II, applications to measurement in Part 
III, and general philosophical considerations in Part IV.
The everyday situations in which récognitive 
theories are used (and there are very few in which they 
are not) frequently involve the concurrent use of more 
abstract forms of understanding, in more or less close 
interaction with R-theories. These will be discussed,
where relevant, in informal language. Though they will 
be assumed to have at least the structure broadly analysed 
in heads A to D above, no attempt will be made at a 
general or comprehensive analysis. Such abstract theories 
are relevant here to the extent that they share certain 
elements (A) with R-theories, and can be seen as attempts 
to organize understanding of the reality underlying the
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recognized structure, in ways which go beyond what is 
(even in principle) recognizable in perception. I shall 
therefore refer to them as substantive theories (or S- 
theories).
Although we shall find some general character­
istic differences between R- and S-theoretical structures, 
no universal rules can be laid down for distinguishing 
them in all contexts, as if there were separate bodies of 
R- and S-theory, universally understood as such. Plainly, 
different ways of understanding a given situation may 
differ over just what, or how much, is recognizable in per­
ception: in more sophisticated situations this is the
question what may count as evidence for any particular 
theory (on the ground that it is evident from observation). 
If I see a man, at night, working with a screwdriver at a 
rear window of a darkened house, I may form the (substan­
tive) theory that he is a burglar. Challenged, he may 
offer an alternative: that he is the owner, whose wife is
away at her mother’s, and who has carelessly locked himself 
out. He may draw attention to various aspects of the 
evidence which, he claims, support his version. As the 
story develops, it is easy to see how different features 
of the situation may be claimed as ’’evident", depending on 
what theory is being promoted.
The question of the borderline between R-theory 
and S-theory, and how sharply that line is drawn, will be 
taken to be a matter for autonomous decision by the indivi­
dual or group adopting the theoretical strategy in each
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case - subject to conditions of rationality and consistency, 
many of which will emerge during the main exposition. At 
this point it must be said that the logical relationships 
between the two types of theory depend on a variety of 
considerations in different contexts. For example, 
although S-theoretical commitments may be thought of as 
in some sense deeper and more general, they are not neces­
sarily either more permanent or wider in application than 
R-theoretical commitments with which they may be associated. 
Our common récognitive commitments about sunrise, sunset 
and the alternation of day and night have surely proved 
more stable, and are involved in more different kinds of 
context, than the S-theoretical explanations of astronomers. 
Again, where real or apparent conflict develops between 
applications of R- and S-theories in particular contexts, 
there is no simple rule of priority: Popper's first
intuition that, in science, a single contrary 'observation' 
may falsify a scientific theory [in my terms, a particular 
type of well-developed S-theory), has become the subject 
of extensive reinterpretation and modification. This 
aspect will be discussed in Part IV (Section 8).
One way in which the borderline between R- and 
S-theories may shift from one context to another is spe­
cially important in the analysis of measurement systems.
I shall show how aspects of theory which in some contexts 
may be taken to go beyond the récognitive evidence, may 
in others be incorporated in R-theories. For example.
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where geometrical or trigonometrical theory is used in 
measuring distances by rangefinder, or the theory of 
expansion of mercury under heat in measuring temperature, 
these substantive theories are not attended to in context, 
the perceived readings of the instruments being taken as 
objective evidence. This principle of incorporation is 
not restricted to contexts of measurement or sophisticated 
theory; we may recognize a fruit as ripe by its colour, 
without attending to the theoretical commitment involved 
in thus recognizing what cannot be seen.
It may help to think of the simplest kinds of 
theoretical construction considered here as roughly equi­
valent to what many philosophers have discussed under the 
heading of belief. The new aspect of the concept intro­
duced here could be called systematic belief - not neces­
sarily involving a sophisticated structure which would 
ordinarily be called 'a theory', merely a collection of 
beliefs which are in some way mutually dependent by virtue 
of the beliefs themselves and the logical connections and 
operations incorporated in them. Both the words 'theory' 
and 'belief' risk connoting too much in contexts of per­
ceptual recognition, but no others - not even 'recognition' 
itself - seem immune from this tendency: the basic notion
is a system of commitments on which we rely.
I shall take it that in empirical contexts 
generally, and contexts of perceptual recognition in par­
ticular, the evidence on which existent elements under A
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are recognized is always partial, in that our perception 
can never be assumed to give us complete information about 
any perceived entity. There may always be (and usually 
are) unperceived entities and properties in any state of 
affairs which is an object of perception. Some, but not 
all, may be recognized by theoretical extrapolation.
Only in more sophisticated theories are some recognitions 
distinguished as evidence for the extrapolation of others. 
In a vast number of ordinary cases, extrapolation is not 
merely a tacit but an unconscious factor in recognition.
As illustrated above, it is only in special circumstances 
that we attend to its theoretical character. When we do 
so, it is frequently quite easy to interpret.
Context
The word 'context* is used in a variety of 
senses. In linguistic analysis, apart from Frege's insight 
that the sense of a word is in general determinate only in 
the context of a sentence, the initial concern was to find 
aspects of the theory of language which are independent of 
context; and this remains an important motive. But the 
effect of context with respect to particular utterances, 
especially in determining the precise references of 
referring terms, and hence the meanings and truth-values 
of the uttered sentences, became increasingly acknowledged. 
Amongst possible aspects of a context, most attention has
26
been paid to the time of an utterance, and the identity 
of the speaker (or writer); it will be argued, in Part IV, 
that these factors are frequently insufficient to deter­
mine meaning.
More formally, a context has been presented in 
terms of an 'interpretation’ or 'model' in which the truth- 
values of a particular set of uttered sentences are taken 
to be determined (usually by unspecified means); on the 
basis that more than one such interpretation is typically 
possible for any given set or sequence of sentences, con­
sidered independently of a context of utterance, and 
that such a context ideally determines a restriction on 
the system of possible interpretations so as to disambiguate 
meanings. Following Geach's concern with the subtle ways 
in which conversational practice may place interpretations 
on words or sentences not obvious from conventional analysis 
of lexicon or syntax, students of pragmatics have paid 
special attention to contexts of utterance. These have 
been analysed, for example, with reference to sets of pro­
positions, or possible worlds, defined in terms of possible 
interpretations of specified utterances: in such a way
that successive utterances may be understood to modify 'a 
context' by progressively restricting alternative inter­
pretations of earlier utterances in a sequence (esp. by 
Gazdar, 1979). But in none of the accounts so far con­
sidered is the concept of 'context' itself specified or 
analysed except in terms.of a supposedly given structure
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of sentences or sentential forms employed in a set or 
sequence of utterances; or of otherwise unspecified 
factors supposed to restrict their interpretations.
By contrast, the term will be given a strict 
sense in this study, at least for the special class of 
contexts being investigated. Broadly, a context will be 
analysed as a set of theories which share enough items 
under heads A to C above (p. 19), in the terms of the 
theories themselves, to be combined under a common logic 
(under head D) into a total structure of understanding 
of these items: the set of theories being adopted either
by a group of persons (using language to coordinate their 
theories), or by one person (using language or not).
Greater or less inconsistency between the commitments of 
different theories of the same context will affect the 
degree of comprehensibility of the theories, used together, 
usually with the idea of reconciling them or deciding 
between them. This account is vague, as it should be to 
match living experience of attempts to reconcile or adju­
dicate rival theories: this is the problem of 'commen-
surability' familiar to post-Popperian philosophers of 
science. But I hope to show that the notion of a single 
récognitive theory of a concrete context can be made rela­
tively sharp, so as to make the notion of commensurability 
more precise in such contexts.
People are, from à logical point of view, en­
titled to believe what they like about what they perceive: 
so this analysis accepts a fundamental autonomy of theory.
28
especially under heads A to C above. I shall however 
restrict myself to a very simple set of logical terms 
under head D, taken to reflect the structure of the tacit 
logic inherent in native intelligence. The autonomy of 
theory is seen as limited only by the demands of internal 
consistency; which, in the case of récognitive theories 
includes consistency between their readings of the per­
ceptual evidence - which are parts of the theories - 
and between these readings and findings derived from them 
under the theories. In practice, concrete contexts yield 
a high degree of consistency in many cases between the 
readings of theories operated in a context by users of a 
common language: measurement contexts are constructed to
maximise such consistency. Hence the concentration in 
this analysis on the notion of context.
Properties, Sets and Entities
A mathematical property of numbers can be iden­
tified with the set of numbers possessing that property: 
we say, the set 'determined by' the property. This 
also applies to relational properties of number; any n-ary 
relation (relating n numbers) being identified with the 
specific set of n-tuples of numbers exhibiting the relation, 
determined by the relational properties of the numbers 
with respect to each other. These identifications are 
unproblematic, because it is a simple basic commitment of
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the theory of numbers that the membership of the set of 
numbers or n-tuples determined by any particular property 
or relation is fixed for all contexts by the rules of 
mathematical logic, even if - as often happens - the set 
is infinite, so that we cannot identify all its individual 
members by name or in any other way. If two properties, 
or two relations, determine the same set, they are logi­
cally identical.
In principle, something similar may also be 
logically true of actual sets of non-numerical entities, 
such as we recognize in our daily experience. Considering, 
for the time being, only unary properties (those taken to 
be possessed by single individual entities), it may be 
possible to say that if any two such properties, A and 
B, are to be distinguished, there must in principle be 
some entity which belongs to the set determined by A and 
not that determined by B, or vice versa; and that, if A 
and B determine the same set of entities, there are not 
two distinct properties but one, giving A = B. Whether 
or not this is so for a universe of logically possible 
recognized entities, such a principle is useless for the 
interpretation of ordinary concrete contexts, where our 
information is restricted to the field of immediate 
attention and memory, and we need to discover which rele­
vant sets are distinguishable on the evidence of their 
perceptible properties. The fact that two or more 
properties determine the same set in this restricted field
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will not, of itself, induce us to identify these properties 
More often it is the contingent coincidence of recogni­
zably different properties in the same set of entities 
which is the centre of interest. Indeed, it is difficult 
to see what sense can be given to the identification of 
recognizably different properties.
This important effect of contextual restriction 
on the universe of entities and properties comes to a 
head in contexts where we wish to assign numbers to ele­
ments of the context and need to decide, in the light of 
some theory of the context, just which numbers to assign 
to which elements (entities or sets). Measurement is a 
relatively sophisticated class of such contexts. The 
simplest form in which this requirement arises is in the 
counting of sets. Two fundamental conditions are needed 
for the counting of sets:
(1) A criterion by which it is decidable whether or 
not an entity belongs to the set;
(2) A means of discrimination between members of the 
set, such that each is counted, and none is 
counted twice.
Further conditions are needed for the counting 
of sets in concrete contexts, but these can be neglected 
at this stage. In simple set-theoretical terms, these 
basic conditions are the availability of criteria, with 
respect to any set S and any entities x, y recognized 
in context, for:
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(1) X £ 5  ;
(2) X, X  ^y.
The second condition requires us to find criteria 
distinguishing each member of S from every other. If 
we do so by recognizing each as a member of some set, we 
need to recognize as many distinct, additional sets as 
there are members of S: that is to say, we have to
recognize that no two of these sets contain all and only 
the same members. Plainly, the most direct and simple way 
of doing this is to distinguish just the members of S 
itself, by distinguishing properties which determine their 
membership of different sets. Having done this, there is 
no point whatever (merely in the context of counting S') 
in setting out to determine the membership of these distin­
guishing sets outside the membership of S (their inter­
sects with 5). How much simpler and more direct, there­
fore, simply to distinguish the properties, and ignore the 
sets they determine, unless we have some reason in context 
to recognize these sets, as such, as well as 5  .
This is, unquestionably, the way we do it in 
practice. Most of the sets we ordinarily count are deter­
mined by a multiplicity of properties (realizing condition
(1) above, the criterion for x g ^  ). We have no need to 
attend to the collection of all sets, determined by every 
such property, of which the set to be counted forms the 
intersect. If we are counting swans, it is not generally 
enough for membership of the set of all swans in context 
that the candidate should be a bird which is white, has a
32
long neck and webbed feet. If we wish to tell swans 
from white geese we shall have to attend to other, more 
subtle perceptual properties. Often the only way we can 
tell the swans themselves apart, on the other hand, is by 
recognizing relational properties, to do with position 
in space, of which more shortly. All I want to say at 
this point is that such properties are not readily asso­
ciated, in practical contexts, with membership of sets.
Since the aim of contextual theory is to reflect 
the structure of attention, it will follow the indications 
above, by containing in its language specified algebraic 
symbols for.properties recognized in context, in addition 
to specified symbols for the entities to which properties 
are attributed or 'assigned', and for sets of entities or 
properties. To distinguish them from properties in 
general, they will be called 'characters'. Although, 
logically, assignment of a character to an entity may be 
equivalent to the assignment of that entity to some set, 
the assignment of characters will be treated as prior.
I
Sets of entities, generally labelled with the characters 
which determine their membership, or sets of characters 
themselves, will only be introduced where their recog­
nition ^  sets has some specified role in the theoretical 
structure.
The resulting emphasis on characters has certain 
other advantages for a theory of recognition. The 
entities of the theory, those taken to be recognized in
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context, are to be called 'idents', since their primary 
significance for the theory lies in their identity (no 
preexisting word, unfortunately, seems to capture this 
unequivocally). They are understood to be distinguished 
from one another by their boundaries in space, at any 
one time - i.e., they are conceived as spatially bounded 
entities. These boundaries are taken to be recognized 
in terms of differences in character. (They need be no 
more, and must be no less, sharply distinguished than the 
context requires. A more detailed account of this aspect 
is given on p. 60 ).
By dispensing with the identification of pro­
perties with determinate sets, contextual theory is left 
with no general criterion for the identity of characters. 
This, like many other aspects of the structure of recog­
nition, becomes a matter for the autonomous determinations 
of theory in context, the only check on the validity of 
such determinations being the consistency of the theory 
as a framework for the understanding of the context.
The decision that two objects are the same colour, for 
instance, only holds so long as the same standards of 
"sameness" are maintained for the whole of the context.
It is claimed that this analysis reflects the actual struc­
tures of recognized similarities.
Properties and Relations
As has been said, there is no difficulty in
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identifying relations between numbers with determinate 
sets, any n-ary relation (or n-place relation, or relation 
of order n) being identified with the set of n-tuples of 
numbers exhibiting the relation (ordered or not, as the 
definition requires). This relation can be called a 
property of any n-tuple which is a member of the set: for
each member of such an n-tuple we can identify a group of 
relational properties with respect to some or all of the 
other members of the n-tuple. It has therefore been 
natural to identify properties of numbers in general with 
relations, treating a unary property (such, perhaps, as 
primeness) as a ’one-place relation'. All talk of pro­
perties in numerical structures can therefore be replaced 
by formulae in an algebra of numbers and relations.
In foundational analysis in the Suppes tradition empirical 
relational systems are treated in the same way, as 
systems of sets and relations, with no mention of pro­
perties other than as "attributes" identified with complete 
systems of sets and relations.
Again, something similar can be done in the 
abstract in linguistic analysis, associating properties 
with n-place 'predicates', whose extensions are sets or 
classes identified with the corresponding relations, a 
unary property, in the above sense, being the extension of 
a one-place predicate. However, bearing in mind the 
problems raised above for linguistic analysis in concrete 
contexts, nothing more can usefully be said on this point 
at this stage.
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The general difficulties just illustrated, for 
the identification of unary properties with sets in 
concrete contexts, increase beyond natural comprehension 
for properties involving pairs or larger n-tuples of 
recognized entities - and natural comprehension, we must 
remember, is what we have to do with in concrete contexts.
If we are to recognize the relation exhibited by the pair 
consisting of a book on a table, are we to do so in terms 
of a restriction on the set of all pairs in a "supportive" 
relation given by 'x is on y'? The hat on the hook, 
the nose on your face, the fly on the ceiling? If not, 
what more reasonable account is feasible?
From the perspective of this study, it has proved 
imperative to pursue the policy of priority for the recog­
nized 'character* over the set of entities determined by 
it, into the field of properties involving two or more 
'idents'. Standard analyses of such properties have 
tended to exhibit them in terms of relations, by means of 
sentences or formulae interpretable as making statements 
about the related entities, which may or may not be true 
or applicable under particular interpretations. Such 
relational statements are always, in principle, ana­
lysable as logically equivalent to one or more different 
statements about the same related entities. For example,
"a is to the left of b", "b is to the right of a"; "a is 
louder than b", "b is softer than a" (of sounds); "b is 
between a and c", "b is between c and a". When considering 
how to render the structures involved in recognizing.
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perceptually, the conditions for truth or appli­
cability of such collections of logically equivalent 
statements, no general principle suggests itself 
for preferring one to another. To recognize the conditions 
for one is necessarily to recognize those for any of its
equivalents.
To capture the intuitions suggested by these
considerations, use is made of a concept of 'figure*, 
similar to that employed in Gestalt psychology (though 
without committing us to any of its doctrines). It will 
be assumed that in concrete contexts a large class of 
relational structures are recognized in a simple unsophis­
ticated way as configurations, understood as assemblies 
of two or more related idents. Different configurations 
are taken to be recognizable, in many cases, as similar in 
structure - in much the way that different idents are recog­
nized as similar in shape or form. So a figure will be 
defined as a set of similar configurations, represented as a 
set of pairs of idents (or n-tuples - assemblies of n idents) 
to which are assigned a common (binary or n-ary) character, 
on the same principle as that by which (unary) characters 
are assigned to individual idents. Figures are typically, 
but not always, recognized visually. (But a triple musical 
chord, for example, could plausibly be analysed as a triple 
configuration in sound, a set of similarly related chords 
then forming a figure.)
The conditions for two or more relations, in the
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standard sense, are thus in principle derivable from the 
recognition of any one figure. Which of these relations, 
if any, are attended to in context, is again a matter for 
autonomous decision by the Reader in each case. Such 
decisions may be assumed made in the light of commitments 
of the Reader's theory of the context; and we shall find 
that such commitments are, indeed, frequently associated 
with particular relations.
To give some simple examples: we may recognize a
cupboard as on the floor but merely touching the wall; 
while a curtain beside it is on the wall but merely touching 
the floor. This judgment involves both recognizing the 
configurations cupboard-wall-floor and curtain-wall-floor, 
and making use of a theory about the means of support of 
cupboard and curtain. (Note that the recognition of con­
figurations does not require that they correspond with any 
neat, generalised linguistic expression, since many of them 
are unique structures, though readily recognized as similar 
to others, especially in terms of spatial organisation.) 
Measurement involves recognized configurations of comparison, 
together with specific theories about the entities compared. 
We shall find that axiomatic theories, about sets of such 
comparisons, such as those of the Suppes tradition, go 
beyond the evidence of recognition, which requires its own 
distinct theoretical foundation. There are, therefore, at 
least two levels of theory to be analysed in measurement.
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Enclosure and contiguity
Special treatment is given to two specified 
figures which are taken as fundamental for all récognitive 
theories, as part of their metatheoretical definition.
These are the figures of 'enclosure' (of one ident in 
another), and 'contiguity' (or 'touch'), understood to be 
recognized solely by the distribution of boundary-deter­
mining characters in space, without any further theoreti­
cal commitment with respect to the recognized configurative 
characters. (No additional commitment was, for example, 
needed to recognize both cupboard and curtain as touching 
both wall and floor; but only to judge the means of sup­
port justifying the use of 'on' in each case.) Each of 
these is a binary figure, to be analysed, like all binary 
figures, in terms of a partial function associating chosen 
pairs of idents with the relevant binary character in each 
case. (It will not, in practice, be necessary to deal in 
this study, formally or in any depth, with n-ary figures 
of higher order than the binary.)
C. Attention and Neglect
Lastly, before launching a more formal exposition 
of my analysis, 1 must try to clarify further the notion 
of attention, which, with its complementary notion of 
neglect, is to form the intuitive principle underlying its
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organization. So far as I know, the attempt to make such 
central use of this rather familiar pair of concepts - 
linked with that of relevance in context - is unique to 
this study. Philosophers may, I think, have fought shy 
of placing too much reliance on it, because of its threat 
to raise the spectre of motivation, or other unruly psycho­
logical factors. The claim here is, however, that what­
ever the psychological origins of the structure of attention 
and neglect, the form this structure takes is expressible 
in terms of the elements of the resulting conceptual frame­
work as a selection from all those which we may imagine to 
be present in the situation under study: if other elements
are present, they are neglected in the subject’s own
understanding of the context, as discriminated from the
•>
total situation, and should therefore also be neglected 
in our metatheoretical account of that understanding.
This approach to the structure of attention in 
understanding does not involve a crudely "behaviourist" 
claim that psychological factors do not exist apart from 
this structure, or that no psychological theories of 
particular structures of attention can be validly construc­
ted, or that I am wrong in thinking that I usually know 
more or less what my motives are for attending to some 
aspects of my experience and neglecting others. The claim 
is only that, although each person’s understanding of any 
context is necessarily subjective, their selection of 
features for attention can be studied independently of
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psychological theories; and, when so studied, exhibits 
certain general structural principles. Groups of people, 
in reaching an understanding of what they take to be the 
same context, can use evidence of each others' selection 
of items for attention - from their use of language, or 
other indicative action - to work towards a common under­
standing, without necessarily sharing psychological moti­
vation. Similarly, we can construct a metatheoretical 
analysis of such a common understanding (or 'group récog­
nitive theory') without attending to psychological factors. 
(We shall see that a similar dispensation of neglect, to 
that applied to the selection of elements for attention, 
extends to the structures of theoretical commitment adopted 
by members of a group, governing the coherence or otherwise 
of the total understanding of the context.)
Without knowing why anyone would want to count 
the number of swans, say, on the Thames, on a particular 
June day, we can predict that, in the context of his 
counting, he will neglect just the following features of 
his experience on that day:
(a) all features but rivers and birds;
(b) all rivers but the Thames;
(c) all characters of birds except those which distin­
guish swans from other birds.
'Neglect' does not, of course, mean an absolute 
denial of existence; it merely absolves us from including 
in the counter's theory of the context any positive suppo­
sitions of the existence of neglected features (entities
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or properties). Some of his decisions - such as what he 
counts as swans (say, cygnets or not), or as being ’on 
the Thames' (in terms of boundaries on the banks, at 
junctions with tributaries or the sea, or in the air-space 
above) - and how precise he tries to be, will depend on 
his motivation, and perhaps also on his theoretical commit­
ments about the behaviour of swans. We can neglect the 
first in our metatheory, but not the second, if his com­
mitments are relevant to the coherence of his understanding 
of his task. If his decisions appear inconsistent, we 
can criticise his theory of the context without necessarily 
impugning his motives.
Contexts of measurement, as we shall see, are 
constructed so as to restrict and define the field of 
attention, and regulate precisely the degree of tolerance 
of neglect, to a point determined by motivations in each 
case. The rigour of definition is, amongst other things, 
a means of minimizing discrepancies due to vagaries of 
motivation, so that they can be neglected in the result.
Attention and neglect are also highly relevant 
to the intuitive basis for the temporal structure of con­
texts, as understood here. Our attention to any parti­
cular context is typically intermittent. It would be 
highly unrealistic, therefore, to assume continuity of 
recognition through time for the general case. If we are 
to achieve a thorough understanding of the role of measure­
ment - not only of time, but of any quantity which changes
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over time - this aspect must be brought into our account. 
Take, for example, a research physicist leaving home for 
work. At home, he may operate a number of contexts, of 
which some may be shared with wife or children, built 
around one aspect or another of the maintenance of life 
or the pleasures of living, special interests in politics, 
art, religion, sport, and so on. His journey to work 
will involve his attention to one or more different con­
texts, of which some may be shared with random selections 
of bystanders or fellow travellers, and others private to 
himself. At work, he may enter a context of sustained 
attention needing a rigorous framework of common under­
standing within a small group of trained colleagues, 
where boundaries of phenomenal discrimination in space 
and time are sharply drawn for all members of the group, 
so that readings and findings may be strictly binding on 
them all.
During the day, his attention shifts from one 
context to another. There may be interruptions, when 
demands related to a different context break into a period 
of sustained attention. Conceptually, however, the time- 
structures of different contexts are typically understood 
as running continuously in parallel with one another, more 
or less independently. Some may be constructed with 
minimal time-intervals which are vaguely bounded and may 
be days, years, or centuries long; in others, time-marking
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events may be sharply distinguished, with minimal measured 
intervals down to fractions of a second which are only 
recognizable by reference to recording devices whose dis­
crimination is finer than that of unaided perception. 
Continuous space or time intervals for each context are 
typically constructed hypothetically, within the relevant 
theories, on the partial, discontinuous evidence available 
within the space-time limits of actual attention to that 
context. (This is generally so even where there are no 
interruptions from other contexts.)
The strongest claim that can plausibly be made 
is that to the extent that anyone's understanding of 
experience at any time i^ organized, it can be analysed 
as organized according to some scheme expressible as a 
coherent theory, however simple. Imagine our physicist 
kidnapped as he leaves the lab late one night. He is 
knocked out, and comes to in a small, featureless room, 
which is almost completely dark. His experience at that 
moment is very poor in recognizable elements on which he 
can construct a context. He may search memory or fantasy 
for contexts to which these few elements (including those 
of self-perception) can be related. But during this 
period of confusion he cannot be said to be operating any 
context. In the absence of a coherent context, we may 
say that rational thought or action is impossible. Con­
texts of measurement belong near the opposite end of a 
spectrum of relative coherence in construction.
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To reflect this intuitive structure, with as 
little idealisation as is consistent with forming a coherent 
metatheory, the time-structure of Recognition Theories is 
to be analysed as a 'sequence' of 'frames', whose duration 
(if any) is left to autonomous decision under the instan­
tiating theory for each context. A récognitive frame 
(or *R-frame') is defined as a structure of characterization 
within which no change of assignments of characters to 
idents is recognized. Since we are only concerned with 
changes which are attended to, the duration of the R-frame 
may be as long or as short as the attention/neglect policy 
of the instantiating theory requires - or, if so required, 
it may be treated for the theory as an 'instant', whose 
duration is neglected. Unobserved intervals between R- 
frames - again, if any - must be filled in with the aid 
of commitments of the theory.
Some problems of analysis are connected with the 
successive appearance in different contexts of what may or 
may not be "the same" entities, properties or concepts, 
especially where the same verbal forms are associated with 
them in each context. For example, our physicist may use 
the word "heat" in both domestic and scientific contexts: 
but the way he recognizes it, the types of phenomenal effect 
he connects with it, the account he would give of its 
nature, or of the meaning or reference of the word, may 
differ widely as between the two contexts. The question 
may be asked whether he is speaking of the same entity, or 
property, in each case. Problems of this kind present
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themselves in a somewhat different perspective in this 
study from that, for example, of linguistic analysis, 
since the contexts with which I am dealing are primarily 
perceptual, and identity a matter of perceptual recog­
nition, for which questions of verbal meaning or reference 
are secondary. Nor would I wish to say, with the oper- 
ationalist, that the recognition of identity resides in 
the means by which it is recognized. Identity will be 
located in the framework of the theory within which recog­
nition takes place.
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II. A GENERAL THEORY OF CONCRETE CONTEXTS
Theoretical Structure
Three levels of theory will be distinguished in 
this study:
(1) Récognitive Theory (R-theory): the structure of 
understanding in terms of which the individual human perceiver 
(to be called the Reader) interprets those elements in per­
ception to which he attends in any context. A structure
of Group-R-theory (GR-theory) will be defined, intended 
to capture the form of understanding of perception by any 
group of persons associated by perception (including that 
of language) with a common concrete context. The term 
"concrete" is used to distinguish contexts dominated by a 
concern with the understanding of perception in this way: 
it will be omitted except for emphasis or the avoidance 
of ambiguity, since we shall be dealing almost exclusively 
with such contexts.
A context for this study is defined as a set of 
R-theories and a GR-theory adopted as a coherent whole by 
any group of persons. A degree of idealisation is, of 
course, involved, and will be discussed in the analysis.
(2) Contextual Theory (C-theory): the fundamental theory
proposed in this study for the analysis of contexts. C- 
theory is therefore presented as a metatheory of R-theories 
(including GR-theories); which are regarded as instances 
of C-theoretical structures. The language of C-theory
is thus the main part of the language of this study: the
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languages of particular R-theories will be discussed in 
the analysis, and will be as clearly as possible distin­
guished from non-linguistic elements and aspects of R- 
theories. These last are taken to be the primary con­
stituents of R-theories, epistemologically prior to 
their linguistic elements and aspects.
The term ’C-theory' will often be used to distin­
guish the special approaches or commitments of this study 
from those attributed to other sources.
(3) Substantive Theory (S-theory): empirical theory, at
least partly concerning elements of R-theories, adopted by 
Readers in association with these theories, and giving rise 
to commitments going beyond the immediate evidence of per­
ception. C-theory itself adopts no general commitments 
regarding the borderlines between S- and R-theory, which 
are taken to be matters for autonomous decisions by Readers 
themselves in particular contexts, as to what counts as 
perceptual evidence on which S-theoretical commitments may 
be raised. It is, however, taken to be typical of con­
crete contexts in general that well-established systems of 
S-theory become, in course of experience, incorporated into 
R-theories by Readers for whom they have become matters of 
background knowledge. For example, in the light of 
experience of the changing colours of fruits as they ripen, 
we come to recognize particular kinds simply as ripe, or 
not: though this cannot strictly be seen, and the theore­
tical status of the commitment is attested by the possible
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conflict between prediction and fresh experience. An 
important part of the analysis will concern examples of 
the use of this principle of incorporation in contexts of 
measurement (Part III) .
The structures of R-theories and GR-theories
In accordance with the intuitive analysis of the 
structure of recognition given above (introduction, pp. 19-42) 
an R-theory will be analysed as a sequence of récognitive 
frames, perceived by a Reader of the context as succeeding 
one another in time. Each such frame will contain, as 
elements, two distinct but closely associated fundamental 
sets: a set of spatially bounded entities, the idents; and
the set of properties, the characters, assigned to the 
idents (or pairs of idents) by autonomous decision of the 
Reader in the context. I shall also define a set of 
entities called composites formed from subsets of the set 
of idents, each of which is recognized, in any one frame, as 
a whole of which the members of the subset are parts.
The frames are distinguished in that no recognized 
change of character-assignment occurs within them, while 
each frame is distinguished from its predecessor by at 
least one change of character-assignment.
Commitments of R-theory are analysed as of two 
main kinds: structural commitments according to which
certain characters are recognized, within any frame, as
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determining particular relationships between idents; and 
implicative commitments according to which assignments of 
some characters are assumed dependent on assignments of 
others. The latter are shown to be intimately bound up 
with structures of assignment of the relevant characters 
over successive frames of a sequence.
A GR-theory will be analysed as having a form 
similar to that of an individual R-theory, being struc­
turally associated with a specific set of such theories, 
with an important role for the language of the particular 
context.
The steps in the formal exposition of C-theory, 
as a metatheory of particular instantiating R- and GR- 
theories for all concrete contexts, are as follows:
A. The Récognitive Frame (R-frame).
B. Characteristic sets and composites (F-sets).
C. Some typical structural commitments for unary characters
D." Some typical structural commitments for binary charac­
ters (including position and ordering).
E. The Récognitive Sequence (R-sequence).
F . Sequential (implicative) commitments (including extra­
polation and induction).
G . Group R-theory (GR-theory); and the role of language 
in concrete contexts.
H. Some linguistic and semantic consequences.
J. Some abstract concepts in C-theory: non-affirmative
assignments, objectivity and empirical truth, error 
and falsity.
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Summaries appear at pp. 14-4* [ss. A - D) and (ss. E - F) 
A general theory of measurement, as a special class of R- 
theoretical contexts described by C-theory, follows in 
Part III.
Notes on symbolism used
Although the elements of R-theories, interpreted 
as values of variables in C-theoretical formulae, are non- 
linguistic (unless otherwise specified), the ordinary 
system of logical symbols will be used throughout. It 
will be claimed that these symbols, so used, can be given 
their normal meaning, as restricted to this particular 
domain of application, which concerns structures of non- 
linguistic perceptual recognition, and includes commitments 
of R-theory (such as those of implication or existence) 
governing such structures. Some justifications of this 
claim will be offered in relation to specified forms of 
récognitive structure, as the C-theoretical language for 
their specification is developed. Some deeper aspects 
of the claim, and its consequences for the application of 
logic to empirical contexts, will be considered in Part IV.
The logical symbols used will be: implication;
double implication or logical equivalence; ”] , negation; 
=, identity of instantiation in all R-theories; in no
R-theory will the connected formulae be instantiated by the
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identical structure; “ j^f» the preceding expression is 
introduced as a typographical abbreviation of the suc­
ceeding one. I shall use normal quantification by V, 
the connectives a and; v , (non-exclusive) or; , the 
succeeding formula follows logically from previous for­
mulations (specified where necessary); and the set- 
membership symbol, e. The symbolsc,^ ,U »H , will be 
used solely for set inclusions, union and intersect, and 
0 for the empty set; PS, the power set of subsets of S.
I must emphasize that all logical symbols are 
to be understood, unless otherwise stated, strictly as 
symbols of C-theory denoting elements in the logical 
structures of instantiating R-theories. C-theory itself 
is purely descriptive. In particular, all implications 
described by the use of or are to be read solely
as constituting commitments adopted by particular Readers 
under their R-theories of the context in each case; not 
as overriding commitments of C-theory or as independent 
logical truths of whatever sort. A special note on the 
effect of this stipulation on the use of the expression 
' 1 (3 •••)* appears on pp. 6 6 ff.
A. The R-frame
The R-frame is constituted of (1) a structure of 
assignments of characters to idents and pairs of idents, 
the assignment structure; and (2) a whole/part structure 
of idents defined under a concept of composition, the com­
posite structure.
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(1) The Assignment Structure
An assignment structure F* is a septuple 
(5 ,C,C2 ,£,£2 such that:
Al. S = {a, b, X, y, . . .}: a finite non-empty set
of idents recognized spatially-bounded entities);
A2. C = {A, B, P, Q, a finite non-empty set
of (unary) characters (recognized properties of idents); 
A3. C2 = {ot, 3, n, T, ...}: a finite non-empty set
of binary characters (or, 2-characters : recognized
properties assigned to pairs of idents in S by £2);
A4. f is a function from S into the power set PC. We
may say that £ assigns to each x in S a unique subset 
f(x) = {P, Q, ...} of characters in C, and that each 
member or subset of f(x), as well as f(x) itself is 
assigned to x; conversely, that x is assigned f(x),
and each of its members or subsets.
2
A5. £2 is a partial function from S into PC2 so that
(Vx, y)(x, y E S » f2 (x, y)S C2).
(Abbreviations : the following are introduced here to
simplify the typography of succeeding definitions and expo­
sitions: P/x P £ f(x); PQ/x =^£ P £ f(x) A Q e f(x);
a/x,y =^£ a £ f2 (x,y); C*/x =^£ C  C  f(x);
C'C'/x =^£ C  C  f(x) A C" C  f(x).
Note that these formulae have the logical form of conditions
of membership or inclusion of subsets of the sets of 
characters C, C2, and not of predicative propositions whose
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subject is the ident x. Hence the use of a distinctive 
abbreviation rather than the usual prepositional forms Px 
or P(x), etc. Their relationships to such propositions 
will be discussed in due course.
Terminology: The ordered pair ^x, y^ such that a/x,y is
2
called an a-configuration; and the set d C S of all a- 
configurations is called the g-figure.) (see note (c)).
A 6 . (VP)( 3 X)(P/x)
In all cases C2 contains the fundamental 2-characters n , t, 
with the following properties.
A7. fi is the enclosure figure, defined on n e C2 , such
that for all a, b, c:
(i) n/a,b A p/b,a a = b ;
(ii) n/a,b A n/b,c ^ n/a,c; 
and, writing -p/a,b “| (^c)(p/c,a A n/c,b) ...AD 1
(iii) n/a,b v n/b,a v -n/a, b v (3 c)(n/c,a a p/c,b
A (Vd)(n/d,a A iq/d,b ^ p/d,c)
(iv) There is a maximal ident m’^ e 5 such that 
(Vx) (x E 3 n/x,m^). N.B. By. (i) , |—  (Va) (a e S n/a,a);
and by ADI, |—  -p/a,% -p/b,a, i.e., a and b exclude
one another.
Terminology: Each instance of n/a,b is understood to mean
that a is recognized as spatially enclosed in b : read,
'a is enclosed in b ' , ' a is-ija b ', or 'b encloses a'. We 
may also say that a is an enclosure of b . (see notes (c) 
and (d)).
A8. t is the contiguity figure, defined on t e C2, such
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(i) T/a,a 
(ii) T/a,b ^  T/b,a 
(iii) T/a,b ( ' j e )  (n/a,c a n/b,c a (r/a,c v T/b,c)
(iv) n/a,b A -n/b,c a T/a,b a T/b,c 
Terminology: Each instance of T/a,b is understood to mean
that a is recognized as sharing some part of its spatial 
boundary with b : read, ’a touches b ’. (See note (d)).
(2) The Composite Structure
The C-theoretical account of whole/part compo­
sition involves the definition, with respect to the set S 
of idents, of a set of composites of sets of idents:
by means of an extension of the domain of assignment under
2
f2 , for the 2-characters n> t, from pairs in S to pairs 
in S X S X S , and X as follows :
A9. The membership of the composite set is given by: 
(U) z iff (U) is the composite of the non-empty
set S, such that:
(i) (Vx)(t/x,(U) -fr*-»- (3a) (a e U a r/x,a))
(ii) (Vx) (n/x, (U) ++ (3 a) (a e U A p/x,a))
(iii) (Vx)(n/(U),x 4-4. (Va) (n/a, (U) 4. n/a,x))
(iv) (3x)(n/x,(U) A n/(U),x).
We also define exclusions for composites by:
-n/x, (U) ^  (Va) (a e U -p/a,x) .
N.B. n/x,(U) A n/(U),x -► ( 3  a) (a e U a n/x,a a n/a,x);
I—  X = a. So X satisfying condition (iv) is a member of 
the component set ti of (ti). It will be called the bound-
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ident of U or of (U): written x = (2). We say that (Ü)
is composed of the members of U, which are its components. 
Bearing in mind that for all a, T/a,a - which is to be 
read as saying that the boundary of each ident is deter­
mined by this contiguity-figure at every point of its 
recognition - condition (i) is taken to determine that a 
composite shares all recognized boundaries of its components, 
in that whatever touches a component touches the composite, 
and conversely. This is taken to justify an assumption 
that to recognize a composite is in principle to recognize 
its bound-ident. A full note on composite structure 
follows in note (f).
(5) The R-frame
AlO. A récognitive frame (R-frame) is a pair F = (F*, S^^) 
such that the composite set consists entirely of com­
posites of sets of idents recognized in the assignment 
structure F*.
We shall see that in most instances the structure 
of an R-frame is restricted by one or more commitments of 
the associated R-theory, for which typical forms will be 
defined. The frame (generally so called, in the absence 
of ambiguity) may also be enriched, especially in contexts 
of measurement, by the recognition of a positional function 
II, to be defined below (Section C(3)): yielding specific
positional characters in C with respect to recognized 
figures as defined in A5.
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Notes on the R-frame
(a) Language of illustrations and examples. In order to 
bring out the intuitive meanings of various aspects of the 
analytical treatment throughout the study, illustrative 
examples will be given in ordinary language. Double 
quotation markes "..." will be used to signal the use of 
terms to evoke types of idents, characters, etc., in illus­
tration of typical R-theories, as elements of non-linguis­
tic recognition, rather than as terms either of C-theory
or of the language of the context.
(b) Uniqueness of f(x) for each x (A4) is to be understood 
as the condition that idents are only distinguishable as 
such where character-differences are recognized. This 
has one consequence which may appear at first counter­
intuitive: that where a number of spatially-bounded entities
are recognized which are not distinguishable from one 
another by unique characters (say, a "pile" of "bricks"), 
such entities are not to be analysed as so many distinct 
idents, but as constituting, all together, a single spa­
tially-disconnected ident. Such disconnected idents also 
occur as the bound-idents of certain composites, a case 
which will be considered below.
In many cases, where the majority of disconnected 
enclosures of such an ident are indistinguishable as dis­
tinct idents enclosed in it, any one may exhibit a special 
character which we may call a mark (such as a crack or a
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patch of untypical colour), by which it acquires unique 
characterization and recognition as an ident. Such a 
mark may, indeed, be put on it for the purpose. Marks 
may not only distinguish particular idents, but also 
configurations or composites, made up of several idents 
which thereby acquire unique characterizations (such as a 
"course of bricks", one or more of which may be marked). 
Counting, from a particular recognized boundary or mark, 
may be used to pick out otherwise unmarked enclosures 
uniquely. This involves the notion of a series of confi­
gurations in a serial figure - to be defined below (C13). 
Pointing may act as a mark by setting up a configuration 
consisting of a finger and a particular enclosure to be 
picked out. A series of marks may be constructed along a 
countable series of enclosures determined by a serial 
figure. No general account is likely to cover all pos­
sible cases of recognitions of disconnected idents or the 
uses of marks: but certain particular types of structure
of these kinds will be analysed in more detail for measure­
ment contexts.
(c) Figure and Relations. -Only binary figures, based on 
the recognition of 2-characters, have been defined above 
for the R-frame; although, as indicated in the intro­
duction (p.36f), it is supposed that n-ary figures of 
higher cardinality are commonly recognized. For example, 
we may regard the "human-shaped" figure as a set of 6-ary 
configurations of trunk, head and limbs, including non-human
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members like ginseng or mandrake roots. Any formal 
reduction of such figures to complexes of binary figures, 
even if possible, fails to capture the essential intuition 
in such a case. For the purposes of the present study, 
however, the definition of a number of different types of 
binary figures will be found adequate for the analysis of 
a wide range of contexts, including all those of measure­
ment.
The set C 2 of binary characters is by implication 
non-empty, since it always contains Y] and T; like C , S , 
and consequently 5 ,  it is defined finite since no one can 
recognize (though they may conceive) an infinite number of 
characters (or idents) in a concrete context. The figures 
f] and ^ have been taken as fundamental to all recognition 
in concrete contexts, since they are claimed to capture the 
essential properties of enclosure and contiguity inherent 
in the recognition of ident-boundaries; these being deter­
mined by differences in recognized unary characters [in C ) 
as distributed in space, which are thereby assigned to 
idents on either side of each boundary so determined. A 
full account of this aspect is given in note (d) below. The 
most obvious cases of figures are those recognized visually, 
in terms of the spatial disposition of their components, 
just as we may recognize relatively complex unary characters 
like "ring-" or "pear-shaped". But, as was indicated in 
the introduction, figures may be recognized in other sen­
sory modes: configurations may be recognized, for example,
in terms of the perceived weights, warmths, or colours of
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their components. Examples of what will be called 
comparison-figures in these modes will be discussed in 
depth below.
It was also pointed out that the recognition of 
a configuration creates the conditions for the recognition 
of more than one relation, in the standard sense; but 
that the question which, if any, of the relations generated 
by a particular configuration recognized in a particular 
context is attended to, is determined by the motivation of 
the Reader in each case. - This will be analysed only in 
terms of the logical consequences, in the relevant R- 
theory, of the particular recognition; and these will be 
shown as analysable in terms of specifiable types of 
commitment of the theory, making some recognitions depen­
dent on others. The commitments defined for the figures 
of enclosure and contiguity by the axioms A7, 8 are funda­
mental examples. These figures are also typically recog­
nized visually; but they can also be recognized, for 
example, by touch; someone or something may be heard as 
inside a room or building; something may be even smelt as 
inside a box or cupboard, which itself may be only felt 
(in the dark, or by a blind person).
The anti-symmetry of t], and the symmetry of ?, 
reflect their intimate involvement in the system of deter­
mination of the boundaries of idents. Both are also 
reflexive: all other figures with which we shall be con­
cerned are irreflexive, i.e., they relate only pairs of
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different idents. No ident can be recognized as "to the 
left of", "larger, warmer, or louder than", itself.
Indeed, no sense can be made of comparing an ident with 
itself in terms of size, warmth, loudness, or any other 
comparative character. Binary characters may have a 
number of other properties, in addition to asymmetry, 
restricting their assignment to pairs of idents. These 
aspects will be discussed below, following definitions of 
the relevant types of structural commitments. Apart from 
and (^, no binary character is fundamental to the recog­
nition of idents in general; though others may help, as 
we shall see, in fixing the identities of particular idents.
(d) Enclosure, contiguity (ff, T ) and boundaries.
A simple diagram, below, will be used to illus­
trate some of the more fundamental aspects of the analysis 
of figures and relations of enclosure and contiguity, in a 
context of the characterizations of the relevant idents.
Three alternative descriptions 
of the diagram will be given, using dif­
ferent types of character-recognition. 
The diagram is not offered as an illus­
tration of typical configurations in 
particular R-theories, but as a set of
—  characterized idents to be immediately
Diagram 1
recognized: the descriptions in the
table belong, in each case, to the language of an R-theory 
of the diagram.
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Each of the three descriptions are taken as 
independently adequate for the recognition of three idents 
from the diagram, so that each could form an independent 
R-theoretical reading of it. But the three descriptions 
are reconcilable, as determining what, under a fourth, 
comprehensive R-theory, would be recognized as the same 
set of three idents, a, b, and c. (The idents are not so 
marked on the diagram, or distinguished other than by their 
descriptions.) The comprehensive R-theory could either 
be a Group-R-theory operated by three different Readers of 
the context, each providing one of the descriptions; or 
it could be operated by a single Reader assigning different 
characterizations successively (in three R-frames following 
one another in time) or contemporaneously (in a single R- 
frame).
Reading by Ident a Ident b Ident c





The area with one 
square and one 
round boundary
2. Colour The black area 















The area bounded 
by P and Q
Attention is now drawn to the following points:
(i) Note the distinction between surrounding (description
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2 (c)) and enclosing (1 (a)).
(ii) We have already discussed the use of marks to dis­
tinguish idents (above, p. 56 , note (b)). The 'marked 
boundary' method of description (3) introduces a variation, 
where the mark is used to distinguish one or more idents by 
characterizing their boundaries. In such a case the mark 
is not to be analysed either as part of any ident- whose 
boundary it marks, or of the boundary itself; the space
it occupies, whether enclosed in the ident (3(b)) or not 
(3(c)) is neglected. Such a use is common in measurement 
in which they may or may not be enclosed. In any case, a 
mark is always to be analysed as a character, whether or 
not a boundary-character (i.e., a character used to dis­
tinguish a boundary).
(iii) More generally, a character which, in some sense, 
is assignable only to part of an ident, is frequently used 
to characterize the whole ident without, necessarily, 
involving the recognition of the part exhibiting the 
character as a distinct ident. Description 2a would 
describe a, even if there were no theory of the context 
recognizing b or c as distinct idents.
A more naturalistic example (in both senses) is 
the common description of the robin as "red-breasted": 
it plainly characterizes the whole robin, and not the 
breast, which is not normally thought of as a separate 
entity. If the breast were to be picked out in this way, 
it would be called not "red-breasted" but "red". (Before
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leaving the linguistic aspect, I suggest that the locution, 
"the robin has a red breast", would not affect the matter 
by introducing the apparently referring noun, "breast".
The information given and received by both locutions would 
normally be the same.)
It may be instructive to mention a possible con­
text in which a relevant theory would pick out the breast 
in this way: an ethological experiment in which a male
robin, in breeding condition and in his breeding territory, 
is presented with
(1) a normal stuffed robin
(2) a stuffed robin with the breast discoloured
(3) a red object of roughly the right size but 
attached to a shapeless lump of material.
The expected result is that the robin will attack
(1) and (3) but not (2), supporting the (non-récognitive) 
theory that the robin reacts to the red breast and not to 
the bird or bird-shaped object. So the breast, here, is 
a distinct entity to which the experimenter's récognitive 
theory of the context attends as such. The fact that it 
forms part of the boundary of the bird, or other ident, is 
not specifically relevant to its role as distinguishing, 
or identifying, character. Generally, identifying charac­
ters may be of many kinds, not necessarily recognized in 
every part of the ident, nor especially in its boundary.
The idea that we may distinguish a property in part of an 
entity (or, indeed, part of more than one entity) without
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distinguishing that part as a different entity, seems 
intuitively reasonable, and will prove useful in our 
analysis, especially of marks and boundaries. But such 
an idea will be unfamiliar to readers of many earlier 
analyses. For example, in Lesniewsky's mereological 
analysis (Luschei 1962), every part of a whole is repre­
sented in the theory, as a distinct element, whether or 
not it is perceptually distinguishable, or actually dis­
tinguished. Goodman, in his Structure of Appearance 
(1951)., distinguishes as a different entity whatever 
appears differently. Again, topological analysis makes 
a point of distinguishing boundaries from the entities 
they bound, and entities which do from those which do not 
include their own boundaries (as closed or open sets).
It may be claimed equally plausible, at least for the 
analysis of perceptual recognition, that we identify the 
boundaries of an "open" space, such as a "room", with those 
of the entities such as "walls" which bound it. In any 
case, an analysis which distinguishes boundaries as entities 
which are themselves bounded is in danger of vicious 
regress.
Note that descriptions 2(b) and 2(c) provide an 
example of a boundary recognized as a locus of discrimi­
nation between colour-characters uniform over the whole of 
each ident, and not by any specific boundary-character.
The essential point, for C-theory, is that, for each pair 
of distinct idents, there must in principle exist at least
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one character of the R-theory in each frame which is 
assigned to one and not to the other, in such a way as to 
determine the boundary between them. We have seen, also, 
that this boundary need not even be continuous; an ident 
may consist of any finite number of disconnected spatial 
enclosures, without these enclosures being recognized as 
distinct idents.
Contiguity, defined in terms of the sharing of 
boundaries, can only be understood in the context of the 
idea that idents may share parts. Axiom A7(iii) requires 
that, if any shared part encloses space, it is recognized 
as an ident: but, however vague a boundary at which two
idents are distinguished, any space it may enclose is neg­
lected. It has already been indicated (p.33 ) that the 
boundaries at which idents are distinguished need be no 
sharper - though they must be no less sharp - than the 
instantiating R-theory requires. The fundamental cri­
terion for adequate sharpness is just that axioms Al, 2, 4 
are satisfied, so that characters are unequivocally assigned 
to distinct idents on either side.
However, in the R-frame as defined, not all 
boundaries necessarily divide one ident from another.
The space determined for the context itself, by recog­
nition of the boundaries of its maximal ident m (A7(iv)), 
is inherently limited. Only elements within these boun­
daries are attended to, the remainder of space being neg­
lected. Similarly, within these boundaries, only the
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space occupied by recognized idents, as characterized, is 
attended to; typically, large parts of the space enclosed 
by m are neglected (see next note). The boundary between 
an ident and neglected space is subject only to the same 
criteria for adequate sharpness as that between two idents; 
namely, that recognized characters are unequivocally 
assigned to the ident so bounded. Recall, incidentally, 
that any such ident, or the maximal ident itself, may be 
spatially disconnected.
(e) Neglect and complementarity
The effect of the normal restriction of the scope 
of quantifiers to elements of the theory under analysis 
(in this case the idents and characters of any instantiating 
R-theory) is to be understood as strictly governed by the 
limits of attention of the Reader in context. So, where 
the negation sign”| appears before the existential quanti­
fier ^ , (as in the abbreviative definition ADI, p.53 , 
what is being denied is not necessarily the presence of any 
entity or property which might possibly be perceived or 
supposed to satisfy the stated conditions; but merely that 
any such entity or property is attended to as an element of 
the R-theory. In other words, it may be read as saying 
that either no such element is present, or, if such an 
element is present, it is neglected. Obviously the decision 
of any Reader to neglect the possible presence of any ele­
ment satisfying any given condition lays his theory open 
to failure as an understanding of the context; nevertheless.
67
it is an autonomous decision in the light of a rational 
consideration of the situation, and not subject to any 
general logical restriction (other than that on open self- 
contradiction) . In measurement contexts, as is well 
known, such decisions are made systematically under precise 
mathematical rules, which will be analysed in due course.
The formula"! (2] x) (#(%)) - where cj)(x) is any 
condition on x - is logically equivalent to (Vx)"](#(%)). 
But the truth of an instance of such a formula for any 
particular (p in any particular context is determined, in 
the first form, by a single decision of the Reader; and 
in the second, only by reference to every ident of the 
context. The first form will therefore be used in every 
case of the occurrence of such formulae in this study.
Such cases, which aim to formulate the main types of commit­
ment to neglect in R-theories, are few; but, as in ADI, 
important. Attention will be drawn to other cases as 
they occur (see pp. 85, 108, 145, 154).
Justifications for decisions to neglect possible 
elements of a context are of two kinds: (i) force majeure
- that such elements, if present, cannot be unequivocally 
recognized; (ii) irrelevance - that the presence of other­
wise of such elements has no logical consequences under the 
theory of the context, a matter which is intimately bound 
up with the motives for the construction of that theory.
In the first case, commitments of S-theory (going beyond 
the perceptible evidence) are often used to complete the 
relevant theoretical structure.
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The structure of neglect is reflected not only 
in explicit negations of existential commitments, but also 
in the lack of commitment to the existence of certain pos­
sible elements of the R-theoretical structure. This shows 
itself most pervasively for possible spatial complements of 
enclosed idents under n, contrasting with the automatic 
commitment to complementarity in the memberships of sets 
under e. Specifically, we are not committed to recognizing: 
(Va,b) (n/a,b a a  ^b (]]c)(n/c,b a -n/c,a)) 
whether or not we add the condition:
(Vd) (ri/d,b A -n/d,a ^  p/d,c) ; 
which would make c into the counterpart, for p , of the normal 
set-theoretical complement of a in b. This aspect of 
neglect has profound consequences for our analysis, as 
indicated in the introduction (pp. 3 8 ff). Commitments to 
spatial complementarity will be shown to depend on rela­
tively sophisticated constructions of R-theory, involving 
special characterizations of composites.
(f) Composition
The composite is not defined for every subset 
of idents in S, only for those whose composites are 
recognized as such. This condition is implicit in the 
existential quantifier on the last bracket in the defini­
tions A9(i), (ii) ; only those idents, sets and contiguity 
relations exist for the theory which are recognized, i.e., 
attended to, in context. All such recognitions depend on 
the associated recognitions of characters assigned to the
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relevant idents. A number of ways in which composition 
(i.e. the structure of composites) is determined by charac­
terization will be schematically defined in the following 
Sections. These will not be claimed as exhaustive, but 
will be found extremely versatile as frameworks for the 
analysis of a variety of contexts.
Many forms of composition are possible, since 
the definition does not restrict in any way the structures 
of enclosure or contiguity between the components. Two 
main types of structure are of special interest. Where 
the component set consists only of discrete, mutually 
excluded idents, the outer boundary of the composite is 
the totality of those of all the components. If we recog­
nize the composite of "all the swans on the pond", its 
boundary is just that of all the individual swans. In 
the contrasting case where all the components are enclosed 
in one member of the set, the boundary structure of the 
composite may be extremely complex. In a square diagram 
ruled into smaller squares, we may recognize the diagram 
itself as a member of the component set of the composite 
of "all the squares in the diagram"; but the set may 
include not only the smallest squares but many others which 
overlap or enclose one another. Similarly complex, and 
less regularly ordered, composites of this type will be 
considered later.
The key property of the bound-ident (3) (A9(iv)) 
is that whatever touches the composite either touches ®  >
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or a part of a boundary of another member of U not shared 
with CB), i.e., an internal boundary of the composite.
We shall say therefore that the boundary of x is the 
external boundary of the composite; and any part of any 
boundary of any member a e U which is shared with x is an 
external boundary of a (with respect to Ü). If the mem­
bers of U are disconnected, in the sense that none touches, 
overlaps or encloses another, the external boundary of the 
composite consists just of those of the members of the com­
ponent set, and no internal boundaries are recognized.
An ident, unlike a composite, may not have internal boun­
daries. Some elementary aspects of these structures are 
illustrated in diagram 2(a), below. Heavy lines indicate 
external boundaries, dotted lines internal ones, of the 
composite ({a,b,c,d,e,f,x}), where x is the (unmarked) 
bound-ident whose boundaries are just the heavy lines.
(a) (b)
Diagram 2
(The diagram is ambiguous as to whether b is 
enclosed in a or c, or not; and whether d encloses or 
surrounds e: autonomous decisions for any Reader of the
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context, and immaterial to the present purpose of the 
diagram.)
As regards the identity of composites, note that 
it does not follow from the axioms that (U) = (I/) U = I/. 
Diagram 2(b) gives a simple counterexample; {x,a} f {x,b}
- where x is again the unmarked bound-ident - but their 
composites are identical, under the axioms. Such cases 
are, however, rare, since few natural characterizations 
will yield structures like this. On the other hand, it is 
not uncommon for the same ident to bound two or more dif­
ferent composites; a "human body" may be seen as bounding 
a composite of "cells" or of "organs", or a "man-shaped" 
configuration of "head, trunk and limbs" - a figure which 
it may share with a mandrake root. However, these 
failures of identity are no embarassment to the theory of 
this study. As with idents, composites are not primarily 
recognized by their spatial structure: rather their
spatial structure is recognized from the dispositions of 
recognized characters in space. If two different charac­
ter sets determine the identical set of idents in any con­
text, they determine the same composite (if any). The 
theoretical interest of such cases was mentioned above 
(introduction, p. 30) , where it was cited against the 
policy of identifying properties with sets of entities.
These considerations give a central role to 
uniformly characterized sets of idents, and their composites, 
broadly corresponding to a concept of recognized classes. 
Since they do not necessarily occur in all R-frames, they
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are not analysed as elements in the basic structure of the 
frame; they form our first major construction on the basis 
of the frame.
B. Characteristic Sets and Composites CF-sets)
Although all idents, configurations and compo­
sites are, as we have said, recognized by virtue of their 
characterizations, the term characteristic composite will 
be restricted to the case where recognition of a composite 
is determined by a set C 'G  C of characters assigned to 
its component idents. Defining G  S by:
S^,=df {a:n/a,x a C ’/a} ... BDl
X  r  *1 Xthen, if and only if (S^,) e (i.e., is composed),
we write:
Fg, (x) = (S^,) ... BD2
N.B. h-r^.Cx) S; and (r^,(x)) = (S^,).
Initial comment on the rationale of the form of BD2, 
on which much will depend, is in note (c) below, p. 76. 
Terminology: is called the base set of F^,(x);
r ^ , ( x )  is called a F-set, being the C  - set on x ; (F^,(x)) 
is a F-composite, or the C-composite on x ; the members of 
r^,(x) are its F-components ; the members of 5^, are the 
C'-components of (I^,(x)); and or ^F^,(x)J is called
a F-bound, or the C-bound on x. C  is a F-determinant set.
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the determinant set of r^,(x); and where C' = {P^,
or {P}, we may write Pp , P^^x) or FpCx); in any case,
P e C' is a P-determinant character for P^,(x).
The following special cases are of interest:
(1) The P-set has been defined 'on' a variable ident x,
which may be put = m^ (the maximal ident). is then
the set of all idents recognized in context as character­
ized by C ; it will be written just 'S^,', wherever
appropriate. P^,, Pp are therefore the most general forms 
of characteristic sets, those of all C '- or P-characterized 
idents in context (and their P-bounds, whether or not so 
characterized: see below).
But the x-restricted form (defined on x) is at 
least as important in the analysis of concrete contexts.
It reflects, for example, the situation mentioned in a 
context of the counting of particular sets of idents 
(above, p.31. ), where many of the [^determinant characters 
of a set to be counted (such, e.g., as "whiteness" for 
"swans") may or may not be [^determinant, or otherwise 
attended to, outside the boundaries either of the composite 
itself (that of swans), or of some larger composite (say, 
that of "birds"). We shall call x the space-restrictive 
ident in such a case.
(2) If n/x,y, = {x}; otherwise (y) = 0.
Necessarily (on So, as we add members
to a P-determinant set, we tend to reduce the membership of 
the [^component set, until we reach the 'identifying' set 
f(x) for some x.
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(3) But cases often occur when a characteristic set has 
only one member, x, although its I-determinant set does not 
include every member of f(x). A very general case is 
given by the result:
(VP,x) ((3y) (Vz) (n/z,x A p/z + z = y) + PpCx) = {y}) . 
This is just the case where y is the only ident in x charac­
terized by P, but may be assigned any number of other 
characters, attended to on account of theoretical commit­
ments attaching to them: even if a swan is the only "white"
thing in a particular R-frame, it will not only be its 
whiteness which identifies it for us, if we are counting 
swans.
Notes on F-composites and F-sets
(a) Every subset 5'£  5 of idents in an R-frame is,
in principle, recognized; a fortiori, every subset 5^,, 
which may happen to be determined by the common assignment 
of any subset C ' S  C* of characters. By definition, how­
ever, nothing follows under an R-theory from the recog­
nition of any such set, unless the theory adopts some 
commitment for the set by virtue of its means of recog­
nition: i.e., its characterization. We shall find there­
fore that all commitments of R-theories are described in 
this study in terms of particular sets of characters for 
which they are adopted (including relational commitments
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defined on configurative characters). All commitments 
defined for a given set C^ are uniquely adopted just for 
the set of idents so determined (where relevant, with 
respect to a chosen space-restrictive ident). It will 
consequently be assumed that the recognitions of sets of 
idents as F-sets are restricted to those whose [^determi­
nant sets carry commitments of the R-theory of the context.
Nelson Goodman, in his Structure of Appearance 
(1951), showed some concern over the existence of what he 
called 'anomalous sums' amongst the permissible collections 
of the 'qualia'which formed the elements of his theoretical 
structure - such, perhaps, as the set of all swans and 
empty cigarette packets. (I shall generally use single 
quotes, '...', to mark technical terms used by other ana­
lysts.) These supposed anomalies gave him, in fact, no 
serious trouble; and the present analysis allows us to 
observe with confidence that they need not be expected to 
do so - they are generally, and properly, ignored. They 
break no rules, they are just boring: their structure as
sets is neglected.
(b) A more intuitive way of describing the recognition
of a set of idents as a F-set is to say that it is recog­
nized .a^__a__wh£l^ (to which a meaning is attributed, in 
terms of theoretical commitments applying to all of it).
But to recognize a set as a whole is not the same as per­
ceiving the whole of it. In this respect it does not 
differ from the recognitions of single idents, which, as
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has been said (e.g., p. 25), are almost without exception 
done on partial evidence. Just as a house is recognized 
as a whole from a view of its street frontage, so a 
characteristic set is typically recognized from the per­
ception of one or more of its members. The project of 
counting swans on the Thames starts with the recognition 
of one swan as a member of the set, whether or not the 
remainder are immediately perceived.
(c) r-bounds, F-sets, and base sets. Recall that, if a 
character-set(T* determines a set of idents, it determines 
a set of boundaries at which these idents are discrimi­
nated from all others in context. These are just the 
boundaries (external and internal) of a composite which, if 
recognized, has a component set consisting of this C-set 
itself, including the C'-bound (whether or not this is a 
member of the base set ). The question whether the
C-bound is a C'-component or not is, as we shall shortly 
see, a matter for decision under the commitments of the 
R-theory for each C'G C  whose I^composite is recognized. 
But, in either case, every part of the boundary of the 
C-bound necessarily coincides with part or all of the 
external boundary of at least one component. So to 
recognize a C-set is inevitably to recognize every part of 
its external boundary, i.e. of the boundary of its C^-bound, 
by virtue of just that characterization by which each of 
its members is recognized, and which carries any relevant 
commitment of the R-theory. This consideration completes 
the reasoning by which the definition of a F-set in terms
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of its composite, and so including its F-bound in every 
case, is justified.
The F-bound, so recognized, can easily be shown 
to be unique. Considering the case shown in diagram 2(a)
(p. 70), we see that once the ident x, bounded by the 
external boundaries of the members of the set {a, ..., f} 
(heavy lines), is recognized, no other bound-ident will 
satisfy the axioms of A9 for that set. Either it will 
fail to enclose {a, ..., f}; or it will enclose x - so 
failing to satisfy A9(ii), since x is not enclosed in any 
member of {a, ..., f}. The argument is completely 
generalisable, whether the relevant F-set is two-dimensional, 
as in the diagram, or one- or three-dimensional (it is 
assumed that no spaces of more than three dimensions are 
perceptually recognizable).
(d) It was pointed out that the diagram is ambiguous
with regard to the mutual enclosures of the members of the 
set {a, ..., f}. Three alternative characterizations of
the space bounded by x, which illustrate several points 
which have been raised, may be considered: (i) the set of
round areas, in which a, c both enclose b,and d encloses 
e; (ii) the set of unbroken areas (not intersected by 
recognized boundaries), in which a, c exclude b,and d 
surrounds, but does not enclose, e; (iii) the set of all 
outlined areas, which will include every member of set (ii) 
plus every composite of a subset of that set. (In set (i), 
c, for example, is intersected by part of the boundary of b.
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This part-boundary is an internal boundary of the composite, 
but not an internal boundary of c: it is not a boundary
of c at all.) Each description, by its characterization, 
generates a different F-set. We recognize these three 
sets, as described, as alternative decompositions of x.
Note, first, that the F-bound x is a member only of (iii), 
not being either round or unbroken. Secondly, under all 
three descriptions, the sets {a,c,d,f} and {b,e} are 
complementary in the set {a, ..., f}: but only under des­
cription (ii) can we form the spatial complements 
({a,c,d,f)) and ÇTb7e}j, in x as bound of the whole set. 
Fuller discussions of the relevance of F-bound membership 
of the base set, in relation to semantic analyses of 'mass' 
and 'count' terms, and to recognitions of the "same" 
character as assigned to different idents, is given at the 
end of the next Section (pp. 90 ff, (h), (j ) ) ; which 
introduces certain types of commitment involved in the 
recognition of ident-boundaries.
C. Some Typical Structural Commitments for Characters in
I have emphasized throughout (esp. pp. 55, 71) 
that the structure of the frame is determined by the recog­
nized distribution of characters in space. This pfimary 
role for character-recognition is realised in each parti­
cular frame by the Reader's autonomous choice of charac­
ters for attention; and his recognitions of particular
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sets of characters (alone or in combination) as having 
specific structural properties in context. It is claimed 
that, in spite of the evident variety of perceptual exper­
ience, schematic definitions of a few types of commitment 
with respect to sets of characters can be presented, in 
terms of which the vast majority, if not all, such recog­
nized structural properties can be analysed. Those given 
here will at least be found adequate for the analysis of 
all contexts of measurement discussed below (in Part III).
In the present Section I present those for charac­
ters in C (unary characters), which are most directly 
involved in boundary-recognition. In the next Section I 
shall present types of commitments for characters in C2 
(2-characters), which are involved in the recognitions of 
countable sets of idents, position, comparison and valu­
ation.
The five types of commitment schematized below are 
(1) separativity and (2) atomicity, for single character- 
sets; and (3) distinctivity, (4) exclusivity and (5) scala- 
rity for pairs of sets. The last is used to generate a 
concept of ’C-scale’, potentially involving any finite 
number of sets. (All definitions given in terms of sets 
C', C” ,, ... of characters in C are, of course, interpretable 
for unit sets of characters {P}, {Q}, ... .)
(i) One-place commitments: for all C'G C,
Cl. +[C']x (Va,b)(n/a,x a  q/b,x a  C'/a a  C'/b a  a b
-n/a,b)
(read, 'C' is separative on x').
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C2. Writing: n/a,b n/a,b A a  ^ b (read, 'a is a
proper enclosure of, or properly enclosed in, b ’; 
or, 'b properly encloses a ’):
(Va) (n/a,x A C'/a ^ l(j]b)(n/b,a)
(read, 'C' is atomizing on x'. a is called an 
R-atom of x).
(ii) Two-place commitments: for all C', C"C C,
C3. / [C',C"]x (Va,b)(n/a,x a  p/b,x a  C'/a a  C"/b + a / b)
(read, '(C',C") is a distinctive pair on x').
C4. //[C',C"]x (Va,b)(n/a,x a  p/b,x a  C'/a a  C"/b
-n/a,b)
(read, '(C',C") is an exclusive pair on x').
05. ^[C',C"]x =^£ (]]a,b)(n/a,x A n/b,x a  C'/a a  C"/b a  fi/b,a)
A (Va,b)(n/a,x a  p/b,x a  C'/a a C"/b
(p/b,a V -n/b,a)
(read, '(C',C") is a scalar pair on x '. In this case,
therefore, (C ,C") is an ordered pair).
06. ^fC',C"]x ^[C',C"]x A +[C']x A +[C"]x
(read, ' (C ,C") is a separative scalar pair on x').
(iii) The 0-scale:
07. C^£ pc is an n-ary 0-scale on x (written '^CC^,n]x') 
iff C^ has just n members C^, ..., C^c C such that 
(Vi,k)(n > i > k a 1 +
Ç
We also say that C is ordered by the relation
XCiACj^(^[Ci,Ck]x), which by 07 is transitive. (Note that
simple scalarity is not transitive; given C',C",C", and
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a,b,c in x, such that |CC, CTx a  |[C",C'"]x a  C'/a a  C"/b a C'"/c,
we have (ri/b,a v -n/b,a) a (n/c,b v -q/c,b) ; -n/c,b a p/b,a
permits that c shall overlap, or even (counterintuitively) 
enclose a. Nor does separativity for each of the two 
scalar pairs prevent this result. I do not think that any 
weaker form of C-scale is useful or interesting.)
Limits of scalarity. The upper limit of scalarity is set
only by the recognition of T^(x) for any C-scale
{C^, ..., C^} on X in context, which is of course autonomous.
But the limiting case, for the maximal ident m , given by 
r^l = {m^} implies a highly structured and simplified con­
text of little theoretical interest. The lower limit is 
set by R-atomicity, for which the following further schemata 
are relevant:
C8. KjTC',C"]x $[C',C"]x A K[C"]x
(read, *(C',C") is an atomizing scalar pair on x')
C9. Kj[cS,n]x j[C^,n]x a  K[C^]x
(read, 'C is an atomizing C-scale on x').
Notes on Structural Commitments for Unary Characters
(a) Each schema has been presented as a condition on
assignments of the relevant set or sets of characters, 
which carries a commitment attributing a structural pro­
perty; for which an equivalent abbreviative notation has 
been given in each case. Formally, each condition can be
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read either (i) as imposing a restriction on the assign­
ments of the relevant character-set(s), according to how 
the characterized idents are spatially related; or 
(ii) as imposing a restriction on how idents, assigned 
one or more of the relevant character-sets, may be recog­
nized as spatially related. In view of the stated primacy 
of character-recognitions (as governed by actual percep­
tual experience) it is the second reading which is 
intended to capture the structural role of these commit­
ments.
Structural commitments are not defined as consti­
tuents of the R-frame (nor of the R-sequence of frames).
It is assumed rather that the conditions defined for R- 
frame and -sequence are only satisfiable, in the circum­
stances of human perception, in a context of the adoption 
of one or more such commitments, according to which ident- 
boundaries are determined by recognition of characters.
Such commitments are, therefore, taken to be necessary con­
stituents of the R-theory of each Reader of a context, 
though many are adopted tacitly or even unconsciously.
(b) Space-restrictions and F-closure of commitments.
The considerations calling for the above schemata to be 
defined on a space-restrictive ident x (chosen for each 
commitment by Reader in context) are similar to those 
stated for the space-restriction of F-composites (above, 
p. 73). It has been argued that we do not, in general, 
recognize a character-set as F-determinant, unless some
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theoretical commitment is adopted for the set, as a whole, 
in context (above, ib.). The converse principle does 
not hold with the same generality, at least with respect 
to structural commitments. Counterexamples will be given 
below in relation to particular types of commitment. 
Broadly, the point is that structural commitments are 
necessary for the unequivocal recognitions of idents and 
composites in the first place; and only if further commit­
ments, important for the motives of the context, attach 
to particular character-sets, do we go on to recognize 
these as F-determinant.
However, the recognition of a character-set as 
F-determinant can be expected to add to the theoretical 
significance of any structural commitments adopted for the 
same set. Where a structural commitment is adopted for 
a character-set which is also F-determinant, we shall say 
that the commitment is F-closed. Again, the effects of 
F-closure on particular types of commitment will be dis­
cussed, with examples, below.
Plainly, if any commitment is adopted for a given 
C' on a given x, it holds for C  on any proper enclosure 
of X - including the C-bound on x, or the C'-bound on any 
proper enclosure of x on which the composite of any subset 
of the base set is recognized. Now, a space-restrictive 
ident x must be characterized like any other. It may be 
of interest that, while f(x) for space-restrictive x on 
any C-determined condition need have no character in
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common with C  ("the Thames" shares no characters with 
the r-determinant set for "swans" on the Thames), it may 
share some characters with C ; but it may not share all 
the same characters without ceasing to be space-restric­
tive. In such a case, x is identical with the C-bound 
on any space-restrictor in which x may be enclosed, 
including m^ ; since no [^^characterized ident recognized 
in context may lie outside it. In other words, if x is 
to be space-restrictive, f(x) must contain at least one 
character which restricts the scope of any commitment for 
C, or the recognition of C^-composites, by virtue of some 
structural commitment adopted for f(x). Some implications 
of this observation will be discussed below, but no attempt 
will be made to give a fuller analysis.
(c) Separativity and partitivity. Intuitively,
+ [CTx means, "any two C^-characterized enclosures of x 
exclude one another". It would apply to any adequate 
r-determinant set for "swans", since no two swans enclose 
or overlap one another. One can easily imagine a context 
in which the visible outlines of two or more swans become 
cnfused, say in poor light, but the recognition of two or 
more necks and heads carries a commitment of separativity 
whereby the number present can be counted. (In mammals, 
a fetus may be recognized as a distinct ident - F-component 
- surrounded, but not enclosed, by the mother). Separa­
tivity could not be adopted for "whiteness" in swans, in 
any context where white parts of their bodies were
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recognized as distinct, enclosed idents; say, their 
"necks". Separativity does not, on the other hand, pro­
hibit contiguity: e.g., "bricks" in a "pile" might be
separative, since no brick overlaps or encloses another, 
even if, neglecting any spaces between them, they were 
recognized as touching (a normal case).
Any r-determinant set C' for which separativity 
is r-closed necessarily determines a partition on the 
C-bound, in the usual sense: i.e., the C^-bound is com­
pletely composed of separate C^-characterized idents. In 
such a case we say C' is partitive on the C'-bound 
(written 'SCC']x*).
Partitivity could easily be adopted for either 
"swans" or "bricks" in suitable contexts; and is common 
in measurement. In counting "swans on the Thames" we 
might adopt separativity for "birds" in general as well 
as for swans, but recognize only swans as a F-set; sep­
arativity would then be F-closed only for swans, being 
thus partitive on that set, and so determining a strict 
count, not required for birds in general. Either "the 
Thames" or "birds on the Thames" would be a natural choice 
of space-restrictor.
Separativity plays an important role in the 
analyses of F-bound membership of the C'-set , and of 
spatial complementarity, both of which will be discussed 
fully later.
(d) Atomicity and neglect. ]x means, "any
entity enclosed in, or overlapping, any C'-characterized 
enclosure of x is neglected in context". Atomicity
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thus represents one of the few major types of systematic
neglect in recognition, as mentioned above (p.GG)* For
instance, we may choose not to attend to any "brick" part
of a "wall" which is smaller than "a brick", or involves
proper enclosures of bricks. It follows obviously that
if C* is atomizing, it is also separative, on any x; but
it is not necessarily F-closed, nor partitive. Some
recognized enclosures of our wall may not be made of
bricks. Hence the need to distinguish a further condition, 
O
to be written 'n [C] x ' , for the case where atomicity is 
F-closed for C  on x: is then called completely
atomizing on x.
In principle, since S is finite, and r\ is tran­
sitive, every ident which is not R-atomic encloses at least 
one R-atom; otherwise there is nothing to stop an infinite 
series of enclosures. But it does not follow that 
every part of the space of the context is atomized. If 
a is an R-atom and rj/a,b all potential idents in the space 
enclosed by b and not by a may be neglected; the space 
itself is not neglected, being part of the space recognized 
as characterized by f(b). But, if all idents in it are 
neglected, it is neither itself R-atomic (not being a 
distinct ident) nor encloses R-atoms. So, only F-closed 
atomizing character-sets are unequivocally completely 
atomizing within their F-bounds; hence the chosen term.
The special case where f(x) is uniquely atomizing 
on m^ for some x, so that x is a singleton R-atom, is 
plainly quite common. In counting swans, a pond on which
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there is only one swan may yield such a singleton, if we 
neglect its proper enclosures as distinct idents. Some 
simple contexts may be wholly analysable in terms of such 
singletons. But more interest attaches to richer con­
texts. In counting swans on the Thames, "birds", 
including swans, may be R-atomic, but only "swans" com­
pletely atomized. "The Thames" may have to be quite 
richly characterized, to decide just what waters are to 
be included in the count; but it is plainly not R-atomic, 
nor are R-atoms in the parts not occupied by birds likely 
to attract attention in context. More subtly, if we 
recognize a particular marked "brick" as R-atomic in a 
"wall" which contains many other bricks not separately 
recognized, the whole wall may indeed be characterized by 
many of the characters assigned to the marked brick; such 
characters could not then form an atomizing F-determinant 
set, but the mark-character would determine recognition 
of the brick as a singleton R-atom on the wall as space- 
restrictor.
In contexts of measurement, certain specified 
elements of the standard apparatus will be found invariably 
to be recognized as completely atomized; while data are 
commonly recognized as having a much less regular R-atomic 
structure. This, indeed, will emerge as one of the 
important distinguishing characteristics of such contexts.
Recalling that atomicity entails separativity, a 
further broad observation is of interest. The recog­
nitions of particular characterizations, such as those
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for "swans" or "bricks", as separative, relies typically 
(but not always) on memories of previous recognitions, 
spread over many contexts having only the most tenuous 
R-theoretical connections. Decisions to treat them as
atomizing, except under force majeure, are invariably 
determined by more or less strict regard to the motives 
of the context. This reflects the importance of the 
chosen strategy of neglect to the structure of atomicity, 
as of other aspects of particular instances of R-theories.
In measurement contexts, this strategy is precisely speci­
fied.
These considerations bring into sharper focus the 
question, implicit in a great deal else of what has so far 
been said, whether more precision can be given to my notion 
of a character; as a property which is perceptually 
recognized prior to verbal description, if any. Some 
clues were given in my discussion of diagram 1, p. 6 0, ff ; 
more will be offered shortly under the head of "sameness 
of characters" - i.e., what is involved in recognizing a 
character as the same as one recognized previously, or 
elsewhere in a frame. It will be found that neglect is 
again a factor.
(e) Distinctivity. The intuitive meaning here is
obvious, and may be reflected in a number of different forms 
of verbal expression. For example, "/ ["swan","black"] 
("this lake")" could be read, "There are no black swans 
on this lake", "None of the black birds on this lake are 
swans", or "No swan on this lake is black". A common basis
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for commitments to distinctivity is typical patterns of 
proper enclosure; no "leg" is a "body", no "brick" is a 
"wall", in the ordinary senses of these words. Such 
cases will appear again under scalarity, which entails 
distinctivity.
No general conclusions will be offered regarding 
the effects of F-closure on structural commitments for two 
or more character-sets. By definition, these concern 
the structures of intersects of the relevant F-sets, if 
recognized, a matter which will be discussed fully later 
(pp. 155 f f . ) .  What is to be borne in mind with a view 
to that discussion is the point already made, that a one- 
place commitment adopted as F-closed on a given space- 
restrictor is ipso facto adopted for any subset of the 
relevant F-set whose composite is separately recognized 
for any reason; and therefore, in particular, for any 
subset defined as its intersect with another F-set. In 
this way, separativity or atomicity adopted for one charac­
terization, say "bricks", may partly impose this struc­
ture on another, say "walls", only parts of which are so 
characterized (made of brick).
(f) Exclusivity. Again, we can illustrate the meaning
by alternative expressions. //["oil","water"]("this
vessel") could be read, "Oil and water are distinguished 
as separate volumes in this vessel", or, "There is no water 
in the oil here, and no oil in the water". (Another 
vessel in the context may contain emulsion, for which 
this need not be recognized.) The definition neither
90
requires nor prohibits either of the exclusive pair to 
be separative on its own; it effectively rules out 
C ' = C which would be consistent with separativity only 
where a / b. It would rule out, as distinctivity would 
not, any separately recognized proper enclosure of a 
"swan" being "black", under // ["swan","black"]("this lake") 
- such as its "feet". "Black" in that case must be read 
as "predominantly black".
(g) Scalarity. C5 expresses a very weak notion of
scale, not involving any metric concepts. Such a commit­
ment is most commonly instantiated by cases where one 
sort of phenomenal feature is habitually recognized as 
enclosed in, or part of, another sort, and no examples
of the reverse relationship are known: e.g. "man" and
"house", "human leg" and "human body", "table leg" and 
"table". While not ruling out vacant houses, homeless 
men, unassembled table legs or amputated human ones, it 
commits us to the assumption that enclosure of one by the 
other, if and when it occurs (and it must occur at least 
once in the context) will be proper enclosure of the 
familiar kind.
However, C5 would permit various structures, such 
as overlaps, or the enclosure of one C-characterized 
ident in more than one C-characterized one, which would 
be anomalous for the quoted examples - though they can 
be imagined, for instance, with wave-forms,
(h) F-bound inclusion in base set: and "mass' or 'count*
terms in semantics. It will be illuminating to discuss
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these two topics together, since it will bring out some of 
the ways in which the approach of the present study leads 
to a different analytical structure from that generated by 
more language-centred approaches. Semantic analysts 
have noted that some terms of ordinary language (most 
simply, certain nouns or adjectives) have the property 
that, if such a term is applicable to each of the members 
of any set of entities, it is applicable to any collection 
of these members, or the set itself, considered as a whole. 
Other terms have the contrary property, that they are not 
applicable as a whole to any collection of more than one 
member of any set to which they are individually applicable 
These classes of terms are known as 'mass' or 'count' 
terms, respectively, on the ground that a term of the 
second class determines a unique count on any set of 
entities which it picks out in a given context; while 
applications of a term of the first class is consistent 
with many different ways of discriminating and counting 
particular entities making up a totality to which it is 
applied. Examples of mass terms are "snow", "white"; 
and of count terms "swan", "house". Any collection of 
patches or bodies of snow is e qually "snow", and equally 
"white"; no collection of "swans" is "a swan", nor of 
"houses" "a house" (the syntactic role of the indefinite 
article thus assumes importance in these contexts).
Though the role of language in concrete contexts cannot 
be dealt with fully until later (Section G), we can at 
this point already note suggestive analogies between my
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analyses of P-bounds which are, or are not, members of their 
base-sets: and the semantic distinction between mass and
count terms. Before the precise nature of these analo­
gies can be understood, two largely terminological sources 
of possible confusion must be cleared up.
Early semantic treatments of this subject (e.g. 
by Quine, Word and Object, p. 95; and Moravcsik in 
Approaches to Natural Language, Stanford U., 1970, pp.264ff.) 
ran into an awkward problem in the analysis of mass terms, 
which was presented in the form that, if such a term 
applies to any entity, it applies to every part of it.
The problem then was that most, if not all, such terms were 
found in practice to exhibit logically arbitrary cut-off 
points, in the progressive subdivision of entities into 
parts (e.g., snow "flakes", or at most "molecules") where 
the principle broke down. This has been overcome, in a 
sense, by later writers (e.g., Lauri Carlson, 1979), by 
restating the principle in terms not of subdivisions of 
wholes, but of collections of parts, roughly in the form 
I have given it at the start of this note. The relevant 
property of mass terms was ’additivity’; but additivity, 
as we shall see, is associated in contexts of measurement 
with a concept having a quite different structure. The 
concept of additivity for empirical structures in measure­
ment is analogous to the additive property of numbers, and 
is more naturally applicable to sets of elements picked 
out by count terms; in C-theory it will be closely asso­
ciated with separative F-sets, whose bounds are not members
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of their base sets. The use of ’additivity’ in semantics 
is better understood here in terms of unions than of sums. 
We may say that a mass term is one which, if it applies 
to the members of any set, applies to any subset, or any 
union of subsets of that set, including the whole set.
In this form it comes very close to an analysis 
in terms of F-sets, in form of a commitment that if a 
C-bound is a member of its base set, so is the C-bound 
of every subset of that set whose composite is recognized. 
Two points of distinction emerge. The smallest elements of 
our F-structure (not necessarily R-atoms) are those deter­
mined by the F-determinant set in each case, whose place 
in the structure of theoretical commitment in context can 
be made explicit: not just those which happen to be
picked out by a particular term of language. Nor are we 
necessarily concerned with every logically possible col­
lection of these elements, only those whose composites are 
recognized by virtue of commitments of the context - which 
may prove an important restriction. But we note that if 
F-bounds are members of more than one subset of the total 
base set, they may overlap or enclose one another: which
is just the condition which is ruled out by separativity 
of the F-determinant set. So a mass term cannot apply to 
a separative characterization; but we cannot be sure that 
a non-separative one can be described by a mass term.
If we now wish to associate count terms with 
separative characterizations, we come up against our second 
threat of terminological confusion. In any particular
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R-theoretical context any recognized characterization
determines a unique count of idents and composites (if 
any), whether or not these may overlap or enclose one 
another. What separativity ensures for us is not merely 
a determinate count, but the absence of mutual enclosures 
or overlaps by members of the base set: so prohibiting
base set membership for any F-bound of a subset of more 
than one member. So the count of any subset of the base 
set is just that of its minimal enclosures; a property 
which will turn out to have great importance in measure­
ment. A characterization which determines readily recog­
nizable sets of minimal (and maximal) enclosures in this 
way is one which typically (but not always) leads to the 
assignment of simple, unitary terms of language: the
count terms. But we cannot be sure that such terms draw 
attention only to separative characters.
We have seen that structural and other properties 
of F-sets are intimately bound up with theoretical commit­
ments of all kinds; these are typically (but not always) 
carried over from one context to another by the use of 
language. The main fundamental difference between my 
approach here and that of semantics is that I set out to 
distinguish between those specific characters which are 
shared by a component-set and its F-bound and those which 
are not: the associated verbal expressions do not, typi­
cally, do so unequivocally. Nor, indeed, does F-set 
analysis: but it allows the distinction to be precisely
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stated, and located within a wider framework of theory.
It is true that if is separative for any F-set in 
context, it remains separative whatever other characters 
may consistently be assigned to all components: i.e., 
whether or not there is C'^such that 5 ^ 5  for
C' C*
some x,y and C^'is not separative, and whether or not 
C ’• The question just which minimal subset of 
is separative may have great importance, deriving from 
any further commitments which may be adopted in context 
for C\ or any subset of either.
The form this distinction may take in any con­
text varies according to the motives of the context and 
the particular structures of characterization for which 
commitments are adopted; and I can do no more here than 
offer an illustration. A F-determinant set for "bricks" 
composing a "wall" is plainly separative, in that it deter­
mines the set of individual bricks which exclude one 
another. But only those characters in that set which 
determine shape are responsible for the separativity of 
the set: all other characters of "bricks" are shared by
the wall as a whole (such as "red", "baked-clay").
"Bricks" is distinguishable as a count term by its plural 
form (as is "a brick" by its attached article): "red",
"baked-clay" operate here, at least, as mass terms, since 
they characterize all collections of separate bricks. 
"Brick-shaped" is separative and not shared by the wall as 
F-bound; "red" and "baked-clay" are so shared, and non- 
separative .
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It is the shape of bricks that leads to the expec­
tation that they can be readily arranged in the form of a 
wall of any suitable dimensions. Redness may have some 
aesthetic implications; but the baked-clay fabric is 
what generates expectations that the final "brick wall" 
will have the necessary properties of strength and insu­
lation. These are matters of empirical commitment, 
based on past experience. Different particular sets of 
characters, all associated with the term "brick" and its 
grammatical variants, give rise to different commitments.
It is seldom necessary, and may be quite difficult, to 
use linguistic distinctions to analyse out which characters 
are involved in which commitments, this being left to 
common background knowledge. We can simply say, "bricks 
are easily assembled, strong and weatherproof", allowing 
the relevant associations of characters with commitments 
to be tacitly understood.
In technical contexts, however, it may become 
crucial to distinguish the sets of recognizable characters 
implicated in various particular commitments - especially 
those characters susceptible of measurement as quantities. 
Here the precise récognitive basis for structural commit­
ments of separativity will be found to have special theore­
tical importance. Language must, if necessary, be con­
structed to make the necessary distinctions. It is the 
récognitive structure required in context which elicits 
the linguistic forms: not the converse. At this point
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the analysis of separativity as a property of character- 
sets appears to present the récognitive requirements with 
some precision.
Linguistic considerations of this kind are out­
side the main concerns of this study. But this discussion 
may serve to illustrate the way in which commitments to 
the inclusion, or not, of /^-bounds in C'^sets are asso­
ciated, inversely, with commitments to the separativity, 
or not, of C  ^ in context. Such commitments rest in prac­
tice on past experience of the recognition of particular 
C'-sets, and their survival in R-theory on their consistency 
with successive recognitions of C^-sets over time: in
short, they are inductive. The form of such inductive 
commitments will be considered below, after an exposition 
of the structure of a sequence of R-frames over time. 
Meanwhile, questions arise over our understanding of what 
is meant by recognizing the same characters from time to 
time, or in different entities at the same time.
(j) Sameness of characters and similarity of idents.
The salient aspect of perceptible properties is 
their vast range of difference and variability. So it 
is hard to say what exactly is meant by 'a character*.
One approach is to ask what is involved in recognizing a 
character, twice or more, as "the same" - not that this 
question, either, is easy.
The answer must rest ultimately on our intuitions 
about the experience of such recognitions. But our intu­
itions of sameness apply differently to recognition of
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those perceptible properties I have called 'characters’ 
and of those bounded entities I have called 'idents', 
according to the different ways these elements are invol­
ved in the structure of R-theories. I shall therefore 
keep the use of the term 'identity' for idents, using 
'sameness' for characters: idents assigned the same
character will be called 'similar' with respect to that 
character, avoiding any reference to characters as similar 
to one another. Characters are those elements of an R- 
theory by which idents are distinguished in space, and 
identified through time. An ident is identified as the 
locus of particular sets of characters at different times: 
its identification is thus dependent on the recognitions 
of assigned characters. The profound philosophical prob­
lems associated with the notion of identity involved, 
where characterizations change, must be postponed to the 
end of the study (Section IV.6). A character may be 
recognized as the same when contributing to the charac­
terizations either of (a) the same ident at different 
times, or (b) different idents at any time (and assigned 
accordingly).
It is with respect to the commitments of the 
relevant R-theory that the difference in the roles of 
sameness of character and identity of ident emerge most 
clearly. All commitments are exhibited here as attaching 
to sets of idents by virtues of the characters assigned 
to them (both these commitments already schematized and
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those to be introduced later). Thus, recognitions of two 
or more characterizations as sharing a common character 
typically carry commitments of the theory associated with 
that character. Generally, these commitments are shown 
as specifying relations of enclosure, overlap or exclusion 
between F-sets of idents (any of which may be unit sets) , 
determined by (sets of) characters recognized as "the 
same" over time or across space. The only check we ulti­
mately have on the validity of such recognitions of same­
ness is that these associated commitments prove consistent 
with experience.
One type of commitment commonly and importantly 
(though not universally) associated with such recognitions 
is that to the use or understanding of the same word or 
expression, at each occurrence, to describe each character 
(or a syntactically appropriate demonstrative or ana­
phoric construction). Can we therefore appeal to the 
language of a context to arbitrate questions over the same­
ness of characters? In the last note it was pointed out 
that words typically draw attention to more or less complex 
combinations of characters, and that the sets of charac­
ters associated with any particular word may vary with 
context, within a reasonably stable range. Words may 
also evoke more or less complex changes of characteri­
zation, especially in the case of verbs or their deriva­
tives. Thus, they are often used to think or speak of 
sets of characters commonly recognized together, rather 
than to recall or specify single characters: whose
100
presence or absence, nevertheless, often distinguishes 
one ident from another, or whose appearance or disappear­
ance in an ident is recognized as change. A large class 
of contexts which come near to providing numbers of 
apposite examples in precise form, is found in books 
describing biological species (from which the term ’charac­
ter' has been borrowed). Minute perceptible distinctions 
between one species and another, or between different 
phases of development in the same species, are given in 
the text; but, if the book is to be used for recognitions 
in the field, verbal descriptions must be supported by 
visual illustrations, which exhibit visual characters for 
comparison with actual specimens. Even technical terms 
specially constructed for the purpose fail, by themselves, 
to determine recognitions of the characters concerned; 
combined with illustration, however, they come close to 
determining unequivocally the critical single characters 
assigned to different species or phases. When we move 
from technical contexts like these to questions of what 
characters determine our daily recognitions of well-known 
faces or voices, we have passed beyond the point at which 
words or illustrations can hope to yield unequivocal 
determinations; yet the discriminations are made, the 
characters are recognized. We may say we recognize 
George on the phone, without being able, or wanting, to 
specify verbally just what characterCs) distinguish the 
voice from all others.
It seems, then, that linguistic forms fail, in
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many cases, to capture the essential criteria by which 
we recognize characters as the same, or different, when 
contributing to different characterizations. The res­
ponse of linguistic analysis to this situation must, it 
seems, be either to claim that no true distinctions or 
similarities exist where none can be specified in appro­
priate language; or, more modestly, to say that the best 
we can do is to study those which can be so specified, 
and assume that no serious principle is thereby neglected. 
These strategies of neglect essentially originate with 
Wittgenstein, and some of the questions involved arise 
in a different form in the arguments he started about the 
notion of a "private language". That notion will be 
discussed in Section IV.3. But such neglect is not accep­
table in the context of this study, for reasons which will 
soon emerge. I must fall back on the resources of my 
analysis of the role of characters in the structure of 
R-theories.
It was proposed in the introduction that the 
principle of identifying a property with a set of entities 
possessing it, cannot be extended from properties of num­
bers to recognizable characters in context (p. 29 ) *, and 
that consequently C-theory has no general criterion for 
the identity of characters (p.33 ). In the absence of 
such a criterion, we must invoke our principle of autono­
mous decision by the Reader, who may or may not attend to 
any particular perceptible difference in context. For
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example, one R-theory may treat all recognizably "red" 
characters as the same, while another may distinguish 
many different shades of red, even neglecting the collec­
tive characterization "red" altogether.
However, it is plainly unsatisfactory to leave 
this declaration of contextual autonomy open to arbitrary 
choice, unsupported by any ground of theory. We shall 
therefore say that, rationally, a character is the same, 
as assigned to different idents or in different frames, 
iff the logical consequences of these assignments are the 
same under the commitments of the theory of the context 
for the character. The following loose definition sug­
gests itself: a character is a recognized property which,
when assigned (alone or with others) to any ident, con­
tributes essentially to the determination of at least one 
commitment adopted for that ident. In many cases the 
fulfilment of these conditions may be unproblematic.
The patterns of commitment associated with recognizing 
traffic-lights as "red" or "green" call for no subtle 
discriminations of colour, such as those which may be 
involved in recognizing a fungus as poisonous or not.
If, in context,nothing important turns on a question of 
similarity or distinction, we can ignore it; but, if we 
are concerned about the consequences, we must determine 
it if we can. If we cannot do it with words alone, we 
must use illustrations; or, failing these, rely on our 
personal powers of perception, comparison and memory.
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The common principle in all cases is that the extent to 
which we can (or must) neglect differences in recognized 
character is exactly the extent to which we can (or must) 
tolerate differences in their expected consequences.
This (often large) tolerance is determined by the moti­
vation of the context, and the structure of theoretical 
commitments adopted in its pursuit: consistency of
recognitions under these commitments being the sole test 
of the validity of different assignments of the same 
character. Such "tolerance" (strategy of neglect of 
difference) is systematically specified, in numerical 
terms, in contexts of measurement.
Further consideration of the kinds of commitment 
that determine the relevant logical consequences must be 
left until after giving an account of time-successive 
aspects of R-theories in Section E; and a fuller account 
of the role of language awaits the analysis of Group-R- 
theories in Section G. Meanwhile the schematic treat­
ment of structural commitments of the R-frame continues 
with those for binary characters.
D. Some Typical Structural Commitments for Characters in C2
Commitments of R-theories for 2-characters always 
include the conditions laid down above for n and t ; 
they may also include conditions adopted for particular 
2-characters in context, constructed from one or more of
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the forms of commitment now to be schematized. Four 
of these are given immediately: asymmetry, transitivity,
progressivity and seriality - on which a schema for a 
counting series is then constructed. Before presenting 
a fifth, comparativity, we define a notion of position 
with respect to a given binary figure; and a structure 
of values for a given unary character, which are in some 
cases compared. We shall find a close association between 
the ideas of position and comparative value.
Dl. T^ Ca] =^£ (Va,b) “I (a/a,b a a/b,a)
(read, 'a is asymmetric’. |—  a/a,b + a / b).
D2. >[a] (Va,b,c) (a/a,b a a/b,c a/a,c)
(read, 'a is transitive’).
D3. )^[a] =^£ f [a] a )[a]
(read, 'a is progressive’. \— (a/a,b a a/b,c
A a/c,a)).
Before defining seriality, we give an abbreviative defi­
nition for the base set S of a: S C S  is called--------  a a
base set of a if = {a: (]]b)(a/a,b v a/b,a) } . . . .DDl
D4. With each a e C2 governed only by the conditions so 
far defined may be associated a distinct character d e C2 
governed by the further condition:
(Va,b) (d/a,b a/a,b a "](]]c)(a  ^ c / b A a/a,c
A a/c,b)).
('d* may be read "a-next", or "a-dot".
I—  and d C d.
The case d = d is just the case where d has only one member,
and is of no further interest).
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(a,à) is a serial pair iff ))[a],
(It is understood that à is in principle recognizable for 
all a, but is only an element of the R-theory if recog­
nized. In general, it is only attended to in association 
with at least one a-series, as now defined.)
D5. 5 is a series on g , (or g-series) , iff
^[g], has at least three members, and:
(i) (Va,b) (g/a,b (a e b e 5^)).
(ii) (Va) (a c ^ (Vb,c)(((&/a,b a  i/a,c)
V (g/b,a A g/c,a)) b = c) ) .
N.B. It follows that if is a series under this defi­
nition, its ordering is homomorphic to that of any sub­
series of the normal series of integers; it is in this 
sense that 1 may in some cases call it a counting series.
If series are defined on more than one 2-character 
in any context, they may be distinguished by subscripts, 
e.g. 5^, 5^, .... If more than one series is defined
on the same 2-character a, they may be distinguished by
s 1 s 2numbers, e.g., , ... . This may easily occur:
for example, lines of type at the top and bottom of a 
printed page may each present a clearly recognized "left- 
right series of letters", and separately used for coun­
ting, without any left-right series being recognized in 
context for sets of letters drawn from different, widely 
separated lines.
The principal importance of the counting property 
of series is seen as its use in the recognitions of* dis­
tinct identities of idents which are otherwise indistin­
guishable in context - e.g., in the counting of swans on
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a pond. This aspect of the property must, in this ana­
lysis, be expressed in terms of character-assignment; 
and it will be convenient to deal with it in the context
of the notion of position, now to be defined.
Position
For each a e C2 , and each x e S , we have two 
determinate (but not necessarily unique) subsets of 5, 
which will be abbreviated as:
ctx =^£ {y:a/y,x} ; 3ca =^£ {y:a/x,y} ... DD2
Either or both may be empty for any particular a,x.
2
D6. We now define a partial function IT from (pS) 
into C such that:
(i) “[ (ox = 0 = 3ca) ( 2 (P e C A P/x A P = n(ôôc , xâ))
(ii) (ox = 0 = ^ )  (n (0x,3ca) = 0).
We shall write P* = P such that H  (ctx,5ca) = P. ôix,^ 
are called the a-position determinants of x, or PDs; 
n  the positional function; P^ the a-positional character, 
or PC, of X in d. Intuitively, where, for example, â 
is a "left-right" figure, P^ = n(ôtx,5câ) is just the pro­
perty of "being to the right of" all members of otx, and 
"to the left of" all members of It is not held
necessary or typical that a Reader should be constantly 
or specifically aware of the identities of all members 
of both PDs of every ident involved in every figure of 
the R-frame; merely that the question whether any parti­
cular y is a member of ôx,3câ, or neither for any particular
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X, should, if it arises, have an answer determined by 
the recognition (or not) of a configuration in d.
Where ax = 0 = xa, x has no position in d, but if either 
is non-empty, its position is determined. PDs and PCs 
are in principle determined for all binary figures, 
including fj and t , and all idents have a position in these 
last.
Notes on position, counting and identity.
(a) All the commitments in this Section have been 
defined without reference to any space-restrictive ident; 
i.e., as if they were adopted for all pairs of idents in 
the R-frame (see pp. 73, 82 above). This has been done 
for simplicity of exposition. Space-restrictions for 
such commitments could easily be constructed if required, 
in the same manner as has been done in Cl - 9. Cases do 
certainly occur; for example, we may attend to series
of "bricks", satisfying D5, in some parts of "walls" and 
not in others.
(b) The main purpose of this sequence of definitions
has been to analyse the structures of commitment involved 
in a strategy of uniquely characterizing idents by coun­
ting; a strategy which has many applications. The prin­
cipal structure for counting is, of course, D5; which 
defines an a-series as a base set (of at least three mem­
bers) each of whose members has a unique predecessor and 
successor (if any) in the series, in whichever direction
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we choose to count. The common use of the term 'base set' 
for both binary figures and F-sets (p. 7 2 )  reflects the 
fact that counting strategies are frequently used on such 
sets, whose F-determinant characterizations, by definition, 
consist of those characters with respect to which they are 
similar, and by means of which they cannot, therefore, be 
uniquely characterized (if the set has more than one 
number).
But the analysis reflects the general case in 
which a serial figure potentially capable of generating 
counting-series (such as "next right", "next larger", 
satisfying D4) does not automatically generate uniquely 
determined series. Formally, the negative condition in 
D4, which excludes intermediate idents, does not ential 
D5(ii), which determines unique succession. Two or more 
idents may be "to the left of", or "larger than" a given 
ident, with none intervening, and so form parts of dif­
ferent series. Moreover, there is nothing in the struc­
ture of D5 itself which decisively distinguishes one pos­
sible series from another.
(c) Note, further, that this negative condition in
D4 is another major fundamental case of a strategy of 
neglect (p. 66); what is denied is not that no such 
intermediate could ever be supposed to exist, but that its 
existence is recognized in context - either because it would 
be practically unrecognizable in the given conditions; 
or because its existence would be inconsequential in the
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R-theory; or because the members of the base set have 
been specially constructed, like "bricks in a wall", to 
form series with this property. Where we are concerned 
with figures determining comparisons between idents over a 
range of values of such characters as those of size, 
warmth, or loudness, the possible existence of interme­
diate cannot be ruled out in any absolute sense without 
doing violence to normal intuitions about such characters. 
Such cases will be fully considered below in the context 
of comparative structures, valuation, and their develop­
ments for purposes of measurement. We shall see that 
they make no appeal to any notion of a "least perceptible 
difference": it will be argued that no such notion is
theoretically sustainable.
(d) The condition a / b in D4, which defines à  as a
basis for the construction of OL-series under D5, is 
introduced only to provide for series in r\ and T, which are 
reflexive. All other figures in which we shall be con­
cerned to construct series are asymmetric and therefore 
irreflexive; so that all their configurations automatically 
satisfy the condition. Again, where a figure &  is tran­
sitive, it will include as oc-configurations all pairs of 
distinct idents drawn from any one recognizedcx-series, and 
not onlyoc-next pairs. Thus, any pair of distinct mem­
bers of a "left-right" series is in principle recognizable 
as a left-right configuration. If counting is carried 
out in such a series, the direction of counting is
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determined by the choice for attention (in any part of 
the series) of one or other of the two distinct relations 
which are in principle derivable from any figure which 
is not symmetric. The only figure with which we are 
concerned which is not transitive is Ÿ; it is also sym­
metric. T-series can nevertheless be constructed; but 
call for special treatment, to be given in the context 
of measurement in Part III. is transitive and anti­
symmetric, and the C-scale (07, p.8 0 )  exhibits a charac­
teristic structure which readily generates T|-series. 
(Incidentally, systems such as sets of Russian dolls, or 
the skins of an onion, are regarded in this analysis not 
as potential ^ -series, but as sets of idents which suc­
cessively surround, but do not enclose, one another. 
T|-series formed of bound-idents of composites of such 
sets, or series in an appropriate surround-figure, can be 
defined; but the definitions are complex, and will be 
omitted as of no further interest here.)
The figures in which series will principally 
concern us will be both asymmetric and transitive; so 
that series are readily formed in them, in suitable con­
ditions. A direction of counting is associated with a 
choice of a dominant counting relation, so as to generate 
a determinate order for that relation in the series, 
corresponding homomorphically with that of the series 
of numerals used in the counting. This is relatively 
unproblematic, in that these figures have a progressive
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structure, and so (as noted under D3, p. 104)  the cyclic 
case is eliminated. Cyclic series can, of course, be 
formed, notably in f ; and easily generate ambiguities 
in ordering. As we count right-handed round a circle 
of dancers holding hands, each one touching the next, 
people we passed to our left turn up again on our right. 
When we come to consider T-series, this case will have 
to be eliminated by definition, where we wish to deter­
mine a unique order for counting. In all the wide 
variety of contexts to be discussed, however, this is the 
only such problem we shall meet.
(e) We have said that idents are distinguished as
such (we shall say, accorded distinct 'identities’, or 
'identified') by the assignment of distinct sets of charac­
ters, unique to each one in context. In general, they 
are identified by one or more non-positional characters, 
not (one or all) assigned to any other. Indeed, no 
ident can be recognized as such by positional characters 
alone. Each ident must first (in a sense of logical 
priority) be recognized as spatially bounded, in the 
manner explored above (pp.6 Off.). The recognition of a 
positional character depends on that of at least one 
configuration of a 2-character to a pair of distinct 
idents (the case of a reflexive configuration in or ^  
can here be neglected). Thus the recognition of a boun­
dary-character, which must be unary, is necessarily prior 
to the assignment of a 2-character to any pair with res­
pect to which a figure may yield positional characters
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to its members. However, such boundary-characters need 
not themselves be unique to the idents they bound; and 
in such cases we may rely on a positional character for 
identification. Positional characters are, of course, 
identifying if and only if they are uniquely assigned to 
the ident to be identified; which may be the case in 
favourable circumstances.
Thus, a particular letter "a" in the immediately 
following pair aa can readily be identified as "the one 
on the left", although none of the recognized non- 
positional characters of the members of the pair, nor in 
particular their boundary-characters ("a-shaped, black 
touching white") is to be distinguished in a normal reading 
context. (I am, of course, assuming such a context, 
including for example the normal orientation of the page 
to the reader; few of the structures of common experience 
on which we build our contexts of recognition can be 
quite so uniform and reliable.) It is distinguished by 
its positional character in oc, where oc is the "left-right" 
figure in context; since its PD set in this figure con­
sists uniquely of a letter "a" next to its right; the 
other of the pair having uniquely an "a" next to its left. 
We are able, in this context, and for this purpose, to 
neglect all other configurations of oc. or oc, since they 
cannot disturb this uniqueness of positional character, 
obtained by a particular application of the IT-function 
for all possibly relevant R-frames. Indeed we may go
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on to say that our recognition that there are just two 
"a"s, and not one, immediately following the word 'pair' 
above, rests on our recognition not only of the unary 
non-positional characters of the members of the pair, 
but, simultaneously, of their distinct positional charac­
ters in the relevant "left-right" configuration.
This form of identification seems to infringe 
at least the spirit of the Leibnizian prohibition against 
the use of relational properties to determine identity, 
since although the PCs are unary characters, their 
determinations require logically prior determinations of 
the memberships of PDs, in turn dependent on the assign­
ments of 2-characters which are in a Leibnizian sense 
relational. But the more general philosophical problems 
of identity will be postponed to Part IV (Section 6).
I want now only to consider how the principle of identi­
fication just used can be extended to counted positions 
in series.
(f) If an ident, indistinguishable from others by
non-positional characters, is to be so distinguished by 
position, its PDs must be unique: they must contain at
least one ident not in the PDs of any other ident. This 
requires only the condition given by (^OC) (Yy)C((ÔÜc,3ôk) = 
(ôy,ÿ«)) -+ X = y). In some instances this can be deter­
mined for particular idents without regard to series: 
to give simple examples, the only "a" in the array aaa| 
which is "to the left of" five "a"s, or the only one "to 
the right of" just three or "to the left of" just two.
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Once a particular member of an unambiguously recognized 
series has been identified, by this or any other means, 
all other members of that series can be identified from 
their positions in that series, by counting from it.
This is simple enough where only one series in a parti­
cular figure is recognized in context. But in the more 
general case, in which more than one series containing 
otherwise indistinguishable idents is recognizable in a 
given figure, the situation is likely to be more complex. 
Indeed, the variety of possible cases is so great that I 
shall only consider a few relatively simple examples of 
typical situations in which counting series are commonly 
used in this way, and which illustrate some of the aspects 
of this strategy which are specially relevant to the under­
standing of measurement.
In the examples given above, I have made use of 
a kind of space-restrictive strategy (such as that analysed 
in Section C above) by directing attention to a particular 
pair and a particular set of six "a"s, among all those 
appearing in these pages. An effect similar to that of 
space-restriction can in some cases be obtained in the 
recognitions of figures, and positions in them, just by 
restricting attention to the intersection of the base sets 
generated by a given F-determinant set of unary characters 
C' and the figure concerned. In favourable circumstances 
the intersect H of the base sets of and oc will 
contain one or more unambiguously recognized oc-series, 
which we may call $sl,...,sn. e.g., a number of "left-
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right" series of letters on this page can be recognized,
and unequivocally distinguished by locating their initial
and final letters by position in an "up-down" figure which
s Iccan, in turn, be unambiguously recognized. For each S 
in this series we may recognize a restriction II on the
positional function FI, which will operate on the PDs
s kfor each member x of S consisting of subsets of that
series which we may write (ocx,xcx) , unique to each x in 
s k5 ; so as to determine a unique PC for x in the series
which we may write (P^)^. Plainly, i f ^  is unique to 
X in context, so is the unrestricted PC, P^, since the
members unique to (ocx,xcx) will also be unique to
- -— — ^ c Tç
(ocx,xcx). Once a counting direction on 5 has been 
determined by choice of a dominant relation, any arbitra­
rily chosen sub-sequence of the natural numbers can be 
made to correspond, each with each of the members of the 
series as identified by their positions in it. Treating 
thses as ordinals, we can identify each member as the nth 
member of the series for the value of n so determined; 
this value corresponding uniquely with its positional 
character in the figure as a whole.
But the circumstances do indeed have to be specially 
favourable (either by accident or design) if one or more 
series are to be unambiguously recognized in any particular 
pair (C \ OC) in f Cx ^ 2 » so as to provide the conditions 
for identification by position in this way. Two kinds of 
interesting case which may arise, even where series are 
readily recognizable, are illustrated in a simplified form 
below:
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O ^  o
(1) a a a a (2) a a a
d a.
(!') bj. d ®f (2') b e f
(The letters in [1') and (2') have been disposed 
in such a way that they can be used to refer in discussion 
to corresponding "a”s in (1) and (2) - which we may think 
of as "swans on a pond", or anything else we might want 
to identify by position.)
Considering the "left-right" figure in (1) and 
(1’), it seems reasonable to point to at least five dis­
tinct series of "a"s which might naturally be distinguished: 
those corresponding to b ,c,d,e,f,g,h; b,d,f,g; c,d,e,h; 
b,d,e,h; and c,d,f,g. (From now on, I shall just use 
the letters in (1') and (2') as names for the corresponding 
"a"s.) However, the identifications of particular "a"s 
by counting from left might already be somewhat ambiguous; 
and would become more so in conditions where the "left- 
right" configurations formed by the pairs [b,c), (e,f),
(g,h) were less clear than I have made them here. Again, 
if we think of less easily recognized figures, such as those 
suggested by recognitions of pairs of idents as "warmer- 
cooler" or "heavier-lighter", unassisted by measurement 
techniques, we can see that the unambiguous recognition of 
series yielding a determinate order would be highly prob­
lematic in an analogous case. (For such figures, see 
pp. 35, 6 7, and fuller discussion under 'comparison figure' 
below, pp.124f.) These are, of course, typical of just
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the kinds of situation in which we may turn to measurement 
techniques to improve conditions for recognition. The 
theoretical basis of these will be fully explored in 
Part III; but a first step towards an understanding of
this basis can be taken at once.
Looking at the case (2), [2’), we may again 
point to more than one possible left-right series: 
b,c,d,e,f; b,c,e,f; b,d,e,f. But considering a 
situation in which the "left-right" configuration of the 
pair (c,d) is unrecognized in context, we are faced with
the simple choice between the last two. In such a case,
I shall speak of'alternative series'. No unambiguous 
counting strategy for all "a"s is now available, but some 
things are already clear. (1) b has a unique position 
to the left of four "a"s, three in each alternative 
series; f an analogous position on the right; and e 
as being to the left of f and right of b,c, and d. These 
unique positions are recognizable independently of the 
recognition of any series. (2) c and d have identical 
PDs and so identical PCs; we can say they are similar in 
"left-right" position to one another, or in similar 
positions in that figure, just as they are similar in 
those characters by which they are recognized as "a"s.
It is colloquially natural to say they are roughly, or 
approximately, the same left-right position. But the 
word "approximate" carries at least some connotation that 
some exactly determined position (or whatever) exists.
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to which the position so qualified approximates; and I 
shall now say how I think this notion can be most simply 
understood.
c and d are indistinguishable in terms of "left- 
right" position; but can be distinguished from one 
another in terms of an "up-down" figure. In this way we 
can unambiguously fix the memberships of the two alter­
native series b,c,e,f and b,d,e,f, in each of which either 
c or d has a uniquely determined position, while the 
other has not. It makes precise sense, therefore, to say 
that d has approximately the same position as c with res­
pect to the series b,c,e,f; and similarly for c with res­
pect to the series b,d,e,f. In each case we are taking 
one series as a "standard", with respect to which the odd- 
letter-out is assigned an approximate position. The 
choice of standard, in this case, is evidently arbitrary. 
Equally, in the case of the array (1), (1*) we could 
arbitrarily choose, say, the "lowest" series c,d,f,g as 
standard, assigning approximate positions to b, e and f 
with respect to it; and similarly for all the other four- 
member series mentioned. The use of a second figure C”up* 
down") to assist in unambiguous recognitions among mul­
tiple alternative series has, of course, its most sophis­
ticated expression in the Cartesian system of coordinates, 
which may be analysed as a structure designed to permit 
exact assignments of positions with respect to any number 
of series parallel to the axes, taken as equivalently
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standard. But this calls for specially constructed 
metric properties which we shall not reach in analysis 
until Part III. The examples given above are themselves 
constructed to yield relatively easy determinations of 
"left-right" and "up-down" positions, which we should not 
expect even from such naturally occurring arrays as those 
of "swans on a pond" or "stars in the sky"; still less 
from arrays in more problematic figures such as those 
mentioned, in which simple spatial configurations do not 
play a straightforward determining role.
Factors affecting the choice of standard series 
from amongst possible alternatives vary enormously with 
the figure involved and the conditions of the context.
They demand, of course, particularly rigorous treatment 
in contexts of measurement. It will be argued that 
philosophical problems associated with the récognitive 
aspects of such choices have been neglected in studies 
of the foundations of measurement like those of the Suppes 
tradition, which have concentrated on the mathematical 
properties desired; and that this neglect has resulted 
in a failure to reveal important factors affecting the 
empirical validity of the systems analysed. In many 
non-metric contexts, however, arbitrary choices of stan­
dard series, provided these are unambiguously and uniquely 
distinguished, may be perfectly adequate for the relevant, 
purposes. But, in order to give this proposal clear 
interpretations over a wide range of contexts, I must 
first give an account of two quite separate concepts:
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that of a set of values associated with a particular unary 
character; and that of the comparison of idents with res­
pect to such values.
D7. The valuative function A is a partial function from C 
into C such that for each Q e C either A(Q) = 0 
or there is a subset C'c C having at least two members 
such that A(Q) = C’, and for all P e C, P Q and
(i) writing C'= {F^, =U(Sp^, 5p );
and
(ii) (VPi,P%)(P.,P% E C  A P. f P^  ^+ Sp  ^Sp^)
(for definition of the base sets Sp, 5^, etc., see BDl, 
p.72).
Terminology: where A(Q)  ^ 0, Q is called a valuative
character (or V-character), whose values are the members 
of the value set C' of Q. Note that, by (i),
|— (Vx) (Q/x (P^/x V ... V P^/x) , and (VP,x)(P e C' a p/x Q/x) . 
Abbreviation: Where Q is a valuative character and C
its value set we write V[C',Q]
Notes :
(a) As with the definitions of binary commitments, 
the notion of space-restrictions on valuation has been 
neglected for simplicity, though it could readily be car­
ried out in terms of restrictions on A defined only for 
the enclosures of any given ident.
(b) The notion of valuation captured here is a very 
broad one, within which comparative value ranges, and 
ultimately metric values, will be distinguished as special
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cases. The aim is to bring such notions as 'quality', 
'attribute' (KLST), 'aspect' (Kanger), within a unified 
analysis encompassing all récognitive classification, as 
restricted by various contexts. Thus a valuative charac­
ter (as Q in D7) has a status corresponding, in most 
cases, with a linguistic 'general term' which collects 
less general terms as its values - in the way that the 
term "animal", for instance, collects "man" and "insect" 
as well as "horse" in some contexts, but in others speci­
fically excludes the first two. At this stage, of course, 
we are not concerned with the assignment of verbal lab les 
except as a means of evoking examples; but with the 
recognition of a set of phenomenal characters as alter­
native values of a general character - the general charac­
ter being recognized in terms of (not by inference from) 
recognitions of one or other of its values. Where such 
recognitions are associated with linguistic terms, it 
seems not too misleading to interpret base sets of this 
kind as the extensions of these terms.
(c) Values are not, in the general case, mutually
exclusive (in the sense defined by C4, p.80), though 
their base sets are distinct. For instance, "equines", 
"horses", "mules" and "cows" are all "animals". Recog­
nition of any of these would justify an assignment of 
the characters understood by the term "animal". Further 
distinctive character-recognition would be needed to 
justify discrimination between "horse" and "mule" as
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different values of "equine".
(d) In most ordinary, simple contexts the number of
valuative characters, and of their recognized values, is 
small; but in others the numbers may be indefinitely 
large - though not merely finite but recognitively manage­
able. Large numbers may occur in contexts involving many 
accepted classification-systems, as in chemistry or bio­
logy. In metric contexts, where numerical values are 
strictly associated with certain values of V-characters, 
they will be called quantities; and A will emerge as 
the function which determines recognitions of distinct 
parameters or dimensions in a context.
Certain V-characters have the special property 
that their values are comparable in such a way that it 
becomes natural to consider idents so characterized as 
having more or less of a property associated with such a 
V-character; or, alternatively (and more perspicuously) 
to consider that one assigned value is greater or less 
than another with respect to the valuative structure as 
a whole. However, a scheme of comparison in which each 
ident is assigned just one value (if any) of a given V- 
character excludes the possibility of a comparison of 
values, except in the form of a comparison between idents 
to which these values are assigned; and any such scheme 
is analysable in terms of a particular type of figure.
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(If one part of an apple, say, is recognized as redder 
than another, then these parts are recognized as distinct 
idents - however vaguely bounded - enclosed in the apple; 
and no sense can be made of comparing such an apple, as 
a whole, as redder or less red than some other apple, 
except perhaps in terms of the spatial extents of their 
parts recognized as redder or less red. This restriction 
of value-comparisons to cases where distinct idents are 
compared is even more obvious for V-characters such as 
length, weight (mass), or warmth (temperature).) So it 
is claimed that the notion of value-comparison is correctly 
captured in terms of a combination of a mutually-distinc- 
tive value structure as defined in D7 above (essentially 
a form of classification) with an associated comparison 
figure, now to be defined. It will be found that this 
leads to the view that the notion of a continuously variable 
range of values of a property associated with a V-character, 
of which at most one may be assigned to each ident at any 
one time in any context, belongs strictly not to récog­
nitive theory (as expressed in particular R-theories) but 
to S-theory: in that it goes beyond what can in principle
be recognized. We shall see in due course, however, that 
such a notion can in some sense be incorporated in R- 
theories, at least in contexts of measurement.
D8. (i) Q is a comparative character iff:
(3c') (VCC ,Q] A (VP,x)(P e C  a p/x -<■
(36)(6 E C% A »[5] A P = pX)
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(ii) ô is a comparison figure for Q iff Q is 
comparative, V[C',Q], ))C6], and
(Vx) (x e Sj ->■ e C ’) .
(i.e., all values of Q are determined by position in at 
least one progressive figure, called a comparison figure 
for Q. In practice, it is rare for more than comparison 
figure to be used for any one comparative character in 
ordinary contexts; but in some measurement contexts a 
manageable number of distinct comparison figures are so 
used. It follows that 5^= (5^,5^,, ...), where
{6,6', ...} is the set of all comparison figures for Q in 
context).
We now, for the sake of broader comprehension,
g
define a non-récognitive property ^  for a comparative
property Q, assigned to pairs of values of Q, by:
D9. The ordered pair P,P' of values of a comparative
6 6
character Q has the property > (so that >(P,P') is 
read, "P is Q-greater than P ' under 6") iff 6 is a 
comparison figure for Q and 
(3x,y) (6/x,y A P = Pj A P' = pp .
Notes :
(a) The relation >^P*,P^) derivable from a recognized y
configuration given by 6/x,y is hard to distinguish 
intuitively from the récognitive configuration itself; 
but for the purposes of this study it is important that 
we should attempt to grasp the distinction in "real" terms.
r,
125
and not only formally. The intuitive difficulty almost 
certainly arises from a form of unconscious inference, 
ingrained by habit (if not innate), which goes from per­
ceptual recognitions to judgments about the recognized 
entities and their inherent properties; this judgment 
being almost as automatically embedded in our total 
system of beliefs about these properties, as associated 
with physical entities in general. This structure of 
unconscious judgment is reflected in common speech: we
say that something "looks redder", "looks longer",
"feels heavier", "feels warmer" than something else. In 
the terms of this study these represent cases of (normally) 
unconscious incorporation of substantive (S-theoretical) 
judgments about the relevant idents into the R-theory of 
the context in each case. 1 shall postpone discussion of 
colour recognition till we come to consider it in a 
context of measurement; in spite of the eagerness with 
which some philosophers rush to call it in support of their 
views, it is one of the most difficult modes of perception 
to analyse (the substantive judgments commonly formed are 
generally false, or at least profoundly misleading). 
Judgments of relative length, however, are plainly enough 
typically based on recognitions of apparent spatial exten­
sion in the visual field, and are notoriously fallible in 
any but specially favourable conditions. Relative weight 
is judged from muscular tensions or pressure on the flesh: 
quite clearly mass, as such, cannot be felt, and 'felt
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weight' is dependent on many factors, other than the 
inherent properties of the bodies felt. 'Felt warmth' 
is similarly judged from familiar kinds of sensation, 
mainly in the skin; it is notoriously unreliable as a 
guide to the inherent properties of the bodies felt, 
depending almost as much on their conductivity as their 
temperature, between which properties we cannot feel the 
difference. Thus judgments like these are clearly sub­
stantive, in that they go beyond the récognitive evidence.
The theoretical basis of this distinction, in 
various modes, will be fully dealt with in contexts of 
measurement. They are raised here to reinforce the 
point that the distinction is important, and that we must 
continue throughout this study to attend to the precise 
role of substantive theory in judgments of this kind.
(b) Recall that a progressive figure does not neces­
sarily or typically generate a determinate order on its 
base set, since it is not necessarily connected (not all 
pairs in are necessarily recognized as 6-configura- 
tions; still less all pairs in 5q , if these are not 
the same). Consequently, nor does ^ necessarily gener­
ate a determinate order on the value-set C^. This dif­
ference from the fundamental 'weak order' of KLST is 
deliberate, and intended to capture an intuitive struc­
ture associated with contexts of non-metric value-com- 
parison. The order properties of the system are more 
ful'ly considered at the end of this Section, and in Part 
III (pp.273ff.)
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By the comparative structure for Q [a compara­
tive character) we shall understand the (n + 1)-tuple 
(Q,6^, 6^) comprising all comparison figures for Q
in context; which determines all positional characters 
yielding values of Q in that context. 1 shall consider, 
now, factors affecting the choice of standard series 
with respect to which a system of determinations of such 
values can be made more coherent, in contexts where more 
than one series may be recognized. It will be con­
venient to confine attention, initially, to the restriction 
of this concept to the base set of a particular com­
parison figure 6 for Q, the Q-values of whose members are 
determined by positions in S: we shall call this a
comparative pair on Q , namely the pair CQ,6). In cases 
like the "left-right" array of "a"s above, which are 
typical of many naturally occurring contexts of value- 
comparison, nothing can usefully be added to the obser­
vation that the choice .is logically arbitrary, depending 
only on practical matters such as stability, familiarity 
and ease of unambiguous recognition. In many quite 
ordinary contexts, however, familiar objects may be 
chosen so as to form a system of series which can be 
recognized as equivalently standard with respect to some 
V-character, in a way now to be formally analysed. Such 
a system will be called a standard set for a given com­
parative pair (Q,5); and will be shown to have formal 
properties which prove relevant, in due course, to the 
analysis of measurement contexts. We shall see in those
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contexts that questions concerned with possible equiva­
lences between values determined in standard sets gener­
ated by different comparison figures for the same V- 
character (or quantity, in measurement) are fundamen­
tally S-theoretical; though the relevant S-theoretical 
commitments may readily become incorporated in R-theories, 
and will in any case be subject to the ultimate test of 
consistency with perceptual recognitions.
We shall first define the following 2-character
of 6-equivalence, on any progressive 2-character 6:
2
DIO. For all pairs (x,y)e S^, where %[6], the asso-
%
ciated 2-character 6 (6-equivalence) is given by: 
6/x,y ^  X ^ y A (Vz)((6/x,z ^  6/y,z) a  ( 6 / z ,x
6/z,y))
Note: It follows that = P^, since the principal con­
dition ensures that the memberships of the PDs of x and 
y for 6 are identical. It is important to realise, how­
ever, that recognition of the condition as stated for
as
6/x,y is logically prior to the recognition of the iden­
tity of position; although it may appear as if the con­
verse derivation is formally possible. In the first 
place, the definition of 6 as progressive requires that 
at least one more distinct member of the base set must 
be recognized if the condition is to be recognized as 
satisfied; since 6 is asymmetric, we must have at least 
one pair of distinct idents characterized by 6: and our
condition gives 6/x,y 6/y,y and 6/y,x 6/x,x, an
obvious contradiction. Recognition that the condition
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of DIO holds for a pair x,y requires that each 6-con­
figuration involving x or y is determined and found con­
sistent with that condition, either by immediate recog­
nition of that configuration, or under a prior commit­
ment of the R-theory. Thus, in principle, recognition 
of the complete structure of 6 is prior to that of satis­
faction of DIO, and so to that of the identity of position 
of X and y . The condition DIO is, of course, to be read 
as a commitment of the R-theory of the context in each 
case, holding that just those 6-configurations involving 
X or y which satisfy the condition are recognized, and 
none which contradict it: recalling that all implications
invoked in this study are to be read strictly as confined 
to the universe of the relevant theory, either as 
commitments of the theory or derivations from these.
The form of the standard set, now to be defined, 
makes use of the prior commitments determined by the 
recognized progressivity of 6, and by the structure of 
its associated 6-figure, to construct a strongly coherent 
system within which recognitions of 6-configurations 
can be articulated. Some useful properties of this 
construction, and the kinds of empirical conditions in 
which its rather strong requirements may be satisfied, 
will be analysed following the formal treatment.
Dll. A standard set Sg C  S for the comparative pair
(Q,6) is given by:
( i )  (VxesJ) ( 3 y )  (yeSjACâ/x.yvô/y.xvC^sfXSjÇSg
,S'A (x,yeS^))
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where is to be read, 'there is a 6-series
Sg satisfying D5, p .105).
(ii) For all x, y , c
6/x,y (:3z)(zESgA((6/x,zA6/y,z)v(6/z,xA6/z,y))).
i.e.» all members of belong to at least one 6-next pair, 
which may belong to a 6-series; and we shall see that in 
any such series (each of whose members must, by D5, belong 
to a 6-next pair) either member of a 6-next pair may be 
replaced by any 6-equivalent ident in so as to satisfy 
the'conditions for a 6-next pair forming part of an alter­
native series.
We may associate with each member x e S^an equi­
valence set (or 6-set) which we shall abbreviate
= {y: 6/x,y}: any such set may, however, be empty.
Theorem (pll). Where C Q  C  is the set of all 6-positional 
characters assigned to the members of a standard set 
for the comparative pair (Q,6) such that V[C',Q], (Q,6)
determines a simple order on C , in terms of the non-recog-
6
nitive relation >. (A 'simple order' is one which is
Q
transitive and antisymmetric.)
The conditions for are satisfied by a single
6-next pair, or by just two 6-sets whose product consists 
of 6-next pairs: in which case either choice of dominant
relation in 6 immediately determines the same simple order 
on every such pair. In the more general case, where 
one or more 6-series are recognized in S^, there is a 
sense in which these can be called equivalently standard
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series. Using these as counting-series, and assigning 
the same number to the identical positional characters 
of 6-equivalent idents in different series, we can write 
the value set C = {P^, ..., P^^, for suitable n, such 
that for all x z we have:
(3k)(l S k < n A A Pj^ /x A (Vy)C6/x,y P% = P%)).
(The possibility of a gap in the count is ruled out by the
final bracket in Dll(i), which determines that any pair 
% 2
in (5^) belongs to at least one 6-series; including 
the extreme cases of 6-sets of members having no predeces­
sor, or no successor, in any series. These we naturally 
choose to assign P^ and P^, where n is the total number 
of 6-equivalent sets, and members with no 6-equivalents, 
in Sg.) Clearly, this system of assignments determines 
a simple order on C\ homomorphic with that on the natural 
numbers 1 to n.
Proof : The cases where Sg contains no series, and only
one or more 6-next pairs, have been shown to meet the con­
dition self-evidently. To show that the counting-system 
set out above can be carried out in all other cases, it 
is necessary and sufficient to show that we can choose 
at least one maximal series S ^ C  with first and last 
members x,y such that P^/x and P^/y, and
(Va e 3~)(2k)(k e 5^ a (6/a,k v a = k) ) . We shall first
prove:
(Vx,y,z) (x,y,z c + (6/x,y a 6/x,z 6/y,z)) ... (1)
sa
6/x,y A 6/x,z -► 6/y,z ... by DIO
Suppose there is w e such that 6/y,w a 6/w,z;
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6/x,y A 6/y,w 6/x,w ... by DIO
whence 6/x,w a  6 / w , z ; contra 6/x,z 
and”! ( 3 w) (6/y,w a 6 / w , z ) 6/y,z ... by D4
Now let k be any chosen member of as defined by Dll.
Then either there is some j e such that 6/j",k, which 
we shall call its 'predecessor' or there is not. If 
there is not, we shall take k as our first member of the 
maximal series 5^. If there is, then j either has a 
predecessor distinct from j or k (since 6 is progres­
sive), or not. If not, we take j as the first member 
of if so, this predecessor either has its own pre­
decessor or not. Since S is finite, C  S is finite, 
and so in this manner we shall eventually reach some x 
which has no predecessor, and which is either identical 
with k, or its predecessor, or connected with k by a 
recognized ^-series consisting of members of We
shall take such an x as our first member and assign it 
the position given by P^/x (we have tacitly taken the 
"left-to-right" relation in any pair (x,k) such that 
6/x,k is our dominant relation for counting). Similarly 
we shall find a last member y , with no successor, to be 
assigned the PC P^, where n is the number of members of 
the series containing x, k and y , which we take as 
our maximal series. (Note that 3(]3a)(ô/a,x), since 
such an a is either the predecessor of x, or there is a 
series connecting a and x containing such a predecessor; 
and similarly 3(]]a)(6/y,a).)
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^ SConsider now any chosen a e such that a i S
s(where S  ^ S ; then either 6/x,a or 6/x,a, or there
is a series in connecting x and a. In any case
s ' 2there is an alternative series S c  Sg containing x and 
a, such that (writing b,c e such that 6/x,b a 6/b,c 
- including the case c = y), either
(i) 6/x,a A 6/a,b (by (1) above), consists just
of a and all members of but x, and P^/a;
(ii) 6/x,a, whence 6/a,b a  6/a,c (again, by ( 1 ) ) ,
s ^ sS consists of the members of 5 replacing b
by a, and P 2/a; or
g 1 • •
( i i i )  there are members d,e e S such that 6/x,d a  6/d,e
(including the case e = a). Now
5/x,b A S/x,d gives either b = d or 6/b,d, and
in either case 6/b,c -+ 6/d,c;
6/d,c A 6/d,e gives either c = e or 6/c,e.
% s '
Then either e = a and 6/c,a, S consists of x,d,a
and all members of after c (if any); or,
proceeding in this manner, showing that each
s 'successive member of 5 is either identical with,
or 6-equivalent to, a corresponding member of S^,
we shall eventually reach some member k c such 
= s '
6/a,k, the membership of 5 being determined 
accordingly. The case 6/y,a being ruled out, 
either k = y and P^/a, or a is assigned a value 
P^ of Q with 2 < k < n such that P^Vk.
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All this may seem to be labouring the obvious, 
since we are familiar with so many structures of this sort.
However, the empirical conditions for the recognition of
such a structure are actually quite severe, and will be 
explored shortly after the definition, below, of an 
approximate set associated with a standard set as just 
defined.
D12. The approximate set with respect to a standard 
set Sg is given by:
(Vw) (w e Sg) w / Sg A (3x,y,z) (x,y,z e a
6/x,y A 6/y,z a  6/x,w a  6/w,z)
In such a case we recognize an associated 6-figure, such 
that 6/w,y.
Note that if the same condition were fulfilled by w such 
that w e it would follow that w = y or 6/w,y, and
6/x,w A 6/w,z; the proof is just a restriction of that 
in para, (iii) above to a standard series of just three 
members. The empirical interpretation of the difference 
between these two cases will be considered shortly. First 
I wish to draw two useful conclusions from the definition 
of an approximate set in D12.
Corollaries
(1) (Vv) (6/y,v A 6/w,y 6/w,v) . This follows easily,
substituting v for y in D12.
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(2) n  (^»y E Sg A 6/x,y A Ô / Z , K  A ô/z,y). By Dll x,y
belong to at least one series in 5^, so there exist
% .
a,b e such that 6/x,a a  6/b,y. Then if
6/z,x A 6/z,y, we have 6/z,a a  6/b,z (by D12); 
whence 6/b,a. \
6/b,y -► "I (6/b,a a  6/a,y) , whence "l(5/a,y);
6/z,a ^ 3(d/x,y a 6/y,a) , whence "l(6/y,a); 
whence 6/a,y; and similarly 6/b,x; so that 
6/x,y A 6/b,a. But we have 6/b,z a  6/z,a; which 
contradicts 6/b,a by D4.
Terminology
Thus for each (x,k) such that x  e a  P j^ / x
-k ~there is a potential subset C which we will call
”" kthe k-cluster, given by = {y: 6/y,x a  P^/x }, which
may be either empty or indefinitely large. Plainly, if
6/x,y then x and y determine the same k-cluster. The
k-cluster is not an equivalence set, since the 6-figure is
not recognized for pairs in that cluster, but only for
z
pairs drawn from Indeed, the definitions do not
exclude 6/a,x a 6/b,x a 6/a,b; we shall see that this 
condition may have a plausible empirical interpretation.
We may thus define a non-recognitive relation on 
the value sets (C— C ) X C~, called the approximation 
relation given by: (j3x)(P%/x a 6/y,x),
and read 'the value of y approximates P^'; noting that 
if the values of a and b approximate P^, their values are 
not necessarily or typically identical.
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Notes
(a) The definitions permit the recognition of standard
sets for more than one comparison figure with respect to 
one V-character Q; and if so, the members of one may be 
assigned to the approximate set of the other. This case 
will be considered in a context of measurement, but neg­
lected at this stage. We may also have more than one 
standard set for the same comparison pair (for example, 
where they are widely separated in Q-values); but this 
does not make for a coherent R-theory, or interesting 
analysis, and will not be considered again. Where only 
one comparison figure is under consideration, the 6 symbol
6 5
may be omitted from >,-: and if only one V-character is
Q Q
concerned, and no ambiguity can result, Q also may be 
omitted.
(b) The references in Dll to the comparative character
Q and its associated value-set C' (within which the 
subset C is distinguished) do not occur essentially in 
that definition; it is at least formally plausible to 
suppose the recognition of a 6-figure, with all its asso­
ciated structural properties including standard and appro­
ximate sets, without associating with it any assignments
of values of a comparative character. But this case 
holds no interest for us here, which is why I have intro­
duced the association with Q-values from the start. Of 
great interest, however, is the case where more than one 
comparative character is associated with a single 6-figure;
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as where values of "ripeness" are derived from the same 
récognitive figure as those of "redness". These, as 
we have seen, are most commonly cases of the incorporation 
of S-theory into R-theory specific to the context; and 
will prove of the first importance in contexts of measure­
ment .
More trivially, for any comparative pair (Q,6), 
alternative choices of dominant counting relation will 
yield opposing orders for what are, at least verbally, 
different V-characters (so that we might wish to call one 
Q, and the other -Q): e.g., "distance from the left,
from the right", or "warmth, coolness".
(c) ' To illustrate the empirical interpretation of Dll,
D12, consider first the arrays e ^ ^ ; p sS: We
shall use 6 = the "left-right" figure as comparison figure 
for Q = "distance (of an ident) from the left side of 
the page" (again taking the "left-to-right" as the domi­
nant counting direction, reading 6/x,y as "y is to the 
right of x", and deriving "the distance of y from the left 
of the page is greater than that of x", or >(P^,Pp. The
S-theoretical aspects of this derivation will emerge 
during the treatment of distance, or length, measurement, 
in Part III).
I have made use of the given metric properties of 
the type-spacing system so that it is easy to take the 
series a,b,c,d; e,f,g; p,q,r as standard series whose 
union can be taken as the standard set in context. Taking 
the spacing between members of these series as the least
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recognized (not least perceptible) standard difference 
of distance in context, we can see that s,t do not belong 
to this set. We can also see, for example, that b is 
Q-equal to f, and that a,f,c,d or e,b,g,(d) are equi­
valently standard with the series already mentioned; 
a, ..., r can be taken as maximal series, choosing any 
suitable intermediates from the standard set. Putting
6/p,q and 6/q,r, we exclude by definition 6/p,z a  6/s,q
or 6/q,t A 6/t,r. We may, consistently with the defi­
nitions, take 6/p,s a 6/s,t a 6/t,r: but, if so, no
6-configuration involving the pairs (s,q) and Cq,t) can 
be recognized consistently with taking p,q,r as a series 
in the standard set. The series p,s,t,r is non-standard, 
and we can take 6/s,q and 6/t,q.
(d) Although I have made use of metric properties in
the above illustration, I have not appealed to their 
theoretical structure as such, relying rather on intuitive 
perceptions of apparently regular intervals of distance.
A degree of arbitrariness is inherent in such a context, 
which may nevertheless be quite adequate for the purpose 
in hand. This aspect of the matter becomes clearer when 
we recall the early use of parts of the human body as stan­
dards of length: the thumb-joint, hand-width, hand-span,
forearm, adult male stride, etc. Though these later 
become conventionalised as more or less precisely defined 
metric standards in many cultures, they can still be used 
in a purely intuitive, non-quantitative way today. To
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take an example even more clearly independent of metric 
theory, consider how we might use the sizes of familiar 
animals to describe those of unfamiliar exotic species, 
saying that one is "about the size of a rat", while 
others might be "more the size of a mouse, rabbit, cat, 
sheep, donkey, horse, ... etc." If we were to pick just 
one "about the size of a rat", it might be understood 
rather vaguely as indicating that this one familiar animal 
was chosen from a reasonably closely-spaced (but unspeci­
fied) series as that to which the unknown exotic most 
closely approximates in size. Or, asked, "Well, just how 
exact is that?", we might say, "Bigger than a mouse and 
smaller than a rabbit", or "Bigger than a hamster and 
smaller than a guinea-pig". To get closer than that, we 
might have to look to measurement.
The simplest case is the standard set consisting 
of a single 6-next pair, with no approximate set: a
simple comparison, with no implications to other valuations, 
such as, "That basket is too small for that dog".
The essential foundation for any empirical inter­
pretation of the structures set out in DIO, 11, 12, if it 
is to offer a prospect of overall consistency and coherence 
of recognition, lies in the specific interpretations for 
the particular context of the notion of a '6-next pair' as 
previously defined (D4). This amounts to a strategy of 
neglect adopted for the R-theory according to which, under 
the condition (^c) (a ^ c ^ b  ^ 6/a,c a  6/c,b)) in D4, 
certain particular 6-configurations are recognized in a
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standard set and all others excluded by fiat in such a way 
that the strong commitments adopted for that set may 
rationally be expected to be met. The sole criteria for 
the validity of such a stragegy are that both clearness 
of separations between values, and closeness of deter­
mination of individual values, shall be adequate for 
the purposes of the context and yield consistent results. 
Thus the choice of strategy is both logically arbitrary 
and strongly context-dependent; the internal logical 
consistency of the R-theory being the main aim of the 
construction.
In some cases this aim can be secured by simply 
selecting members of a standard set in context so that
(a) 6-next configurations are recognized in the set so 
as to form at least one maximal series, and (b) every 
member of the set is recognized as either identical or
6-equivalent to a member of at least one such maximal 
series. More often in practice, however, not all rele­
vant 8-next configurations or 8-equivalences are imme­
diately recognized at once, some or all being, as it were, 
reconstituted from memory or what is sometimes called 
'background knowledge'. This is seen in this study as a 
matter of inductive theory: a notion which will be more
clearly specified after the full treatment of récognitive 
sequence (time-sequence in the R-theory) in the next 
Section; and explored as a fundamental philosophical 
concept in Part IV. At this stage it need only be said 
that the inductive nature of such commitments requires
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that they be attached to sets of idents by virtue of 
certain relatively stable and familiar character-assign- 
ments, other than assignments of relative value, associated 
in memory or general knowledge with previous 6 -next con­
figurations involving pairs of these idents or relevantly 
similar pairs. To make sense of our animal-sizing example 
above, both utterer and interpreters must once have seen, 
or known by illustration or description, how "mice, rats, 
and rabbits" would look if appropriately compared.
All these considerations apply equally to standard 
sets used in measurement. The main difference is that 
non-metric standards rely on regularities and familiarities 
occurring naturally or "by accident", and chosen from what 
is suitable and available; while metric standards (with 
few but important exceptions) are specially constructed 
for the purpose, and must fulfil additional conditions.
"By accident" here means without human contrivance for the 
purpose : it does not exclude the use of building bricks,
for instance, as intuitive standards for length, weight, 
or even colour. However, the nature of these demands 
makes it less than surprising that living things, because 
their genetic organization is the main source of human- 
scale regularities in the world, figure prominently in 
non-metric contexts of value-comparison. Dogs, however, 
because of the way we have manipulated their breeding 
habits, will not do unless a well-known breed or a par­
ticular dog is specified.
Finally, before analysing the notions of récognitive
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time-structure in terms of an R-sequence, I want to point 
to certain aspects of the type of order structure on 
values of a comparative character which emerges from the 
above analysis. Although other methods of formal des­
cription may be possible, this analysis has been construc­
ted to reflect certain intuitions about perceptual com­
parison, especially:
(1) The relation of exact equality is not recognizable, 
since elements which appear equal for some comparative 
character may always be unequal at some finer level of 
discrimination, whether perceptible or not.
(2) Ambiguous relations of the form ' :< ' are also 
unrecognizable (except, perhaps, in special cases of no 
theoretical importance); since such a recognition can 
always be read as a disjunction of the form '..<...or
which is consistent with '=’ and therefore 
with ' > ’. The form ’*[^(Pg ,P^) ’, in C-theoretical terms, 
which may be read as formally equivalent, is to be read 
strictly as saying that there is no recognized figure 
6/x,y from which such a relation is to be derived; 
taking account of the strategy of neglect adopted for the 
relevant R-theory. It need have nothing to do with a 
"least perceptible" inequality, if such a notion has 
meaning. In measurement contexts, where arithmetical 
properties are attributed to values in the standard 
structure, we shall see that the notion of least recog­
nized inequality can, by contrast, be given precise 
meaning, in arithmetical terms.
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(3) The present analysis restricts the existence of 
6
^-relations to cases where the relevant comparative pair 
(Q,8) is recognized, and either the appropriate 6-confi- 
guration is immediately recognized 0£ it can be derived 
from other such recognitions, by extrapolation, using 
commitments of the R-theory for which schemata have been, 
or will shortly be, provided. One of the most fruitful 
of these is the commitment to the progressivity of 6, 
and therefore of built into our definition of the com­
parative pair. The intuition this claims to capture is 
that the kinds of récognitive comparison, and associated 
valuation, we are analysing here can only be clearly
understood if it is assumed that this property holds for
all configurations and derived valuations determined for 
the same time (the same R-frame, whatever its duration, 
during which assignments do not change), under a particular 
R-theory: i.e., for any one Reader of the context. No
strictly récognitive commitment to progressivity outside 
such limits seems to me plausible; commitments to con­
stancy or universality of any particular system of value- 
relations belong to the realm of substantive theory (S- 
theory). The ways in which such commitments may be
associated with, or incorporated in, R-theories, will be
considered in contexts of measurement (Part III).
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Summary of Sections A - D: R-frame and Structural Commitments
The R-frame has been defined (AlO) as a pair con­
sisting of an assignment structure (Al-8) and a compo- 
site Structures (A9). F* is a septuple consisting of 
the set S of idents, the sets C  >C 2 unary and binary 
characters, the corresponding assignment functions f, f2 , 
and the figures i],T of enclosure and contiguity. This 
frame structure is intended to reflect the form of a con­
text of recognition over a period of time (however short 
or long) during which no recognized changes of characteri­
zation occur: in terms of the characterizations of idents,
or configurations of pairs of idents, and their recognized 
compositions as wholes consisting of distinct parts.
The structure of characterization consists of 
assignments of perceptually recognized (or recognizable) 
properties (the characters) to spatially-bounded entities 
(the idents): each boundary being recognized in terms of
differentiating boundary-characters assigned to the idents 
either side of the boundary. These boundary-characters 
are not a special kind of characters, but any characters 
recognized as determining boundaries; a boundary need be 
no more, but must be no less, sharply determined than the 
purposes of the context require. The conditions for boun- 
dary-discrimination, and consequent distinctions between 
idents, are determined for each R-frame by the relevant 
structural commitments of the R-theory in which th^ R-frame 
occurs. Typical forms of structural commitment have been
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schematized as restrictions on the determination of the 
assignment functions f, f2 for chosen sets of unary or 
binary characters respectively. The restrictions on 
f (Cl-9) include one-place commitments of separativity 
and atomicity (Cl,2), and two-place commitments of dis- 
tinctivity, exclusivity and scalarity (C3-5), on which a 
weak notion of scale is defined (C7). The restrictions 
on f2 (Dl-S) are defined on commitments of asymmetry and 
transitivity (Dl,2); from which a series structure is 
derived for any suitable binary figure oL (D5). This 
involves the use of a strategy of neglect in determining 
a secondary ’(Xrnexf figure associated with &  (D4) . Full 
notes on the concept of neglect in C-theory are at 
pp. 6 6 ff.
The definition of a positional function IT is 
used to derive a notion of position in any suitable figure 
(D6). This may be associated in some cases with a quite 
distinct notion, defined in terms of a valuative function 
A,of a set of characters, recognized with respect to a 
single, distinct character, as values of that character 
(D8); in such a way that configurations of a particular 
figure can be recognized as comparisons of values for the 
associated valuative character, and a position in the figure 
corresponds with a value of the character. This pair 
of notions is specially fruitful where the comparison 
figure can be used to generate series; in which case 
positions in a series are naturally associated with an 
ordered range of values. This last notion is strictly
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substantive and non-récognitive ; i.e., it belongs
strictly not to any instantiating R-theory, but to its 
associated S-theory. But in particular cases such a 
structure may become incorporated in the R-theory.
For preliminary discussion of R-theory, S-theory and 
the concept of incorporation, see notes on theoretical 
structure at p.48 : these aspects are fully developed
later. The structures of T1 and A are, however, 
strictly R-theoretical.
The notion of whole/part composition is fully 
discussed in note (f) to Section A (pp.6 8ff): it has
its most important development for this study in the 
notion of characteristic sets or F-sets (Section B, 
pp. 72 ff). These are sets of idents recognized as com­
posing distinct wholes, whose members are their parts, by 
virtue of a shared set of characters: each such F-set
contains a bound-ident which may or may not share the 
F-determinant set of characters, according to the struc­
tural commitments of the R-theory for that set. It has 
been said that the full importance of these F-sets, and 
the main basis for their recognition, depends on the con­
current adoption of specific commitments (other than those 
of composition itself) for their determinant sets of 
characters: this applies specially (though not only) to
what will be called sequential commitments: i.e., those
adopted for more than one frame in a temporal sequence 
of frames of an R-theory. They include commitments of 
constancy, implication and extrapolation: the importance
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of their association with F-sets will emerge clearly in 
the following Sections E, F, on R-sequence and sequential 
commitments, summarised on p .172 f.
E. The Récognitive Sequence (R-sequence)
The R-sequence will be defined with respect to 
a sequence of R-frames {Fq , ..., F^, ..., F^} adopted by 
a particular Reader R (an individual perceiving subject); 
such that each frame has the form defined for the R- 
frame in Sections A, B above. We shall write:
'"k ° k^/^ k^  ' "here = (S%,C^ ,C^ 2,fk,f%2'^ k'^ k)'
satisfying the definitions Al-8; and satisfies A9 
with respect to FjJ,. (see preceding summary) . The con­
ditions now to be defined for the R-sequence are those 
under which the Reader is taken to recognize a particular 
sequence of R-frames as governed by a single R-theory 
(and hence belonging to a single context). Since this 
will involve assignments (by the Reader) of characters to 
idents and configurations for frames other than those at 
(the time of) which these assignments are made (i.e., 
assignments relating to times other than "the present" 
at any frame), we introduce the following abbreviations: 
EDI. i  ^ ^»k , i^^k : at R-frame F^, the set of
characters C', or the character P, is assigned to 
the ident x for the R-frame F^.
ED2. : at R-frame F^, the set
of binary characters, or the binary character a.
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is assigned to the pair (x,y) for the R-frame 
(Cases may occur under FD1,2 where F^ is earlier or later 
than F^, or identical with it.)
We now define:
El. F is a R-sequence with respect to the ordered (n+1)- 
tuple {Fq , — , F^, F^) of R-frames for a
Reader R iff:
F = (S,C,C2,S^,0,0^) such that:
=U{s(^_^}, and:
(i) (a) 0 is a sequence of functions Qq _j^ from S into
PC y associated one-to-one with frames F^_^, 
whose values are given by:
@u(x,k) {P:P e C A i£Z^k} : such that:
(b) (Vx,i.j.k)(0 < i < j < n 9^(x,k)C 8j(x,k)); 
and:
(c) (VP) (P e Cy. +(gx,i)(x E A P E e^(x,k)).
2
(d) 0 2 is a sequence of functions ®o2-n2 S 
into PC2 , associated one-to-one with frames 
^0-n* whose values are given by:
e^2 (x,y,k) =^£ {a:a e C2 a i— - ^ k } ; such that:
(e) (Vx,y,i,j,k)(0 < i < j < n -»
8i2(x,y,k)g: GjgCX'y'k)); and:
(f) (Va) (a E Cj^ 2 ^Qx^y^i) (x,y E 3% A a E EL2 (x,y,k)).
(ii) (Vx,j)(x E S ^ A X E S ^ A i < j < k - ) - X E  S.),
( i i i )  (V k ) ( l  < k < n + f  f ( k - l )  '' hz ^  f ( k - l ) 2 ) )
Notes
(a) It follows from (i) (a) that, for. all x,k, 8^ (x,k) = f^ (x) ;
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and from (i)(d) that for all x,y,k, 9^2 
= fk2 (x,y)' (The value of fj^ 2 (^>y) for any particular
x,y,k may, of course, be the empty set 0.) Within this
P / Xframework, the expression i—^ k  emerges as an abbreviated 
form of P e 6^(x,k), in the same way that, for the 
single fram, P/x abbreviates P e f(x) - and similarly for 
i— — --^ k . The reason for introducing the 8-functions is 
to reflect an important conceptual difference between 
recognitions in successive "presents", dominated by the 
evidence of immediate perception, and (typically partial) 
characterizations of idents over a succession of frames, 
"past", "present" and "future", in a manner which is 
dependent on commitments going beyond the perceptual 
evidence. The forms of the relevant sequential commit­
ments of the R-theory are the subject of the next Section. 
Just as structural commitments restrict assignments under 
0 and 02 in the R-sequence. Formally, each function 9^  
assigns a sequence of characterizations to each ident, 
reflecting its "life-history" as understood at a particular 
time, that of the frame F^; taken together, all such 
characterizations form a major contribution to what we 
shall call the state-of-the-theory at that frame. Clearly, 
the structure of an R-theory changes over time, both in 
terms of assignments and associated commitments.
(b) Since the basic sets S, C, C2 , S o f  the R-
sequence are defined only as unions of the corresponding 
sets in each frame of the sequence, it is consistent with
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this account that there should be no members in common 
between (any pair of) different frames. Such a situation 
would be very untypical, bearing in mind that the analysis 
presupposes a Reader's adoption of the structure as 
falling under a single R-theory throughout. But it may 
perhaps not be unexampled. Consider the case of a popu­
lation of "caterpillars" which are recognized as turning, 
simultaneously, into a population of "butterflies". No 
characters are recognized as common to caterpillars and 
butterflies; nor can any one butterfly be strictly iden­
tified with a corresponding caterpillar. We may have 
some substantive theory by which the transformation is 
explained, involving constant elements which survive it. 
But, whatever these may be, they are not recognizable; 
they may indeed be neglected without endangering the con­
tinuity of the R-theory. The philosophical problems of 
identity raised by such a case are more deeply considered 
in Part IV. Meanwhile, the best we can say is that for 
some reason (perhaps because the transformation takes place 
inside a glass case) we are committed to strict identity 
for a r-bound ident determined as bounding "caterpillars" 
in one frame and "butterflies" in the next.
More" generally, however, it is not uncommon for 
either characters or idents to occur in some frames of a 
sequence and not in others. For more discussion, see note
(d) below on frame-changes.
(c) Only two forms of continuity are defined into the
R-sequence as such. One is the weak form of continuity
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for idents under condition (ii), which says effectively 
that nothing can be recognized in two successive frames 
without being supposed to exist in intervening frames, if 
any. (Its characterizations in intervening frames may, 
perhaps, be almost completely neglected.) This is taken 
to be the weakest possible form of commitment consistent 
with our intuitive notions about the persistence of 
objects. It is, for example, perfectly consistent with 
instances of theories involving "quantum jumps" which 
preserve identity over discontinuities of time (or space).
The second form of continuity is that for charac­
terization under conditions (i) (b) and (e): that all
assignments to idents or configurations, once determined 
for a particular frame, remain constant for that frame.
This is an undoubted idealization: we typically change
our minds about details of characterization during the 
course of a context, without feeling that our whole 
understanding of.that context is destroyed. No general 
rule can, I think, be proposed under which it can be deter­
mined whether a particular change in characterization (for 
a particular ident or configuration at a particular time) 
is to be regarded merely as a revision of the relevant 
theory, as the replacement of that theory by another, or 
as a total disruption of understanding. What the present 
analysis proposes is that the least that can properly be 
said is that such a change demands either revision or 
abandonment of the theory. It will be assumed that revision
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of R-theories (however simple and intuitive or sophisti­
cated and rigorous) is a common feature, and philsophi- 
cally unproblematic. This is another, and more crucial 
aspect of theory-change underlying the importance of the 
notion of the state-of-the-theory at a given frame, 
mentioned above (p. 1 4 9 note (a)).
(d) Condition (iii) of El provides the structure
of frame-change. Recalling that the R-frame is defined 
so that no recognized change of characterization takes 
place within it (see also note (e) below), this condition 
says in effect that each frame is distinguished from the 
next by at least one change of characterization. Since 
all characterization for Fy, is determined by f^ and fj^ 2 > 
the condition as framed is necessary and sufficient for 
a change as between and Fy., Thus, f^  ^  ^ ^k-1 entails
either 0x) (x g Sj^a x 6 S A £j^ (x) # 21
0x) (x e Sjj,A X or (0x) (x^ J^A xs . In
each case, the range of f is different in the two frames; 
in the last two cases, the domain also differs (the do­
main cannot change without the range also changing, by A4). 
Alternatively, f^ 2  ^^(k-1)2 entails that either there is 
at least one pair x,y whose binary characterization is 
different in the two frames, or there is at least one 
pair in one of the frames, one or both of whose members 
is absent from the other frame. Defining an event for 
C-theory as either a pair (x,k) or a triple (x,y,k) for 
which one of these conditions holds, El (iii) can be read
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as saying that at least one such event determines a frame- 
change identifiable with the pair ( ^ Ik-l ' Such 
frame-changes are often over-determined, in the sense 
that more than one event determines the same change; it 
is common for some kinds of event to be picked out as 
mark-events in association with which other contemporaneous 
events are situated in time. This role is analogous to 
that described for characters used as marks distinguishing 
idents or their boundaries in space (p.5 6 note (b) , 
and p.6 2 (d)(ii)).
It has been said that in all cases 0^(x,k) = f^(x), 
and similarly for 0 (note (a) above). Characterizations 
for Fy under 0 ^,0^2 where i k may of course be incomplete: 
indeed, new characterizations for Fy may be added at a 
later frame in some cases. Similar considerations apply 
to the recognition of particular idents as members of S y  
at different times. This incompleteness of recognition 
or characterization need not mean, for instance, that a 
particular frame-change is not determined until it occurs. 
But this can obviously happen; the conditions mean only 
that, once a frame-change has been recognized, it remains 
a feature of the R-theory.
Where such a change involves the occurrence of 
an ident in one frame but not in the preceding or succee­
ding one, it is not necessary to interpret this intuitively 
as a case of "creation" or "annihilation"; the recog­
nition of what I shall call new or ceased idents in par­
ticular contexts is generally interpretable, in principle
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at some level of theory, as a rearrangement of persistent 
elements so as to yield different structures of recog­
nizable idents. The "birth" or "death" of an "animal"
(to sidestep the question of souls) are only among the 
more dramatic examples; bound-idents of nerw or ceased 
composites - a very large class indeed, as we shall see - 
are the principal candidates. Among these, configurations 
are prominent; all recognitions of motion involve succes­
sive changes in structures of enclosure, and so of enclo­
sure configurations which may be recognized as composed.
(e) Not all perceived changes constitute recognized
character-changes determining changes of R-frame. Aspects 
of idents perceived as forms of continual change - steady, 
intermittent or random movement, variation of colour, 
shape, size or temperature, for example - may be recog­
nized as persistent characters, a frame-change being 
recognized only when some particular kind of change occurs 
which is attended to, as relevant to the particular R- 
theory. That is, recognition of time-boundaries between 
frames, like that of space-boundaries between idents within 
a frame, are subject to the principle of attention and neg­
lect . Most of us will be content to characterize a gold­
fish as "swimming about" in its tank, even if it is some- 
tmes still; paying attention only, perhaps, if it stops 
and floats to the surface, or jumps out. A biologist, 
on the other hand, may be concerned with changes of speed 
or direction associated with the presence of certain
155
chemicals or nutrients, measuring these effects on a 
chosen plan in which particular variations are seen as 
significant changes of behaviour, marking frame-changes.
But even the biologist will neglect variations between 
chosen limits, related to his theory. They need not be 
the utmost limits of perception.
F. Sequential Commitments; and the Logic of Récognitive 
Implication
Just as the realisation of any particular instance 
of the structure defined for a single R-frame is dependent 
on the adoption by a Reader of specific structural commit­
ments for chosen sets of characters (Sections C,D), so 
the realisation of an instance of an R-sequence is depen­
dent on the adoption of forms of commitment, which will be 
called sequential: specific to sets of characters chosen
for attention in context. As for structural commitments,
I can offer no more than schematic analyses of typical 
forms of sequential commitments. These cannot be shown to 
be exhaustive of all possible forms, but, as before, are 
claimed to cover a wide range of commitments found in prac­
tice, including all those with which we shall be concerned 
in this study - and by no means confined to contexts of 
measurement.
(1) F-sets and the logic of assignment
All commitments of R-theory are assumed expressible
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in terms of relations of implication governing conjunctions
or disjunctions of assignments of the general form 
C ' /xi— ^k, as defined for the R-sequence. In the state-of- 
the-theory at a given frame the totality of such assign­
ments determines a frame-structure for F^. At any frame
F^, the state-of-the-theory with respect to any C^x,k for 
C ' /xwhich i— ^ k  may be taken to incorporate all commitments 
involving the assignment of members of C' for Fy, subject 
to all revisions up to F^. Thus the membership of the 
set {x: C' C  f^(x)} may be regarded as fixed for F^ and 
any set C ' Q  c at any state of the theory; though not 
necessarily identical at all such states, consistence of 
any earlier state with a later state is secured if neces­
sary by revisions at the later state, if the theory sur­
vives. The further assumption is then made that the 
adoption for the R-theory of any general commitment at 
any frame with respect to assignments of particular sets 
of characters for any sequence of frames (including, espe­
cially, the dependence of any such assignments on those 
of other sets of characters) involves the prior recog­
nition, in principle, of these sets as composed; i.e., 
to their recognition as F-sets for the appropriate frames 
(Section B, pp.72 ff.). It therefore becomes of interest 
to analyse the structure of F-sets, and in particular 
their structures of union, intersection and complement, 
as these are related to disjunctions and conjunctions of 
the relevant particular assignments. Modifying our
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notation for the I-set to take account of sequential 
structure, we now write:
(ifkc,); where
= {y: n%/y,x a  ... FDI
Under the above assumptions, any such set is 
either empty or fixed in its composition in the state 
of the theory at any frame F^.
It will be convenient to analyse the structures 
of unions, intersects and complements for composites in 
general, before examining these structures in the special 
case of F-sets (for the definition of composites, see 
Subsection A(2) , p.54)«
Consider now the ident-sets U,ti',U”c  S such 
that (U) ,CW) ,(U") e S^:
(a) Putting Ü" = U U U'r
(i) (Vx) (t/x, (U") 4-^  ( ^  a) (a e U v a e U') a x/x,a)
(ii) (Vx) (n/x, (U") (2 a) ( (a e U v a e U') a n/x,a)
(iii) (Vx) (n/(U") ,x (Va) ( (n/a, (U) v n/a,(U')) n/a,x) 
(all by virtue of the corresponding conditions for 
composites in A9, p.Si ).
Thus the logical equivalence (U”) = (U U U'), 
where U” = U U W  , generates no contradictions or ambiguities, 
and may be freely used in further construction. Moreover, 
the bound-idents (U),(U') are members of their respective 
component sets (whether or not, in the case of F-sets, 
they belong to the respective base sets); and satisfy all
158
conditions as components of (U"). So we may recognize 
unproblematically the further composite ( Q ) , ÇÜ ') ) 
such that (TPQ = , (TT^ .
(b) Putting U" = U n W  , a similar construction is available 
by putting ( a e U _ A a e U ' )  in the appropriate 
brackets in (i) and (ii), and (n/a,(U) a p/a,(U'))
in (iii) above. This gives the acceptable equiva­
lence (Ü”) = (U n U'); and (TP^ =
applies in this case also.
(c) Putting U" = U - U', where n/ ÇP^ , (IF) , the relevant
formulae are (a c U A a  ^ Ü') in (i) and (ii), and
(n/a,(U) A -ri/a,(U')) in (iii) above; yielding
(U”) = (U - U’) and (TP^ = ÇU - Ü'] , which (if recog­
nized) constitutes the spatial complement of fli '3 in 
(ÏÏ) . (Note that such a spatial component is not 
recognized unless it is distinctly characterized.)
This last construction will prove specially signifi­
cant in the context of metric structures.
Going on to apply these results to F-sets, as a 
special case of composites, we note that their unions, 
intersects and complements have interesting properties in 
terms of characterization, which can then be interpreted in 
the context of their spatial organization. Since the 
memberships of I-sets for a given determinant set of 
characters may vary from frame to frame, their unions, 
intersects, etc., are only determinate within a single 
frame. But the principles now to be presented plainly
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hold for all frames; they also hold independently of 
space-restriction, provided that all F-sets involved in 
a construction are subject to the same overall restriction. 
I shall therefore omit these factors from this part of the 
analysis, for simplicity, putting U = F^,, Ü' = F^», etc. 
(a') F^, U F^„ = ({x: C'/x v C”/x}); so that a composite
formed by the union of two F-sets is characterized by 
a disjunction of their F-determinant sets. This prin­
ciple can plainly be extended to unions of more than two 
F-sets; so that, for example, the union of all F-sets 
determined by the values in context of a given valuative 
character is identical (in each frame of its recognition) 
with the F-set determined by that V-character (D7, p.120 ). 
(b') rj,, n = ({x: C'/x A C"/x}) = ; whence
^^(C'UC")^ = (F^, n F^w). This equivalence will be impor­
tant in the context of the analysis of implication and 
extrapolation, below.
(c') The construction of a spatial complement given by 
rj,, —  F^„ is dependent on the recognition of a base set 
{x: C'/x A “|(C"/x)}: but our analysis reveals problems
associated with the idea of a negative assignment such as 
”1 (C"/x). Not to recognize a particular assignment C"/x 
does not amount to recognizing that no such assignment 
holds. The problems will be more fully discussed below 
(pp. 212 ff.); at this point it is enough to say that we 
shall only be concerned with cases where the negation of 
an assignment is derived from a relevant positive assign­
ment together with a commitment prohibiting the assignment.
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to any one ident in any one frame, of both the positively- 
assigned characters and those which are thereby negated. 
(Prominent among such commitments is that which says that 
an assignment of one value of a V-character rules out an 
assignment of any other value to the same ident for the 
same frame.)
Thus, given a commitment of distinctivity f [C ',C"] 
(C3, p.80) together with a recognition of the set
U r^ rii , we have {x: C'/x a  "1(C"/x)} =
{x: C'/x A C"'/x} in context. This is plainly consonant 
with the point made above, that the spatial complement of 
one composite in another is recognized only if distinctly 
characterized.
So, given the above conditions, we can write 
rj,, —  = T^, n C'")* may also write it
as , gi,, leaving the existence of C" ' such that / [C", C" ' ] 
and determining the F-set structure, to be understood.
Note, finally, that for the space-restricted case 
we have , (x) = T^, H frame; so that in the
following analysis, exhibiting the correspondences between 
F-set structures and those of certain forms of theoretical 
commitment, space-restricted structures do not require 
special treatment. It is understood that in many contexts, 
for particular C',x, the complement is neglected as
uncharacterized; but the principles of the analysis are 
not thereby flouted.
The above equivalences demonstrate that an ordi­
nary Boolean algebra on F-sets is strictly associated with
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an equivalent spatial structure recognized in context in 
terms of the unions, intersects and complements determined 
by the perceived spatial boundaries of their F-bounds (a 
concrete analogy with the system of Venn diagrams in set- 
teoretical analysis). It is this which enables us to 
feel some confidence in the availability of sound logical 
relationships between assignments recognized on percep­
tual evidence only, before introducing as part of our meta- 
theoretical account any defined structure for propo­
sitions in a language of a context; and to argue, there­
fore, that authoritative sense can be given to the use of 
logical symbolism for récognitive structures independently 
of any associated linguistic structure (except that of 
the metatheory, C-theory).
Thus, to provide a simple basic "translation" 
(within the language of C-theory) from forms of impli­
cation into F-set structures, we write:
(a") (Vx)(C'/x V C"/x C"'/x) iff U
iff =
(b") ( v x ) ( c ' / x  A c " / x  -  c ' " / x )  i f f  = r^ ,  n r^ „
iff is the intersect or overlap ofO ' ©
(c") (V x ) (c ’ / x  A 1  (C"/X) + c'"/x) iff
iff |r^„ is the spatial complement of
in ( g .
It should be recalled that, although not everything 
enclosed in [F^ >) is necessarily C'-characterized - in par­
ticular, the bound-ident itself may not be so characterized
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- its boundary is recognized precisely by virtue of the 
character-differences which mark the external boundaries 
of its C'-characterized components. It is this which 
guarantees the converse inferences from the last formu­
lation in each case to those which precede it. Accor­
dingly a frequent motive for the adoption of theoretical 
commitments is to reflect the interdependence of charac­
terizations of external boundaries with other charac­
terizations of the same idents.
The most important feature, however, of the above 
set of equivalences is that formulae using the logical 
connective are shown to be equivalent in every case
to formulae defining a relationship of union, intersection 
or complement of F-sets - recognized composites of idents. 
These formulae do not appeal to a phenomenal form of impli­
cation, but only to structures of enclosure or exclusion 
of characterized spaces which are in principle directly 
accessible to perception.
We may now ask, in the light of this aspect of 
the analysis, in what sense the recognitions of such struc­
tures are to be understood as theoretical commitments, 
equivalent to acknowledgements of implications. The 
answer appears to lie in the extent to which such structures 
are confidently recognized on the basis of partial evi­
dence ; for example, by the recognition of C”/x (x as a 
member of F^ ,,) on phenomenal evidence only of C'/x (x as 
a member of F^,). The source of such confidence can only 
be the readings of present experience in the light of
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past experience; a structure of inductive theory relying 
on supposed regularities in relationships between elements 
of the context over time. The concept of "induction" here 
appealed to will be more fully considered in Part IV; at 
this point, I will only say that it is not seen as resting 
on any general principle of regularity in nature. It 
will rest rather on the consistency with experience of 
specific commitments adopted in the theory of the context: 
whose general forms are analysed in the next subsection.
(2) Sequential commitments: constancy, implication and
extrapolation
Once again we shall find that a small number of 
basic structures are adequate to found an analysis of most 
(if not all) of the more sophisticated systems of commit­
ment commonly used in concrete contexts - now looking 
beyond the single R-frame to the R-sequence. Sequential 
commitments are generally based on just two such structures, 
those of constancy and implication. Each of these is to 
be defined with respect to a particular adoption frame F^, 
with which is associated a specific state of the theory at 
that frame; under which commitments are defined as adopted 
for a sequence of frames ^ sub-sequence of the
total R-sequence ^o’’**’^n many instances identical 
with the whole sequence). Thus we have the conventional 
numerical relation 0 < g < m < n, commitments being defined 
for frames F^^F^,, such that g < k < m and g < k' < m.
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(i) Constancy
FI. C  is a constant set of characters for the sequence 
{Fg,...,F^} at the frame F in the R-sequence formed 
on {FQ,...,F^} (the condition will be written: 
ig[C']p iff:
( V k , k ' )  C g s k s n i A g s k '  sm- >-  ) •
The intuitive interpretation of this definition is that 
certain sets of characters are recognized as picking out 
idents which retain this element in their characteri­
zation unchanged over a specific period of time (sequence 
of frames). Typically, such a set consists of two dis­
tinct subsets. For example, we may have C  = C” U (P) and 
C" D {P} = 0, such that P is a value in a range of values, 
and r^„ a set of idents for which the commitment adopts P 
as a constant value (it may, of course, be a unit set).
It may either be a case where P is assigned constantly to 
all C”-characterized idents, while other idents may vary 
in value from frame to frame; or where all C"-characterized 
idents maintain this constant value while their charac­
terizations vary in other respects. A set of measuring 
rods may be maintained in such conditions that their 
lengths and temperatures vary. Note that the recogni­
tion of constancy in the first case requires that the 
constant-valued idents are distinguished from variable ones 
not only by their constant value for the relevant V- 
character, but by at least one other character (in C") 
which determines that the commitment to constancy of P
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applies exclusively to C'-characterized idents. Thus, 
here as in the general case, the constancy commitment 
applies to Ù' as a whole and not merely to the constant 
value P.
Plainly such constancy commitments are specially 
important for the recognitions of sets of idents as stan­
dards for the comparison of V-characters, whether metric 
or not. This necessarily involves constancy of positional 
characters in the associated comparison-figures (above, D6 
- 8, and summary pp. 144 f f . ) .  Since such PCs are deter­
mined with respect to other idents in the figure, the 
relevant constancy commitment may have to be space-restric­
ted so as to apply only to position within a series or 
pair whose other members are also subject to constancy 
commitments. The relevant space-restrictor will be the 
bound-ident of a suitably constructed composite; and a 
restriction must also be placed on the positional function 
n  so as to determine just positions within the series or 
pair. The formulation might be rather complex, but 
clearly raises no question of principle, and I shall 
therefore not carry it out in detail.
(ii) Implication and Extrapolation
Having said that all theoretical commitments 
involving the idea of récognitive implication (or its 
equivalents in terms of Fset structure) rest on readings 
of experience over time, we now need to provide a simple
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notation by which to indicate aspects of temporal ordering 
among the frames of the R-sequence - however this may be 
recognized in context. Let T be a set of binary numeri­
cal relations such that for each T e T, and each pair 
(i,k) such that 0 < i < n and 0 < k < n, the expression 
T(i,k) denotes a temporal relation in the terms of the 
context between frames and F^ of the sequence of frames 
^0-n R-sequence; we shall call T a temporal ordering
of the sequence.
F2. The triple (C',C",T), where T e T and C',C"c C, is 
an implicative triple for the sequence {Fg,...,F^} 
at the frame F^ in the R-sequence formed on 
{Fq ,...,Fj^} (the condition will be written: 
Cg[C',CM].) iff:
(Vk,k') (g < k < m A g < k' < m A T(k,k') C
ic' ^C"
Notes :
(a) The membership of the temporal ordering T is chosen
to reflect the temporal structure of the commitment in each 
case. In simple, intuitive instances it will be chosen 
from <,>, and = ("before” , "after", "at the same time as"). 
Where metric values of time are involved - at the simplest 
level, dates and clock times - i,k and k ' can be assigned 
such values and the members of T given appropriate numeri­
cal expression. This aspect will be considered more fully 
in the context of time measurement systems.
(b) Where k  ^ k', the formula 5  cannot be
read simply as equivalent to a recognition of I-bound
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simply as equivalent to a recognition of I-bound enclosure, 
since such a recognition can only take place within a 
single frame. It should rather be read as a commitment 
to a relation of set-inclusion between sets of idents 
recognized at for F^ . This is interpretable only 
on the basis that the same idents in which are charac­
terized at F^ for F^ by C’ are also members of , in 
Fj^ ,; for which frame they are among those recognized at 
F^ as characterized by C” (whether or not they are also 
characterized by C’ for that frame). This involves the 
further tacit commitment that the members of will
be (or were) exhaustively identifiable with the members 
of one or more F-sets recognizable, in principle, at F^/:
4 I
either F^ ,| itself, or a number of its proper subsets.
All idents, however characterized, belonging to any such 
subset must, necessarily, be properly enclosed in the 
bound-ident of , and so also must the bound-idents
of any F-sets to which they are supposed to belong. So, 
to form such a commitment, it is unnecessary to specify 
or attend to any characterizations of the members of 
^Fq for F^^, other than C" : the condition is in any
case expressible in the form of one or more relations of 
F-bound enclosure, in the manner given by example (a") 
above (p. 161 ). While sequential commitments of this 
kind can, obviously, be empirically problematic, their 
expression in this form makes no assumptions not made by 
the relevant theory of the context in each case.
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Different forms of commitment will emerge from
this formulation in particular instances, according to
whether or not C' fl C” =0; if so, the commitment is to
a total change of characterization in repsect of C', C”
as between and F^, (whether k < k' or k' < k) . The
i——->k ’ i _ >V
converse implication, C  , , adopted concurrently,
entails for the theory that just the same idents constitute 
the membership of both sets; the pair of commitments is 
equivalent to a commitment to a change of characterization 
in these idents.
(c) Similar considerations apply to positional characters 
under implicative as under constancy commitments (pp. 
permitting the construction of commitments involving 
changes of (relative) position or associated value.
(d) Where T takes the value ’=' the formulation yields a 
simple implication within each of the chosen frames 
Fg,...,Fm« The common case where i = k = k' includes the 
important class of instances whereby some aspects of char­
acterizations are recognized on the immediate perceptual 
evidence of others. We will call these instances of 
récognitive extrapolation. I shall assume that, once 
adopted, commitments of this sort hold, subject to revision 
of the theory, for all frames of adoption or assignment 
(the few exceptions are, I think, unimportant). I shall 
therefore write such a commitment simply *C[C',C"]'.
All such extrapolative commitments, being 
adopted for single frames, are immediately interpretable 
in terms of I-set enclosures. However, by introducing
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them only as special cases in the overall temporal ordering 
of a sequence, I aim to reflect the intuition, expressed 
above, that they rest on readings of experience over time.
Two special cases are of interest, namely those in 
which either C' or C” is a unit set. Wherec[{P},C”], we 
say that C" is an implied set of P; it plainly follows 
that (VQ) (Q e C" ->-CCP,Q]). Where C C C', {P} ] , we say that 
C" is an inferring set of P; here, it follows that 
(Vx)(C'/x P/x) . The principal interest of these cases 
is that they appear to capture the form of two types of 
theoretical commitment which are frequently met with in 
practice, and which may both be strongly intuitive and 
largely or wholly unconscious. For example, assignment 
to an ident of the character "man" may lead to a commitment 
to the assignment by implication of some particular set of 
anatomical characters which, being attended to in context, 
is a proper subset of C. In another context, the assign­
ment of a single character may found a commitment to many 
others: the quality of a heard voice may be enough to
permit the assignment of a considerable set of characters, 
relevant in context, associated with a "man", or even a 
particular person.
The general point is that in the schema,CC(1),(2)], 
the character or set of characters in the antecedent 
position (1) is intended to be satisfied by features recog­
nized directly on the phenomenal evidence, while the charac­
ter or characters in the consequent position may be assigned.
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by virtue of theoretical commitment, only on evidence for 
those in position (1). Much of the importance of this 
class of commitments resides in that it is the natural path 
through which commitments of S-theory - which go in prin­
ciple beyond the evidence of immediate perception - become 
incorporated in R-theories. One of its most fruitful
developments, which may or may not incorporate S-theoretical 
elements - is a structure of extrapolative identification, 
next to be analysed.
(iii) Extrapolative Identification: the E-function
A class of extrapolative commitments which deserves 
special treatment: those in which the effect of the extra­
polation is to complete an identifying characterization for 
a particular ident: i.e., where CC',C"] a C  U C” = f^(x)
for some x and any chosen k. It amounts to a commitment 
to recognize some ident x uniquely, at any time, on the 
evidence of an assignment of some chosen subset of its 
identifying characters; as where we recognize a particular 
person from their voice. It is possible to represent this 
class of cases in terms of an extrapolative function, now 
to be defined.
F3. The function B from S into PC is the extrapolative
function (E-function) of the R-theory of an R-sequence 
defined on the R-frames Fq ,...,F^, whose values are 
given by:
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(Vx,C')(C' £ E(x) (Vi,k)(C' = 0^(x,k) v
C q  ccXSiCx.k) - C ’)]^ ).
Notes :
(a) E(x) is non-empty for all x, by virtue of the term
C' = e^(x,k}; but it is understood to be typical of con­
texts in general that nearly all idents are recognized on 
partial evidence, at least in each frame. One virtue of 
defining this form of commitment over a sequence is that 
it reflects the way in which it may be supposed that we 
synthesize the total characterization for an ident from 
partial characterizations frame by frame over an extended 
period.
(b) Although the form is here defined for an individual 
ident, it is assumed to be common, for example, for all 
members of a F^set which are distinguished from one another 
only by positional character (in a given figure: see pp. lllf)
or its associated value (for a given V-character) to yield 
values of the f-function which also differ only in PCs or 
values. In this way the notion of extrapolative identifi­
cation is easily extended to cover sets of similar idents.
In some instances, a sufficiently bold (and there­
fore vulnerable) R-theory may adopt commitments involving 
the existence for the theory of a number of distinct idents 
even where their essential distinguishing characters 
(typically PCs or values) are not directly perceived, but 
extrapolated from evidence for their existence as a suitably 
structured set - for example, the cards in an apparently 
complete new pack. Generally this involves the
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incorporation of more or less sophisticated S-theory; and 
will emerge especially in contexts of probability assess­
ment (Part III, Section P).
Summary of Sections E, F: R-sequence and Sequential
Commitments
The R-sequence (El, p. 148 ) has been presented 
as a sequence of R-frames, within which no change of 
characterization is recognized; each frame of the sequence 
being distinguished from the next by at least one change 
of characterization, called an 'event' (152). Recog­
nitions of events, like recognitions of spatial boundaries 
between idents, are governed by the strategy of attention/ 
neglect adopted in context (154) . Significant events for 
an R-theory, called 'mark-events', are often changes of 
positional character in some figure, or value for some V- 
character, affecting chosen idents (153). With each frame 
of an R-sequence is associated a state-of-the-theory, com­
prising all assignments and commitments adopted under the 
R-theory £t that frame for all frames of the sequence; 
typically accumulating new structures in successive frames, 
and capable of change under accepted revisions of the 
theory (147-152) .
Continuity in an R-sequence is primarily recog­
nized in terms of the identities of idents occurring in 
different frames; characters may also be recognized as
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"the same" in different frames by virtue of neglect of 
possible differences (comparison being impossible); but 
idents are typically recognized as persisting through 
changes in characterization, which may be total (149-50, 
and see 97ff). The principal "force" holding an R- 
sequence together is the structure of sequential commit­
ments , inductive in character, adopted in the light of 
experience over time, and constituting the essential con­
tent of the R-theory in each case (related, of course, to 
the Reader's motives). All sequential commitments to be 
considered here are analysed in terms of two fundamental 
schemata, for constancy and all forms of implication, res­
pectively (164-9) . Many different forms of implication 
are exhibited as special cases of the given fundamental 
schema, including those involving positional and valuative 
characters. In particular, we explore the structure of 
extrapolative identification, regarded as reflecting the 
commonest form of identification over time (170-2) ; although 
deeper philosophical problems of identity are left to 
Part IV.
The strategy of attention/neglect is largely 
governed by the involvement of idents and characters in 
commitments of the relevant R-theory; which is also the 
main determinant of recognitions of composition (which typi­
cally changes from frame to frame), in particular that of 
F-sets (156). It has been shown that formulae expressing 
theoretical commitments in terms of the standard impli­
cation sign are logically equivalent to formulae
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expressed only in terms of relations of enclosure, overlap 
or exclusion between F-sets so determined; so that in 
principle all sequential commitments of the kinds analysed 
here, together with all associated structures of logical 
consequence, can be rendered in terms of such spatial 
relations as recognized, recalled or expected in context 
(162-3). That such commitments and consequences can, 
therefore, be interpreted as non-linguistic structures 
implies not, of course, that the use of language is unim­
portant in the construction of R-theories' generally, but 
merely that in many simple instances, or at unsophisticated 
levels, it may be absent. The central role of language in 
the formation of 'group R-theories' (involving several 
Readers) is examined in the next and following Sections.
G. Group R-theories (GR-theories); and the Role of Language 
in Concrete Contexts
(1) I now extend the analysis of récognitive theories
to structures of understanding of a common concrete con­
text by a group of perceiving subjects - to be called the 
Readers of the context in each case. As indicated in the 
Introduction (p.27 ), such an understanding is closely bound 
up with the notion of a language of the context. But the 
language of C-theory, as so far constructed, contains no 
structures specifically defined as even a first-order 
descriptive language of an R-theory - i.e., a language 
used in context to describe the perceptual recognitions of
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members of the group to one another (though examples of 
such language have been used in illustration). Having 
thus failed to distinguish, in our analysis of the recog­
nized structure of a context, between its linguistic and 
non-linguistic elements, we are now in a position to make 
the distinction in the terms suggested by the form of this 
analysis: namely, in terms of the commitments adopted for
these classes of elements under the relevant R-theories.
Although we shall find that our formal treatment 
of a language system shows it as strictly independent of 
the structure of a group of Readers using the system, it is 
obviously appropriate to introduce it only after that struc­
ture has been defined, so that the two structures can be 
related. (The notion of a "private language", adopted by 
a "group" of one, will be discussed in some depth in 
Section IV.3.) The structure to be defined for a common 
R-theory (called a group R-theory, or GR-theory), shared by 
a group of Readers whose members are determined by their 
adoption of that theory, is by the same token strictly inde­
pendent of their use of a common language; but since, in 
practice, the formation of such groups independently of 
language is a relatively rare occurrence in man, the two 
structures will be introduced in immediate succession, the 
group of Readers adopting a common GR-theory being called 
a language-group or L-group.
(2) GR-theory 
G1 .(i) A group R-sequence (GR-sequence) F is a sequence
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of recognitions adopted by a finite set
of Readers (called the L-group 
of the context) in association with a set 
F* = {...,F^,...} of distinct R-sequences (def.
El, p.l4 8); each Reader e R^ associates the 
sequences F^,F^ e F*, so that (indicating elements 
and functions of the respective sequences by their 
appropriate superscripts):
(a) (Vv)(s'"C A  ^ (.Gç  ^ c  c^) ; 
and
(b) ( V v , x , y , i , k ) ( x , y  s + Ce^(x .k )  Ç  e Y ( x , k )  a 
8^^(x,y,k)c:  e Y ^ ( x , y , k ) ) ) .
(ii) A Group R-theory (GR-theory) is a structure of common 
récognitive commitments adopted by all members of an
Q
L-group R of Readers consistently with the assign­
ments of a GR-sequence F^.
Notes :
(a) Condition (i)(b) requires that, though individual 
Readers' assignments may vary as between their respective 
individual R-sequences, all Readers must agree on assignments 
in F ; including, crucially, those pairs of assignments 
which determine events marking frame-changes in the GR- 
sequence .
(b) No special condition has been included to secure
common structures of enclosure and contiguity in the GR-
sequence. These are secured by common assignments of
c c
positional characters in fî .
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This definition is a gross idealisation for many 
contexts, in postulating total agreement between members of 
the L-group. But such agreement may be approached closely 
by sufficiently restricting the field of recognitions sup­
posed included in the GR-theory; and it is claimed that 
this postulate does not differ essentially from an almost 
universal tacit assumption intuitively made by most people 
in what they take to be common contexts of concrete recog­
nition. Neither intuitively nor for C-theory is such 
total agreement treated as infallible; its status for C- 
theory is that of a general commitment to be incorporated 
in the individual R-theory of each member of an L-group, 
which, to the extent that it survives exposure to the per­
ceptual evidence, holds for all members. In practice, it 
remains unchallenged unless inconsistencies appear in 
the R-theoretical structure for one or more of the Readers. 
In the typical concrete context, confidence in a common 
understanding is sustained to a large extent by the assump­
tion that differences between non-linguistic recognitions 
and commitments of Readers (including unproblematic extra­
polations) are negligible, except for a few special points 
which call for the use of language. Thus for C-theory 
the role of language in such contexts is taken to be as 
much the maintenance and regulation of a consensus which 
is for the most part non-linguistic in origin, as the 
introduction of new material into a GR-theory.
In attempting now a fairly rigorous account of 
the structure of commitment under which it will be supposed
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that linguistic elements are distinguished and used, I 
shall start, as the principles of this analysis demand, 
with the tasks these elements are called upon to perform 
in context. The underlying intuition is that we learn 
to use language in much the way we learn to use other 
familiar constructional materials, to form structures 
serving recognizable purposes; and learn to understand 
their use for these purposes by others. So, languages 
are seen as socially and historically developed resources, 
consisting of components which can be put together in 
various ways: the least resulting structure capable of
entering into an unequivocal relation of non-linguistic
reference being a sentence. (Though this involves a mar­
ginally non-standard interpretation of 'reference', it 
does not appear to raise any serious conflict with more 
familiar uses.) Each sentence, as uttered, is newly con­
structed to take its place in a context. It is in this 
spirit that I shall suppose that 'natural' languages, 
which may have been developed over thousands of years to 
handle information in a bewildering variety of contexts, 
can be drawn upon to answer the particular needs of each 
new utterance as they arise. More will be said shortly 
on this aspect; and some deeper philosophical problems of 
language will be taken up again in Part IV. The under­
lying notions which will inform these discussions must 
first be defined, as rigorously as possible.
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(5) Basic Language System
The definition of a basic language system for a 
concrete context must rest initially on an understanding 
of the forms of non-linguistic structure this system is 
supposed to reflect.
The elements of a GR-theory have been exhibited 
as common subsets of those of the R-theories of the Readers 
of the L-group; likewise the assignments and commitments 
of the GR-theory are taken to be held in common as parts of 
these individual R-theories. We have seen above that all 
such assignments and commitments are in principle logi­
cally equivalent to recognitions (either immediate or 
inductively extrapolated) of structures of enclosure, inter­
section, complement or mutual exclusion of F-sets (Section 
F, pp.155 ff.). These structures are themselves composed, 
and recognitions of the relevant spatial relationships 
between their bound-idents are equivalent to recognitions 
that these particular assignments and commitments hold in 
the R-theory concerned. It should not be forgotten that 
the recognitions of the F-sets themselves are generally 
motivated by association with commitments of the theory 
adopted for the relevant sets of characters in context.
(To facilitate the treatment of negative statements of the 
base-language, we shall assume for the present that recog­
nitions of some bound-ident relationships are logically 
equivalent to recognitions that the negations of particular 
assignments or commitments hold in the theory - e.g., Pjf6^ (x,k), or
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C  ) . The preconditions for such recog­
nitions will be discussed in Section J(l) below.)
All such recognitions that particular assignments, 
commitments or negations hold in the GR-theory will thus 
be supposed to have the form of complex T|- and Y-configu­
rations , whose structure will not be further analysed.
They will be called H-configurations, represented by the
n
set H defined informally by:
r>
G2. Each member h of H is equivalent to a recognised 
assignment or commitment such that, exclusively, 
either h or"^(h) holds in the GR-theory.
All significant utterances (spoken or written) 
occurring in a context will be assumed analysable as 
sequences of one or more distinct sentences, recognized 
as bounding complex configurations (heard or seen) of the 
relevant R-frames. Their detailed structure will, again, 
not be analysed here. (Some account of a possible method 
of analysis is given, however, in Section H.) More expli­
citly, a sentence is taken to be the bound-ident of a con­
figuration of verbal forms, recognized as composed: so,
its structure is determined by those of its components, 
and their manner of composition. No attempt will be made 
to analyse language use as a whole: attention will be con­
centrated on a somewhat idealised base-language defined for 
each context, supposed drawn from existing natural or
specialised languages, and consisting of statements. These
n
statements are related to the members of the set H com­
prising recognized assignments and commitments (or negations)
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by a reference function, also defined for each context.
g
G3. The pair L is a basic language system for the
GR-theory adopted by the L-group R for the GR-
sequence F iff:
G G(i) L C  S is a set of recognized statements
n
Uttered or interpreted by members of R 
(called the base-language) ;
(ii) for each (v,i) there is a recognized subset
lV C  L^ of statements made or interpreted by
V) G C
R E R at frame (including the case
lV = 0);
(iii) Ÿ is a function from into (defined by 
G2), called the reference function: such that
r>
s £ L is held true in the GR-theory iff *(s) 
holds in that theory, and:
(Vs,s')(s £ lV A s ’ £ lV A s = s' *(s) = *(s')), 
where s j s' means that the two statements are 
linguistically identical. This is understood 
as saying that they are recognized as the same 
sentence, characterized identically except in 
terms of (a) utterer or interpreter or [b) mode 
of utterance (e.g. spoken/written).
Where statements of different linguistic structure 
(different sentences) are understood as associated by *
p
with the same member of H , this constitutes a further com­
mitment of the GR-theory, that they are members of the
Psame prepositional set L'C L , defined as follows:
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P rG4. The propositional power set L Ç  pL is given by:
= {L' : L ' Ç  A (Vs,s')(s,s' e L' ->■ $(s) = 3(s'))} 
The pair (l/,*) constitutes a proposition.
Notes on G1 - 4:
(a) The treatment in G2 of assignments and commitments
as ’H“Configurations' without distinction reflects the 
intuition that the distinction itself is, to some extent, 
artificial and subjective as well as highly context-depen­
dent. Assignments are, in a sense, commitments of the 
theory: commitments take the form of patterns of possible
assignments (where "possible" means consistent with the 
commitments). The fundamental distinction is between com­
mitments supposed to rest on the immediate evidence of 
perception (assignments); and those, adopted on the basis 
of past perceptual experience, used to extend the Reader's 
understanding beyond the reach of immediate perception.
An important part of the purpose of language in concrete 
contexts arises from the fact that what is an assignment 
for one Reader (/?^  ) may be understood only as a consequence 
of a commitment for another reader (/?^). A statement by 
may serve to set up, or confirm, this commitment for R^: 
if he takes the statement as evidence, he will accept the 
assignment as his own.
pP>'s statement, "The apples are red", may set up 
or confirm a commitment for who cannot see the apples.
183
that they are ripe at the time; it may at least be taken 
as evidence for the assignment of redness to the unseen 
apples. Few cases are quite so simple. But the claim 
is made that, in concrete contexts, all possible assign­
ments, and therefore all valid commitments, are reducible 
to recognitions of configurations of enclosure and con­
tiguity determined by the distributions of relevantly 
characterized idents in space and time. To take another 
relatively simple example: "All swans are white" amounts
to a commitment expressible as '17, „ c: 17, , . . „ ’ , for ^ swan white'
all frames of a context which specifies no restrictions 
of its universe in space or time, or in terms of the asso­
ciated L-group (except, perhaps, that they should be speakers 
of English). To provide it with some rational basis, it 
may be supposed adopted inductively on the basis of the 
multiple assignment, "All swans I have seen, or of which I 
have been told, are white": where the L-group consists of
the speaker and all those whose statements - in whatever 
natural language - he has heard or read and taken as evi­
dence, and the assignments are restricted to all frames of 
the context up to and including the frame of utterance.
It will, of course, be contradicted by any one assignment 
of "blackness", for example, to any ident which is still 
recognized as a "swan" (constituting a recognized intersect
of the bound-idents of ^»biack" ^'swan"* coupled with
an exclusive structural commitment (C4, p. 80 ) for the
pair of characterizations ("black", "white") as read in 
context).
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(b) A somewhat relativised form of Quine's notion
of 'referential opacity'* would have been introduced into 
C-theory, if we had sought to give general expression to 
the idea that, for each Reader R^, the reference of state­
ment by any other Reader R^ is a matter of interpretation, 
which could be seen as possessing a higher degree of 
'theoreticity' - to adapt another Quinian term - than /?^ 's 
understanding of the reference of an utterance of his own.
We may take to use an utterance of R^ as evidence
either (a) of the relevant portion of the R-theory 
of
or (b) that the assignment or commitment, to which
he takes #*'s statement to refer, holds for 
the GR-theory.
Choice of (a) would have involved the construction 
of complex expressions for notions like '/?^ 's theory of 
7?^ ' s theory' - carrying the threat of higher orders of meta­
theory. Apart from its dangers of confusion, such an 
analysis strikes me as unrealistic. In using particular 
expressions to refer to particular aspects of his theory, 
takes them to be "correct", or at least effective for 
use, in the context of the particular GR-theory. This is 
a theoretical judgment on his part, no less vulnerable to 
error than is that of R ^  in seeking to interpret the ref­
erence of 7?^ 's statement. So alternative (a) seems unlikely 
to yield an articulation of any structure of theoreticity 
offering greater clarity or plausibility to compensate for
* Quine (1953), pp. 142 ff.
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its complexity. I have therefore chosen alternative (b) 
for the ordinary concrete context, along with an acknow­
ledgement that such a strong theoretical position is open 
to error at many points. Questions of theoretical error 
in concrete contexts will be taken up later.
Note, in passing, that the same person may 
appear as a Reader of the L-group and an ident of the GR- 
sequence. Characterizations of a Reader may, for instance, 
be attended to where that person is a part of the essential 
subject-matter of the theory (say, in a doctor-patient con­
text) ; or where the identity of the speaker is important 
for the truth-conditions of an utterance, as with the use 
of personal pronouns or positional indicators. No special 
problems seem to be created; nor is it necessary for all 
Readers to figure in this way.
(c) The basis of understanding defined for the
reference function $ is that a sentence s is held true in 
the theory iff the corresponding assignment, commitment 
or negation, #(s), holds in the theory. This amounts to 
the assignment of an abstract (non-recognitive) property of 
'held-truth' to s . But the association of this assign­
ment with récognitive structures is so strong that we may 
regard it as incorporated in the GR-theory, at least in 
unproblematic cases - as strong, for instance, as that 
involved in recognizing a house as somewhere to live, and 
a particular house as the home of a particular family.
The recognized association between the configuration s and 
the H-configuration 'F(s) has the character of a super-
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configuration, analogous to that presented by a house and 
its inhabitants (learnt, in each case, from experience). 
Profound questions of the relationship of 'held-truth' 
to more familiar (if no less problematic) concepts of truth 
will be raised in Part IV, especially Section 7. The 
discussion will include consideration of the case where s 
is held false, i.e., the case where (#(s)) holds in the 
theory.
(d) While the manner of presentation of the defini­
tion of a proposition in G4 is non-standard, its logical 
consequences are claimed to be very similar to those of 
more familiar accounts. We may start by deriving the 
consequence that the truth-conditions for all s e L' such
p
that L' 6 L are identical under the GR-theory. (Linguis­
tically identical statements (tokens of the same sentence) 
are trivially co-propositional.) This identity will carry 
over into the restrictions placed on a field of possible 
worlds by the truth-conditions of s : the contribution of
s to the truth-conditions of any compound sentence in 
which s is recognized as implicated; or to the truth-con­
ditions of any statement of propositional attitude of which 
s is the subject (strictly in the context of the GR-theory 
in each case). Again, questions about the contributions 
of verbal components to the determination of the truth- 
conditions of s , other members of L', and associated struc­
tures like those just mentioned, are likely to turn in the 
normal way on the linguistic rules of the natural or 
specialised language from which they are drawn. Some
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indications on this aspect of the matter are given in the 
next Section (H).
By way of summary, we may now define a GR-theory 
rather more fully and explicitly than in G1 above, as 
follows :
G5. A GR-theory adopted by an L-group R of Readers is 
a quintuple (F^,H^,L^,#,L^), such that:
g
(i) F is a GR-sequence consisting of the commonly 
agreed structures of the R-sequences recognized 
by the members of R under the R-theories of the 
context adopted by them; ... G1
(ii) H is the set of all configurations of T-bound 
enclosure, intersection or mutual exclusion 
constituting recognized assignments or commit-
p
ments for F ; ... G2
c c
(iii) the base-language L (a subset of the set S of
idents of F ) is the set of all statements, 
being those sentences, recognized as bounding 
composed configurations of verbal elements, 
associated with members of H by «Î»; ... G3
n
(iv) the reference function # is a function from L
r r
into H such that s e L is held true in the GR-
theory iff 4*(s) holds in the theory; and ... G3 
P G(v) L C  (p L is the propositional power set, such
p
that each set L' £ L consists of statements
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held true by reference (under to the same 
member of ; and the pair constitutes
a proposition of the GR-theory. ... G4
While this formulation may seem like an enormously compli­
cated way of saying something very simple, the manner of 
articulation is held to be important for an epistemological 
understanding of the construction of common contexts by 
groups using language. Although the emphasis of this 
study is on non-linguistic aspects of concrete contexts, 
there is nothing in the definition of ^ to prevent its 
extended interpretation for references to assignments or 
commitments involving other linguistic elements, or even 
self-reference. Such references could include the assign­
ment of the property of 'held-truth' to statements. These 
aspects will not be pursued further here. But, in view 
of the strong emphasis on language in much current philo­
sophy, some indications must now be given of the relevance 
of this analysis to linguistic structures actually used in 
simple concrete reference itself.
H. Some Linguistic and Semantic Aspects of Concrete Reference
(1) The most striking difference between the present
analysis and most earlier accounts of reference is that 
what we may call - for want of a better term - the 'unit' of 
reference is the pair consisting of a sentence (statement) 
and the recognized non-linguistic condition associated with 
it. In the tradition of linguistic analysis which, in 
this respect, has taken many of its fundamental concepts
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from Frege (especially his (1892), trans. Geach et al.
(1960), pp. 56 ff.), reference is assigned primarily to 
certain words or expressions within sentences, called 
'referring expressions'. In general, each referring 
expression has been supposed to arrive on the scene 
equipped with a more or less determinate range of "ordinary 
reference": which can perhaps be identified with the exten­
sion of the concept to which it is taken to refer. (But 
Frege accepted that we never attain to comprehensive know­
ledge of this reference: op.cit., p. 58.) Such an expres­
sion, however, was often considered to lose this standard 
reference, when incorporated in a subordinate clause 
governed by any context of indirect or reported speech 
(which, for Quine, produced an 'opaque context', as mentioned 
above, p. 184). That is to say, loss of ordinary reference 
is seen to occur when a statement including the expression 
is explicitly attributed to someone - in our terms, a 
particular Reader of a particular context - as something he 
has said, believes, thinks, etc. In such cases the refer­
ence is supposedly to the sense, which Frege practically 
equated with the contribution made by the expression to the 
thought constituting the sense of the sentence. In C- 
theory, all utterances, together with the recognized con­
ditions (assignments, commitments or negations) of which 
they speak, are explicitly attributed to particular Readers 
of particular contexts, as their utterers or interpreters.
The circumstance that, for a particular utterance of a 
particular GR-theory, this attribution is not made verbally.
190
does not change its theoretical status. No privilege 
attaches, for example, to the R-theory of a speaker as 
determining "the" references of the expressions he uses.
The reference function »? is taken to be adopted by each 
member of the L-group as holding for the group as a whole. 
L-groups will generally draw on pre-existing forms of lan­
guage, though they may adapt and add to them. - But the 
suitability of such forms for the purposes of the context 
rests, in this analysis, not on appeal to some supposed 
general system of ordinary reference, but rather to a more 
Wittgensteinian notion of effective use based on recollec­
tions of previous uses of the chosen expressions in con­
texts perceived as similar. (No attempt will be made to 
refine the notion of ’similarity’ appealed to here, for 
the generality of cases. But we shall find that this is 
another notion which takes on special clarity and precision 
in contexts of measurement.) Thus, the necessary commit­
ments adopted in context for linguistic elements and their 
relationships are constructed inductively, as are all commit­
ments of the GR-theory.
It is true that, of all human artefacts in familiar 
daily use, the forms of language are amongst the most 
closely controlled and therefore regular: the associated
inductive commitments, built up socially and historically, 
are exceptionally stable in consequence (though not, of 
course, wholly static). But these considerations apply 
most strongly to internal rules of grammar and syntax, which 
have attracted most attention from philosophers. These
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are effectively unchanged from context to context: while
relations of reference outside language need to be newly 
constructed (or reconstructed) for each use in each con­
text, and are most open to both subjective and objective 
variation. I do not, of course, deny that component 
expressions of a sentence can be thought of as having dis­
tinct reference to specific elements in any structure of 
which the sentence speaks. But the view forced on me by 
the epistemological motives of my analysis is that such 
references can only be determined in the context of a 
complete sentence. Some complementary arguement for this 
view, from the purely linguistic standpoint, will be 
offered later. It will rest on the observation that a 
large proportion of component expressions in familiar 
languages are, taken alone, ambiguous in reference; and 
the first level of disambiguation is to be found in the 
structures of the sentences in which they are used.
(Even if some terms appear to have a strict, universal 
reference, this does not affect the principle.) But, 
first, I want to point to the restrictions placed on the 
forms of language by the structures of récognitive theory 
to which they are used to refer.
(2) Analysis will be simplified by restricting
attention to cases where a statement is used to add a 
single récognitive condition (assignment, commitment or 
negation) to the GR-theory - by bringing it forward for 
acceptance by the L-group. (It will be found that, in 
strictly récognitive contexts, negation is always used 
in association with a parallel positive condition).
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Such statements are amongst those which have the effect of 
changing the GR-theory in some respect. So they necessarily 
involve a frame-change, marking a change in the state-of-the 
theory at the frame of their introduction into the context. 
This frame-change is not necessarily that brought about 
by the condition to which, in each case, they refer: 
which may be adopted for earlier or later sequences of 
one or more frames. This aspect is dealt with in many 
languages partly by the use of tense-forms: otherwise
by distinct time-referring expressions, including calendar 
terms or names of specific events. These matters are 
mentioned here only as indications of possible means of 
analysis; they will not affect the main points to be 
made. Storage of information over time is, of course, 
another important use of language (written, recorded, remem­
bered) . Such use helps to secure the stability of a: 
GR-theory, in the form of constantly maintained assign­
ments or commitments. (These are not the same as 'con­
stancy commitments' of the sort analysed above (FI, p.164) 
though they often coincide for the same characters). It 
also permits the recruitment of new members to the L- 
group, as interpreters of earlier utterance: and is
virtually a precondition of long-lasting contexts of 
theory adopted by large L-groups. Such contexts have 
naturally dominated the subject-matter of philosophy, 
especially linguistic analysis. But the temporal struc­
ture of a context is largely irrelevant to our immediate 
concern with concrete reference.
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(3) The analysis has been presented so far in
terms of an idealised 'base language', intended to repre­
sent a minimal sentential structure assumed common to all 
languages capable of concrete reference. We may clarify 
the relationship of this idealised language system to 
other languages by saying, first, that any corpus of actual 
language - "ordinary" or "specialised" - will be taken to 
have concrete reference for C-theory to the extent, and in 
the form, that a translation is in principle available 
into one or more consistent statements of a suitable base- 
language, instantiating the terms and conditions of G3, 
p.181 . A "translation", for this purpose, may be a 
linguistically identical or logically equivalent struc­
ture in the same actual language. A "concrete propo­
sition" can be taken as the set of all sentences which 
are translatable into the same set of base-language state­
ments of some GR-theory. A subset in a single language 
of such a 'prepositional set' would be similar in form to 
a set of Chomskian 'transformations' of one another.
I shall now concentrate attention on a fragment 
of English, either taken to be a translation, in this 
sense, of a part of a base-language containing only state­
ments which change the GR-theory as explained above: or,
equally, we may think of each example as itself a frag­
ment of a base-language, drawn from English, considered 
as fulfilling the conditions laid down in G3. Amongst 
these statements, attention will be further restricted.
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for simplicity, to cases where a statement is used to add 
a single character, or set of characters describable by a 
word or simple phrase, to the characterization of a single 
ident, itself describable by a word or simple phrase: so
as to modify that characterization at and for the sequence 
of frames immediately following its utterance. We shall 
still be able to bring out the main lines of the demands 
made by the task of concrete reference on the construction 
and interpretation of linguistic forms.
From a standpoint of linguistic analysis it would 
be natural to take our departure from the straightforward 
case of a sentence, designed to carry out the task des­
cribed, consisting of a subject-predicate pair; of which 
the first element is a referring expression picking out 
or denoting the ident to be spoken of, and the second a 
predicative phrase containing an expression referring to 
the character to be added. Such cases.are, indeed, typi­
cal, but far from universal. A few examples show that 
many natural usages appear quite anomalous in these terms.
A. It’s raining.
B. Three statements accompanied by pointing to a 
table :
(i) This is a table.
(ii) This is marquetry.
(iii) This is a scotch (referring to the contents
of a glass on the table).
C. The door is open (where more than one door is
visible,-but only one is open).
D. (i) Socrates is worrying the students.
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(ii) Socrates is worrying the sheep (where Socrates 
is the name of an English sheepdog).
In all these cases it can be argued that the 
strict reference, in the sense of that which determines 
the identity of the ident whose characterization is to 
be modified, is fixed by the predicative phrase. Nor 
is it clear how any appeal to Chomskian transformational 
grammar, by modifying the content or relationship of 
'noun phrase’ or ’verb phrase’, would assist our under­
standing of how reference operates in these cases.
It is important to recall that we are not merely 
concerned with the logical form of truth conditions of 
the sentences (though these are always relevant) but 
their informative force in changing the theory of the context 
and the nature of the referential commitments by which this 
force is applied. From this point of view, the interpre­
tation of a statement must determine at least three fac­
tors in the situation:
1. The context of theory (in so far as this is not
predetermined by existing non-linguistic commit­
ments, or previous discourse).
2. The particular ident spoken of.
3. The character to be added.
This can be understood as involving a progres­
sive concentration of attention; to more and more distinc­
tively characterized spaces (at relevant times). The pro­
cess is complete only when the necessary characterizations 
have been determined under both heads 2 and 3. Where
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these characterizations are simple enough, as in case A 
above, we need not be surprised that both these tasks are 
done by one phrase. Nor is its grammatical form critical: 
"It's rainy", or the single word "RainI", would have 
achieved the same result. The time and place of utter­
ance (not necessarily the speaker) are typically adequate 
to fix the space characterized and the time of charac­
terization in this case, given the récognitive conditions 
and more or less universal non-linguistic commitments.
But these factors do not fix the context of the theory, 
under head 1. It might appear, at first glance, that 
this does not matter, since it is not obvious how it would 
affect the truth conditions for the statement. But the 
context of theory is what settles the logical consequences 
flowing from a statement. In this case, it might clearly 
affect how much precipitation would count as "raining": 
enough to stop a football or a tennis match - or enough 
to spoil a new hairdo. This, in turn, will affect the 
truth-conditions in context. We may suppose that the con­
text of theory is supplied, in such cases, by non-linguis­
tic commitments or by previous discourse. (Davidson's 
treatment of this sentence as a paradigm of understood 
meaning is considered in some depth in Part IV.)
In most cases of deixis (like B(i) - (iii)) the 
demonstrative and accompanying visual indications serve 
only to restrict the space to be characterized, leaving 
all characterization to be carried out by the predicative
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phrase. In the three examples given, this phrase also 
does much to fix a context of theory. Since no competent 
English-speaker needs to be told that a table is a table, 
B(i) seems to belong to a context of language-teaching - 
or perhaps logical or linguistic analysis. In B(ii) we 
are interested mainly in the decoration on the top of the 
table, probably in a context of antiquarianism, or buying 
and selling. In B(iii), the consequences seem unequivocal. 
This is not, of course, a comprehensive analysis of refer­
ence in deictic contexts - merely an indication of pos­
sible trends in a C-theoretical analysis, as are all these 
illustrations.
General terms like 'door' (case C) supply a 
characterization sufficient only to restrict attention to 
a class (r-set) of idents. If more than one is available 
for reference in context, further characterization is 
needed to fix reference to one of the class. Here, this 
is done by the predicate, given the stated récognitive 
conditions. It might also be done, for instance, by 
deixis; or by an adjective - "The safe door is open",
"The open door is ...". Many possible contexts of 
theory suggest .themselves, but I shall not pursue them.
Proper names (cases D(i), (ii)) are designed to 
fix reference to particular individuals, however charac­
terized in context, and problems under head 2 arise only 
when more than one individual bears the same name.
Generally non-linguistic commitments of a context restrict
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alternatives within manageable bounds - especially with 
names as rare as Socrates (outside Greece). Where con­
fusion is possible, little additional characterization is 
usually needed to determine which individual is named, 
and this is often supplied by the predicate which also 
adds the necessary character under head 3. I have, how­
ever, used case D to illustrate how abstract (non-recog- 
nitive) contexts like that suggested in D(i) can intro­
duce ambiguities not dispelled by non-linguistic commit­
ments - as they certainly would be in D(ii). Someone 
who has a dog called Socrates may find himself having 
to say, "Socrates, the philosopher,
(4) The main motive of this discussion of examples
has been to argue that the key factor in concrete refer­
ence is the association of elements of characterization 
with the particular words or expressions used: and that
the complete sentence is the linguistic unit within which 
the definitive structure of characterization is built up. 
The grammatical structure of the sentence, important as 
it may be, serves the purposes of concrete reference only 
in so far as it helps to determine how the characters 
evoked by virtue of this association are related to one 
another and to the idents assigned them. More will be 
said shortly about the roles in characterization of dif­
ferent grammatical categories of expressions. But first 
I want to emphasize the importance of the structure of 
contextual theory (head 1 above) to the operation of
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reference. Many proper names, and most common general 
terms (like the noun, 'table', or the adjective, 'open', 
for example) carry an enormous wealth of associated 
characterization from past use in a variety of contexts. 
Apart from the dangers of ambiguity, in many cases pairs 
of characters associated with a given term would be incon­
sistent if understood together in a single context. The 
shared commitments of a well-constructed GR-theory have 
the effect of restricting the field of associations 
selected for attention in context; essentially, to those 
involved in the commitments of the theory. It is the 
interaction of these commitments with past linguistic asso­
ciations which makes adequately consistent and unequivocal 
reference possible.
A further important contribution of the GR- 
theory is derived from the -function, which ideally 
determines, by extrapolation, a consistent pattern of 
characterization in all individual R-theories of the con­
text, in spite of all variations in the sources of infor­
mation of different Readers (see F3, p. 170f).
(5) Accepting at least for the sake of argument,
that the contribution to the reference-value (under 1) of 
a statement by a component word or expression consists 
of a set of characters, selected for attention in context 
from a larger field associated with it in memory, I want 
now to examine the relevance of the grammatical category 
to which a component term may be seen to belong.
While the supposed existence of character-fields
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of reference may seem relatively unproblematic for names, 
noun-phrases, and even adjectival phrases which can be 
clearly understood as having composite idents (F-sets) as 
contextual fields of reference, certain other types of 
expression may be thought of as raising special problems. 
I shall therefore say something more about two of these: 
verbs, and comparatives.
9, To prepare the ground for these considerations,
I want to make a short detour into the grammatical pheno­
menon of 'parts of speech' as a feature of indo-european 
languages in general. By making more or less clearly 
recognizable structural (morphemic) differences between 
types of words distinguished as nouns, verbs, adjectives, 
adverbs, etc., and inflecting them in various ways to 
mark number, gender and tense, one can use these inflec­
tions (and 'agreements' between them) to clarify verbal 
relationships, and so, often, to disambiguate possible 
alternative readings of the referential roles of the 
inflected words. Much of this aspect has been lost in 
English: in the Chinese group of languages it is com­
pletely absent. (For all that I say henceforth about 
these languages, my source is "About Chinese", Richard 
Newnham, Pelican, 1971.) Interestingly, it is generally 
true that the less inflected a language, the more it 
relies on word order for disambiguation: the highly
inflected structure of Latin gives almost total poetic 
freedom of word order, while the reverse is the case with 
Chinese, whose poetry glories in ambiguity.
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It is sometimes said that Chinese has no verbs 
(or, for that matter, adjectives). This does not mean 
it has no words for the kinds of features of experience 
we refer to by verbs; merely that it makes no morphemic 
distinction between these words and, say, nouns. There 
is no visible or audible difference, for example, between 
the 'verbal noun' (e.g. English "running" - itself ambi­
guous - French "le courir", German "das Laufen") and 
other 'parts' of the verb. This suggests that the indo- 
european types of morphemic system, though useful, are not 
essential to successful reference. Bearing this in mind,
I want now to point to some aspects of the usage of verbs 
in English.
Many verbs have concrete reference, which (apart 
from tensing) may be classified as behavioural or relational 
By behavioural reference I mean reference to perceived 
change over time, assigned to any ident, e.g., "run",
"boil". By relational reference I mean reference to any 
configuration assigned to two or more idents by the use 
of the verb in conjunction with expressions referring to 
those idents, e.g., "match", "support" (in concrete senses). 
The two kinds of reference may occur together in one verb, 
where perceived change affects more than one ident, e.g., 
"race", "hit", "assemble", "follow".
We have already seen (note Ce) > p.154) that 
change recognized as continual (even if not strictly 
continuous) may be analysed as a persistent character
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assignable to an ident for any frame (or sequence of 
frames), limited only by the specific commitments of the 
relevant R-theory as to which forms of change are to deter­
mine frame-change. It is persistent characters of this 
kind - varying with context - which form the typical fields 
of reference of verbs like "run". "The trains were 
running normally out of Euston this morning", "I had to run 
for the bus", "The bath tap's running", are varied 
examples. There is no difference in principle, so far 
as I can see, between the recognition of persistent 
characters involving continual change in such ways as these, 
and of more "static" characters like those involving, say, 
shape or colour. Some examples of frame-change involving 
verbial characters will be considered shortly. Relational 
verbs can be simply analysed as referring to a specified 
type of configuration, defined as ident, composed of the 
idents associated in the assignment referred to - typi­
cally by drawing attention to a relation derived from 
the relevant figure (the relevant definitions are in note (c), 
p. 57f). Mixtures of these types of reference raise no 
additional problems. A verb like "to live" has for most 
of us a huge field of behavioural and relational charac- 
ter-reference: yet in a particular context just a few,
or even one, of the characters it comprises may be enough 
to characterize an ident as "living".
The English habit of forming parts of verbs out 
of parts of "to be" coupled with verbal adjectives - "is 
running", "was broken", "has been following" - seems to
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reflect an intuition that "running", "broken", "following" 
are recognizable characters like any others. Verbal 
nouns like "runner", "breaker", "follower" may be seen as 
"naming" some ident by reference to a verbial character. 
"Runners" and "followers", in some contexts, become what 
might be called 'status-character' referent terms, belon­
ging to the same type as "nurses" or "fathers". The last 
two are grammatically nouns, although the verbial aspects 
of their reference are attested by the verbs "nursing" 
and "fathering". English, again, has a habit of making 
verbs out of nouns with no immediate verbial connotations: 
"to water", "to bridge", and - much to the fury of British 
pedants, the American-born "to contact".
Recalling that Chinese does without most of 
these distinctions, the point is made (short of comprehen­
sive demonstration): it may be plausibly claimed that
all concrete reference, by whatever combination of parts 
of speech, can be analysed in terms of assignments of 
characters to idents.
(6) The reference of comparatives raises a different
kind of question: very important in the context of a
study of measurement, as a class of organised systems of 
comparison. The present analysis seems to lead to the 
conclusion that this is an aspect of language use in which 
non-linguistic factors of the particular context dominate 
the R-theoretical structure to such an extent that purely 
linguistic analysis is bound to fall short of an adequate 
general account of reference. Use of a comparative term.
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if it is to achieve concrete reference, must direct 
attention to a specified comparative structure, within 
which a comparison figure is recognized» such that the 
pair of idents specified form a configuration of that 
figure, yielding a comparative relation in terms of values 
of an associated V-character, also to be specified in 
the relevant statement. The success of a statement, 
often quite simple in form, in specifying such a structure, 
plainly makes considerable demands on the L-group's com­
mon understanding of the reference function - even 
allowing for heavy reliance on the non-linguistic aspects 
of the context. The formal account of a comparative 
structure given above ( D8 and 9, pp. 123-4) calls for
both a set of compared idents and a set of characters, 
values of a V-character, in terms of which they are com­
pared (as well as the recognized comparison-figure).
This account contrasts, on the one hand, with metamathe- 
raatical accounts in the Suppes tradition, and on the 
other with linguistic, or semantic, accounts of comparison. 
The first approach, as we have seen (Introduction, p.28), 
starts with the entities to be compared, the compared 
qualities (attributes, etc.) and relations of comparison 
being defined simply as sets of such entities. Linguis­
tic aspects are neglected. Linguistic approaches, on 
the other hand, take their departure from the fields of 
reference (extensions, or concepts) associated with 
verbal expressions, regarded as objective structures which 
are there to be discovered and analysed, rather than
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continually constructed and adapted in use, and the 
memories and records of use. Consequently they may be 
faced with problems arising out of verbal forms which 
are no more than accidents of usage - however practi­
cally useful - limited to a few, generally indo-european, 
languages. While C-theoretical analysis suggests that 
we should in principle distinguish, for each particular 
comparative structure, a V-character with a distinct set 
of values recognized, to a context-dependent standard of 
accuracy, in association with a chosen comparison-figure, 
ordinary English usage, for example, is rather less than 
perspicuous in describing such a structure.
If the V-character is "length", for example, 
so that each ident of the comparative structure is in 
some sense assigned "length", any one ident may be said 
to "have greater (or less) length than" another; or, 
say, to "have a length of n metres", for some specified 
number n. These locutions fit easily with C-theoretical 
analysis, using qualifications of the term for the V- 
character to designate members of the value set. But 
we may also use adjectival forms, saying that an ident 
is "longer" or "shorter" than another, or "n metres long", 
with no easily discernible difference in the reference 
from that of the previous usage. At the same time, how­
ever, we may call some idents of the structure "long" 
and others "short". In a particular context we may call 
an ident "short" (or "not long") which is quite consistently
206
called "2 cm. long". (We cannot call it "2 cm. short" 
unless we want to say it is 2 cm. shorter than it ought 
to be: if we want to say it is 2 cm. longer than it
ought to be, we must say just that, or perhaps "it is 
2 cm. over length" or "too long".) Further, we may 
speak of idents "increasing in length", "getting longer", 
or "lengthening": these usages are generally equivalent,
but the last seems unacceptable where no change in 
length is involved. The branches "get longer as you go 
down the tree"; they only "lengthen" (but also "get 
longer") as the tree grows.
Comparatives may also be applied to verbs, by 
adverbial qualification. From previous discussion, it 
is to be expected that for C-theory the structural dis­
tinctions from noun- or adjective-related comparatives 
is more apparent than real. A small group of examples, 
with brief analytic notes, illustrate the point:
(a) "A ran faster than B", "A ran at a greater speed 
than B": comparison between A and B in terms of
their "running" and "speed" characters.
(b) "A ran faster and faster", "A ran at increasing 
speed": most naturally interpreted as referring 
to the assignment to A of a single 'persistent- 
change’ character, possibly measurable by a 
single acceleration-scale. Alternatively, as 
in the next example, changes in speed could be 
related to frame-change.
(c) "A ran faster (A's speed was greater) before the
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damage to his knee": comparison, with respect
to A, in terms of his "running" and "speed" charac­
ters, before and after a frame-change referred to 
an event: a change of characterization called
"the damage to his knee". (The knee was "undam­
aged" before the change, "damaged" after.)
(d) "A's shirt was brilliantly white": an 'adverbial'
qualification of the adjective "white", or of 
the verb-phrase, "was white"? Or equivalent to 
"brilliant and white", or, "the whiteness (of A's 
shirt) was brilliant"? Although not expressed
as a comparative, this suggests at least a tacit, 
vaguely conceived comparison between A's shirt 
and white shirts in general - or, perhaps, a more 
definite comparison with other specified shirts 
in context, or with A's shirt in a pre-bio-wash 
frame - in terms of degrees of "brilliance" (or 
otherwise) of "white" [or a range of colours).
It surely should not surprise us that in face 
of the enormous variety of récognitive conditions calling 
for valuation, and especially comparison of values,
English throws up a number of alternative grammatical 
forms of expression, some of which make analysis of the 
structure of reference problematic. Nor need we suppose 
English to be exceptional in this. In most everyday 
contexts, the "fit" between language and recognition is 
loose: no closer than it need be. In stricter contexts,
including those of measurement , we make use of carefully
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constructed and controlled artefacts to supply standard 
values - standard colours, standard weights, clock times 
- and assign linguistic terms by registered convention.
In English (and all indo-european languages I know about) 
such conventions use terms both for V-characters and 
their values which are grammatically nouns - though 
English, typically, often adapts them as adjectives: 
a "vermilion" tie, a "four-pound" salmon, a "two-hour" 
session.
(7) One semantic account of adjectives, however,
draws attention to the association between comparative 
valuation and the logical problems of vagueness in a way 
which suggests interesting parallels with the C-theore­
tical version (Kamp, 19 75). Hans Kamp argues that the 
attempt to deal with adjectival comparatives in terms of 
a many-valued logic, distinguishing degrees of truth- 
value for sentences using a single adjectival predicate, 
lead to confusions or even contradictions in the resul­
ting combinatorial system (see op.cit.. Sec. 2(10)).
He therefore opts for a standard two-valued logic, which 
leads immediately to an analysis of thé comparative in 
terms of the association with each adjectival predicate 
of a set of 'graded' models: distinct interpretations in
each of which any one-place predicate either holds, or 
not, or is undecided, for each element of the universe in 
each interpretive model and choice of elements (as assign­
ments of values to variables) for that model. These
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interpretations may also be 'context-dependent' in terms 
of which assignments for the variables yield decided 
truth-values, and which not, in different contexts.
There is some loose similarity of structure with C-theory 
in the choice of two-valued logic (for which I have 
offered no argument), associated with a set of discrete 
structures within which certain assignments to idents - 
in this case of characters which are values of a V-char­
acter - hold, or not, under a theory which selects cer­
tain idents and values as elements of the context. I 
shall not attempt translation between the two formu­
lations, which have different aims. But both accounts 
accept the partial status of typical - and perhaps all 
- actual instances of comparative systems which might be 
susceptible to their analyses. Kamp treats the partia­
lity of his semantic systems in terms of vagueness, 
associating each partial interpretation with a set of 
logically possible completions (in the sense of van 
Fraassen's supervaluation theory): in each of which some
or all of the truth-values left undecided for the instan­
tiating context (or situation) are decided one way or 
the other, in terms of the appropriate model and alterna­
tive choices of elements. For this set of completions 
he considers a probabilistic structure, for which an 
ideal measure is proposed: but rejects it, at least for
the general case, on the ground that it fails to resolve 
contexts in which there is more than one criterion for
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the applicability of the relevant adjectival predicate.
The more epistemological perspective of this 
study suggests at least two different aspects of the 
theoretical structure under which notions of vagueness 
might be considered to fall. Both, I think, can be 
accommodated within Kamp’s analysis. One is taken to 
occur strictly within the comparative structure of the 
relevant R-theory, for which I have proposed the asso­
ciation, in many cases, of a pair consisting of a stand­
ard and an approximate structure. In the standard struc­
ture, definite character-values and comparative relations 
are determined for the theory; further assignments are 
then more vaguely associated with these standard values, 
for elements of the approximate structure, for which 
the theoretical commitments are weaker, particularly in 
rspect of transitivity. A full account of such structures 
in non-metric contexts, with examples, is given above 
(DIO, 11, 12, pp.l28ff ). This aspect of vagueness 
remains to some extent under the control of the L-group 
or individual Reader, where they can eliminate indetermi­
nate value-assignments by neglecting them in the construc­
tion of the R-theory. In measurement contexts, not only 
are standard values and the limits of tolerated vagueness 
expressed sharply in numerical terms, but associated 
approximate values can be restricted to those which are 
well determined in the same terms, with some loss of tran­
sitivity. This determinacy may, of course, be limited or 
excluded in particular contexts by the unavailability of
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a recognizable comparison figure.
The second aspect of vagueness for C-theory 
arises at the point where comparative values come to 
depend on commitments of substantive theory - i.e., 
where we must go beyond what can be recognized on the 
phenomenal evidence using only the commitments of R- 
theory (we shall see that this conceptual boundary is 
itself dependent on the theoretical structure of the par­
ticular context). Here, choices between alternative 
readings of comparative values and relations, derivable 
under the various commitments of substantive theory, 
may be undecidable. There are obvious similarities bet­
ween this account and Kamp's analysis in terms of pos­
sible completions of a partial model. Although, for 
C-theory also, probabilistic structures are not always 
appropriate to such cases, it has been found better to 
treat the whole question later, under the head of proba­
bility, and after the analysis of metric contexts.
Although Kamp's main choice of theme concen­
trates his attention on comparatives in relation to adjec­
tives, he also gives some consideration to nouns in this 
context. C-theoretical analysis suggests that what 
determines whether or not comparatives can coherently be 
deployed in association with an expression depends not 
on grammatical analysis of parts of speech as much as 
upon the recognition - in concrete contexts - of an 
associated comparison-figure (and I suspect that an
212
analogous criterion holds in abstract, or mixed, contexts) 
The Chinese, after all, dispense with these indo-european 
distinctions. Newnham suggests that this poverty of 
distinction makes Chinese "a poor medium for logical or 
philosophical ideas" (op.cit., p. 85): but perhaps he
has a narrow view of philosophy. China has produced 
great philosophers, and may hope to produce more in future 
But they are unlikely to be linguistic analysts.
J. Notes on Some Abstract Concepts in Contextual Theory
The exposition of C-theory, as metatheory of 
R-theories of particular contexts, has now been brought 
to the point at which the treatment of measurement con­
texts as special cases can be carried out. A few impor­
tant background considerations, however, remain. I want 
to clarify the status of certain key abstract concepts 
for the theory, namely: non-affirmative (principally nega­
tive) assignments, objectivity, truth, and error. I 
shall suggest how each of these concepts may attain 
sharper significance for measurement systems.
(1) Non-Affirmative Assignments
(a) Negation. In the fundamental definitions of R- 
frame (A1 - 9, pp. 52-4) and R-sequence (F(l)(c), p. 81)
- on which the whole structure of C-theory is built - all 
assignments of characters to idents are affirmative and
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unequivocal. This is claimed to reflect the actual 
intuitive experience of phenomenal recognition. For 
any P and x, either P e f(x) or not. If not,[P i f(x)), 
the judgment that P is not assigned to x does not rest 
in any simple way on the phenomenal evidence for the 
characterization of x alone. It is, indeed, a logical 
consequence of the definitions that this negation holds 
for each and every character in C and not in f(x). But 
it would be an entirely false account of perceptual recog­
nition that required us to make this negative assignment 
for every such character - an impossible task in many 
such contexts. We do not use logic in recognition, but 
to derive the consequences which interest us from the 
results of recognition. (The only appearance of negation 
' in the fundamental definitions is in the definition 
of exclusion '-n/a,b'; ADI, for A7. The expression
(3 c) (ri/c,a A n/c,b)*, which occurs there, does negate 
a formula which contains assignments of configurative 
characters, in the form of enclosure-relations 'n ' (for 
this interpretation see discussion in Note (e), pp.66ff.
But it must be strictly read as saying that no such assign­
ment for any ident c is part of the R-theory, i.e., 
attended to. Again, the expression 'CVc)*l(n/c,a a n/c,b)' 
is a logical consequence, but its récognitive testing would 
require us to check every ident of the context to see 
whether or not it satisfies these enclosure relations.)
The intuition to be captured is that we only 
attend to specific negative assignments; in C-theoretical
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terms, this restriction of attention is governed by the 
specified commitments (explicit or tacit) of the parti­
cular R-theory. Three key schemata have been introduced 
which may yield negative assignments. I will now dis­
cuss each of these in turn.
(i) rjn, —  3 c ' u  c") '** p.160
To treat only the simplified case of single-
membered sets of characters, and putting y = T^q » we 
easily derive |— (Vx) (ri/x,y -> 3  CQ/x) ). F-set construction, 
as defined, rests on the recognition of the composite 
ident (satisfying BD2,p.72 ) of all idents characterized
by a particular set of characters for each F-set. In
and
rj,Q = 3) —  I^q ; e.g., the sets of "all birds", "all white 
birds", and "all non-white birds", recognized as "not 
white". This result rests, as we have seen, on two under­
lying commitments: first, to the recognition of certain
particular features of idents in a given region as "the 
same character" when assigned to different idents; and, 
second, the recognition of certain particular sets of 
idents so characterized as enclosed in composite idents 
in such a way that complements, such as 1^—  be
determined (see "characterization and the logic of assign­
ment" , pp. 155 ff.) .
(ii) ^fP,Q] (Va,b) (P/a A Q/b + a f b)
... distinctive pair, C3, p.80, 
We: derive easily |—  / [P,Q] ->■ (Va) (P/a ^ 1(Q/a)): 
following the example given on p. 90 , we can say that
this simplified case, the relevant F-sets are 1^, T^q,
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anything "black" will be at once recognized as "not a 
swan". It must be insisted that such a negation rests 
on the specific recognition of this pair of characters 
("swan", "black") as a distinctive pair in context; in 
another context we might lump all swans, or all birds, 
together, of whatever colour, in distinction from all 
other animals some of which may be black, others white, 
or any mixture of colours. (Such distinctive pairs are 
often important in determining boundaries: we can dis­
tinguish parts of a knitted sweater as exclusively "purl" 
or "plain", neglecting variations of colour common to 
both sides of the boundary.)
A distinctive pair of characters, as instanced 
here, may or may not be values of a third, valuative 
character - which would bring them under the following 
schema:
(iii) V{C',Q} (VP,P')(P,P' e C  A P / P' Sp / Sp,)
... (value set: D7(ii) and notes, p. 120)
That schema represents the general case where 
the values of a value-set are not distinctive (note (e), 
p. 88). But in many familiar cases, especially of 
metric values, values are distinctive: nothing can have
more than one value of length, say, in any one frame.
So, adding the condition (VP,P’)(P / P ’ / [P,P']), we 
have (VP.,P* ,a,b) (P,P* c C' A p/a a  P'/b A p f p' + a / b); 
whence (VP,P',a) (P/a a  P / P » 1(P'/a)).
Except in highly restricted contexts such as
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those instanced above, there are few plausible examples 
of negative assignment where no covering V-character is 
recognized, if only tacitly, as assigned to the ident to 
which the assignment of a particular character, as one 
of its values, is negated. We are certainly committed, 
in some ill-defined way, to the implication that a "table", 
or a "piece of music", is "not a swan". Neither of 
these can readily be assigned a V-character of which "swan" 
is also a value. But it is also hard to think of any 
rational context in which such negations would form part 
of an R-theory. Cases of this kind, if they can be dis­
covered, would be hardly generalisable and not very inter­
esting. (In what context would it be apposite to point 
out that "The Dying Swan" is not a swan?) Underlying 
such a negation is, typically, such a tacit assignment as 
"this bird is a goose", or, "this bird honks", "so it 
can't be a swan"; would it ever be rational to make the 
judgement, "this motor car honks, so it can't be a swan"? 
The case of the honking bird leaves open the question what 
value of "bird" other than "swan" is to be assigned, if 
any; and illustrates how a distinctive pair ("swan", 
"honking") of type (ii), although not being a pair of 
values of any V-character, can be part of the basis for 
discriminating between values of a V-character of which 
one of the pair is a value.
One interesting use of negative assignments is 
to block extrapolative identification (see F3, and dis­
cussion, p. 170f). If a "bird" is assigned many of the
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characters which could lead to its identification as a 
"swan" on partial evidence, but is then found to "honk", 
a tentative identification would be blocked.
It is not claimed that this set of three 
schemata exhausts all sources of negative assignment.
But it is comprehensive enough to form the basis for a 
discussion of the main metatheoretical problem raised 
for C-theory by such assignments. Every negated charac­
ter must be a member of the recognized domain C  of 
characters for the R-theory; there must, therefore (by 
A6, p. 53), be some ident recognized in the context to 
which it is assigned. So we could not deny swanhood to 
any ident in a context where no swan is recognized.
This is not as restrictive as may at first appear, since 
it is not required that the excluded character should be 
recognized in the same frame : so, by extending the con­
text far enough back in time, we may negate any character 
recognized in the past', for which a suitable distinctive 
commitment (for example) is adopted for the R-theory.
The "storage" facility of language (p. 192 ) is 
of major importance here, in increasing the domain of 
values, stable over long periods, which can be brought 
within R-theoretical accounts of contexts familiar to a 
particular L-group. We are still, however, restricted to 
characterizations which can be understood as resting on 
phenomenal evidence available at some frame of the relevant 
R-theory to some member of the L-group. What counts as 
such evidence, and how much the R-theory may "read into it".
218
is within rational limits a matter of autonomous decision 
within the theory in each case (ultimately, too, what 
counts as "rational"). These limits can be relatively 
clearly stated for measurement contexts, and fuller dis­
cussion is therefore left for Part III. At this point, 
it may just be noted that the property of valuative 
commitments, whereby affirmative assignment of one value 
yields negative assignments of all others, is sharply 
defined for measurement systems.
(b) Other Non-affirmative Assignments
The C-theoretical analysis of disjunctive 
assignments of the form 'P/a V Q/a' follows closely the 
analysis of negation, which has already been presented as 
generally the result of a choice between alternatives.
In case (i), recognition of the sets Fp and leads at 
once to the derivation [— (Va) (a fi (Fp U Fq ) — ► (P/a v Q/a)); 
only if I^Q = 0 is this an exclusive 'or', so that 
P/a— Tj(Q/a). In case (iii), looking back to the defi­
nition of a value set given by V[C',Q] (D7, p.120 ), we 
see that condition (i) requires (Va) (Q/a (^P)
(Pe A P/a))). Putting {P^,...,P^], the consequent
formula can be written: 'Pj^/aV ...V P^/a', the simple
alternative P^/a v being the special case where
has just two members. Only the distinctive condition
for value set, or the recognition of a distinctive pair, 
yields the negation P^/a — (P2/a) .
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Disjunction appears, therefore, as an interme­
diate stage in the process of recognizing assignments.
It occurs naturally in questions, like, "Is this a swan 
or a goose?"; where the questioner has tacitly made a 
V-character assignment ("bird", or something narrower 
such as "large white long-necked bird") and is looking to 
another Reader's utterance for evidence leading to a 
specific value assignment. This form of question helps 
to determine the form of the context, by directing atten­
tion to a specified range of values, perhaps clarifying 
an accompanying gesture which might equally have done for 
"What is that swan doing?". Often, a simple question 
like, "Is this a swan?" will have the same effect.
Orders or statements of intention - "This wall 
will be white" - can be analysed, like predictions, as 
assignments under sequential commitment (pp. 163 ff.) - 
and equally open to disconfirmation at a later frame.
Other syntactical forms, placing phrases referring to 
assignments in subordinate clauses, may assign special 
status to these assignments in the framework of a Reader's 
supposed psychology in terms of hope, belief, desire, etc. 
These attributions may fall within a psychological theory 
which is unlikely to be concrete in C-theoretical terms, 
but which may affect the acceptance of the assignment, or 
otherwise, for the Group-R-theory. But they do not 
affect the form of the assignments as such, if the relevant 
references can be assigned to the phrases in question; 
and will not be considered further. The statement that a
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Reader "knows", or, in certain senses that he "sees", 
"perceives", or in similar terms "is aware that" some 
assignment holds (via the assigned reference of a subor­
dinate clause), will carry some commitment to 'objec­
tivity', which is next to be considered.
(2) Objectivity and Empirical Truth
The question whether this study can throw any 
light on general philosophical or metaphysical notions of 
reality or truth must be left for discussion towards the 
end. But, at this stage, limited informal definitions 
of these concepts for C-theory can be given in terms of 
an abstract property of 'objectivity' for idents and char­
acters. Corresponding with the property ordinarily 
attributed to anything by the word "real", or to a pro­
perty or character attributed as "really" possessed by 
anything, it is (usually tacitly) assumed for all idents 
and characters of an R-theory. If any phenomenon occurs 
in the spatio-temporal framework of a context, and is 
attended to in association with the context, from which 
the assignment of objectivity is withheld, it is gener­
ally given concurrently to some associated ident to which 
the appearance of the phenomenon is attributed (see 
examples below).
The conditions for its assignment vary from 
context to context; and, within each context, from
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Reader to Reader, and from element to element of the R- 
theory. Its assignment brings with it certain types of 
theoretical commitment which also vary in this way, but 
which seem always to involve spatio-temporal aspects of 
the associated idents, i.e. (1) their extension in space, 
and (2) their persistence through time. The first is 
dependent on our general beliefs about the proper exten­
sions of natural objects: "real" people cannot walk
through the spaces occupied by "real" tables (an 'exclu­
sive' commitment under Schema C4, p. 80 ) - though they 
may seem to walk through their "real" reflections in trans­
parent glass. Commitments of this kind generally bring 
with them other, ancillary commitments about consistency 
with the perceptions of others. The commonest test of 
objectivity is to ask others whether their perceptions 
tally with our own: "Do you see.what I see?" Commit­
ments of the second kind are equally testable by a single 
Reader of the context: "real" elephants do not vanish
on the instant or appear intermittently to the uninter­
rupted gaze (a 'constancy' commitment under Schema FI, 
p. 164). However, the same does not apply to the ordi­
nary unscientific experience of seeing "real" flashes of 
lightning.
But an after-image, though it persists for the 
expected time in the perception of a single Reader, does 
not occupy the region of space suggested by this per­
ception, nor are we surprised that it is not seen by others. 
We are inclined to think of it as "real", all the same.
222
because such things are regularly perceived by people 
after looking at bright lights, and their accounts of 
the effects tally well enough (though we should not feel 
the same about pink elephants seen by heavy drinkers).
We may go on to construct a theory connecting them cau­
sally with chemical effects in the retina; and we can 
imagine an experiment in which A recognizes the chemical 
effects by direct observation in B's retina whenever B 
recognizes an after-image. Regular correspondence re­
inforces both the theory and the attribution of objec­
tivity to the after-image.
It seems clear that the conditions for the 
assignment of objectivity rest on a principle of induction, 
in the broadest sense of theoretical reliance on the 
persistence of regularities over time in the forms of 
"real" phenomena - an important aspect of empirical theory 
being the recognition and consistent expression (or tacit 
understanding) of these regularities. This is not the 
crude "inductivism" castigated by Popper, which holds 
that theory merely generalises from past observation: 
it is, on the contrary, implicit in his own "hypothetico- 
deductive" model of scientific theory, since all empirical 
hypotheses from which deductions may be derived, in such 
a way as to predict future observations, presuppose such 
regularities. Typically they involve hypostasis of 
unperceived structures which are typically supposed just 
as objective, or "real" for the theory as the phenomenal 
evidence on which they are recognized. The relevance of
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these considerations for this study is that contexts of 
measurement are constructed - physically as well as 
theoretically - to maximise assignments of objectivity 
to particular elements of the phenomenal evidence.
The results of measured recognition are generally treated 
as the final arbiters for the objectivity of unperceived, 
hypostasized elements of the associated substantive (non- 
recognitive) theory.
Where conflicts occur between perceptual rea­
dings and inductive commitments respecting the objecti­
vity of particular idents or characters, we seldom have 
difficulty in making the distinction, and preserving 
the commitments. Where doubt is unresolved, appeal is 
often made to minimal characterization, of the kind asso­
ciated in epistemological writings with special entities, 
called sense data, qualia, etc. (but having no special 
status for C-theory). "Well, it may not be a real tomato, 
but at least I see a round red thing in my field of 
vision." Training in art or psychology may help, but 
this is no reason to suppose that untrained people cannot 
understand such things [as seems to be suggested, e.g., by 
Quine (1970, p. 1) and Quinton [in Warnock, 1967, p. 68)). 
Most of the time, in concrete contexts, the distinction 
between "appearance" and "reality" is, naturally and pro­
perly, neglected. The ordinary language of perception is 
forged in the experience of this general neglect; it has 
to use special devices - like those of the sentence about
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the tomato - when the need arises to point up the distinc­
tion, and it does not always do it very well. We talk 
of "seeing a house" and not of "recognizing it on the 
evidence of its visual appearance"; of course, but such 
syntactic observations cannot be used to found theories 
of perception, to which they have no relevance.
Although this concept of objectivity has been 
introduced here in the context of Group-R-theory, and a 
good deal said of the role of language in reinforcing its 
assignment, I do not want to leave the impression that it 
necessarily requires such reinforcement. Our ordinary 
conduct of life depends on a rich profusion of such assign­
ments by each one of us, made without help from our friends, 
and much of it unsupported by language.
The abstract assignment of objectivity to the 
elements of a récognitive assignment (ident and character), 
together with the commitment that this assignment holds 
for the R-theory, has equivalent force in the logic of 
assignment to that of held-truth in the logic of the base- 
language, and of its actual-language translations, where 
they enter into the context (see discussion p. 185 , note
(c)). This is a concept of empirical truth, which functions 
as logical truth in the logic of the associated empirical 
theory. The common acceptance of consistent systems of 
assignment as empirical truth leads naturally to the 
abstract assignment of error to inconsistencies between 
assignments, since truth can never be inconsistent.
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(3) Error
The underlying principle in the analysis of error 
for this study is the assumption that it shows up, if at 
all, in the form of inconsistency in the relevant GR-theory 
(or individual R-theory). The concept is thus firmly 
relativised to particular theories, and is to be distin­
guished from any universal or supratheoretical notion of 
falsity. Its relationship to this notion will be con­
sidered in Part IV, Section 7. The distinction in the 
context of a particular theory between error and falsity 
is not the same; it will be discussed at the end of this 
Section.
One important aspect of error was mentioned 
above (Section G, note (b), p.184 ): inconsistencies
between Readers' understandings of the references of state­
ments in the base-language. Since these references are 
to assignments, commitments or negations of the GR-theory, 
we can take them to be ultimately reducible to systems of 
conjunctions or disjunctions of conditions of the form 
P e 0V(x,k) or P^8Y(x,k). This reduction points to five 
variable factors in the theoretical understanding of the 
context, in terms of which error may appear: the reference
function 'i* for the particular context, associating a state­
ment with a condition of one of these forms; the elements 
(P) of characterization; the idents (x) supposed to be 
characterized thereby; the R-frames (i,k) at and for which
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the condition is taken to hold; and the identities (/?*0 
of the Readers in whose R-theories it is taken to hold. 
These same factors, other than represent the possible 
loci of errors in recognition itself, independently of 
language. (I shall neglect the possibility of error 
through misperception - say, mishearing - of an utterance; 
and deliberate lying or other misuse of language. We 
have enough trouble without these.)
I shall distinguish between 'local' error, where 
inconsistencies occur either within the R-theories of 
relatively few members of the L-group, or between these 
and the R-theories of most of the group in factors for 
which these majority theories are mutually consistent; 
and 'group' error, where inconsistencies occur in what 
are recognizably the same factors for all, or nearly all, 
members. (There will be borderline cases, especially in 
less rigorously organized contexts.) Local error is 
generally relatively easy to diagnose and deal with; 
though, where discrepancy occurs between the theory of the 
many and that of the few (even the solitary one) it is 
not always that of the few which must be 'corrected'.
The most serious difficulty arises in distinguishing 
between error due to inconsistencies in the reading of 
the symbolic function 4», (i.e., verbal meanings), and 
inconsistencies in the reading of one or more of the ele­
ments of the assignment determined by (P,x,i,k) for 
'P£0V(x,k)' (i.e., perceptual recognitions). This
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raises fundamental questions about the relationship 
between language and perception (or sensation), which will 
be further considered shortly. Some other special cases 
of local error follow:
(1) Where the value of P is a positional character of 
the form P^ for some figure oc of the context (see 
above pp. 106 ff.), an ident x, otherwise consis­
tently 'read', may be assigned to a different confi­
guration from that to which it is assigned by the 
rest of the group; for instance, a hand, or a voice, 
assigned to the 'wrong' person.
(2) The case where inconsistency, though, often, apparently 
due to local differences in character-assignment on 
direct perceptual evidence, can best be analysed as 
inconsistency in the understanding of an associated 
theoretical commitment. For example, recognizing
an apple, wrongly, as unripe because it is green.
Some cases of this type can also belong to type (1).
The distinction between recognition by theoretical 
commitment and that by direct perception is not 
definable in general terms; it is context-dependent, 
and a matter for determination under the relevant R- 
theory. In measurement contexts, it can be of 
critical importance.
(3) We have seen (above, pp. 212 ff.) that what I have 
called cases of 'negative assignment' are often 
special cases of some form of theoretical commitment 
(falling under head (2) above), by which the
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assignment of one character precludes the assignment 
of some other character to the same ident. Such 
cases are probably the most common source of error; 
they can be diagnosed and solved for a Group-R-theory 
either in terms of correcting the assigned character, 
or the identification of the ident, or by the 
revision or abandonment of the commitment (the correc­
tion being made either locally or for the group).
If, for example, a group holds that all swans are 
white, and that white excludes black, the discovery 
by a member of a bird he takes to be a swan but black 
leads to inconsistency in the GR-Theory: this threat
of error may be averted by (a) excluding him from the 
group; or deciding (b) that it isn't black - just a 
trick of the light; (c) that it isn't a swan;
(d) that some swans are, after all, black; but prob­
ably not (e) that some things can be both predominantly 
black and predominantly white - or, for that matter, 
both swans and crows. As we also saw on pp. 215 ff 
commitments to sets of characters as sets of values 
of a valuative character are rich sources of récogni­
tive negation, since assignment of one such value 
precludes assignment of any other value to the same 
ident at the same frame. Black/white and swan/crow 
are both pairs of mutually exclusive values under this 
analysis. Measurement systems are constructed with 
the aim of eliminating récognitive inconsistencies of
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this type for values of the valuative characters 
chosen in context; an aim assisted, as we shall see, 
by fixing levels of 'tolerance' below which incon­
sistencies are neglected for the context.
(4) Inconsistencies in the reading of v -  i.e., in the
identification of the R e a d e r w h o s e  statement may 
determine a change of assignment - should in general 
be safely negligible; in view of the commitment in 
definition Gl(i)(b) (p. 176) that what holds for one 
Reader holds for all of the group, taken with G3(iii) 
(p. 181), which says that identical statements from 
different Readers refer to identical assignments. 
Apparent exceptions will occur where a speaker is 
involved in the reference of his own statement. "My 
foot hurts" is a simple example; more sophisticated 
ones will occur in scientific or technical contexts 
where conditions affecting an observer are factors 
in his observation report. For C-theory we must 
see the utterer in such a case as filling two distinct 
roles: (a) as member of L-group and source of utter­
ance, and (b) as ident of the Group-R-theory to which 
characters - including configurative characters deter­
mining relations - are assigned for the theory (i.e., 
tX' in 'P £ 9Vcx,k) ') . If these roles are 
clearly distinguished, we see that only the second is 
involved in the reference of the statement - loosely, 
in what the statement says. Errors (inconsistencies) 
in the understanding of this reference can then be
230
understood, once more, independently of the identity 
of the utterer. If John says, "My foot hurts", 
and someone else, thinking Peter spoke, reports 
"Peter’s foot hurts", any third person believing 
this report will make the same error (with respect 
to the group theory) as the second in thinking that 
Peter's foot hurts, and not John's. The source of 
the error and its correction will best be determined 
by agreeing about whose foot hurts - i.e., the 
correct assignment to John as ident - and we can 
again safely neglect errors associated with the iden­
tity of an utterer.
(5) Not much need be said - nor could be, in general terms 
- about the tendency of error to be revealed as a 
result of increasing the coverage of a Group-R-theory 
in time (by the addition of frames) scope (by the 
addition of idents or characters), or by the addition 
of members to the L-group, as the context develops. 
Such an expansion of context increases in principle 
the opportunities for inconsistency (not least in the 
understanding of the reference function), to be read 
as 'error' unless and until 'corrected' in the manner 
illustrated above. In general, the more a context 
of theory is consistently expanded and the threat of 
error met, with or without correction or revision, 
the greater its claim to objectivity. Discussion 
of the relationship of this claim to that of empirical 
truth must, once again, be postponed to the end of 
the study.
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(6) Two relatively straightforward types of error-
source can now be considered as cases of group incon­
sistency in the understanding of the symbolic function 
I: namely, (a) redundancy, where more than one form
of statement may be taken to refer to the same assign­
ment; and (b) ambiguity, where the same form of 
statement may be taken to refer to more than one 
assignment.
(a) Redundancy. If, for simplicity, we suppose that 
we have clearly distinguished sets of expressions in 
the ideal base-language of C-theory, one referring 
to idents, another to characters, others to utterance 
or assignment frames, and so on, the existence of 
redundant expressions in any one of these sets should 
not give rise to error, so long as all members of the 
group understand them as referring in the same ways. 
Inconsistencies in such understandings will emerge in 
the same ways as would local errors for Ÿ, as dis­
cussed above; in terms of conflicts about the readings 
of statements in relation to specific assignments. In 
non-ideal languages, however, the position is less 
clear - frequently because, for example, expressions 
taken to refer to the same entity may carry confused 
or conflicting associations with past characterizations, 
The understanding of two expressions as referring to 
the same entity amounts to a theoretical commitment; 
this would be the basis of a C-theoretical analysis 
of the notion of 'genidentity* as used by Carnap.
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If either expression is limited in reference to the entity 
as characterized in a certain way, a further commitment 
is required, that this characterization obtains at all 
relevant frames of the context. The recognised Fregean 
test of referential identity of this kind is substituta­
bility of the relevant expressions; and a favourite 
example is that of the morning and evening stars, iden­
tified with the planet Venus. The original theoretical 
commitment on which this identity is based is credited 
to an ancient Babylonian astronomer. Before him, no 
single entity corresponding to our planet Venus existed 
for any known theory. After him, the three expressions 
are commonly thought to have identical reference. But 
now consider the statement: "I can see the evening star
from my window" - perhaps in a letter. Substitution of 
either alternative expression destroys the meaning;
’morning star' would lead to the implication of a false­
hood, that the window faces East. We can rescue the essen­
tial thought (at the cost of romance) by analysing the 
sentence as equivalent to: "I can see the planet Venus
in its evening phase ..."; thus revealing clearly the 
factor of frame-dependent characterization.
What we have to say, for C-theory, is that if 
two expressions are to refer to the same ident, they must 
be tied by the common understanding of 4», and the values 
of 0 for the group theory, to the same sets of characters 
for each frame of the context in which it occurs.
On the-face of it we should be on safer ground
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with redundant expressions for characters. Here, the 
favourite example is "bachelor/unmarried man" (not in our 
sense strictly a case of récognitive character, but this 
does not affect the argument). Again, care is needed.
If we follow the O.E.D. - and, I think, common usage - 
by glossing "bachelor" as "unmarried man (of marriageable 
age)" (my emphasis), we might be cruelly misleading a 
young girl by describing an elderly widower, though cer­
tainly unmarried, as a bachelor. It is not, I think, 
pure chance that I am driven to use an old-fashioned and 
well-worn example. Frege’s interest in the substituta­
bility of expressions derived from his wish to assimilate 
expressive language with the language of mathematics, 
for which this facility is a major requirement. Ordinary 
expressive language, however, is evolved for use in day-to- 
day communication, where the last thing we want is that 
our words should be replaceable by others without loss of 
truth. Hence, although partial redundancies, in the sense 
of overlapping references, are common, perfectly substi­
tutable synonyms are rare.
(2) Ambiguity. Where the same utterance is taken, say, by 
different Readers to refer to more than one assignment, 
error will only show up if the assignments or their asso­
ciated commitments are in some way incompatible, so that a 
theoretical inconsistency is revealed. It will be assumed 
that the moment such an inconsistency revealed, it can 
be corrected by revision of the function 4» and the base
r>
language L so as to provide different expressions for
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the different recognized assignments. For example, if 
two people in the group are called "John", we can distin­
guish between them in reference by the addition of a 
further name or a description so as not to understand - 
in conflict with the evidence - that the "wrong" John’s 
foot is hurting. Similarly, if a particular "house" is 
described as "high", we may have to sharpen reference to 
the character, by specifying either the sense "lofty" or 
the sense "built on a hill", if inconsistency is to be 
avoided.
Such errors, then, are relatively trivial; 
they must be clearly distinguished from what we may call 
concealed ambiguity, where identical expressions are used 
to refer to what are taken wrongly, by the whole L-group, 
to be identical assignments. For example, suppose two 
different people were recognized as one, called "Lee Harvey 
Oswald", leading to potential inconsistencies in the his­
tory of J.F. Kennedy’s assassination; or suppose the 
character "fungous" was wrongly taken by naturalists to be 
a value of the character "vegetable", leading again to 
potential inconsistencies in their theory; we may properly 
distinguish these as cases of ambiguity of recognition, 
leading to a real but unrecognized ambiguity of reference. 
Such cases are trickier than simple ambiguity of reference, 
since they reveal themselves only when potential inconsis­
tencies are actualized, and diagnosis is then often prob­
lematic. This is because the consequent decisions involve
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choices between theoretical commitments, either at the 
level of basic récognitive assignments, or at the level of 
the dependence of some types of assignment on others, which 
may involve deeply ingrained beliefs.
Two types of récognitive ambiguity can be use­
fully distinguished:
A. Cases where a possible solution lies in the decision 
to replace a single ident by two (or more) similar but 
distinct idents, to which otherwise inconsistent characters 
can be consistently assigned (such, perhaps, as the hypo­
thesis of the two Oswalds). So, we retain our commitment 
to the inconsistency of the characterizations at the cost 
only of the commitment to the identity of the original 
single ident. This involves, of course, the construction 
within the theory of two distinct, consistent and plausible 
'life histories' for the newly recognized idents, where only 
one existed before (David Wiggins* account of identity in 
terms of 'life histories' will be discussed below, in
Part IV, Section 6).
Cases where récognitive ambiguity reveals itself for 
a single character-assignment to a single ident are rare. 
Récognitive ambiguity for characters is therefore best 
considered as a special case under the second head.
B. Cases with respect to composites (A 9, p. 54): e.g.,
r-sets (BDl, 2, p. 72 ; or composed configurations (see
esp. p. 71 above). Récognitive ambiguity for any such 
definitive characters may lead to inconsistencies in the 
recognitions of enclosures of supposed components in such
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composites until the error in the theory is corrected.
Some examples: (a) Discovery that what was thought to be
a single bird species of the genus phylloscopus, with two 
kinds of song, showed minor but systematic anatomical 
variations, corresponding to the songs; corrected by 
recognizing two distinct species (C-theoretical composites) 
names p. trochilus and p. collybita (willow warbler and 
chiffchaff); (b) discovery that fungi exhibit certain
features, and lack others, that are respectively absent 
and present in plants generally; corrigible either by 
recognizing fungi as a sub-order, or as a distinct order, 
and modifying recognition of the order 'plants’ accordingly 
(still, I believe, controversial); (c) discovery that 
whales, once thought to be fish, exhibit features common 
to mammals, and lack many common to fish; corrected by 
recognizing whales as belonging to (enclosed in) the class 
(composite) mammals, and not fish; (d) early-morning 
discovery that what I took to be my left shoe pinches my 
left foot; corrected by revising my recognition of its 
configuration to that of a right shoe.
It is claimed that the above account of error 
sources, if not exhaustive, presents the major types 
encountered in relation to recognition of, and reference 
to, idents and characters in C-theoretical terms. It 
emerges that, at least in those types of cases considered, 
group error shows up, if at all, as a conflict between 
locally inconsistent theoretical commitments, some of which
237
the group is usually unwilling to abandon - regarding 
them as parts of the common structure of ’knowledge'.
A special class among such conflicts are those which call 
in question the common understanding of the structure of 
the reference function 4>.
Ambiguity of reference, however, is sometimes 
adopted as a deliberate strategy, for greater flexibility 
or scope in speaking of classes of idents whose distinc­
tive characterizations (marking each as unique) carry no 
critical differences of commitment for the GR-theory. 
Typically, though not always, this strategy is used where 
these distinctive characterizations are, for practical 
reasons, inaccessible to recognition in context. Because 
of the dangers of confusion if the resulting logical struc­
ture of the context is not strictly kept in mind, the 
strategy will now be carefully examined. It will be found 
that the theoretical consequences of this analysis are 
important in many cases of measurement and probability 
assessment.
Deliberate Ambiguity, Synonymous Sets and Tolerance of Error
Deliberate ambiguity involves the neglect of par­
ticular kinds of differences in characterization between 
idents, as part of what might be called R-theoretical 
strategy for the context; on one or more of the following 
grounds, of which the first and last are crucial:
(1) that these kinds of differences are irrelevant, i.e..
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they do not affect (through any form of theoretical 
commitment) factors of recognition which are important to 
the group in context;
(2) that attention to them may unduly complicate or con­
fuse the group's understanding, or otherwise inhibit the 
development of the group theory;
(3) that they are in practice either partially or totally 
unrecognizable on the available phenomenal evidence in 
context.
A universal form of such neglect in concrete con­
texts is that which is operated in the choice of atoms, 
atomizing characters, etc. for the context (C2, 8, 9, 
p. 80-1). This may be read as a commitment to neglect poten­
tial inconsistencies, or tolerate error, for any differ­
ences of characterization involving proper enclosures of 
these atoms. But ambiguity of reference need not accom­
pany such tolerance, since in many contexts reference is 
only made to idents whose characterizations are unique, 
as C-theory requires, so that one-to-one correspondence 
is secured. In other contexts, however, one or more 
characterized sets of atomic idents ('atom sets') may be 
so recognized that each set encloses more than one member, 
but every member of each such set plays what is seen as an 
exactly equivalent role in the Group-R-theory of the con­
text. The members of such an atom set are taken as 
indistinguishable for the context, and all character-dif- 
ferences between them neglected. Such neglect is expressed 
in a deliberate ambiguity of reference, the same term or
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expression of the base-language being used to refer indis­
criminately to each and every member of the set; which 
I shall therefore call a 'synonymous set'.
In many scientific contexts, especially those of 
physics, this type of indistinguishability is interpreted 
as identity, according to what is known as 'Leibniz' Law'.
I think this term is misleading. Leibniz, as I understand 
him, insisted that each one of his monads had a unique set 
of properties. In saying that if monad A and monad B 
were indistinguishable, they were identical, he was thinking 
in terms of an ideal distinction of properties such that 
any one monad is indistinguishable from itself and distin­
guishable from every other: not a form of practical dis­
tinction in which the property-differences of distinct 
monads can be neglected. My analysis parallels Leibniz 
in insisting that each recognized ident is assigned, in 
principle, a unique set of characters. Since, however, 
this is a theory of practical recognition, the words 'in 
principle' are there to signal an admission that, in many 
contexts, the principle is wholly or partly neglected for 
members of synonymous sets satisfying requirements (1) to
(3) above.
It is nevertheless worth noting that the recog­
nition that any synonymous set has more than one member 
involves the underlying acceptance of this quasi-Leibnizian 
principle. A physicist may treat all molecules of a given 
volume of hydrogen as "identical": if he now wishes to
240
estimate their numbers in given conditions of pressure and 
temperature, he would, to be consistent, have to answer 
"one". In such a case, the only assignable character- 
differences will be positional, involving ideal and unper- 
ceivable (not measurable) space-time or mass-energy 
relations between the hypothetical multiplicity of atoms.
We can best understand this for C-theory as the construction 
of an ideal, extrapolated frame-sequence structure, for 
which statistically-expressed variations in values of 
chosen valuative characters (say, of position or momentum) 
are used such that the estimated number of distinct atoms 
could, if the structure were at any frame practically recog­
nizable, be consistently distinguished. Nothing in this 
account militates against the deliberately ambiguous use 
of synonymous reference to members or subsets of the atom 
set, for the purposes of free generalisation and abstraction 
At a simpler level, standard units of a measure­
ment system often appear in context as members of synony­
mous sets - not all of which are necessarily atom sets.
All "centimetres" of a context may be treated as mathe­
matically "identical" (though recognitively "equivalent"). 
But the recognition or extrapolation of an interval of 
"100 centimetres" which is also a member of the distinct 
synonymous set of "metres" involves a commitment to their 
distinguishability in principle, if they are to be coun­
table; and in many instances we may need in practice to 
distinguish a particular interval, uniquely characterized, 
as "a centimetre".
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At the same time tolerance of error, such that 
character-differences between members of a synonymous set 
which is also an atom set are systematically neglected, 
is a necessary pre-condition of the use of synonymous 
reference, to any such set or any set composed of its 
members. In measurement contexts, this tolerance can be 
given numerical expression; an aspect which will be given 
further attention in due course.
Error and Falsity
A question seems to arise over the distinction 
between error and falsity, each as opposed to truth.
Error is seen here not as the contrary of truth, but rather 
as a failure to determine truth within the theory, in the 
sense of a consistent reading of any particular utterance 
of the language of the context by all Readers as referring 
to an assignment which holds for the Group-R-theory. As 
we have seen, failure may occur as inconsistency in the 
group theory of the reference function or through 
defects in some or all of the component R-theories with 
respect to the assignment to which the utterance is taken 
to refer. Defects may arise either from lack of foun­
dation (in recognition, or by implication under theoretical 
commitment), for an assignment taken as possible for the 
theory; or from the recognition or implication of contra­
dictory assignments, of which no more than one can hold for 
the theory,and none holds unequivocally. In such cases no
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determinate value of truth or falsity is available in the 
theory.
We are left with various alternatives, of which 
the following are the most clearly defined: to reject
the theory, to neglect one or more of the relevant possible 
assignments, or to construct a probabilistic theory assign­
ing 'weights* to each possible assignment. The last 
alternative is considered in Part III in a context of 
measurement.
Falsity under a theory is determined by what the 
theory prohibits, by virtue of implication under definite 
commitment from unequivocal assignment. (It may, of 
course, apply to negative assignments, pp. 212 ff.) The 
question of the relation between truth or falsity under 
empirical theory, and logical - as it were, absolute - 
truth or falsity, will be left for discussion at the end 
of the study.
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III. MEASUREMENT IN CONTEXTUAL THEORY
K. The Structural Conditions of Measurement
1. Comparative Structure and the Notion of Quantity
A stage was reached in the development of C- 
theory where, within the R-frame, a comparative structure 
is defined in which sets of idents can be ordered with 
respect to sets of characters, namely value-ranges of a 
V-character, Q, by virtue of the recognition of a compari­
son figure, 5 , associated in the comparative pair (Q,6) 
(D8-12, pp. 123-134). The structure so defined was not 
affected in any way by the subsequent definitions under 
the heads of R-sequence or Group-R-theory. Determinate 
ordering under the relation ^ was shown to be dependent 
on the selection or construction of a standard set (Dll) 
within the comparative structure; with which an approxi­
mate set (D12) might be associated. These definitions 
were constructed without essential use of numbers. It 
was pointed out, however, that arbitrary sequences of 
numbers - most simply, a sequence of the first n positive 
integers or "natural numbers", for suitable n - could 
readily be placed in functional relation onto a standard
g
set so defined, such that the ordering under ^  was homo­
morphic with that under >  on the numerical sequence. 
Further, the same numerical sequence could be associated
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with an approximate set .defined with respect to that 
standard set, such that a unique subset (or cluster) of 
the approximate set is associated with each member of the 
standard set, called the k-cluster, where k is the number 
assigned to that member, under the'arbitrary function.
(The sequence from 1 to n was in fact used, for conven­
ience only, in the definition of these terms.)
However, doubt was expressed whether the con­
struction, without further, of such an arbitrary function 
from a numerical sequence could in any sense be called 
measurement, since any conventional order (say, an alpha­
bet) could be used in the same way, where no special 
property of numbers as such is involved. The same kind 
of doubt arises whether the associated V-character in such 
a case could properly be called a 'quantity*. Before 
further formal definition of theoretical structures, there­
fore, more will be said in an introductory sense about these 
questions.
Consider a row of books on a shelf, wrapped in 
plain covers numbered on their spines. So long as the 
numbers are all different, they can be used for identifi­
cation. Though not essential, it will be more convenient 
if the number of each book is also given in some index 
which gives particulars of its author, title and subject; 
if the index observes one or more orderings, say, alpha­
betical; and if the books are shelved in numerical order 
from the left. It will now be the case that the order of 
the distances of the books from the left end of the shelf
245
will correspond exactly with the order of numbers on their 
spines. It will also correspond with the alphabetical 
order chosen for the index, provided the numbers in the 
index follow that order. It does not seem reasonable, 
without further, to call the assignment of numbers in this 
case a form of measurement; although it appears to satis­
fy the conditions demanded by some writers, especially in 
the Suppes tradition, for what they call 'ordinal measure­
ment'. Nor, I suggest, does it seem reasonable in 
general to regard the numbers as related in any way to 
distance-from-the-left as a quantity. (A rather odd 
exception would be the case where all the books were uni­
form - say, copies of the same book. We could then say 
that the left edge of the nth book would be n-1 book-widths 
from the left; and, if the books were numbered with 
successive integers from 1, we would have constructed a 
primitive and idiosyncratic measuring system for length or 
distance. Such systems will be briefly mentioned in 
later analysis.)
Supposing the books were not uniform, they could 
be re-ordered for height, so that the higher the book, 
the further right it would be shelved. The comparison 
figure here would be that recognized when two books are 
placed vertically side-by-side on the shelf, the relation 
^ (where S is the figure and Q = "height") being assigned 
to any pair of which the first extends vertically beyond 
the second. (I am assuming that we shall not here distin­
guish any special subset of the books as standard, so that
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if ordering is to be unequivocal we must treat the whole 
set as standard, recognizing, if necessary, some least 
difference - however intuitively judged - below which 
pairs of books are assigned "the same height", and no 
books of intermediate heights recognized.) If the books 
are now renumbered in height order, books of the same 
height must be given the same number. Could we now 
choose the numbers so that their assignment could be 
called measurement, and so that they can be seen as related 
to height as a quantity? There appears to be no logical 
or theoretical difference, for this purpose, between this 
case and the former, where the comparison figure is one 
elaborated from the left-right figure discussed on p.137 
(note (c)), and the V-character is distance-from-the-left. 
The two kinds of ordering could be combined, so long as 
our "unit" of left-right ordering becomes not the indivi­
dual book, but the set of books-of-the-same-height.
What function, then, if any, do the numbers perform?
Well, if the books were taken down and disordered for any 
reason, they could be replaced in height order by refer­
ence only to the numbers and the left-right order, 
without repeating the height comparison. If the numbering- 
for-height now seems to have mysteriously taken on some of 
the quality of measurement of a quantity, I suggest it is 
because our somewhat arbitrary procedure has provided us 
with a crude ad-hoc theory by which we can extrapolate 
from the numerical ordering to height ordering. But it 
is a weak theory, in the sense of being poor in logical
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consequences, even for the restricted context. It is 
difficult to think of any use which could be made of 
such a theory.
Suppose we try to make it more interesting by 
adding a further theoretical commitment. Let us say 
that the left-hand support of the shelf is weak, and we 
are using height as a rough indicator of the weight of 
the books. On this basis, the arrangement will ensure 
that the centre of gravity of the books will be (just 
about) as far to the right as possible. But, if we 
really care, and we can get hold of some scales, we will 
use these to check the weight-order of the books (the 
appropriate comparison figure will be discussed later, 
under weight or mass measurement). We can expect a 
fairly close correlation between the two orders ; but let 
us say that it is not exact, and a few books now turn up 
in different places. We re-number for weight. The 
correlation now becomes irrelevant. We will choose 
between optimum weight distribution, and the aesthetic 
effect of a smooth curve along the top edges of the books. 
We will, in effect, have distinguished between height 
and weight as two different quantities assignable to the 
books, by a procedure which could be called measurement. 
But if the orders had happened to coincide - as they well 
might - would we then have identified the two quantities? 
In this case, surely not. Nor can we say that the dif­
ference, in spite of identical ordering, depends in any 
simple way on the comparison figure, or its associated
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procedure, in operationalist terms (Introduction, p. 16£). 
We shall see that some ways of comparing weights are 
carried out, in fact, by comparing lengths (or heights) 
which, under the associated theory, ^  correctly indi­
cate weights. In general, we shall find that the same 
comparison figure may be paired with different quantities 
(V-characters) in different regions of a context; and, 
conversely, the same quantity with different comparison 
figures. What determines the pairings is the associated 
(substantive, or non-récognitive) theory of the context in 
each case.
Consider now one further project for the books: 
an attempt to order them for intrinsic interest. As a 
first effort, we may place them in order of frequency of 
use, using past records in some associated context. As 
an indicator of interest, this frequency is quite plausible 
but subject to odd errors. The set book for some impor­
tant exam may be frequently used, but thoroughly boring.
We may try to check our results by asking a sample of 
readers to score the books on a scale, say, 0 to 5: not
read, very boring, rather boring, no clear opinion, quite 
interesting, very interesting. This, again, is subject 
to error. Respondents may wish to impress the surveyor, 
or themselves, with their intellectuality; or they may 
treat all surveys as a joke; people have different ideas 
about interest anyway. But, if the two orderings turn 
out to be fairly closely correlated, there is a temptation 
to think that one or other - or some statistical amalgam
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of both - is thereby reinforced as a true measure of 
interest. But looking back to the height-weight corre­
lation in the example above, we see at once that such 
confidence is illusory. If there such a thing as a 
true order of intrinsic interest, we have no reason to 
suppose on the evidence of our investigations alone that 
it is nearer to either of the observed orders, or to a 
statistical average of both, or wide of either. We 
could, of course, improve the scoring system of the survey, 
introducing further distinctions and weighting factors. 
These would reflect our own concerns, as investigators, 
with various aspects of our idea of "interest", and what 
we intended to do with the results. Whether frequency 
of use would now enter into our calculations, and how 
much, would also depend on our concerns in context. I 
do not intend this as hostile criticism of such procedures, 
but as an introductory indication that what distinguishes 
these from physical measurement systems is not so much 
the accuracy of their observations (frequency counting 
and survey scoring yield unequivocal numbers) as the rela­
tive importance and quality of non-recognitive theory in 
the measurement context. Further analysis will aim to 
give more precise meaning to this general comment.
Meanwhile, of course, for height, weight, and 
many other physical quantities we can point to a further 
stage in the development of récognitive theory, which 
associates numbers with quantities in such a way that
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additive operations on numbers are taken to correspond, 
more or less precisely, with operations of composition 
on idents compared for these quantities. We shall show 
that this amounts to a major step in the development of 
a structure of logical consequence for the R-theory.
2. Formal Definitions of Metric Structures-
In so far as the ordering of sets of numbers in 
functional correspondence with that of values of a V- 
character for R-theory can be termed 'ordinal measure' 
ment', the necessary structures are adequately defined 
above in terms of comparative structures (D8-10, pp. 123ff) 
As a first step to the definition of structures which are 
unequivocally metric, we define a composition operator, 
as follows: '
Kl. The composition operator o is an operator on the 
product S X S, given, for all a,b in S such that 
({a,b}) e by:
a o b = X iff -y|/a,b a x = Q U E D  
i.e., a and b exclude one another, and x bounds 
their composite. Although the operator is defined, 
in principle, for all composed pairs of idents, we 
shall only be concerned with its recognition in 
association with a metric structure, as now 
defined.
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K2. ^G,K^ is a metric structure for the comparative pair
(Q,a) iff:
(i) G is a standard set for and K =
such that:
(Va) (a e G A P^/a "| ( ^  b) (b e G a  6/a,b) , and
(ii) (Vi, j ,k,a,b,x) ( (a,b,x GaP^/ea P^ ./bAP^^/xAa o b = x)
-» i + j = k)
(For 'comparative pair', see D9, p. 124 and note (b), p. 126 
and for 'standard set', Dll, p. 129. An ident a such that 
P^/a satisfying (i) is called a minimal component (m-compo- 
nent) of G . Since each pair in G is necessarily composed 
under (ii), G itself will be composed; proof is omitted.) 
K3. G' is a data set for (G,K) with respect to (Q,ô) iff
(G,k) is a metric structure for ^Q,6^, G' is an appro­
ximate set with respect to G for ,6^ and:
(Va,b,c)(a,b e G' a  c e G ”] (6/a,c a 6/b,c a  6/a,b)) 
(For 'approximate set*, see D12, p. 134}. The final con­
dition rules out the recognition of any determinate 6- 
relation between members of the same k-cluster as defined 
p. 135.
Notes :
(a) Evidently the demands made in terms of practical
realisation by the structure of K2 are much more stringent 
than those made by the non-metric standard structure (Dll, 
p. 129 ). It is assumed that in the majority of cases 
construction rather than selection of natural elements will
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be needed to satisfy the conditions; • i.e. the physical 
assembly and shaping of materials, the making of marks, 
etc. Cases of selection of regular elements, either 
natural or constructed for some other, non-metric purpose, 
do occur, and these will be mentioned in the course of 
discussion of particular types of measurement context.
(b) The condition in K2(i) requiring that the
elements of the metric sequence of values K shall corres­
pond with the first n natural numbers for some n (neces­
sarily finite, since the universal set C from which K is 
drawn is finite), and that, by (ii) , these are required 
to have the normal additive property, will seem excessive 
if these elements are thought of as necessarily identical 
with the values of some standard unit. The intended 
commitment is the much weaker one that every system of 
measurement requires the provision of some standard struc­
ture the assigned values of whose elements can be placed 
in functional correspondence with such a sequence of num­
bers. The choice of function (which will be discussed 
in relation to particular types of context) allows such 
a standard apparatus to be used with an indefinite variety 
of theoretical interpretive structures. Again, the 
relation of what is chosen as a standard "unit" to the 
least recognized interval (characterized here by P^) is 
a logically arbitrary practical decision for the particular 
context. Typically, a conventional unit is chosen, and 
the least interval expressed as a rational [decimal)
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division of that unit, or decimal multiple, to a chosen 
number of "significant figures".
At the same time, our commitment to a unique 
function from the standard value range onto a set of 
integers appears markedly stronger than that adopted by 
KLST for their weakest axiomatization of an additive 
empirical structure ('Archimedean ordered semigroup', 
definition 2, p. 44). This effectively posits a partial 
function into the real numbers, together with an 'Archi­
medean' condition, under which (roughly speaking) no 
element of the structure is * greater than' a finite mul­
tiple of any other such element. However, some bold 
epistemological assumptions are implicit, both in the 
notion of the empirical ordering relation 'not greater 
than', and in the quasi-additive notion of 'concatenation' 
on which an effective "multiplication" of 'copies' of 
empirical elements is inductively defined (in the sense 
of mathematical induction). Both are frankly modelled on 
corresponding arithmetical properties of numbers, without 
serious consideration of the question whether, and if so 
under what theoretical conditions, their instances could 
be recognized for actual empirical structures. This 
question is no part of foundational analysis in the Suppes 
tradition.
More will be said about these aspects shortly. 
From the point of view of this study, KLST's assumptions 
are far too strong as the basis of a generalized analysis 
of the field of relations with respect to any concrete
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quantity - even, we shall see, one as fundamental as 
"length". By adopting stronger conditions for a stan­
dard structure, and much weaker ones for associated data 
(not, for example, involving "multiplication" of data),
I shall try to show how the demands of rigour and flexi­
bility in mathematical description can be reconciled 
both with each other, and with the limitations of actual 
recognition.
(c) The appearance of the exclusive '-T]/a,b' in
the definition of the composition operator o (Kl) is 
necessitated by the use of the non-exclusive value-system 
V[C%Q] (D7,8, pp. 120-3) for the basic comparative struc­
ture, which is not further restricted for the general case 
of a metric structure (K2). Only in a few special cases 
(of which mass or weight measurement against standard 
objects in an equal-arm balance is the principal) are we 
concerned only with comparisons between discrete objects. 
In spatial interval comparison - whether of length or 
angle, or as an indicator of some other quantity - com­
parisons are frequently made between two idents, one of 
which is enclosed in the other.
I must now go on to show how, in the terms of 
C-theory, it is proposed to analyse the conditions for 
the recognition of empirical structures, satisfying the 
commitments of metric and data structures (K2,3), in 
concrete contexts.
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Since the composition of spatially bounded 
entities (rather than any operation on the values them­
selves) emerges as the key operation for measurement, we 
might expect to be landed with the conclusion that all 
measurement contexts are necessarily reducible to terms 
of spatial measurement. I suppose the truth to be for­
tunately less crude than this; it has to do with the 
empirical theory behind the choice of interpretive function 
in each context, mentioned in note (b), p. 252 f, and still 
to be left for later. Meanwhile I merely point to the 
central role in fact played by spatial concepts in the 
vast majority of measurement contexts, and the often re­
marked tendency to "spatialise" the concepts of non- 
spatial types of measurable quantity. At all events, we 
must start by dealing with some of the points which arise 
with regard to spatial measurement itself, accepting, for 
the moment, its central role.
3. Complementarity, Continuity and Contiguity in Récog­
nitive Structures
If any structure of spatial composition is to 
yield homomorphism with arithmetical addition, it must at 
least exhibit complementarity - in the sense that, given 
positive numbers x,y,z such that x + y = z, y is the com­
plement of X in z. But the attempt in C-theory to ref­
lect the actual structure of perceptual recognition has
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led us to abandon the general principle of spatial comple­
mentarity for idents. This has been taken to reflect 
the intuition that every actual récognitive context is 
so constructed as to leave out a number of neglected 
spaces, about which the R-theory has nothing to say.
In consequence, the language of C-theory as so far formu­
lated has no general means of describing a "full" space, 
in which every proper enclosure of a given ident has a 
spatial (rather than merely set-theoretical) complement 
in that ident. It is no good, for instance, writing of 
some X that:
(Va) (i)/a,x (Jb) (TT/b,x a (Vc) (if|/c,x A -r|/c,a
^/c,b))) (see C2, p.80)
This says no more than that for each recognized 
proper enclosure a of x there is another proper enclosure 
b, outside a, which encloses all recognized proper enclo­
sures of X outside a. It is satisfied, e.g., by
Diagram 3
If we recognize the composite (ta,b,xj) - e.g., 
as an enclosure configuration - the pairs {a,b},(x}; 
{a},^b,xj; {a,xj-,|b} are set-theoretically complementary,
and may be used to generate corresponding pairs of compo­
sites; but they are not spatially complementary, nor are 
the bound-idents of the corresponding composites. So
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there is no evident basis here for a generalizable homo­
morphism from operations of spatial composition into 
addition on the integers, corresponding to simple addi­
tion of the numbers of members of the associated sets.
If we now seek to overcome this difficulty by 
revising the language of C-theory so as to express a 
general notion of spatial complementation, we shall find 
that this results in complication, without serving a 
useful purpose. To show this, I shall introduce the 
necessary terms temporarily, numbering the definitions 
distinctively to signal that they form no part of C-theory 
proper.
What we will need is a means of referring to at 
least some uncharacterized spaces, assuming for the moment 
that they can be recognized without the assignment of recog­
nized characters. One scheme of definition is as follows: 
XI. In recognizing any ident a as properly enclosed
in an ident x, (i.e. T)/a,x), we necessarily recognize its 
boundary (whose dimensionality depends on that of the 
space defined by the field of attention, having one spatial 
dimension less than that space). That boundary divides
the space in x into two parts, one of which is a itself, 
recognized in terms of the unique set of characters f(a). 
The other space is not necessarily recognizable in terms 
of any characters in C , but is determined by recognition 
of the boundaries of x and a, and its exclusion by a. I
shall call it the antident of a in x, written: a(x).
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Every ident has an antident in the maximal ident m , 
which will be written just x for each x. Antidents, as 
such, are not recognized spaces; but they may enclose, 
or even coincide with, recognized idents, where the neces­
sary characters are assigned.
X2. We define an operation on bounded spaces,
recognized or not, which forms from any two such spaces 
which share some part of a recognized boundary a single 
space, determined as enclosed by all boundaries of the 
two original spaces except the shared region of boundary. 
There are several possible cases, but the interesting 
case at this point is the formation of the enclosing ident 
from any proper enclosure and its relative antident 
(spatial complement), given by:
(Va,x) ( ^ / a , x a  □ a(x) = x) ;
which follows from XI and X2. In particular: 
(Vx,y) ( x D x  = y O y = m ) .
X3. We now suppose that in specific instances it is
possible to identify particular idents with the antidents 
of other idents, as having identical boundaries, so that:
Tj / a , x  A ( i ( x )  = b) -e» a 0  b = x .
Looking at the equivalence proposed in X3, we
seem to have successfully described a case where the space
occupied by x is completely "filled" (or, "exhausted")
by recognized idents a and b. If we could construct more
complex equivalences yielding identities of the kind:
X - a. D a-O.. .n a 1 2  n
we would appear to be well on the way to describing a 
spatially "full" ident such that for any t)/a^,x, we could
259
identify â^(x) with some combination formulated by repeated 
use of □ with sequences of idents a^ to &%+! to a^.
But, bearing in mind that antidents remain unrecognized 
unless and until they are identified with fully character­
ized idents, and that in the general case idents may be 
scattered discontinuously through neglected spaces, the 
new terminology does not, in fact, make such a construction 
notably easier. Even with the simple case of diagram 3 
(p. 256), we can "fill" x with a □ i(x) £r b O b(x); 
but, if we want to express the total space in terms of 
both a,b and antidents, we shall have to write, say, 
a □ b □ b(i(x)) - and, unless we can identify this last 
term with some coherently characterized ident, we shall 
still not have filled the space with idents. As the num­
ber of enclosed idents increases, such a construction 
becomes rapidly less manageable in récognitive terms.
Can we do better with the original, unextended 
language of C-theory? The notion of an antident was 
defined in terms of boundaries and the operation & in 
terms of shared boundaries which were said to be eliminated 
by the operation. The space of an ident could be filled 
by a properly enclosed ident and its relative antident 
because the enclosed ident shared the whole of its boun­
dary with the enclosing ident - and so the whole boundary 
was eliminated by the D-operation, leaving us with the 
complete enclosing space. In the original unextended 
language, the notion of shared boundary is expressed by 
the relation of contiguity f; but this provides no ready
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means of expressing the condition in which one ident shares 
a whole boundary, or any specified part of a boundary, with 
one or more others.
There is, however, a structure already defined 
within the theory which does exhibit coincidence of boun­
daries under t, and hence a correspondence between set- 
theoretical and spatial complementation: the F-set struc­
ture. Recall that the necessary coincidence of boun­
daries is derived from the common characterization which 
distinguishes, from all other elements of the context, each 
and every member of a F-set (including the bound-ident), 
and its composite.
What we seek is therefore a system of F-sets 
associated with a V-character so that, in any Fset LL of 
the system, where one of its values picks out a subset LL’ 
oi. LL y its complement in U is also assigned a value.
These values are to be associated with numbers so that the 
number associated with each composite is the sum of the 
numbers associated with those of any subset and its comple­
ment. There is one, and apparently only one, simple 
general condition under which this aim is achieved; namely 
that the numbers associated with the values of the sets 
Ü, ü',ü"are precisely the numbers of members of these sets.
These values are, however, primarily determined 
with respect to a comparison figure, recognized under the 
instantiating R-theory of the context, so that
(a) the values of standard elements are associated with 
numbers directly in the manner just set out; i.e..
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they are determined by the number of atomic 
elements of which each element is composed;
(b) it follows that these values, which typically 
differ as between one standard element and another, 
cannot belong to the common characterization (the 
F-determinant character set) of any standard set
- though the common V-character (say, the quan­
tity Q) may be understood to do so;
(c) datai values are recognized, under the comparison 
figure, as approximating those of the relevant 
standard composites;
(d) datai elements, whose values are thus determined, 
are distinguished from one another, and from stan­
dard elements, by characters other than the members 
of the F-determinant set which distinguishes the 
standard structure; and other than values of Q 
(otherwise no two data could have the same value).
Assuming that data are disjoint as well as dis­
tinct from standard elements, the following conditions 
also obtain:
(1) Comparisons between standard and datai elements 
are for boundary-characters, and occur at external boun­
daries of the standard composites [i.e., at the Fbounds 
of these composites; for the distinction between external 
and internal boundaries, see note [c), p. 76 ).
[2) Value-comparisons between standard elements them- 
selves typically occur at internal boundaries between
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components of standard composites. In the light of point
(a) above, this means that internal boundaries between
minimal standard components (characterized by under
1
K2(i) above) are constructed so as to secure that the value 
of each such component is understood to contribute an 
amount of value corresponding to the addition of 1 to the 
numerical value of any composite to which it belongs 
(represented by the subscript k to the value of the com­
posite) .
The following definition exhibits a simple struc­
ture of contiguous idents in which these conditions are 
fulfilled:
K4. S' is a T-series (written, 'r(S')') iff:
(i) (S') E S^), and the members of S' are ordered 
as a sequence (a^,...,a^), n > 1, such that:
(ii) (Vk) (1 < k  ^ n-1 ?/&k'^k+l)'
(iii) (Vi,k)Cl  ^ i,k < n A i 7^ k-»-a^?^ a^) ; and
(iv) (Vi,k)Cl  ^ i ,k < n A i ^ k A i ? ^  k+1 a k i + 1
“I (T/a^,a^)) .
(We may also write: r^a^^,...,a^) ) .
Note that a T-series has the properties of a 
counting series, as defined for a progressive 2-character; 
the special definition being necessitated by the fact that 
T is not progressive: see D4,5 and note (d), pp.104, 109.
Where the same set S' is both a T-series and a counting- 
series for a 2-character yielding a comparison figure for 
a quantity, the same numbers can be used for positions in 
both series.
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(S') under this definition, is a "full" ident 
(containing no neglected spaces, and whose sub-composites 
exhibit spatial complementarity) if and only if S' coin­
cides with a Fset. But since the F-set is the only form 
of composite so far defined as recognized under the funda­
mental definitions, which can generally satisfy the con­
ditions of a T-series, it will be assumed that each such 
series is also a F-set for some F-determinant set of 
characters in context. Nevertheless, it is not possible 
to lay down general conditions in terms only of T-series 
which will reliably fill the whole recognized space of a 
context (except for the trivial and uninteresting case 
where the context consists solely of a single T-series). 
Consider the following definition;
K4'. X  is T-connected iff
(Va,b)( n/a,x a n/b,x -► ( j ] S ' ) ( T ( S ' )  a  a,b e S')).
This will be satisfied by an ident x all of whose 
proper enclosures are connected by T-series - making x in 
that sense "continuous" - but without exhausting the space 
in x: we may still have lacunae of neglected space,
although a T-connected ident cannot be "discontinuous" in 
the sense of being enclosed in a number of wholly disjoint 
boundaries (like swans on a pond).
Even so, such a T-connected space does not cap­
ture the typical structure of measurement contexts. The 
T-series was introduced above to answer the requirements 
for the additivity of standard sets in metric structures.
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as defined in K2 above, and is not commonly found in data 
structures or other elements of these contexts (though it 
may, of course, occur). 1 therefore adopt the alternative 
strategy of proposing that, in the general case, these 
requirements are confined to standard sets which are con­
structed or selected for the purpose in context; and go 
on to consider what further conditions may be necessary 
for their satisfaction in this restricted field. For­
mally, this restriction may be accomplished by defining 
the r-sets with which standard sets are identified on a 
suitable space-restrictive ident all of whose enclosed 
spaces are T-series.
The conditions for a T-series may be satisfied 
by recognized structures of any spatial dimensionality 
(which, to be perceptually recognizable must be :^3); the 
diagram gives a straightforward example of dimensionality 2 
(D iagram 4(a)) .
(a) (b)
Diagram 4
Such a series will also satisfy the conditions 
for a metric standard set iff commitments of R-theory 
obtain according to which the values of some quantity, for 
any composite of members of such a series, correspond 
functionally with the number of minimal components of that
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composite. But no geometric theory is to hand according 
to which a T-series of enclosed volumes or areas satisfy 
the necessary conditions for values of volume or area; 
other than euclidean systems (or their derivatives) in 
which amounts of volume or area are calculable from values 
of length (or distance) and angle. I find, therefore, 
that the only theories available to satisfy our requirements 
concern the class of special cases in which the enclosed 
spaces of the components of the relevant T-series are 
negligible: i.e., what we may call 'one-dimensional*
series (as in diagram 4(b)) whose external boundaries are 
the phenomenal correlatives of lines ; while the internal 
boundaries between their components are recognized as 
having spatial dimension, and are the phenomenal corre­
latives of points. We shall find that a wealth of 
theories are available whereby functional correspondences 
exist between the numbers of minimal components of such 
series, and values of physical quantities (not only length 
or distance). Note that such a one-dimensional series 
may be an open curve of any shape, though euclidean straight 
lines or circular arcs predominate in contexts of physical 
measurement; for which it will be argued that theoretical . 
systems of the type just described form a complete basis.
Recalling that character-differences associated 
with assigned values of a standard metric T-series are to 
be recognized at internal boundaries between its components; 
and that these values are functionally associated with 
numbers of m-components in composites separated by these
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boundaries; I now introduce the definitions necessary to 
integrate the T-series fully with a metric structure.
K5. (%,j) is a marked interval series [written:
iff:
(i) S ’ is a T-series, I = S' (J {x: S” C  S ’ a
X = CS") A T[S”)};
(ii) J (Z C is a set of characters (called ’marks')
such that:
(a) (VA,B)(A,BGJAA^&+(]^x)CxeTaAB/x))
(b) (Vx) (xeI->(3A,B) (A,BeJAAB/xAA?^BA
(VOCCeJACjk^ CC=AvC=B) ) )
(iii) For all x,yel and A,BeJ:
(a) AB/x A AB/y ->■ x = y
(b) AB/xABC/yAx
-»-(3 z) (zgIaAC/za (x=({y,z})vy=({x,z})vz =({x,y}) ) )
(c) A/x A A/y T/x,y.
(The members of I are called 'intervals').
Notes :
(1) Condition (iii)(c) is to be read as saying that
the members of J mark the shared boundaries of those members 
of I which touch. Putting [S’) = (x^,...,x^), then since 
S ’ S  I (by (i)) and each member of the series touches the 
next by K4, it follows that the members of J can be arranged 
in a series corresponding with the first n + 1 natural 
numbers (including 0 (i.e., 0 to n), two for each member 
of S ’. The first and last members of J mark the unshared 
boundaries of x^ and x^, which are the ends of (S’).
The shared boundary-mark for (x^,X2) is thus
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numbered for '2'; for
so, each E I such that y^ = (x^,...,x^) is also a 
marked interval series (MIS) having k members, whose end- 
marks are numbered 'O' and 'k'. We can therefore assign 
to each such y^ the 'interval-value' k, which coincides 
both with the ordinal number of its non-zero end-mark, 
and with the cardinal number of members of S' of which it 
is the composite under 'o'. Taking y^,y^ such that
0 < i < k; y^ = (x^,...,x^); y^ = (x^,...,x^,...,x^):
we may also recognize z = (x^^^,...,x^), the cardinal 
number of its component members of S' being k-i. Thus, 
each contiguous series z of members of S' may itself be 
recognized as a MIS to whose maximal interval we can 
assign an interval-value coinciding with the cardinal 
number of its component members of S' and with the dif­
ference between the ordinal numbers of its end-marks.
(2) Though nothing is said in the definition about
the dimensionality of the series, and other cases are 
possible, only the one-dimensional case will be of interest 
in any instantiating context to be considered in this study, 
for the reasons stated above p.265
(3) Again, although it is not stipulated that the
members of the basic T-series S' are atoms of the context, 
so that proper enclosures are not ruled out, every inter­
val in I is either a member of S' or a composite of a sub­
series of its members, so that no interval is recognized 
as a proper enclosure of any member of S', whose members 
are therefore recognized as the minimal constituents of
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the series. In measurement contexts, numerical signifi­
cance can be given to this aspect.
S' will therefore be called the * constituent 
series' of ^I, ,  and its members the 'constituent inter- 
vals' of I.
Now, let be a marked interval series and
X £ J an end-mark of I. Then for all A,B e J, where 
A,B t X and A  ^B, the available orders are ^X,A,B^ and 
^X,B,A^. Putting x,y,z e J such that XA/x a  XB/y a  AB/z, 
we have either x = (y,z) a  n/y,z^ or y = (x,z) a  n/x,y .
X
We can therefore define a relation > on J by the abbre­
viation:
X -
® T ^ df ^3^»yHx,y e I A XA/x a XB/y a  n/x,y))
X
The transitivity of > follows from that of n since:
X X ^
C > B a B>A-»- (2]x,y,z)((XC/z a XB/y a XA/x a p/x,yAfi/y, z)
whence XC^ a  x/^ x a  p/x,z. If Y / X is also an end-mark
(the other end) then the order {x,...,A,...,B,...,Y^ for
X Y
which B > A will also give an order for which A > B, for
each pair (A,B) in J.
It might seem natural to say, therefore, that
y
for any x in I such that AB/x a  B > A, x is 'positive on X 
in I', while x such that BA/x is 'negative' on the same 
end-mark. But this will not do in the present analysis, 
since by definition AB/x ^  BA/x. Positive or negative 
'sign', therefore, emerges as dependent on a specific 
order of assignment of marks. The role of marks as 
characters was referred to in Note (b), p. 56-7, and the 
notion of sign will obviously be important in the context
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of the order of assignment of marks in measurement. But
more fundamental matters must be dealt with first.
4. The Structal System
We now associate the marked interval sequence 
with the metric structure.
K6. The pair (I,J) is a structal system for the compara­
tive pair iff:
(i) I o  ; J c: PC; and for each I e I there is 
a unique J £ J such that is a marked
interval series; and a value set K d  C such 
that is a metric structure for
and
(ii) for all x,y such that x e 1; y £ %'; 1,1' £ I;
and I / I':
(a) 6/x,y V 6/y,x v 6/x,y;
(b) a/x,y "W. (3 z) (z £ I  A 6/x,z a 6/y,z).
(N.B. The term 'structal' is used to signal the intuition
that the extremely rigorous conditions demanded for 
this structure are such that they will normally only 
be satisfied by a system of specially constructed - 
or, in rare cases, selected - standard idents taken 
by the R-theory of the context as elements of a 
measuring apparatus.)
Notes on Structal System
y
1. The order generated by J on a chosen end-mark X
2 70
for a given structal sub-system {l,J^is the same as that 
generated for the same elements of J by the relation â 
associated with the relevant comparison-figure and V- 
character Q. (This is a simple consequence of K6, 
putting  ^ . Each such sub-system thus satis­
fies the conditions for a structal system.)
2. In any sub-system {Z, , numbering one end-mark
X as 'O', and the remaining members of J as '1', '2',...,'n' 
in the order of ^ , we can choose corresponding numerical 
assignments to the values K of the quantity Q, such that 
the value of Q for any member of J will correspond with 
its interval-value: i.e., with the cardinal number of its
component members of S^. As we have seen, the values so 
assigned are not taken to be necessarily identical with 
any particular range of values of a standard unit specified 
for Q, but are to be in functional correspondence with 
such a range of values under an interpretive theory of the 
pair {Q,6^ in the context. At the very least, the inter­
pretive function is to be so constructed that the numerical
c
values of all standard equivalence sets under ^ for each 
sub-system shall have equal numerical values for the 
structal system as a whole (see DIO, p. 128, and notes; 
and notes (4), (5) below).
3. The numerical value for x e j  under this system
depends solely on the number of members of the constituent 
series of I of which x is composed; not necessarily on 
their length, which will depend on factors associated with
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the comparative pair in the context. (Where, for
example, the marked intervals to be compared are those of 
an arc swept by a needle in a voltmeter, equally-valued 
intervals are not necessarily equal in length.) In the 
simplest case, where Q "length", and S is the ordinary 
comparison-figure (in which line-like features of the 
relevant idents are aligned, and x ^ y iff x extends beyond 
y at either end and y does not extend beyond x, as inter­
preted in the context) then the equivalence-classes in 
standard interval series under « will be of "equal length"
- including, of course, the constituent class of minimal 
length for which the value for Q is equal to such
that P^ = '1'.
In other cases, the equivalence of marked inter­
vals is not recognized by the direct comparison of the 
intervals themselves, but by some procedure which, under 
the R-theory of the context, ensures that marked intervals 
are equivalent to mutually equivalent differences in the 
value of Q. This type of procedure, called by engineers 
"calibration", will be discussed under particular examples 
later. The fact that some of these procedures are tech­
nically highly sophisticated does not prevent them ful­
filling the role of 'comparison figure' in the terms of 
this analysis. Once the procedure is established, the 
actual structure of the perceptual recognitions involved 
in comparisons is typically direct and simple.
(The assignment of numbers to values, and the 
comparisons of values, in contexts of non-physical measurement
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is a different matter again. It will be considered 
shortly in the general discussion of the order properties 
of the relevant structures, as well as under specific 
examples later.)
4c As a metric structure, each ,7^ will support
a data structure (K3) which, as a special case of an 
approximate structure, collects non-standard elements of 
the comparative structure into unique subsets of S' (the 
*k-clusters') characterized by approximation to distinct 
values of Q (see D12, p. 134 ), as assigned to the stan­
dard equivalence-classes under £ determined for the members 
of 7,by the approximation of relation &.
5. The choice of end-mark X = 0 for each J z J
is, as has been said, dependent on the interpretation of
^Q,5^ in the context, and must be made so that the order
X s
under J is the same as that under . In the case Q =
"length" and S = the standard alignment figure, it is
intuitively clear that choices of end-mark are restricted
only by convenience, since 6-comparisons of intervals
s s
yielding ^ or ^ relations are in principle readily carried 
out between any pair which can be brought into alignment. 
For other V-characters the comparison procedures mentioned 
above place considerable restrictions on the choices of 
end-mark and order.
There is, of course, no necessary connection 
between the value X = 0  as defined here, and any ultimate 
zero-value for Q as interpreted by any overall theory of 
the context. But the conditions of these definitions 
will only be met by a system of measuring apparatus which
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includes a perceptual scale (or scales) consisting of 
marked intervals which, in the R-theory of the context, 
exhibit the additive properties for values of Q (inclu­
ding, where appropriate, negative values or subtractive 
differences) which, in correspondence with compositions 
of the intervals, permit the construction of a numerical 
function from a chosen subset of these values onto the 
appropriate sequence of positive integers, for each scale 
in the apparatus.
5. Order Properties: Comparison with Foundational Analysis
The contrast outlined in the introduction (pp. 3-7) 
between the approaches of this study and of the Suppes 
tradition in the analysis of the foundations of measurement 
(as represented especially in KLST) can now be made more 
precise. That tradition seeks, as was said, to provide 
a variety of axiomatic systems for what are called 'empi­
rical relational structures' (ers), presumably on the 
ground that the material for analysis in these terms is 
taken to be the product of empirical investigation. Par­
ticular projects in measurement are then supposed to be 
testable according to whether or not their results (how­
ever obtained) can be shown to satisfy one or more of 
these axiomatic systems. No questions are asked, for 
example, about how the elements of the theoretical struc­
tures of these projects themselves are distinguished from.
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or related to, the totality of human experience, even in 
a particular context; nor about the perceptible forms 
taken in different contexts by the fundamental ordering 
relation of which nothing is said but that it "corres­
ponds" to the numerical relation >  . Such questions are, 
as we have seen, the central concern of this study, and 
this contrast of approach leads to major differences in 
formal structure, which will now be considered.
(1) Connectedness. KLST's fundamental relation ^  is 
defined as connected (Definition 1.1, p. 14); i.e., the
relation is determined, one way or the other, on every 
pair of elements drawn from the self-product of a single 
fundamental set. The C-theoretical relation whose 
role in the structure appears broadly comparable, is 
determined only on those pairs of idents to which the 
relevant characterizations are assigned by virtue of 
the recognition of a particular configuration in context. 
Again, KLST's definition of the unequivocal relation 
by: X >  y x ^  y  ^ ^  x) : suggests a parallel
between their y ^  x (by virtue of connectedness, equi­
valent to'^(x>- y)), and my own "|(x > y) . But this last 
negation only excludes the recognition of the relevant 
configuration, and fails to assert, in the general case, 
any other relation. The virtue of connectedness, for 
KLST, is that it leads to a representative function from 
the ers into the real numbers as a theorem (their Theorem 
1, p. 15). This result strikes me as unrealistic.
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KLST's underlying theory directs attention 
exclusively to those pairs of elements in any context on 
which the fundamental relation is taken to be determined; 
this appears, ultimately, to be the meaning of the commit­
ment to connectedness. Since the structure so connected 
is said to be empirical, we must suppose that the relation 
is empirically determined in every case: the testing of
a particular measurement project against the axiomatic 
system would proceed by considering its structure of 
results as a model of the system. The theoretical struc­
ture connecting these results to the phenomenal evidence 
is outside the system altogether: which appears to res­
trict its usefulness as a programme for assessing the 
status of particular measurement projects.
In this study, connectedness is assumed only 
for standard and approximate structures, of which metric 
structal and datai structures are special cases; and 
for fictal structures extrapolated from these. Because 
the language of C-theory is rich enough to distinguish 
between these ^-connected structures and others in con­
text (whether or not Q-valued), we are able to analyse 
the theoretical structures within which Q-values are deter­
mined. The main source of this richness is, of course, 
the inclusion of terms for the characters by which the 
different sets of idents are distinguished; permitting 
analysis of the structures of characterization by which 
these different sets are recognized as related in context. 
The Q relation is itself a character relation, and the
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resulting orderings are determined on sets of idents by 
virtue of character assignment.
(2) Equivalence. KLST define a fundamental type of equi­
valence by: X '^y -*—>• x ^  y a y ^  x (Definition 2 , p. 15) .
No similar simple equivalence is available in C-theory, 
since ^ is non-reflexive and antisymmetric. The basic 
equivalence here is given by: x « y 4-T](x ^ y) ^ ( y  ^ x) ; 
which, once again, is defined only on a standard set for 
Q.
(5) Order. KLST's definitions produce a derivable order 
on the fundamental set which is proved homomorphic to an 
order in the real numbers with the numerical relation ^ . 
Again, the notion of an order is first introduced into C- 
theory at the level of a standard structure, and it is 
argued that in the general (non-metric) case this order 
cannot be associated with numbers in any way that raises 
useful consequences from the properties of numbers as such, 
other than conventional order.* This standard order 
rests, not on connectedness and equivalence as in KLST, 
but on the stringent conditions of the definition of the 
standard set (see Dll, and associated theorem, p.129 ff.). 
This collects the members of the standard set into equiva­
lence sets under with which members of the approximate 
set are associated into clusters under the weaker
There may seem to be a tacit implication in KLST's presen­
tation that any particular instance of a weak order 
generates a homomorphism with a unique set in the real 
numbers under ^ ; if so, it is misleading.
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equivalence These conditions are justified in terms
rrof the construction (or selection) of a standard set S 
of idents conforming to this condition; which I take to 
be a much more plausible basis for the determination of 
order in actual contexts of comparison (whether or not 
metric).
(4) Transitivity. KLST's definitions product transitivity 
of >  on the fundamental set. In C-theory, transitivity
of ^ on a standard set is determined only for a single 
(subjective) Reader and a single R-frame (during which his 
assignments do not change) (Note (d), p.l5 2 )• The 
extension of such a commitment to more than one frame - 
i.e., in spite of the possibility of change - is under­
stood as a commitment to the stability of the ordering, 
permitting past comparisons to be incorporated in present 
judgments (essential where successive measurement readings 
are to be combined). The extension to more than one 
Reader is understood as a commitment to the objectivity 
of the ordering (Section J(2), pp. 220 ff.). I claim that 
in actual contexts of comparison such commitments to 
stability and objectivity are severely restricted by the 
(tacit or explicit) theory of the context for its Readers. 
If so, it is important that our metatheoretical language 
should be rich enough to allow expression to be given to 
such restrictions; which KLST's is evidently not.
(5) Additivity. While the previous features of theore­
tical structure have been exhibited as restricted to our 
standard structures and their associated approximate sets.
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it should be emphasized that, although these may be sup­
posed to include such systems of empirical relations as 
those studied by KLST, they are much broader, and include 
contexts of comparison which could not remotely be classed 
as measurement (such as that instanced on p. 139 )„ KLST's 
own definition of 'standard sequence' is much more res­
tricted, being introduced to handle the concept of additivity 
in metric structures; and demanding amongst other more 
sophisticated requirements a structure of concatenation.
I have pointed out (p. 4) that this notion is frankly 
modelled on the numerical operation of addition with which 
it is taken to be homomorphic. This would not be sur­
prising if I am right in supposing that KLST's empirical 
structures are to be identified with the (numerical) 
end results of measurement projects, rather than the evi­
dence on which they are constructed. Their somewhat 
cursory explications, in terms such as those of placing 
rigid rods end-to-end for the measurement of length, play 
no essential part in their analysis.
The problem of additivity in empirical structures 
has been approached in this study through the quite dif­
ferent concept of composition, with its roots in the most 
fundamental level of analysis, designed to render recog­
nitions of whole/part structure in the phenomenal world. 
Additivity, as such, is traced back to the properties of 
complementarity of countable sets; and the problem of 
securing additivity in empirical structures is seen as 
that of selecting or constructing just those systems of
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complementary sets of idents whose membership counts can 
be theoretically associated in context with amounts of the 
quantity to be measured.
In the light of this enriched account of metric 
structures, we are now in a position to address the ques­
tion, posed at the outset (p. 1), what it is that gives 
measurement its powerful status, as a basic component of 
many branches of human understanding.
6. The Status of Measurement: Clarity, Precision and Accuracy
If we now recall what was said about the logic of 
assignment (pp. 155ff.), and about the structure of pos­
sible correspondence between this logic and the logic of 
associated utterances (p. 186, note (d)), we see that it 
is at least plausible to suggest that such a field of shared 
commitment within a Group-R-theory can be "locked into" the 
truth-functional structure of ordinary propositional logic 
governing linguistic expressions of that theory. The 
cautionary double quotes signal an admission that there 
seems little hope of putting together a complete demonstra­
tion of this thesis.
A major strengthening of the logic of a Group-R- 
theory accrues in the context of measuring systems satis- 
faying the conditions of a metric structure, by virtue of 
the operational homomorphism between (1) récognitive oper­
ations on an empirically ordered system ( (^^, o) ), and
(2) arithmetical operations on an associated numerically 
ordered system ((^>,±)), which with reasonable care can be
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made derivable from the definition of that structure 
(condition (ii) of K2, p. 251; and see note (2) on the 
structal system, p. 270). By this means, most if not 
all commitments under the group theory of the recognized 
compositional structure of the empirical system (1) can 
be locked into the truth-functional structure of mathe­
matical logic governing descriptions in mathematical lan­
guage of that system under the theory. Again, the 
general demonstration must be lacking; a point which must 
lead to greater caution in the assumptions of homomorphisms 
for all sorts of quantities than has been shown by the 
foundational analysts so far. The adoption of the strong 
types of commitment needed to sustain this major step is 
seen as dependent on the organization of conditions of 
clarity and precision for recognitions, by members of the 
L-group, of values of the quantities chosen for each con­
text, in the light of consistent motivation and under­
standing (as defined in terms of the GR-theory).
(1) Clarity is a matter of consistent understanding, by 
members of the L-group, of the structure of the refer­
ence function *?: that is to say, of transparency of
reference of the terms of the language of measurement 
to corresponding elements of the measuring apparatus 
(the structal system - allowing for the use of synony­
mous sets, where appropriate (pp. 239 ). For
instance, "Size 2 eggs" distinguishes a particular 
class clearly, provided a well-constructed convention 
exists, and is known to the addressee. Clarity of
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this kind is claimed to be a salient property of 
actual measurement systems; a clarity which is to 
some extent transmitted to patterns of reference to 
the associated data structure whose values for the 
chosen quantities are approximated to those of the 
structal system by the use of the same comparison 
figure in each case. This aspect will be further 
explored in considering particular examples of 
types of measurement system, below.
(2) Precision is interpreted for C-theory in terms of 
the standards of consistency of value-assignments 
adopted by an L-group for the group theory of a con­
text (and is, therefore, immediately dependent on 
clarity of reference to idents and values). It is 
to be distinguished from accuracy, which will be 
interpreted in terms of the tolerances adopted by the 
group for the context. Thus, I can say that the sun 
is precisely 93 million miles from the earth, to the 
nearest million: not very accurate, but I can confi­
dently expect that it will be consistent with anyone 
else's reading to the same accuracy. By contrast, 
people are not very precise in their judgments of 
relative temperatures of objects by feeling with their 
hands. Where precision fails, accuracy cannot be 
determined. Both precision and accuracy can be 
increased if technical facilities can be improved: 
but, for a given level of technical sophistication, 
precision will tend to decrease as the chosen level
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of accuracy increases - with "indeterminacy" as the 
limiting case.
Perhaps the most unusual (and probably contro­
versial) feature of this analysis is that it leads to the 
view that the required combination of clarity and precision 
with the possibility of constructing an operational homo­
morphism in the structure ((^,o) , (>,+)) is, with few 
exceptions, available only for physical quantities which 
are either themselves spatial in character, or can be 
indicated by means of some mechanical system yielding a 
spatial analogue which can be calibrated (p. 271 and below 
p. 327 ). This is seen to be a consequence of our biolo­
gically-evolved systems of perceptual recognition. So, 
though metaphysically contingent, it is practically neces­
sary as a condition of these kinds of recognition; and 
appears to be linked, in ways merely suggested here in 
terms of T-set structures, to the systems of logical infer­
ence we use in understanding our phenomenal experience.
What I shall try to analyse, for certain particular cases, 
is the structure of theoretical interpretation used to 
represent the relevant indicator systems in terms of 
interpretive functions from values of the measured quan­
tity onto values of the recognized spatial intervals. We 
shall find that this necessarily involves the incorporation 
into the récognitive theory of the context of prior sub­
stantive theories of the measured V-characters (below, 
p. 326 ). The vital point here is that the prior determi­
nants of these structures lie in the overall interpretive
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theory and not in the mechanical or récognitive operations. 
This theory determines the choice of operations (often more 
than one) for the context in each case. Meaning comes 
from the theory and not the operations.
As well as examples to illustrate these proposals, 
some real and apparent exceptions will be discussed in the 
following sections.* I shall ignore recently-developed 
systems which contain a further mechanical linkage to a 
digital display, where these amount to a mechanisation of 
the procedure of perceptual judgment of approximate datai 
values. But these must be distinguished from digital 
displays linked to mechanical counting systems for dis­
crete entities (such as Geiger counters), which, in C- 
theoretical terms, are not strictly measurement systems - 
since they do not involve comparative structures. Some 
methods of psychological or sociological quantification 
are, in this sense, counting rather than measurement systems; 
others assign numbers to non-physical parameters by the 
use of ad hoc scoring systems which, again, do not conform 
to C-theoretical definitions of metric systems exhibiting 
the necessary operational homomorphisms. Such systems are, 
however, often operated in conjunction with substantive 
theories in which their results are treated analogously 
with those of physical measurement, using mathematical
* For reasons of space, much of this analysis will be pre­
sented in summary form only. See Note on Sections M-R, 
p.294
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structures developed in spatial contexts (and often 
explicitly using spatial concepts or graphic represen­
tations) . One purpose of the present analysis is to 
exhibit as clearly as possible the structures of such 
analogies, and the limitations on their reliability for 
ambitious programmes of extrapolation.
Any such assessment - which need not be dero­
gatory or illiberal - must rest, for C-theory, on its 
understanding of the relationship between récognitive and 
substantive theory in each context.
7. R- and S-theories in Measurement: an Ontological
Analysis
C-theoretical analysis of the distinction between 
récognitive and substantive (roughly, non-recognitive) 
theory within the group theory of any context will rest, 
in turn, on an intuitive three-fold distinction between 
types of supposedly existent elements, according to 
whether or not they are specially constructed (or selected) 
to conform to some commitment of the theory of the context; 
and, if so, whether or not they are elements of an R-theory 
of the context.
A. Data are those elements of phenomenal experience which 
are not recognized as specially constructed (or 
selected) to conform to theoretical specifications 
formed for some purpose determined for the context.
If, like Hamlet, we know a hawk from a handsaw - or
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a hill from a house, a rock from a clock, a man from 
a measuring stick - we know that the second member 
of each pair has literally built-in characters con­
nected with its normal human use; while the first 
of each pair must for the most part be accepted on 
its own terms. We may select from its characters 
those which interest us in context - specially those 
to which we attach theoretical commitments - but our 
theoretical constructions with respect to a datai 
element are passive. That is, if they do not con­
form to our theoretical commitments, we change the 
theory rather than rejecting or attempting to recon­
struct the data. (Not that this principle is always 
followed.)
B. Structa are those elements which - while remaining
elements of the Reader's récognitive theory of the 
context - are physically constructed (or, in rare 
special cases, selected) to conform with theoretical 
commitments adopted for that context. Since they 
share an R-theoretical structure with data, the 
consequences of their conformity can be extended in 
various ways to commitments for suitably related 
data. With respect to structa, our theoretical 
constructions are active, in that, if they fail to 
conform with our commitments, we may seek to reject 
and replace, or reconstruct them, to ensure consis­
tency within the R-theory. In the above pairs of 
examples, the handsaw, house, clock and measuring-stick
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are of this type. In the context of use for which 
they are constructed, their assigned characters are 
almost exclusively determined by prior design. (The 
rare cases where selection rather than physical con­
struction is adopted for the determination of structa, 
concern either natural structures whose regularities 
are found adequate for the purpose of the context, or 
human constructions whose regularities can be adapted 
for uses for which they were not designed. As with 
most intuitive distinctions, there are borderline 
cases. But in contexts of measurement, the dis­
tinction is generally sharp. At the most sophisti­
cated level, the use of the wavelength of caesium 
radiation as a standard for length is a clear case 
of selected structa - though its regularity as data 
had first to be established by the use of physically 
constructed aparatus. An intermediate case would 
be the use of standard bricks in a wall as a basis 
for the determination of length; and, at the most
primitive level, the use of parts of the human body
to determine units such as "spans" or "cubits" was 
once considered adequate. We need not be surprised 
to find that man himself - the measure of all things 
- may turn up as a borderline case.)
The distinction between structa and data was already 
implicit in the definition and discussion of the 
structal system (K6, pp. 269 ff.). The third clas­
sification of sets to be analysed in the terms of
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this distinction is now mentioned for the first 
time.
C . Ficta are elements of human construction whose use, if 
any, is not completely determined by any R-theory of 
any context - though we shall be interested only in 
those types of ficta which are used in theoretical 
correspondence with data or structa of such R-theories 
Again, there are certain borderline cases, such as 
works of art, for which questions may arise as to 
whether their use is wholly exhausted by the recog­
nition of their phenomenal structure. The use of 
ficta in concrete contexts (especially those of 
measurement) includes a class of special cases of 
the use of fictal structures to carry or store infor­
mation in theoretical correspondence with concrete 
contexts of recognition which may or may not coincide 
in space or time with the immediate acts of recog­
nition used in forming the relevant R-theories.
The type of theoretical correspondence involved can 
be broadly characterised as reference, the associated 
fictal structures being broadly characterised as 
symbolisms - whether linguistic, algebraic or graphic 
(i.e., diagrams, maps, plans, etc.). Beyond their 
use for the simple carriage or storage of information, 
these structures, by virtue of their potential 
detachment from the immediate context of recognition, 
can be used for fertile schemes of extrapolation, by 
the application of implicative commitments beyond the
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description.of immediately perceived concrete 
contexts. In particular, they are used for the 
theoretical "prediction" of data, and for the 
design of structa.
The term 'ficta' may be thought unfortunate 
for its possible associations with "fiction". The 
distinction is deliberately blurred for the same 
reasons as underlie the treatment of all empirical 
knowledge as 'theory'. Ficta are human construc­
tions employed in the contexts of theories, and are 
exactly as reliable (or not) as elements in the con­
struction of truth (as a metalinguistic class in 
Tarski's sense) as are the theories for which they 
are used. Many theories, as has been said, are 
well enough founded to be accepted unhesitatingly as 
'knowledge', and their derived statements as 'true'. 
There appears to be an unbroken continuum of relia­
bility or acceptance from these to the most inter­
estingly speculative, or plain scatty, that people 
can devise - the present study not excepted.
(The terms 'datum', 'structum', 'fictum', will
/
be used for single elements of the structures falling 
under these concepts as just informally defined; and the 
adjectives 'datai', 'structal', 'fictal' for associated 
terms, structures, systems, etc.)
The use of fictal construction, especially in 
measurement contexts, may go beyond the transmission, 
storage or extrapolation of information referring to
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assignments for characters or idents belonging to the 
Group-R-theory. It may involve theoretical commitments
by the L-group to the existence of entities or proper­
ties not held recognizable by any Reader of the group in 
any frame of the associated concrete context, but "locked 
into" that context by further commitments of the same 
theoretical structure, such that assignments of properties 
to entities within this fictal structure are derivable 
under the logic of the group theory from those of the 
Group-R-theory. Any adequately coherent, and consistent,
fictal structure of this kind belongs to the S-theory of 
the associated concrete context. Notions of adequacy, 
coherence and consistency are taken to be context-depen­
dent in exactly the same way as they are for R-theories.
So, also, are many decisions of the L-group as to what is 
to count as the boundary between R- and S-theories, in 
terms of the entities and properties governed by these 
theories (only those of R-theories being categorized as 
idents and characters). Entities, properties and struc­
tures of commitment belonging to S-theory in one context 
may become incorporated into the interpretive structure of 
the R-theory in another. For example, the substantive 
theory of the expansion of mercury and glass under heat 
is incorporated into the récognitive theory of the measure­
ment of temperature by mercury-glass thermometer, as a 
tacit or neglected factor in the adoption of the thermo­
meter as indicator of temperature values. These consi­
derations are not, I believe, trivial. They reveal an
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important aspect of the role of measurement systems in 
the construction of successively more sophisticated forms 
of empirical theory, each being incorporated in the récog­
nitive theory of the next.
One important area of decision in this respect 
is, however, pre-empted by the fundamental assumptions of 
C-theory. The essential point was made in reference to 
atomization note (d) p. 85 ). In every region
of an R-theoretical space, R-atoms exist of which no 
proper enclosure is recognized. Similarly, in measure­
ment contexts, a least recognized interval-value (P^) is 
specified as minimal (K2, p.251 ). Thus no smaller values 
than P^, and no intermediate value between P^ and P^+^ can 
be recognized, since no ident so characterized is recog­
nizable. Still less can any irrational value - e.g. for 
the diagonal of unit square. But, once a suitable inter­
pretive function has been constructed for an S-theory of 
the context,- there is nothing to prevent the extrapolation 
within that theory of such unrecognizable values. If 
necessary, the objective existence of entities possessing 
these values as properties can also be extrapolated.
Such existence cannot, however, be checked by measurement. 
The recognized metric value may therefore be the meeting- 
point for two sets of approximation-conditions: those
specified for the data structure in terms of the standard 
apparatus and comparison figure, and those specified by 
the mathematical rules for the numerical structure of the 
associated substantive theory.
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There are interesting consequences for the 
notion of continuity in the variations of value for any 
quantity, such as intervals of space, time or temperature. 
For concrete structures, any such notion involves fictal 
extrapolation of intermediate values under the substantive 
theory of the quantity in context. We are in no way 
obliged to assume that entities or properties posited 
within a purely mathematical accounts of continuity - such 
as the countably infinite sets of Cantor, the notion of 
pointwise 'density', or the calculus of limits - corres­
pond with elements having objective concrete existence.
My own intuitions of perceived continuity in the real 
world are to the contrary, but argument on this point is 
beyond the scope of the present study.
Two further aspects of fictal construction are 
among those which will be exemplified for particular 
measurement systems:
(1) Calculated as distinct from directly recognized
(measured) quantities - of which the classic example is 
the calculation of values of velocity from readings of 
distance and time. One aim of the analysis will be to 
distinguish such cases from those of indicated measurement, 
as described above; some earlier writers (notably N.R. 
Campbell) have lumped these cases together under the head 
of 'indirect measurement'. It is worth noting, for 
example, that there are cases of indicated, as distinct 
from calculated, measurement of velocity, such as by 
spectrographic readings of "red-shift" in astronomy. I
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shall try to avoid confusion over the various meanings of 
the word "measurement" by speaking of direct readings 
from a metric structure in terms of 'registration' and 
'registered values'.
(2) Probabilistic and statistical extrapolation,
often using the notion of synonymous sets (pp. 239 ff.)
- especially in contexts of analogies between physical 
and non-physical measurement systems.
8. Summary of Measurement Theory
No further metatheoretical structures are to be 
defined at this stage. It will be found that a very 
wide range of measurement systems are interpretable as 
special models of those already defined, in association 
with appropriate substantive theories. Yet more are 
interpretable by analogy in terms of the same structures. 
I therefore list the principal structures below, with 
summary indications of their theoretical relationships.
(i) The structal system (K6, p. 269) consists of a 
set of subsystems, each of which associates
(ii) A Marked Interval Series (K5, p.266 ) with
(iii) A Metric Structure (K2, p. 251). This, in turn, 
associates
(iv) The Composition Operator (Kl, p. 250) with
(v) A Comparative Pair, consisting of a comparison
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figure for a valuative character (called, in 
measurement, a quantity), common to all subsys­
tems of the structal system (D8, 9, and notes 
pp. 123 ff ) for which
(vi) One or more standard sets are constructed or 
selected in context (Dll, p . 129). These qualify 
as Marked Interval Series ((ii), above) by satis­
fying the conditions for
(vii) The T-series (K4, p. 262 ); and being character­
ized by an appropriate sequence of marks, on which 
the composition operator ((iv), above) is deter­
mined.
(viii) The Data Set (K3, p. 251 ; interpreted for the 
structal system in note (4), p.272 ) is a special 
case of an approximate set (D12, p.134)
(ix) A numerical structure is associated with the 
system, such that each interval of each marked 
interval series is assigned a numerical interval- 
value equal to the difference between the ordinal 
numbers assigned to its end-marks; these being 
assigned to the marks according to a system of 
interpretive functions constructed to reflect the 
group substantive theory of the quantity in con­
text. This interval-value also corresponds 
functionally, under the definitions of the structal 
system, with the cardinal number of members of the 
constituent series of least recognized intervals 
under the Group-R-theory. All approximate values.
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and values interpolated under the substantive 
theory, are strictly related to these interval- 
values. (See notes to K5, p. 266 £f)'.
NOTE ON SYNOPSES IN SECTIONS L - R
Considerable research has been done on applications 
of C-theory to a large number of instances of actual 
measurement contexts, with the aim of exploring the 
varieties of theoretical structure it can be used to 
analyse, and the kinds of conclusions it may yield. A 
full account of this research would exceed the limits 
apporpriate for a Ph.D. thesis, but it seems desirable 
even at this stage to give some indication of the scope 
and character of the insights which may result. I have 
therefore presented much of this work below, in synopsis. 
Where conclusions are presented without argument, they 
are in fact the product of careful reasoning. References 
for the main publications consulted will be given in the 
bibliography. But the work has been unsupervised, and 
is strictly not part of the thesis proper.
Only for the analyses of length measurement 
(Section L) and probability assessment (Section P) have 
the fundamental principles been set out in reasonable 
detail, as integral parts of the argument of the thesis; 
further work on these subjects, also, being indicated in 
synopsis.
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INSTANCES OF MEASUREMENT CONTEXTS
L. Length or Distance: (i) the alignment system
1. It has been pointed out that much of the existing
work on the fundamental principles of measurement, up to 
and including that of KLST,has placed great reliance on 
the presentation of simple length measurement, as carried 
out on a basis of ordering structures supposed to consist 
of equivalent standard elements laid end-to-end, sometimes 
called 'rigid rods'. Analysis has then proceeded on the 
assumption that a principle of additivity in empirical 
structures, taken to be obtained by the assembly or 
'concatenation' of numbers of 'copies' of standard elements, 
can be extended by analogy from this literal interpre­
tation to measurement contexts in general; although no 
argument has, as far as I can discover, been offered for 
this assumption (other than a few evidently special cases, 
such as the assembly of numbers of standard weights, which 
will be mentioned in synopsis in Section 0).
Argument has been offered above, particularly in 
the last Section, for the view that the only soundly 
generalizable basis for attributing a property analogous to 
numerical additivity to directly recognizable structures 
is in terms of numbers of members of a standard set, held 
under the (R- and S-) theory of the context to exhibit, in 
a chosen comparison figure, values of the relevant quantity
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proportional to their numbers in composition. The 
basic structure exhibiting this property is the standard 
one-dimensional T-series of marked intervals.
Where the quantity to be measured is itself "length", it 
is obvious that there are simple applications in which 
the comparison-figure directly yields "equal length" for 
each interval (by means which will be investigated 
shortly). But, even for the measurement of length or 
distance, there are many contexts of a quite simple kind 
in which the intervals are not of equal length, and 
the criteria for their equivalence in the structal system 
rest - as in all other cases, like those of temperature, 
time or velocity - on the commitments of the incorporated 
S-theory associating each interval with equal amounts 
of the measured quantity, for which equal length of these 
intervals is not a consideration. Thus, the circum­
stances that one very literal interpretation of this for­
mulation can be provided for length measurement by the 
rigid-rod model - and, possibly, a few other special cases 
of 'empirical additivity' suggested - cannot coherently 
be supposed adequate for a general account. By contrast, 
C-theory will present this particular model as itself a 
special case in which R-theory, without incorporation of 
S-theory, provides an instance in terms of a standard set 
of idents which can be directly recognized as both equi­
valent for the measured quantity and readily composable 
in the required manner. So the general case, for length 
as for other quantities, is that in which we must appeal
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to incorporated S-theory for a structure of commitments 
according to which the standard intervals satisfy the 
conditions for equivalent value and composability. It 
will be found that this approach leads to greater flexi­
bility (in all senses), combined with rigour, than an 
analysis based on analogies with abutments of rigid rods 
(the theoretical use of the 'rigid rod' concept in rela- 
tivistic analysis is quite a separate matter).
We shall return to the theoretical status of 
'rigid rods' in sub-section (i)5. I must start, however, 
with more detailed consideration of the literal instan­
tiation of structal and data structures, putting the 
quantity Q = "length" and the figure $ = "alignment" as 
the comparative pair. The rationale for the choice of 
such a system as fundamental was given in para 1, p.255. 
The basis of the system was further characterized in 
note 3, p.270, on the structal system, where it is 
stated: "The numerical value for xcj... depends solely
on the number of members of the constituent sequence of 
I of which X is composed" (where I is the set of all 
intervals of one of the marked interval series (MIS) of 
the structal system, and its 'constituent series' is the 
T-series (S') composed of its least recognized intervals 
for the context; every member of I is either a member of 
•S', or the composite of a subset of S', p. 267 ). The 
note goes on to point out that the value of x in this case 
has no necessary relation to the lengths of these con­
stituent intervals, which are to depend on "factors
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associated with the comparative pair Q, for the 
context". Where Q "length", the values of the consti­
tuent intervals and their composites will be read as "the 
lengths of" the respective marked intervals in the struc­
tal system; and hence those to which the lengths of the
associated data structure are approximated. The com-
'
parison figure 5 = "alignment" is described in the same
note, as a figure "in which line-like features of the
S
relevant idents are aligned, and x ^ y iff x extends 
beyond y at either end, and y does not extend beyond x, 
as interpreted in the context". (The most important 
factor for ’interpretation' in this case is the decision 
as to the degree of accuracy with which 'extending beyond' 
is to be interpreted.) Since all relations of equiva­
lence and approximation are defined in terms of the
note concludes: "the equivalence-classes in standard
S
interval sequences under ^ will consist of idents of 
'equal length' - including ... the constituent class of 
minimal length for which the value in K is equal to 
such that = '1'." (where J is the set of marks assigned 
to the members of J; /f is the set of all interval-values 
of Q for the structal system). So the interval-value, 
or "length" of any ident x of the structal system is 
given simply by the number of minimal constituent inter­
vals (to be called, 'm-intervals') of which it is composed, 
which is equal to the difference between the ordinal num­
bers of the end-marks by which it is characterized.
Since no further interpretation is required, no
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difficulty is created by the fact that any sub-series of 
any standard interval series satisfies the conditions for 
a standard series, either of whose end-marks can be set 
at 'O’. Further interpretation will, however, be needed 
as soon as we wish to use the resulting numerical values, 
in conjunction with the logic of arithmetical addition 
and subtraction, to derive commitments regarding con­
structions defined in these terms, involving two or more 
idents of the datai system. This will be dealt with 
below under the head of "composition and sign" (p.310 ). 
Generally, we shall find that restrictions are placed 
on the assignment of ordinal numbers of marks by any 
interpretive theory which goes beyond the simple assign­
ment of values of "length" on the basis of counting the 
number of m-intervals of which a standard ident is com­
posed - or, in the case of a datai ident, the number of 
such intervals in a standard ident to which it is approxi­
mated.
But I must first go on to clarify, as far as 
possible, how the basic 'alignment' figure is to be fur­
ther interpreted for the measurement of length.
2. What is meant by a "line-like feature" of a rele­
vant ident was more fully described on p. 265 , as part of 
a solution to problems associated with the "filling of 
space" in such a way that fully complemented - and there­
fore additive - compositions of idents can be constructed 
and recognized. The type of feature required was there 
described as "that in which we restrict attention to what
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we call one spatial dimension of a particular region of 
an R-frame. Such a region may be regarded as a T-series 
whose spatial 'enclosure' (as a limiting case of this 
concept) is recognized in terms of a single boundary 
shared with neighbouring idents, or as a pair of closely- 
aligned boundaries whose enclosed space is neglected.
It is the phenomenal correlative of a line-segment. ...
The shared boundaries of (these segments) are recognized 
as having no spatial dimension: they are the phenomenal
correlative of points." It is, of course, these "point" 
boundaries which are recognized by their characterizing 
marks (or, more literally, by their configurative relations 
to these marks, which necessarily occupy space "alongside" 
them).
The 'alignment' figure 8 can be seen in these 
terms as a figure whose instantiating configurations are 
constructed and recognized as "a pair of closely-aligned 
boundaries whose enclosed space is neglected"; each of 
these boundaries being recognized as a distinct region of 
one of the two idents whose "lengths" are compared; all 
other regions of the boundaries of these idents being neg­
lected in this recognition, for this R-frame of the 
context. (The time restriction is essential here, as we 
shall see.)
In the structal system, the boundary-regions which 
instantiate MIS are constructed so as to be readily recog­
nizable, unequivocally, by all members of any L-group for 
any context in which they are used. It may be helpful
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to think of them as distinct quasi-idents in their own 
right, 'enclosed' in the pieces of apparatus on the boun­
daries of which they are constructed (but seldom con­
sciously or explicitly distinguished). In ordinary 
English parlance they are called "scales": but, to avoid
ambiguities from varied uses of this term in the litera­
ture, I shall call them structal interval series (SIS).
The sense of "dimension" in the above description 
needs careful interpretation. It is to be understood 
only in terms of the SIS-boundaries themselves, and must 
not be taken to suggest that, even in the same context, 
there may not be a further interpretation in terms of sub­
stantive (in this case, geometrical) theory under which 
these boundaries are describable as embedded in, or part 
of, a structure of more than one dimension: for example,
if an SIS is taken to be "curved", or if two distinct 
SIS (or the same SIS in different frames) are taken to be 
related so that their interval-values are to be assigned 
to different geometrical dimensions. Interestingly, the 
very notions of "straightness" and "rigidity" (the last 
being a combination of commitments to "constant straight­
ness" and "constant length", often blithely assumed in 
accounts of measurement theory) will emerge as belonging 
to the substantive, geometrical theory of the space, and 
not to the récognitive theory of measurement itself.
Geometrical theory will enter our analysis at a 
very simple level, when we come to discuss the use of 
triangulation systems for length or distance measurement
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in subsection (ii)2. We may neglect for the present (but 
not in any complete development of this analysis) relati- 
vistic accounts in which S-theory calls for rigid rods 
whose length varies with conditions of observation.
But only if we understand the structural role of the
’incorporation of substantive theory’ at this fundamental
level, will we be able to develop our analysis successfully 
for structures whose sophistication is limited only by 
the intellects of the theoreticians engaged in the con­
struction of the context, and the technology at their 
command (in that order).
3. Returning, now, in the light of these consider­
ations, to the ’line-like’ SIS in its own terms, we may 
speak of it, if necessary to avoid ambiguity, as being 
of ’one R-dimension’. We start by looking at the inter­
vals of a single SIS, compared by alignment with one 
another to the extent that their boundaries are aligned -
i.e., that they overlap. (In this section I shall, for
& G 8
simplicity, write ’>,» , for ’ q » q >q ' » since the values 
of 8 and Q are constant throughout.)
(a) Each interval x of such an SIS is aligned with 
itself, and trivially satisfied the definition
given for a/x,y (putting y = x) for all standard
structures (Dll(ii), p . 130 );
(b) The relation >/x,y for any x,y in the SIS will be 
satisfied iff:
(i) the whole boundary of y is aligned with the 
boundary of x;
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(ii) some non-neglected part of the boundary of x 
is not aligned with that of y ;
(iii) treating the SIS as a ’quasi-ident’, x and y 
are also quasi-idents enclosed in it, and y 
is a proper enclosure of x.
(c) X and y are distinguished as enclosures of the SIS 
by reference to their characterizing marks. It is 
by reference to these.marks that parts of the boun­
daries of X and y are recognized as aligned, or not.
(d) It is convenient to restrict attention to the case 
where, for some marks P^, Pj,P^& 7 for the SIS, 
and P\Pj/y (i.e., these marks are members of f(x), 
f(y), respectively, for the R-frame: AS (note), p.52, 
That is, P^ is a common end-mark of x and y.; Pj ,
the other end-mark of y, is a mark of x; but P^, the
other end-mark of x, is not a mark of y . [We say
that a mark P. is "between" marks P. and P. on a SIS
3 1 ^
iff there are intervals x,y of the SIS satisfying
these conditions.) Relations of other types of
interval-pairs can easily be reduced to conjunctions
of cases of this type. It follows in this case that
P . P, , and that there is an interval z of the MIS 
J K
such that P.P,/z; no part of z is aligned with any 
3 K
part of y ; and 7]/x,z. Also, since each SIS is
part of the metric structure, x = y o z; and x,y,
and z are composed of integral numbers a, b, and c
of m-intervals such that a = b + c, and a = k —  i,
b = j —  i, c = k —  j, where the ordinal numbering
of the marks P. . . is 'i', 'j', 'k'.
1 > 3 > ^
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The interpretation Q = "length", 8 = "alignment", 
also determines that of the equivalence-relation «  by 
which idents of the structal system are read as "of equal 
length" iff they are composed of equal numbers of m-inter­
vals. Since, in general, there is no question of every 
pair of m-intervals of a structal system being aligned in 
any actual context, this essential condition must normally 
be the subject of a (usually tacit) commitment of the R- 
theory that any two m-intervals of the structal system 
are aligned, either with each other or with a third m- 
interval, they will exhibit the relation ?=«. (Again, 
since, in general, it is not practical to align two dis­
tinct intervals of one SIS, it is best to think of this 
commitment as referring to the 8-equivalence of each such 
interval with any m-interval of another SIS of the system. 
If no other SIS is, in fact, present, the commitment is 
to the possibility of constructing one, which need not be 
composed of more than one m-interval). In a world where 
SIS for length measurement are mass-produced, such matters 
are normally taken on trust, together with a commitment to 
their conformity - to a tolerance acceptable in context - 
with some institutional SIS.
4. All datai values are recognized on evidence of
a relation ^/x,y, where x is an ident of the data struc­
ture and y of the structal system. In the present case, 
this depends on the construction of an alignment confi­
guration in which a line-like feature of x is aligned with 
y (which is defined as line-like) so as to satisfy the 
defined conditions as interpreted for the context. Since
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datai idents are not in general provided with specially- 
constructed line-like features, such a construction nor­
mally involves a judgment by the relevant Reader under his 
R-theory of the context - which is not always trivial.
It is not possible to generalise about this, except to 
say that in most cases the matter can be adequately resolved 
at the levels of precision and accuracy required for the 
context. Equally, the recognition of datai marks of x 
as point-like features, not specially constructed, such 
that the conditions for -^/x,y are satisfied, is a matter 
for theoretical judgment, normally assisted by established 
rules which are epistemologically trivial. Alignment of 
the datai interval (line-like feature) with the structal 
interval to which it is thus approximated, must be such 
that any space enclosed by the aligned boundaries is negli­
gible in context. In practice, the configuration will 
always be constructed so that the datai interval bounded 
by one datai and one structal mark is negligible, approxi­
mation being judged by the relative datai intervals - if 
any - recognized between the other datai mark and the 
nearest (as judged) structal marks.
S. Constancy of length, from frame to frame, of
intervals in the structal system is an essential commit­
ment of the R-theory which is, again, normally tacit and 
unproblematic. In some special cases, corrections based 
on substantive theories about variations with temperature 
or stress may be required. From an epistemological stand­
point, the interest here lies in distinguishing the types
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of theory involved, and their roles in the theoretical 
structure as a whole. (Much intuitive reliance is cer­
tainly placed on commitments that structal or datai ele­
ments of linelike form, when made of known flexible 
materials, do not change in length Within certain toler­
ances) when bent.)
Straightness, as we have seen, does not enter 
fundamentally into the theory of length-measurement by 
alignment. It is enough, for example, for a flexible 
tape to be in contact with a datai ident in such a way 
that the space enclosed by the relevant line-like features, 
datai and structal, is negligible. In those cases where 
straightness is important, we have seen that for C-theory 
it belongs to the substantive geometrical theory of the 
context. Commitments to straightness may be adopted for 
datai as well as structal elements. An interesting case 
for C-theory is that where I wish to measure the length of 
a wall, which I take to be straight, with a metre ruler 
or tape, the wall being at least several metres long. 
Foundational analysis tends to suggest that I "concatenate" 
the necessary number of "copies" of the ruler by placing 
them end-to-end, assuming that they are "rigid". This 
is at best misleading, and would create problems with a 
flexible measuring-tape which do not arise in practice.
What I actually do is to assume that the wall is straight 
- if this is important in context - and mark off succes­
sive portions of it, metre by metre, until the last section 
for which I read off an approximation to the desired
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accuracy. This procedure satisfies the condition that 
all data are approximated to structa, if we regard the 
marked-off metre intervals along the wall as ’temporary 
structa’ for the context. This can be done,since they 
can be constructed to conform as accurately as required 
to the relevant definitions; but the last section, which 
is approximated, remains datai. The commitment to straight 
ness is adopted for the wall as a whole, independently of 
whether any part of it is assigned structal or datai 
status. (The main difference between ’temporary structa’ 
of this kind and regular elements of the structal system 
is that the end-marks of their component intervals (which 
may not be minimal) attract no theoretical commitments 
beyond the immediate operation for which they are construc­
ted; they are neither specially constructed in advance, 
nor have they any further practical or theoretical rele­
vance. They return to be indistinguishable parts of the 
data structure, as do the temporarily-marked intervals 
they bound. Indeed, as the next example shows, the ’’marks’’ 
themselves may be purely notional, having no objective 
existence.)
There are cases also where the greatest interval 
is - at least initially, datai, alignment is used, and 
straightness is not material. For instance, wheels 
equipped (for convenience) with counters can be used to 
measure the lengths of curves of any shape and any practical 
length: big ones for measuring travel along a road, small
ones for their representations on maps. Here, the
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circumference of the wheel is the initial structal inter­
val, best seen as an open curve whose ends happen to 
coincide, again for convenience. The intervening datai 
marks can safely be omitted - though we must be committed 
to saying that they were drawn in, each circumference- 
long datai interval so constructed could be converted 
into a 'temporary structal interval'. Total contact 
- negligible enclosed space - over the whole of the 
greatest interval is the key to the epistemology of the 
theory. Not even the circular geometry of the wheel is 
fundamental - another mechanical convenience. [Counted 
paces along a "straight edge" or "curved path" provide 
a more primitive example.)
6. "Length" and "distance". We have seen that
geometrical properties like straightness venter into the 
epistemology of the theory of measurement only where we 
go beyond the use of a simple alignment configuration in 
the measurement of length. An even simpler case than 
those we have considered is that where an interval of the 
structal system is placed so that a pair of datai marks 
can be found to satisfy the conditions for approximation, 
but no line-like feature is recognizable in the datai 
structure of which the datai marks are end-marks; e.g., 
the diameter of a circular table, or a gap between two 
stable structures. If we adopt the commitment that the 
structal interval is geometrically "straight" (and a 
taut tape will do as well as a rigid ruler), we can say 
that "the distance in a straight line" from one datai mark
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to the other approximates the value of the structal interval 
No datai quasi-ident exists for the R-theory of which the 
"length" can be equated with this distance. The distance 
is thus strictly a fictal construction - going beyond 
the phenomenal evidence, and calling in aid our (very 
simple) geometrical theory of the space. However, it is 
normal to regard such a distance between datai marks as an 
element of the datai structure: a datai interval. For
C-theory, this means incorporating our substantive theory 
of the space into our récognitive theory.
This "distance" would not necessarily cease to 
exist, as such, for the R-theory if we were (then or 
later in the context) to discover or construct some recog­
nizable line-like feature aligned with it, whose "length" 
could be equated with it. Can we say that with every 
length a distance is associated? Or that length is 
a special type of distance? Note that distances need 
not be straight. They may have any regular geometrical 
shape associated with line-like structures - such as the 
distance travelled by a ball swung round on a string - 
or no regular shape. Having measured the length of a 
road with a wheel, we know the distance travelled by the 
measurer.
It seems to me that the distinction we draw 
between these terms will vary with our theory of the con­
text, and other factors associated in that context with 
the values concerned (say, its relation to the time of 
travel at a given velocity). For this study, I shall
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keep "length" for values of spatial intervals assigned to 
line-like features recognized as (parts of) idents whose 
identity is completely determined by the assignment of 
other characters; and "distance" for all other recognized 
spatial intervals.
7. Composition and sign. To satisfy the conditions
defined for alignment-length measurement, all data must be 
line-like features with point-like end-marks approxi­
mated to recognized structa; and any assignment of inter- 
val-values to data by arithmetical calculation from sum­
mation or subtraction of their approximate numerical values 
must be analysable so that the resulting value can - at 
least in principle - be assigned to some recognized datai 
interval satisfying these conditions. The simplest case 
is that of a configuration of data satisfying the conditions 
for a marked interval series (K5, p.266 ), though lacking 
the theoretical commitment to correspondence between the 
ordinal numbers of marks and cardinal numbers of consti­
tuent series which distinguish an SIS. That is to say, a 
contiguous series of line-like features recognized as 
bounded by shared end-marks, and therefore exhibiting the 
strict spatial complementarity of the T-series (K4, p. 262) . 
For further exposition I will adopt - mostly for this 
section only - the following terminology and symbolism:
(a) A configuration of data satisfying the above
conditions will be called a datai interval series (DIS).
a,...,m =^£ the sequence of idents a,...,m form a DIS.
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The letters g,h,j,k will be used as variables representing
any members of such a DIS. Where g,...,k designates
any sub-series, including a,...,m itself, gk denotes the 
total interval composed by g,k, and all intervening inter­
vals .
(b) ,G,A,...,M will be used to denote the marks of a 
DIS given by a,...,m; ordered so that O/^a, Gl^ak, and
GK/gk (where G stands for the predecessor of G in the order, 
such that G,G are the end-marks of g, so that G(^ g; a 
convention to avoid identifying some particular letter 
in the series with this end-mark). G,H,J,K will be used 
as variables representing members of this series of marks.
(c) We can now follow the normal convention by writing
GK, for gk, or GG for g , for all values of these variables; 
i.e., naming an interval by its end-marks. I shall use 
x,y,z as variables for members of the associated SIS,
and NQ,Ng,N^,Nj,N^ as variables for the ordinal numbers 
which are their end-marks, writing for x where NgN^/x.
The convention will be that the order of end-marks denoting 
Ng is the ordinary numerical sequence, such that k >  g; 
and the order of datai marks GK will be that of 0  to N, 
which will be uniform for each DIS for each context. But 
where we have two (or more) distinct DIS in any context, 
say D =  {a,...,l} and {a/,...,m'j, there is no general 
commitment to the relationship between the orders 0  to L 
and 0to M' .
(d) There is plainly a functional relation which
will be written L = "the length of "; such that for each
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gk = GK there is some structal ident, say x = N^, such 
that Wgk,x; the conditions for MIS give ^ (x) = j —  h; 
whence f(gk)^ j —  h *Cs (GK). j — h is necessarily an 
integral number which is the cardinal number of m-inter­
vals in X, and is positive under the above convention 
that j >  h. I shall consider shortly what meaning can 
be given to negative values, either structal or datai; 
meanwhile there is plainly no sense in the idea that x 
may contain a negative number of m-intervals. (Strictly 
speaking, we should say that "the length, expressed
as a number of m-intervals of the structal system, of"; 
an m-interval, here, is not necessarily a conventional 
unit. A further, interpretive, function, converting 
these numbers into units or part-units of the context, 
and assigning consistent values for all datai intervals in 
context, must normally be constructed under substantive 
theory.)
(e) The conditions for the comparison figure of
alignment require that, where data are aligned either with 
structa or with other data - say, GK of D  with x = or 
with H'J' of D ’ - the end-marks are placed so that the 
question which, if either, 'extends beyond' the other, at 
one or both ends, is determinate. This is in practice 
only possible if at least one pair of end-marks is matched 
so that the spatial interval between them is negligible in 
context. This would yield the value, say, L = 0
or £(GH') = 0; and will be written as a configurative 
relation, =(GN^), or =(GH'), as the case may be.
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Only for a pair of structal intervals can both pairs of 
end-marks be so matched; but, if G K a n d  =[GN^), the 
pair (K,Nj) will approximate to this configuration.
Such an approximative matching configuration will be 
written i&(KNj) .
I shall now use the above notation to discuss 
a number of consequences and questions which arise for 
the interpretation of alignment-length measurement.
(1) Consider the possibility that, within any one
DIS there exist two marks K, K ' such that for some J,x, 
^/JK,x and --/JK',x. Let L M  = n; then f(JK)=& n ^  (JK ' ) 
Since, by K3 (p.251 ), “[(>/JK,JK'j and “](>/JK',JK) ,
^(JK) ^  £(JK'). All such JK, JK',... form a k-cluster 
as defined for D12, p.135. So all such marks K, K',...
can be regarded as indistinguishable for the context, and 
the intervals between them neglected; i.e.,=&(KK'), etc.
Further, for all idents x,y, of the structal 
system such that »/x,y we have ^(x) = L{y)\ so that if 
GJ, H'K' of two distinct DIS Z7 ,Z7' satisfy ^VGJ,x,^/H'K' ,y, 
and »/x,y, we have ^ (GJ) ^  f(x), whence ^(GJ) a  ^ (y) , 
i.e., f(GJ) =&= f(H'K').
(2) Since, within any DIS, datai intervals satisfy
the conditions of spatial complementation for the T-series, 
we can extend the definition of the composition operator
o; so that for GJ, JK of DIS Z7, GJ o JK = GK. By the
definition of a DIS, it follows in such a case that there 
exist x,y,z of some SIS such that 'VGJ,x, ^/JK,y, 'VGK, z, 
and X o y = z.
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Any calculation, under this extended definition, 
of an approximate length for a composition of data from 
different DIS - say, GJ o H ’K ’ - carries with it the 
commitment that datai and structal intervals exist such 
that the above conditions are satisfied and appropriate 
approximations and equivalences hold: e.g., there are
J", H", K" of " and x,y,z such that Z(GJ)=a= 
f(H'K').» ~/H"K",y, ~/J"K",z, and
X o y = z; whence £(GJ o H'K')^ f(z).
With reasonable care - which may involve the 
construction of "temporary structa" such as those pro­
posed for the measurement of a wall (above, p.307 ) - 
such conditions are normally satisfied, quite literally, 
for ordinary contexts of alignment-length measurement, 
with the help of certain unproblematic substantive commit­
ments to the stability of the relevant structures, to be 
considered shortly. But for many contexts, including 
some of measurement systems for spatial intervals, the 
recognition of both structal and datai intervals equal or 
approximate to the greatest composed interval whose value 
is used in calculation is not realisable readily, or at 
all. Error and inconsistency may then arise from the 
cumulative effects of successive approximations, unchecked 
against the structal system.
(3) Proceeding now to the consideration of sign,
let us ask at the outset what sense can be given, within 
C-theory, to an operation of "negative composition" on 
perceived spatial intervals such that, say, the "length"
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Z(GH) —  has negative value? We will expect to
proceed by aligning GJ and H ’K ’ with x,y,z such that
X = Nj , y = n J^ , z = N^, and (1) ^(GN^),
(2) =(K’Nj^ ) ; as in the following diagram:
Cl) ,
H ’ (J'} K»
(If GJ, H ’K' are not, and cannot be, aligned, 
these alignments must be done successively, by moving the 
MIS {x,y,z}. Some consequences are discussed shortly.)
We now have L (GJ) T (x) , T(x) = k —  j ; 
fCH'K').b f(y), £(y) = k — h; whence (fCGH)-- f(H'K'))
(k —  j ) —  (k —  j ) ) ; i.e. h —  j, which has negative 
value. But what meaning can we give to this result in 
C-theoretical terms? What ident is assigned this value? 
The structal ident z is composed of j —  h m-intervals, 
which is a positive number - whether you count them from 
Nh to Nj or from Nj to N^. If we wish to identify a 
datai interval approximate to z, we can place a mark J ' 
in H'K' such that ^J^Nj): so that H ’J ’ is the spatial
complement in H ’K* of J ’K ’ such that ^(J’K ’) ^  [(GJ).
But what is negative about that?
It becomes clear that negative values, if any, 
must be assigned in the terms of a substantive theory 
(S-theory) of the context, under an interpretive function 
which takes the values of *h’, 'j', ’k ’ (which are always 
positive for C-theory) into corresponding values in a
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numerical structure where negative values are given meaning 
which goes beyond the perceptual evidence. Thus, e.g., 
if in C-theoretical analysis = 'O’, Nj = ’ 3 ’ , = ’5’,
we can construct a simple interpretive function ’minus 3’, 
taking N^ into ^3, Nj into 0, and N^ into 2. But note 
that what we are doing here is not to change the marks on 
the MIS Nj^  - which would not affect any of the points 
made above - but to assign them values in the substantive 
theory such that the direction of counting has a specified 
meaning for that theory. So the reference above (p.268] 
to the dependence of sign on the ’’order of assignment of 
marks’’ can now be clarified to mean their order of assign­
ment within an associated S-theory.
The S-theory must offer some rationale according 
to which counting from Nj to N^ and from Nj to Nj^  shall 
be done in opposite directions - called, conventionally, 
positive and negative. Moreover, that rationale must 
also determine whether this counting-rule shall apply for 
all alignments or, if not, for which alignments and on 
what principle.
As noted in our fundamental consideration of 
'counting series', an order of counting is associated 
with an autonomous choice of one of any pair of relations 
which are in principle derivable from a progressive binary 
figure (Section D, pp. 103 ff.). Selective attention to 
a particular relation can only be determined by some theore­
tical commitment attached to that relation; and, where 
the figure is a comparison figure for a measurable quantity.
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the decisive commitment is likely to be to a functional 
association of variations in that quantity with those of 
some other factor of importance in the context. Such 
an association gives critical meaning to the direction of 
any particular variation. This theory-dependence is 
strikingly true of contexts of measurement of length or 
distance; since, notoriously, spatial directions have no 
significance in isolation, being wholly relative not only 
to conditions of recognition, but to choices of particular 
directions and alignments as decisive with regard to the 
motives of Readers of the context. This is so even if 
the motives are purely intellectual and abstract in content, 
as has been my arbitrary choice of illustrative direction 
above.
Thus, the present analysis provides a substantial 
epistemological base for the conventional view that nega­
tive numbers are a symbolic introduction into mathematical 
representations of empirical quantities, yielding the 
subtraction operations required by the demands of the 
empirical theory of the context and the purposes of the 
associated calculations. This has been done without 
appealing to any distinct concept of 'difference measure­
ment', as invoked by KLST and many others: since all
our metric elements are presented in the form of intervals, 
represented by numerical differences between numeral 
marks, which may be interpreted as positive or negative 
according to the commitments of the associated S-theory.
(4) A minimal form of S-theory (which may or may not
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involve the assignment of negative values) is already 
implied in the mention above of successive alignments, 
typically involving the moving of structa with respect 
to data. If we are to make sense of compositions arising 
from successive readings - located, necessarily, in 
different R-frames - our S-theory of the spatial structure 
of the context must include commitments to stability of 
length from frame to frame of all structa; and stability 
of spatial position for at least one datai element, with 
respect to which other datai structures can be located.
This notion of position is, of course, context-dependent, 
and, as I have said, a matter for substantive commitment, 
whose only criterion of validity is that it forms part of 
a consistent theoretical reading of the context as a 
whole. The least possible commitment to datai stability 
would appear to be to stability of position for one end- 
mark of one DIS, composed of at least one datai interval 
with one other end-mark; this carries a further commitment 
to the existence of at least one structal interval to 
which this datai interval is recognized as approximate.
For each such 'stabilised' DIS I shall suppose that one 
end-mark is chosen as the primary locus of stability, from 
which all numerical values are counted: to be called the
'origin' of that DIS and symbolised '©'. Where both 
negative and positive values are to be assigned under the 
S-theory to intervals of a single recognized T-series, 
they will be interpreted as two distinct DIS sharing a 
common origin but to be read in opposite directions -
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their geometry, as parts of a "straight line" or not, 
being also a matter for S-theoretical commitment. So 
long as all datai idents of the context are enclosed in 
one such stabilised DIS, a simple S-theory can be con­
structed without further commitment - even to stability 
of length-value, where the identities of the DIS and its 
enclosed intervals are recognized from frame to frame.
(A simple and intriguing example, which dispenses even 
with a stable origin, is the measurement of someone's 
waist from time to time over a long period. Our commit­
ments are to the stability of the structal tape and its 
marks, and the identity over time of the person and his/ 
her waist. Our assumption is that the length of the 
closed curve is independent of the chosen origin. As 
soon, however, as we wish to distinguish different inter­
vals of a closed curve - say, the circuit of a lake - one 
or more stable origins must be identified.)
It is worth noting at this point that a datai 
interval or DIS - whether stabilised or not - must retain 
its identity over time, as a basis for sequential commit­
ments from frame to frame, although its value for a 
measured quantity may vary: while, although structal
intervals must retain stable quantitative values, their 
identities are less crucial. They form a system of 
synonymous sets (above, pp. 239 ), whose differences of
character, except values for the measured quantity, are 
neglected. It follows that the sequential commitment to 
the identity of features forming an ident, from frame to
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frame, attaches to non-metric characters. For example, 
we do not just measure "lengths", but the lengths of 
objects, identified by characters other than their 
lengths. It is with these non-metric characters that 
the commitments to physical stability (like those which 
determine a direction of counting) are associated.
As the S-theory of the context becomes more 
sophisticated, more commitments with regard to the geo­
metrical relations of the data are added. No general 
theory of this development seems possible, but increasing 
geometrical complexity may be expected to be associated 
with the introduction of more datai or structal elements 
into the context, and some familiar lines of development 
should be mentioned. Straightness may first appear as 
the "shortest distance between two points", or as a 
schema for common alignment of several datai or structal 
features. Straightness itself is generally an important 
component of Euclidean schemes leading to commitments 
regarding relativities, and especially congruences, of 
length-values. At an early stage commitments to the
stability of particular datai angles, and circular arcs, 
are typically introduced; more will be said on this aspect 
shortly. Human constructions for use - especially fur­
niture and buildings - must, historically, have provided 
a rich source both of motivation and realisation for 
increasing sophistication of this sort; including the use 
of level and plumb-line, and the Egyptian 3-4-5 triangle. 
Descartes' coordinate system can be seen as a generali­
sation and abstraction from the resulting structures.
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The more recent, non-Euclidean geometries are constructed, 
in practice, as purely mathematical modifications and 
elaborations of the Cartesian scheme. Tests of the 
resulting theoretical commitments by measurement of speci­
fied data require the reduction of the results of calcu­
lation to a Euclidean form: in the light of C-theory,
this appears as a necessary consequence of the epistemo­
logical preconditions of measurement.
Such reduction often involves approximations 
within the mathematical structure, which, from our meta- 
theoretical standpoint, must be clearly distinguished as 
belonging to different theoretical systems (the S-theories) 
from the récognitive approximations involved in the theory 
of measurement as such (the R-theories). Mathematical, 
S-theoretical, approximation may also be necessary to 
reduce calculated results - e.g., of irrationals - to a 
number of significant figures such that they can be func­
tionally related to an integral number of recognized m- 
intervals of the structal system in context. It was in 
these senses that it was said above (p. 290) that the 
measured value may be the meeting-point of two systems of 
approximation. The tendency to speak of the simpler sur­
viving S-theories, and their associated measurement systems, 
as "approximations" to, say, Einsteinian theories of 
spatial structure, regarded somehow as the "real" geometry 
of space, must at least be treated with caution. But 
this must be left for later discussion. In practice, 
for reasons which further analysis will suggest, the
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measurement systems associated with the more sophisticated 
spatial theories always involve the incorporation into 
R-theory of (often tacit) commitments derived from earlier, 
established S-theory - of the kind accepted in context as 
common, or background, "knowledge". Some examples will 
now be offered.
(ii) Distance measurement using incorporated substantive 
theory
1. There is one aspect of the substantive theory
of the structure of space which is tacitly incorporated in 
so many contexts that its acceptance as "knowledge" is 
beyond question - though just what is known by it, and 
what, under the term "space", it is known about, may be 
matters for debate. What I am speaking of is essentially 
a commitment to the quantitative uniformity of spatial 
structure, independently of the operations of measurement 
- most obviously, of the units used, or, in C-theory, of 
the constructed m-intervals of the context. This has 
been dealt with, in the Suppes tradition, under the name 
of 'uniqueness' (see especially KLST, pp. 9 ff.) in terms 
of 'permissible transformations' of the 'numerical function' 
at the core of a 'representation theorem'. At its 
simplest, the notion can be formulated, for what is there 
called a 'ratio scale', as the commitment:
(V(j) ,<{)’) (3«-) (Va) (<j)Ca) = a  <!>’ (a) ) ; 
where a ranges over the basic set of the 'empirical
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relational structure',^ , ({)' are ’numerical functions’ 
associated with ’scales’ using different ’standard units', 
and 06 is a positive real number. This simple form of 
uniqueness commitment (which can be proved as a theorem 
for many cases under KLST’s assumptions, and would cer­
tainly be taken to hold for all simple cases of length- 
measurement) explicitly applies to the numerical theory of 
the context; though it is not precisely clear what is 
credited with "uniqueness".
For C-theory, each of two structal systems, not 
constructed so as to be defined in terms of specified 
functions on the values of their standard intervals, 
presents itself as part of the data structure of the other 
While certain not very interesting regularities could no 
doubt be derived from the commitments, in each case, to 
systematic inequalities, it is not generally possible to 
give a unique value to which would satisfy the above 
formulation, and which could be precisely tested in 
measurement. This would be the case, for example, when 
translation was attempted as between the language of the 
metric system (based on the metre) and either some uncon­
ventional ad-hoc system such as the "book-widths" or 
"bricks" instanced earlier, or the anglo-american inch- 
based system. All measured relationships between these 
systems are approximations, to the tolerance adopted in 
context. The assigned value of the parameter oc is thus 
context-dependent, and the statement that it has a com­
pletely determined value in the real numbers is an
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idealised commitment of the substantive theory with 
respect to pairs of structal systems. KLST’s assumption 
that the system of units can always be referred to some 
’’sufficiently fine-grained standard sequence’’ is there­
fore unrealistic, unless interpreted within some system 
of tolerances. Any notion of an ultimate limiting value 
which is progressively approached will founder - as part 
of a theory of measurement rather than of an abstract 
structure of space - at molecular distance scales, if 
not before. I have accepted that such commitments are 
unproblematic for the measurement of spatial intervals, 
at least at ordinary scales. But the extension of such 
commitments to systems incorporating higher-level theories, 
and especially to systems in the human sciences employing 
analogues of spatial structure for hypothetical quantities, 
it becomes important to analyse as closely as possible 
the theoretical structures employed. This I take to 
justify my somewhat pedantic analysis of this type of 
commitment as a case of the incorporation of S-theory in 
R-theory.
2. A perfectly practical case of this kind of
commitment (for which I will in future use the simple 
term ’incorporation’, where unambiguous) is the incor­
poration of Euclidean, Pythagorean and trigonometric 
theory in R-theories for the measurement of spatial inter­
vals by various forms of triangulation. These incor­
porations occupy the whole of the middle ground of spatial
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measurement between lengths and distances measurable by 
alignment with surveyors' tapes, and astronomical dis­
tances for which the Earth's orbit is too short a base 
for accurate assignment. They include the use of optical 
rangefinders, and of various kinds of navigation equipment 
to fix positions and distances at sea or in the air, 
typically using radio or radar beacons or beams: in all
these cases they therefore also incorporate a theory of 
the straightness of 'rays' of electromagnetic radiation.
It is no part of the task of this study to go into detail 
on the structures of any of these incorporated theories 
in their own fields; I merely note their presence as 
structures of tacit commitment within the R-theory of 
associated measurement. To qualify for tacit incorporation 
of this kind, commitments of substantive theory must be 
well established and unproblematic, accepted as knowledge. 
The commitments underlying systems of triangulation are 
paradigms (in the pre-Kuhnian sense) of this kind of 
knowledge. Overlaps occur between the ranges of distance 
so measured and those measured, at the lower end, by 
alignment, and at the higher, by more sophisticated forms 
of incorporation. Consistent readings by different sys­
tems in these overlapping ranges add inductive support to 
the incorporated commitments - hardly necessary in the 
ranges mentioned here, but becoming increasingly important 
at extremes of scale, even in spatial measurement. For 
some other types of measured quantity, this aspect can 
become crucial.
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A further concept which must be introduced, if 
the notion of incorporation is to be clearly understood, 
is that of an indicator system - in cases of physical 
measurement, always a physical linkage system - in which 
perceptually recognized intervals of one type of quantity 
are taken to 'indicate' values of another. We shall 
find that this concept has application in the analysis 
of the vast majority of measurement systems. I introduce 
it in the context of spatial measurement incorporating 
triangulation theories, because here it has particularly 
fundamental application. Here, both the recognized inter­
vals - which I shall call 'registered' - and those to 
which values are assigned - which I shall distinguish as 
'measured* (by indication) - are spatial. (For reasons 
already sufficiently stated, we shall expect nearly all 
registered intervals to be spatial.) The essential 
notion is that some feature of the measuring apparatus, 
which I shall call the 'standard variant*, presents an 
analogue of variations in datai intervals which the apparatus 
is used to measure: approximations between changing
(registered) values of the standard variant and structal 
intervals constructed in the same apparatus are read - 
without additional calculation - as values of the measured 
quantity for the datai intervals themselves. The 
structal intervals are marked (calibrated) with measured, 
not registered, values.
In an optical rangefinder, for example, images 
from two sight-lines at either end of the instrument are
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brought together by reflection to the eye of the Reader, 
in such a way that his adjustment of a marked wheel in 
matching the images registers the angle between the sight- 
lines. The marks on the wheel, as it is adjusted, sweep 
out a circular arc aligned with a graticule, in such a 
way that the position of the graticule with respect to 
the marks registers the angle; but the marks are so 
calibrated that the position of the graticule is read as 
an approximate distance from the instrument to the datai 
mark whose two images are matched by the Reader. The 
calibration - i.e., the placing and numbering of marks - 
of the instrument is carried out in terms of measured dis­
tances .
Note that the two quantities are not simply 
related; the registered differences in angle for equal 
differences in measured distance are not equal angles. 
(Strictly, what are registered - as with all measurement 
of angles - are intervals of circular arc: the incor­
poration of simple Euclidean theory is obvious.) The 
rangefinder may be calibrated either by matching its rea­
dings with values of distance obtained by alignment- 
systems; or, more likely, by calculating the appropriate 
angles for various distances using the principles of the 
incorporated S-theory.
Calculations used, as in this case, in determining 
the positions and values of structal marks for calibration 
in an indicator-system, are to be clearly distinguished 
from calculations made on registered or indicated values.
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after readings have been taken. The results of .the second 
kind of calculations are classed not as readings but as 
findings from readings, though in common usage such 
findings are often called ’measurements'. In the above 
example, distinguish either (a) the determination of the 
same distance, not by the rangefinder, but by measuring 
the angles subtended by the object at each end of a base­
line of measured length, and calculating the distance from 
these readings; or (b) the determination of the distance 
between two remote objects by measuring the distance to 
each by rangefinder, and the angle between the sightlines, 
and calculating the required distance from these datai 
values. In case (a), triangulation-theory is used in 
the calculation but not incorporated in the measurement 
system; in (b), it is both used in calculation of findings, 
and incorporated in the indications of the rangefinder 
from which readings are taken. These further distinctions 
elaborate somewhat the points made above about the con­
flation of concepts in Campbell's terminology of 'indirect 
measurement' (p. 291, note (1)). Such distinctions may 
become important in analysing the theoretical structure of 
many more sophisticated cases of interrelationships between 
registered and indicated values and substantive theories, 
and findings calculated from them.
Synopsis of Further Work
(1) - A main purpose of further exploration of the
variety of incorporated S-theories, and associated procedures.
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for the measurement of spatial intervals, would be to 
bring out the point that the level of sophistication depends 
less on the type of measured quantity (here simply 'length' 
or 'distance') than on the remoteness of the context of 
attention from ordinary human modes of perception.
(2) The following examples of spatial measurement
systems are among those cited:
Type of system Order of Incorporated 
scale theories 
(approx.) include:





(a) Radar Up to Electronic Direct reading of
2 50,000 information deflection of
miles theory and oscilloscope beam.
speed of indicating time-
radiation lapse, indicating
distance of object
(b) Triangulation Up to Relativistic Calculation from
on base of 250 geometry of recorded angular
earth's orbit light orbit and readings
years recorded
light
(c) Spectroscopic ? mil­ Expansion of Calculation from






























(3) The following general observations, among others,
are based on discussion of these cases:
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(a) Use of photographic and other recordings (e.g., case
(b)) or electronic counting (cases (e), (f)) require a 
small conceptual leap for C-theory, in that they replace 
human perception by mechanical devices at various points
in the system. But the essential limitations on the perfor­
mance of these devices differ from those on human perception 
only in scale, and they exist so to transform their "recog­
nitions" that they can be read by people. Again, the 
theoretical commitments by virtue of which they "recognize" 
certain aspects of their input as "significant", and 
"neglect" others, are of course built in by human designers. 
The notion of a 'comparison figure' needs elaboration to 
embrace these complexities. It is to be elucidated, in 
general, by reference to physical analogue relations sup­
posed to obtain between variations of the measured quantity 
and positions of standard variant, by virtue of physical 
linkage.
(b) Below the limits of scale considered above, we now 
predict that a succession of limits will be reached as we 
approach subatomic scales, beyond which, first, all indi­
cator systems will break down for lack of any form of 
physical linkage, yielding an analogue; and, second, S- 
theoretical models of space-time structures, used in cal­
culating spatial intervals, will progressively lose appli­
cation to the point at which, thirdly, our theories of 
space-time itself lose application in the domain of particle 
physics.
(c) Our examples exhibit a huge range of 'standard units' 
from parsec (order IQlb m) to angstrom (lO'lO m). In 
each context, measurement restricts attention to a small 
number of 'significant figures', in decimal terms. Each 
decimal step may be considered as marking an 'order of 
magnitude' in terms of the chosen unit. Regarded as 
setting limits to regions of theoretical attention, these 
'orders of magnitude' can be interpreted in terms” of the 
C-theoretical notion of C-scale, associated with that of 
'proper enclosure'. Their actual quantitative expression 
in decimal terms must be supposed to have biological origins 
they obtain independently of whether or not the units used, 
or the mathematics of computation, have a decimal structure. 
The notion can be generalised, by analogy, for all measured 
quantities, unless special theoretical considerations apply.
M. Temperature (Synopsis)
(1) Temperature is taken as typical of a large class
of physical quantities for which no comparison figure is 
recognizable, in terms of the quantity itself, capable of 
generating a marked interval sequence which can be put into 
correspondence with a metric structure. For this class of 
quantities, one or more indicator systems have been deve­
loped such that, by incorporating S-theory, variations of 
some other quantity - usually spatial intervals - for which
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a comparison figure is recognized, can be read as analogues 
of variations in the quantity to be measured. We have 
seen that this principle applies to the measurement of 
length/distance over certain ranges; but temperature seems 
the simplest and most illuminating example of a quantity 
whose measurement calls for the application of this prin­
ciple over its whole range. It is also a quantity asso­
ciated closely with a directly perceived comparison figure 
- that for values of "felt heat, warmth, cold", etc.
But it is argued that what is felt is not temperature, but 
heat gain or loss at the skin surface (important for the 
survival of the organism). Felt warmth etc. do not in 
fact yield an unequivocally transitive ordering with res­
pect to that of measured temperatures. Different methods 
of temperature measurement can, by contrast, be adjusted 
to show transitive orderings with respect to each other 
(within accepted tolerances) over regions of overlap between 
their ranges: a precondition of their being understood as
measuring the same quantity.
(2) The history of temperature measurement is used to
show how increases in the precision of measurement march 
step by step with the development of theory: with theory
always one step ahead, defining what is to count as pre­
cision - and deepening understanding of what thermometers 
measure. The contributions of Boyle, Bernoulli, Charles, 
Gay-Lussac are cited; but the crucial step was the inter­
pretation of heat as a form of energy (Joule), leading to 
that of temperature in terms of thermal equilibrium.
(3) Almost all systems of temperature measurement
rely on setting up thermal equilibrium between the measured 
body and a standard variant linked to visual SIS (scales). 
Standard variants exploit 'thermometric properties' of 
various substances or systems: amongst those cited are:
(a) Expansion systems using liquids, solids (e.g., pairs of 
metal strips in contact), or gases at constant pressure;
(b) Pressure systems using gases measured at constant 
volume ;
(c) Electrical resistivity systems, registering the varying 
resistances of conductors of chosen materials with tempera­
ture;
(d) Electrical potential generated at interfaces between 
different metals;
(e) Change-of-state methods registering relative amounts of 
liquid and vapour in closed systems;
(f) Systems registering the varied magnetic responses of 
paramagnetic salts;
(g) Various methods of registering the frequencies and 
amounts of radiation given off, mainly at visible wave­
lengths, called 'pyrometry'.
Types (e) and (f) have been developed for very 
low temperatures, and (g) for very high temperatures; but 
the other methods overlap over very large ranges.
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The fundamental problem in calibration (construc­
ting standard sets of marked intervals) is that you cannot 
strictly compare intervals at different temperatures. 
Repeated operations generating similar amounts of heat, 
progressively raising the temperature of a measured body, 
is a good procedure, but ultimately not good enough in 
theoretical terms. The same may be said of the search for 
correlations and comparisons between the results of dif­
ferent systems: but assumptions of random deviation have,
of themselves, no sound foundation (see under 'probability', 
below. Section P). Finally, confidence in the validity 
of temperature measurement is to be sought in the coherence 
of the S-theory which is used to explain them. The last 
step cited is Kelvin's interpretation of heat transference 
in terms of the ideal 'Carnot cycle', as it affects the 
understanding of temperature values. All systems can, 
by application of this principle, be shown to be more or 
less in error, and their particular errors assessed 
against the theoretically 'predicted' shapes of phenomena. 
Fortunately the performances of actual gases under method
(b) above are close enough to that of the 'ideal gas' (as 
analysed by Kelvin) to give expression to this confidence 
in practice, over its range from about 2° to 500°K (approx.) 
though the method is not itself practical for general use, 
and is used to check and correct an 'international prac­
tical scale' based on a combination of electrical devices 
(extending from about 90° to 1300^K).
(3) This account is contrasted with KLST's naïve
appeal to "laws of similitude", which reflects their dis­
interest in epistemological concerns. The notion of such 
"laws" is hard to interpret in terms of actual theory, and 
is absent from metrology, which is the practical expression 
of the epistemologist's search for sound foundations in 
measurement theory.
(4) Discussions of measurement beyond the region 2° 
to 1300°K (cryogenics at the lower end, pyrometry and 
astronomical methods at the other) cannot be summarised 
here, in spite of their special interests for C-theory: 
nor can accounts of our understanding of the discrepancies 
between real and ideal gases. It is noted that, once more, 
as we move towards extreme values, direct readings from 
indicators are replaced by the use of mechanical "recog­
nition" systems and marked by increasing use of calculation 
from registered values. Also, since all temperature 
measurement depends on conditions of relatively stable 
thermal equilibrium, all transient temperatures are neces­
sarily obtained by calculated extrapolations within sophis­
ticated theoretical models.
(5) Heat, then, is a form of energy, distinguishable
in practice by its effects on the 'thermometric properties' 
of systems, measured as temperature. It is tempting to 
consider a possible generalisation from this principle.
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according to which all systems of physical measurement 
are specialised ways of recognizing the structures of 
energy in matter, the forms of such recognition being 
restricted by the available means of organizing perceptible 
effects. It is at least clear that all recognition 
involves transfers of energy of some form between a recog­
nized and recognizing system - a point which finds special 
expression in the uncertainty principle of Heisenberg.
These more fundamental aspects will be given further con­
sideration later.
N. Time (Synopsis)
(1) At one level, time appears as a quantity readily 
measurable by a wide variety of indicator systems, which 
provide analogues of what are recognized as intervals of 
time, registered in the form of spatial intervals accor­
ding to the normal principle just exemplified for temper­
ature. At a more profound level, it is a focus of 
(appropriately) perennial metaphysical problems, classi­
cally seen in terms of reconciling the notion of time as a 
continuous flow, with those of instant or duration; or 
with the experience of time as an all-embracing medium, 
through which one appears to move at varying speeds, encap­
sulated in an ever-changing "now", where an ever-receding 
past is never quite invaded by a relentlessly arriving 
future. C-theory is in principle neutral on these deeper 
questions, but our understanding of measurement has rele­
vance to the "now" concept, through its involvement in 
relativistic accounts.
(2) Time plays a dual role in the C-theory of the
structure of recognition: as a quantity measured by the
recognition of associated comparative and metric struc­
tures, used as indicators; and as part of the structure of 
the basic R-theories. To measure time, we must choose,
or build, some regular sequence of events on which we can 
raise the necessary commitments under which it can be adopted 
as structal for the context. Datai intervals are then 
recognized by the approximate coincidence of their end- 
marking events with pairs of events marking the boundaries 
of structal intervals, by virtue of the comparison figure 
adopted for the context, and the associated tolerance 
rules. The events which mark frame boundaries - datai or 
structal - are changes in character-assignments (including 
those of positional characters in various figures). If 
successive structal intervals are to be distinguished, the 
characterizations of their start- and finish-boundaries 
must be different from one another. If there is no 
intrinsic difference - as in the case of atomic oscillations 
- the mark-events must be distinguished by their relations 
to some other, differentiated sequence of frame-marking 
character-changes - such as those generated by a quartz- 
regulated electrically-driven clock, as in the 'atomic 
clock'.
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So, even at this abstract theoretical level, 
recognizable changes within successive frames, not counted 
as frame-changes, are necessary constituents of any com­
parative structure for time (for the récognitive status of 
such changes, see note (e), p.154 ). Such changes are 
to be termed 'T-processes'. An obvious illustration is 
the change of position of the hand of an ordinary clock in 
moving from one minute-mark to the next. A sequence of 
such T-processes characterizing successive m-intervals of 
a structal system for time measurement is to be called a 
standard T-sequence, or STS. Each (least recognized) m- 
interval of an STS is thus bounded from the next by a 
frame-boundary recognized as a shared end-mark. All 
longer structal time-intervals in the same context are 
bounded by pairs of these end-marks, and recognized as 
composed of the set of intervening m-intervals, by analogy 
with spatial SIS. Datai time-intervals are approximated 
to structal intervals of the context, as stated above.
It has proved possible to reconcile this account 
with a wide variety of instantiating contexts. [Inter­
esting special cases like that of archaeological time- 
measurement must be omitted from this synopsis.) Concepts 
of time as a continuous flow or medium, of which m-intervals 
are seen as subdivisions, are shown to belong to S-theore­
tical extrapolation. As with all 'marks' for measurement, 
the 'mark-events' of STS are distinct from the intervals 
they mark, and so do not affect the issue.
(3) Two kinds of T-process have figured largely in
the development of time measurement: natural periodicities,
and mechanical systems. The function of any T-process is 
seen as the 'metering-out' of successive, equal amounts of 
energy in work on repeated operations, as precisely similar 
as possible. Astronomical processes do this, as it were, 
naturally. The important step in mechanical systems is_ 
the production of the 'escapement' (first devised for 
water-clocks in China before 1100 AD): which allows rela­
tively large, energetic systems to be regulated by systems 
of relatively small mass/energy. The resulting process 
is relatively robust with respect to perturbations (which 
affect all such systems more or less). Unlike temper­
ature, and most other 'indicated' quantities, there is no 
indication that repeated operations have different effects 
over different intervals (a factor which is associated 
with the observation that for time, as for space, there is 
no natural resting-place for the metric 'origin').
Until recently, all precise measurement of small 
intervals has used the theory of mechanical systems them­
selves to determine their own standards of precision; 
but now, these too are based on a group of natural periodi­
cities - frequencies of electro-magnetic radiation (EMR). 
Another natural periodicity, the resonances of quartz 
crystals, is used to provide the energy-generating system
335
to which the EMR frequency acts as "escapement". But 
astronomical processes - involving the largest distri­
butions of mass recognizable as belonging to the same 
entities over periods of time - remain the ultimate sources 
of metric standards, even for ’atomic clocks'. The 
second is now defined as 1/31556925.9747 (precisely) 
of the standard 'tropical'year.
It remains to ask what is being measured: 
plainly not the amounts of energy expended in the T- 
processes, which vary so much as between systems. Our 
best answer comes from relativistic accounts (see head (5) 
below).
(4) Conceptual confusions associated with the "spati­
alisation" of time (which, it is argued, are responsible 
for most of the ancient puzzles) are at least partly 
resolved by C-theory. The detail cannot be given here, 
but the main point is that attention to distinctions of 
theoretical level, parallel with those already urged with 
regard to the spatialisation of quantities in general, 
assists the process of understanding. Spatialisation is
a common feature of indicator systems for all physical 
quantities: spatial (e.g., graphic, or analytical) repre­
sentations are also common in association with S-theore- 
tical accounts of all types. Primitively, the Greeks 
just did not have the means to distinguish short intervals 
of time from the spatial distances covered by moving 
objects; nor the 'mark-events' bounding them from the 
physical marks reached or passed.
(5) It turns out that C-theoretical analysis, with
its emphasis on the relativism of recognitions to the 
individual Reader, is well suited to the discussion of 
the epistemology of relativistic accounts - rooted as 
they are in the interpretation of metric recognitions.
The word "accounts" here emphasizes the point that the 
introduction of relativity theory does not affect our 
analysis of the recognition or measurement of time or 
space intervals in any fundamental way. What it does is 
to modify the structure of associated S-theoretical commit­
ments which, at most, may lead us to accept one alter­
native reading rather than another as more precise in a 
particular context. Philosophically, a radical effect
of this modification is its abolition of the absolute 
framework of universal time, and in particular of the 
universal "now".
Sophisticated argument - not readily summarised 
- shows how the literal interpretation of a Reader or 
'observer' as a particular human perceiver can readily be 
generalised, under certain S-theoretical restrictions, in 
terms of metric 'origins' to which structures of EMR 
(typically, light) can be referred in temporal or spatial 
terms, in such a way as to accommodate a Minkowskian 
interpretation. Importance is attached to a formulation
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by MiliE Capek (in Fraser, J.T., ed., 1968) in terms of 
'world intervals' associated with 'world lines': and its
interpretation in an entropie framework, at least for 
macrophysical systems. What emerges, however, is a rela­
tively simple idea: the proposal that what is "metered
out" by T-processes is a structure of intervals of EMR - 
for which the natural frequency-based metric is almost 
obligatory. For a particular 'observer', what count as 
temporal intervals are those of EMR arriving 'successively' 
from what is recognized as "the same source" (or sources 
along the same geodesic line). The notion of energy- 
transfer from 'recognized' to 'recognizing' system (men­
tioned above. Section M(5)) is central to this account. 
Geometry (ultimately relativistic) provides the S-theore- 
tical structure by which spatial intervals are recognized 
in terms of EMR received from different sources at the 
same time. This answer removes some of the fundamental 
questions from the domain of metaphysics.
0. Special Cases in Physical Measurement
(1) The main purpose of this Section is to consider 
real or apparent exceptions to the dominant role in phy­
sical measurement of indicators using marked spatial inter­
vals, as predicted by C-theory. It is emphasized that 
this prediction, which is not absolute, rests only on obser­
vation of the contingent restrictions imposed by the limi­
tations of human perception, and not on fundamental pro­
perties of measured quantities. This accounts, too, for 
the associated dominance of incorporated S-theory.
The cases considered are mass (or weight); 
hardness; and the relationship between types of colour 
measurement and that of frequencies of light.
(2) Mass, or weight, can be measured in many con­
ditions with an equal-arm balance, using the principle 
that for these quantities the measured value of a whole set 
of idents (suitably composed) can be taken equal to the sum 
of the values of the members of the set (space- and time- 
intervals being, almost certainly, the only other quantities 
for which this obtains).
This system is compared with others used for the 
same purpose, but without using this principle: the
sliding-weight balance, the spring balance, and centri­
fuges or oscillators used in the absence of a suitable 
gravitational field. Many factors of interest are invol­
ved, but the main point made is that mass is not recog­
nized perceptually as such, only registered in terms of 
'forces' (natural or artificial) operating on it. (In 
this, it is distinguished from 'weight' - which is con­
sequently- a vague and "impure" concept. The use of the
term 'force' is taken up again in Section Q.) From this
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point of view, it is seen that even the equal-arm balance 
makes use of the equal lengths of its arms to indicate 
equal moments (incorporating a simple S-theory familiar 
to Aristotle). It can thus be most perspicuously ana­
lysed as a special case of the sliding-weight balance, in 
which the standard weights, rather than being slid to 
vary the distance-component of the moment, are constructed 
to give as many distinct values of the mass-component as 
may be practical or necessary in context. The exception, 
however, is real, to the extent that it incorporates the 
’additivity' of mass, and hence of gravitational 'force', 
in its S-theory.
(3) Hardness is often cited (E.G., by KLST, 131) as
a physical quantity whose measurement yields only non­
additive values - sometimes called a system of 'ordinal 
measurement'. Criticism of this concept was given above 
(p.244 ), making the point that where the only relevant 
property of assigned numbers is their order, an alphabet 
would do as well, negating the essential purpose of measure­
ment. This account of hardness measurement rests on 19th- 
century work by Mohs, which could not assign definite 
approximate values to datai samples of materials, and has 
apparently had no practical use (as C-theory would predict).
Systems (not cited in the foundational literature) 
have since been devised, starting at the turn of the cen­
tury, which ^  employ indicator- mechanisms, ^  yield values 
which are effectively additive over short ranges, and are 
used in practical engineering contexts. It has to be 
admitted that the levels of S-theoretical interpretation in 
these contexts are not very sophisticated. Each type of 
instrument covers only quite a narrow range of materials - 
which is generally adequate for practical purposes.
However, quantitative correspondences between the readings 
of different instruments in overlapping parts of their 
ranges are close enough to justify a comprehensive system 
of conversion tables, to two or three significant figures.
The situation is in many ways similar to that of temper­
ature measurement, up to quite a late date. What is missing 
is any S-theoretical development, parallel with those of 
Joule or Kelvin, on the basis of which we could say which 
instrument, of two giving readings for the same set of 
material samples, is the more precise in relation to some 
underlying concept of "what hardness is". But some 
aspects of the subject do seem to suggest lines of advance. 
The variation of hardness with temperature, for instance, 
is quite precisely measurable for some materials, using the 
existing systems. It shows a particular pattern of corre­
lation which closely follows that for the variation of 
hardness with tensile strength. This last correlation is 
precise enough for hardness to be used in some contexts as 
an indicator of tensile strength, where measurement of 
the latter as such is impracticable.
Principal sources have been Dieter (1961) and 
Tweedale (1964).
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(4) (i) Colour measurement is of philosophical interest 
mainly because of debates about whether colour is an 
external, inherent property of objects, or an internal, 
subjective phenomenon or state-of-affairs constituted by 
perception. Criticism is given elsewhere of arguments 
for the first position from ’ordinary language’ (pp. ,
). But these are sometimes backed up by suggestions 
that there is some scientific explanation (not the concern 
of the philosopher) in terms of which, e.g., what we see 
as "red" is identical with, or corresponds to, a uniquely 
describable physical structure or attribute which is 
the same for all objects we see as red. Such suggestions 
are decisively contradicted by the structures of theory 
developed in association with the practice of measurement, 
on the one hand, of colour, and on the other, of properties 
of light as generated by, or reflected from, objects.
The subject is intricate (and might intimidate non-technical 
philosophers), but a selection of simple, bald observations, 
each uncontroversial in its own context, may be enough to 
indicate the indeterminacy of the relationship between 
external stimulus and internal response.
(a) The recognition of spectral colours is irrelevant for 
the recognition or measurement of frequencies of light -
a black-and-white photograph of a spectrograph reading 
contains all the information required.
(b) The colour associated with any given frequency can be 
matched exactly in an indefinitely large number of ways, 
including many using little or no radiation at that fre­
quency.
(c) The great majority of colours actually recognized 
are not associated with single pure frequencies, but with 
mixtures of many frequencies; and any such colour can be 
(ideally as well as practically) matched by an indefinitely 
large number of mixtures of different frequencies.
(d) The validity of experimental results and systems of 
measured tests carried out with systems of colour analysis 
or reproduction is not critically dependent on any theory 
of human colour vision: and, in any case,
(e) while the physical analysis of retinal response to 
light of different frequencies provides us with an S- 
theoretical account of colour vision, colour as such does 
not enter into the associated investigation.
The essential point is that human colour vision 
depends on the relative responses to light of three sets 
of cells in the retina; each set responds to a wide range 
of frequencies, without differentiation except in terms of 
the total electrical response of that set. That is why 
we can say that precisely the same colour can be experienced 
as the effect of responses to an indefinitely large 
number of different frequency-combinations, provided the 
total response elicited from each set of cells is the same: 
"pure" spectral colours can be mimicked as well as any 
others.
This is the basis of colour reproduction, e.g. 
by photography or television. Such systems make use of
339
sets of 'primary colours' (or 'complementaries') - chosen 
entirely with regard to the practicalities of each par­
ticular system. As we have seen, our own colour responses 
make no use of primary colours: their distribution over
the visual band is also far from well-balanced - which is 
why in general yellows "look brighter" than blues.
(ii) When we turn attention from measurements of
light-frequencies or retinal responses to attempts to 
measure values of colour itself, we find again that the 
most empirically adequate representations appear as three- 
dimensional. But the three "dimensions" are quite dif­
ferent from those of the trichromatic analyses we have been 
speaking of: typically they are 'hue'; 'lightness' (or
'value'); and 'chroma' (or 'saturation'). Values are 
obtained by visual comparison between datai and standard 
samples, the latter themselves the products of subjective 
comparisons by panels of judges. Different systems are 
used in different contexts, but most are now based on an 
analysis by the painter A.H. Munsell in 1907, which employs 
a range of 100 standard 'hues', constructed on the prin­
ciple of 'least noticeable differences' at similar values 
of lightness and chroma. This principle is familiar in 
schemes of psychological quantification; being explicitly 
acknowledged to be founded on subjective reports, it is 
clear that the Munsell test is indeed such a scheme. 
Questions concerned with how far such schemes are properly 
classed as 'measurement' in the same theoretical sense as 
physical measurement are left for Section R. Here, we 
note only that the values are in no sense "additive". No 
mathematical operations can be significantly carried out
on them. They are effectively no more than catalogue 
index numbers.
(iii) The relevance of these considerations to the
fundamental question mentioned at the start of this sub­
section (4) is not so simple to analyse. There seems 
little doubt that the consciousness by which we recognize 
colours as characters of particular idents outside the body 
is located in the brain. This consideration applies, of 
course, to our recognitions of any properties whatever of 
external objects, or of these objects themselves, by any 
sensory means:, it is not a peculiarity of colour. C- 
theory has little to add, beyond asking the question: if
we can extrapolate the position and boundary of the back
of a house by virtue of what we recognize of its front, 
why not the position and boundary of the front also?
(The main sources for this subsection are 
Cornwell-Clyne (1951) and Pirenne (1967).)
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P. Probability
(i) Theoretical structure and general principles
A substantial part of the literature on this 
subject proceeds on the supposition that, since relatively 
reliable assessments of the probabilities of certain types 
of events can be reached on the basis of empirical obser­
vations, it is proper to regard such assessments as a form 
of measurement, and probability itself as a measured quan­
tity.
This supposition is a feature of two clearly 
distinguishable approaches, sometimes adopted together: 
a pragmatic approach, which points to the existence of 
many contexts associated with counting or measurement in 
which numerical values assigned to probabilities prove 
empirically adequate within tolerable limits; and the 
search for a rigorous, typically formalised articulation 
of the logic or syntax of statements about probabilities, 
in a way which yields numerical representations. The 
first approach concerns itself primarily with the mathe­
matical theory involved in methods of calculating proba- 
bility-values of complex states of affairs from those of 
simple events. In the second, philosophers have sought 
to elucidate the notion of probability as a rational con­
cept, by showing what logical or syntactic properties 
probabilistic statements are to have, if they are to 
satisfy the axioms of a mathematical theory. My analysis
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will suggest that each of these approaches tends to 
obscure an important distinction in theoretical level 
between measurement and the assessment of probability.
Since this proposal places such assessment outside the 
main scope of this study, I shall not discuss the logic 
or mathematics of theories of probability, except in the 
most general terms. However, probability theory is closely 
bound up with many contexts of measurement, where it is 
commonly associated with the theoretical treatment of 
statistics - the line between the two concepts being 
variously drawn. In such contexts it can be regarded as 
a precondition, not of measurement, but of successfully 
calculated extrapolations from measured values. A con­
ceptual analysis will therefore be given in which the 
relationship in different contexts of probability between 
different theoretical levels, as understood in C-theory, 
will be indicated.
The essential principle of this analysis is 
that probability is an abstract, relational property of 
pairs or larger sets of theoretical models: possible
structures of extrapolation, from partial evidence, under 
the relevant theory of the context. "Possibility", 
here, is understood in terms of consistency with the 
commitments of a theory. This property of probability 
is understood in terms of strengths of commitment to 
alternative extrapolations; and to take numerical, in 
some sense"objective", values only where the relevant 
theory yields, by extrapolation under its commitments.
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clearly articulated alternative models, for which equal 
(or rationally assessed) relative weights, or strengths 
of commitment, are adopted. It will be argued that the 
resulting account is both simpler and more unified over 
the whole field, without sacrificing rigour; at the same 
time raising little or no essential conflict with estab­
lished probabilistic or statistical theory, except in 
the analysis of theoretical levels and the consequent 
epistemological indications.
The concept of probability has generated some 
confusion amongst philosophers and other analysts; not 
only over the question whether or not it is a measurable 
quantity, but also over (a) how many kinds or categories 
can be distinguished, and on what terms, and (b) the re­
lated question, what kinds of entities or structures are 
the objects of assessment for probability. Under head
(b), Brian Ellis lists "events, states of affairs, theories, 
propositions, etc." as amongst possible objects for 
assessment (1966, p. 165). His "etc." might have inclu­
ded such entities as values, errors, or statistical devia­
tions, whose probabilities are often assessed in prac­
tical contexts. Under head (a), we can, I suggest, 
assimilate most available typologies in terms of three 
vague categories: (1) intuitive, non-quantitative, or
subjective probability; (2) logical, mathematical, or 
analytic probability (Carnap's probability^); and 
(3) empirical, statistical or synthetic probability 
(Carnap's probability2 , which he identifies with a 'fre­
quency concept' (1950)). Often these different
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categories of probability are thought of as relating 
different categories of object. Carnap, for example, 
considered his probability^ (P^) as governing propositions, 
and his probability2 as a theory of the relative
frequencies of specified types or classes of events; but 
he also felt the need to distinguish a theory of esti­
mation (of values of quantities), based on his analysis 
of his P^ (op.cit., and Schilpp, 1963, p. 74). Some 
current analyses assume that all categories of objects of 
probability-valuation can. be reduced to events, on which 
a set-theoretical algebra can be constructed (e.g. KLST, 
pp. 199 ff.). But this term requires very broad inter­
pretation, if all or most contexts in which a notion of 
probability is invoked are to be covered. I shall try 
to show in due course how some of these different approaches 
can be reconciled with a single account of probabilistic 
contexts, without any loss of rigour in the analysis of 
the particular types of context described under these 
special categories. But first I must give a fuller 
analysis of probability in the terms of C-theory itself.
1 propose the following semi-formal definition 
of a unified concept of probability, based on a prior 
definition of a structure of extrapolative models with 
respect to any (G)R-theory (where '(G)R-theory' may refer 
either to a GR-theory, or to the R-theory of a single 
Reader, whether or not it forms part of a GR-theory).
For simplicity of exposition I shall define the proposed 
structure with respect to the state of a given (G)R-theory 
at a given frame of its R-sequence, leaving it to be
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understood that, as with (G)R-theories in general, the 
commitments of the theory and its associated models may 
change over time with the ’state-of-the-theory' (above, 
p.149 ).
PI. (i) By an extrapolative set (E-set) of E-models
with respect to a (G)R-theory ©, we are to under­
stand a set 0^ = £ E^*^, . . . having at least 
two members, and satisfying the following conditions:
(a) Each E^ ’^ e 0^  has a theoretical structure to 
a s e t S ^ ’^  of entities; a set of proper­
ties; an assignment function 6^ ’^ ; a logic 
identical with that of©; a consistent set of 
theoretical commitments defined on the elements 
5  of idents and C* of characters in©; and a
frame-sequence structure defined on that of 0.
X k(b) S ’ is a non-empty set, each of whose members is
either an ident of S, or an entity not in 5.
X kcalled an X-ident, whose existence for E ’ is
X kextrapolated under a commitment of E * .
(c) is a set, having at least two members,
each of which is either a character of C, or
a property not in C  called an X-character,
X kwhose existence for E * is extrapolated under 
a commitment of E^ ’^ .
(d) Each E^*^ of 0^ may be called a possible model,
or structure of extrapolation, under 0; and
X keach member x of an E-model E * is assigned 
a unique subset of given by 0^*^(x,i) for
each frame F  ^ for which x exists.
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V
(ii) An E-set © under a theory 0 is an alternative 
E-set (AE-set) iff the commitments of the 
members of © are such that no two such members 
are logically consistent with one another.
(iii) Probability is an abstract valuative property 
(the. term ’valuative’ being used analogously 
with its use for characters in R-theories) 
whose values, called p-values, may be assigned, 
by any Reader /? of the L-group adopting©,
(a) to the members of any AE-set 0 of 0 , so
X kthat the p-value p(E * ) of each such member 
E^>^ for R  is to reflect the strength of ’s 
commitment to the particular structure of extra­
polation from 0 which E^*^ represents; or
(b) by virtue of assignments under (a), to 
any simple or compound assignment determined
by any member or members of 0 . (By ’compound’ 
assignment is meant any structure of conjunctions 
or disjunctions of simple assignments of the form 
P 6 9^ ’^ (x,i) or negations of the form 
P ^ 0^*^(x,i). For considerations affecting 
the assignments of p-values under (a), or 
relationships between such assignments and those 
under (b), see notes below.)
(iv) The following relations are introduced, as an
exhustive set in this analysis, on pairs of p-
X 2values of E-models or assignments in (9 ) ; to 
be understood, by analogy with récognitive
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valuation, as reflecting the judgments of the 
relevant Reader(s) as indicated: 
p(E^*^) >  p(E^’^ ), as reflecting the judgment 
that p(E^'i) is greater than p(E^’^ ) (taken to 
be logically equivalent to p(E^*^)< p(E^’^ )); 
p(E^*^) ^  p(E^’^ ), called ambivalence, as 
reflecting indecision by R  as to the relative 
strengths of commitment involved; and 
p(E^’ )^ = p(E^’^ ), as reflecting F's accord of 
equal strength of commitment.
The relations are taken to be in
principle to be determined for all AE-sets for 
which p-values are assessed; the first two 
being asymmetric and transitive for each Reder.
is taken to be symmetric for each Reader, but 
is not assumed transitive in the general case.
= is undetermined in the absence of additional 
special commitments, to be discussed in note
(e) below.
(v) An AE-set 0 ^  of 0 is closed (and called a CE-set) 
iff all cases where no member of 0 holds are 
neglected under the commitments of 0 and 0 .
An AE-set which is not closed is open and called 
an OE-set. It will be assumed that the p-value
Y
of a (simple or compound) assignment a is that 
of a disjunction of the set E^(a) of all E-
y
models in which it holds; and that, when 0 is
y
a CE-set, the p-value of the negation of a is
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that of a disjunction of the complement of 
E^(a) in 0^. In an OE-set, the p-values of 
negations are not in general determined.
Notes
(a) The assignment of p-values in any context will 
be called p-valuation. Any terms not explicitly defined 
above are to be understood in the sense defined for GR- 
theories in Section G , pp. 174 ff.
(b) For simplicity, I shall consider in the notes 
which follow only the structures of relative p-valuation 
of models and assignments for a single frame F  ^ of the 
(G)R-theory (but see note (f) below).
(c) This is an explicitly psychological account of 
probability, but psychological in exactly the same way as 
are the C-theoretical accounts of recognition and measure­
ment. So, although it is acknowledged that the p-valu- 
ation of any AE-set by any Reader is dependent on psycho­
logical factors unique to that Reader and context, varia­
tions due to these factors may in many contexts be neglec­
ted in an analysis of the valuation under an appropriate 
metatheoretical description. Like the C-theoretical 
account of recognition, this expresses a fundamentally 
empirical observation respecting the actual behaviour of 
people in the relevant contexts.
(d) Following the proposed analogy with récognitive 
valuation (Condition (iv) above) I shall assume that the
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simplest and most fundamental forms of p-valuation for E- 
models or assignments are not numerical, or readily pro­
vided with a significant numerical representation - any 
more than are our commonsense, unmeasured judgments about 
the relative sizes of animals or weights of rocks. Our 
means of judging relative p-values are fundamentally intro­
spective rather than perceptual (even where they are con­
cerned with extrapolations for recognizable elements), 
and are thus less commonly decisive than those for récog­
nitive valuation, except in special cases: some of which
are considered in the next note.
On the same principle, I shall not suppose that 
they typically determine a unique, unequivocal order over 
the whole of any particular AE-set or its associated 
assignments. Thus the relation of 'ambivalence',6 ,  is 
intended to reflect large class of cases in which a Reader 
is unable to decide between the relative strengths of 
commitment appropriate to a given pair of E-models or 
assignments. (The class may include cases which are 
considered in standard analyses under the head of 'indif­
ference' . But any commitment to transitivity for such 
a relation seems to me to call for additional special 
conditions which I shall not explore, apart from the 
special case of equiprobability below.) No general 
rules hold as between p-values assigned by different 
Readers; the fact that two people disagree about the 
relative p-values within an AE-set does not in general 
lead us to say that they are operating different theoretical
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contexts, nor that their views are logically inconsistent 
(there is nothing that one holds unequivocally true and 
the other false).
Two assumptions of general interest do, however, 
remain plausible even under the very weak conditions I 
have supposed for the general case. The first is the 
transitivity of the relations >, <, reflecting unequivocal 
judgements of relative p-value by the individual Reader.
The second can be expressed as the principle that the p- 
value of a disjunction of a set of E-models is in some 
sense the same as the combined p-values of the members of 
the set. In the absence of numerical values we cannot 
speak of the "sum": though this interpretation becomes
available wherever numerical values can be assigned.
Both the above assumptions can, however, be given clearer 
meaning in the simple and common case where each member 
of an AE-set extrapolates a single, simple assignment: 
for example, alternative weather forecasts for a particular 
time and place. In such a case, it seems immediately 
rational to equate the p-value of each assignment with 
that of the E-model in which it holds (the epistemolo­
gical significance of the E-model being that it provides 
the theoretical commitment under which the assignment 
holds). The transitivity of > , <  on p-values can in 
such cases be simply transferred from the set of E-models 
to the set of assignments (in a way which would not be 
possible for simple assignments which are components of 
compound assignments associated with E-models). Also,
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the p-value of a disjunction of assignments can be assumed 
to be that of the combined p-values of the separate 
assignments. In conditions where the AE-set can be 
taken as closed (A CE-set, under condition (v) above), 
this conclusion can be given even clearer meaning; in 
that the p-value of the negation of any disjunction of a 
set of assignments is that of a disjunction of all the 
remaining assignments. This can be given its sharpest 
meaning for ordinary intuitive contexts in the observation 
that the p-value of the negation of any one of a closed 
set of alternative assignments is that of a disjunction 
of all the others; especially where one assignment is 
taken to be clearly more probable than all others put 
together (in which case the other p-values can, often, 
be neglected).
It remains important to note that the notion of 
the negation of an assignment, excluded by C-theory as 
a form of direct recognition, is also permissible here 
precisely where, and only where, it is adopted as a con­
sequence of the commitments of the theory as applied to
other, positive assignments of the context.
Where E-models determine compound assignments
X
we may suppose that any one simple assignment a (of the
y
typical form P e 6 (x,i)) may hold in more than one E- 
model as an element in a conjunction. In such a case, 
the p-value of this assignment may plausibly be supposed
the same as the combined p-values of all the E-models of
y y
the set E (a) in which it holds. But a may hold in two
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models and E^*^ such that p(E^*^) >  p(E^’^ ) - so
that no simple relationship exists between the p-values
of all assignments of 0 and those of its E-models. We
X X  Xmay nevertheless reasonably hold p(a ) >  p(b ) 4-+ p(E (a))
>p(E^(y), and similarly for (so long as neither 
assignment is involved in a disjunction in any model, in 
which case the relationship is unclear). Sense can also 
be given to the p-values of some negations where 0^ is 
closed. The more complex the AE-set, and the ambi­
valences or disjunctions of assignments in models it 
involves, the less clear is the meaning to be given to 
such formulations. The lines between confusion, guess­
work and rational judgment seem impossible to draw, the 
only clear distinctions being, on this view, those indi­
cated in note (e) below.
But first, a simple illustration may help to 
clarify what has been said so far. Suppose that in a 
simple language of weather forecasting only the following 
characterizations of weather are assignable to a parti­
cular region at a particular time: s = sunshine, r = rain,
n = snow, f = fog, c = cloud, excluding cases r,n, and f.
A probabilistic theory using such a language constitutes 
a CE-set iff all forms of weather-forecast are either 
forced into these categories or left out of account. If 
not (the OE-set case) it makes sense, for example, to 
set (for a particular place and time) p(r) >  p(n) and 
p(c) >  p(r) - whence p(c) >  p(n); but not to say, "It 
will probably be cloudy", if what is meant is that
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p(c) >  p(s or r or n or f) ; since we have not ruled out 
the possibility that, say, hail, which has not been 
classified, might either attract a greater strength of 
commitment on its own, or, together with other conditions, 
provide a disjunctive alternative which would tip the 
balance of commitment. For the closed case, we must 
suppose that all assignments such as that of hail are 
either forced into one of the chosen categories (say, 
rain or snow), or considered so rare as to be properly 
excluded from our forecasting theory. In such a theory 
there is some sense in a forecast of cloud as more 
probable than all the others put together; but it remains 
a somewhat vague and intuitive theory, corresponding 
rather to the oracular pronouncements of a weatherwise 
old shepherd than to a public weather forecast. If 
such a forecast were to be printed in a newspaper, we 
would have a right to suppose that it is based on a well- 
articulated and sophisticated system using numerical p- 
values based on accurately measured observations, of 
pressure, temperature, wind-speed, etc., within which 
strengths of commitment to a wide variety of complex con­
ditions can be clearly expressed and assessed. Some 
possible preconditions for numerical p-valuation will now 
be considered.
(e) In spite of the similarities between p-valuation
and récognitive valuation which have been invoked above, 
there is one aspect of the theoretical structures involved 
for which the analogy crucially breaks down, when we come 
to consider questions of the significance of numerical
353
values, or even determinate order. In récognitive valu­
ation, we found that determinate orderings were available 
only for specially constructed standard sets, with respect 
to which approximate sets could be assembled into asso­
ciated clusters for each standard value: numerical
values being confined to metric structures for which addi­
tional stringent conditions were imposed. Plainly, none 
of these structures are available for the valuation of 
strengths of commitment to E-models or their associated 
assignments. (Constructions involving 'standard distri­
butions' are themselves probabilistic systems of extra­
polation, of quite different theoretical status. Some 
of the epistemological considerations raised will be dis­
cussed in due course.)
There is, however, one very simple and common 
form of probabilistic context in which numerical p-valu­
ation can be given precise and plausible meaning, and 
which will be our point of departure for the discussion 
of all such p-valuation. It is closely associated with 
systems of récognitive valuation (calling for extreme 
care by the epistemologist to distinguish the levels of 
theory involved). This is the variously exemplified 
class of contexts where extrapolations consist of distri­
butions of finite sets of values of particular V-charac- 
ters as assigned to a finite set of idents. It includes 
cases with only one ident, but at least two characters - 
such as the guess whether the coin under my hand shows 
head or tail: and indefinitely complex cases. Our
354
earlier analysis and discussion of V-characters shows 
that the notion is extremely versatile, since it covers, 
as defined, virtually all cases of alternative assign­
ments amongst a range of possible characterizations under 
a (G)R-theory. Extrapolative assignments of values of
such characters in the manner set out above will auto­
matically satisfy the conditions for an AE-set, in that 
just one value may be assigned to each ident for each 
frame. Cases in which this is taken to be a CE-set 
include (1) some in which values are in principle recog­
nizable as directly assigned to each ident for each frame, 
like the marked values on the faces of a conventional die; 
and (2) some in which approximate values are extrapolated 
for the members of an approximate set by virtue of their 
supposed positions in a suitable comparison figure (D12, 
p. 134 ) - including the case of a metric data set (K3, 
p. 251). (Distributions of values in standard sets, 
including metric structal systems, are by definition recog­
nized and not extrapolated. The sense in which, in cer­
tain contexts, particular extrapolated values are treated 
as 'standard', cannot be explored at this point.) Similar 
principles can be extended, with care, to cases where 
either X-idents or X-characters are unrecognizable, their 
existence being accepted only under the commitments of 
associated S-theory; provided that an adequate basis for 
numerical p-valuation holds in that theory (as in statis­
tical mechanics).
The simplest basis for numerical p-valuation
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occurs where, in a given CE-set, each assignment of the 
_ X kform P 6 9 ’ (x,i) receives the same strength of commit­
ment as every other (where P is a value or approximate 
value of the relevant V-character or quantity, which may 
involve X-characters; and x ranges over idents and X- 
idents of 0 and ©  ). Some epistemological considerations 
respecting such assessments of equal strength of commit­
ment will be discussed below. Here, we point out only 
that, given such an assessment of equiprobability, it
will result in the accord of equal p-values to each E- 
X kmodel E * giving a complete, distinct distribution of 
assignments of values of the V-character or quantity
amongst idents and frames. Given n members of the CE-
X k 1set, the p-value of each E * is conveniently set at — ;
that of any disjunction of ra different E-models is
naturally assessed as the numerical sum of their p-values,
i.e., and that of their complement in 0^, (i.e.,
1 - ^, the p-value of the disjunction of all members of
X
being unity, so expressing the commitment to closure 
of the CE-set). Further, the p-value of any simple or 
compound assignment consistently derivable in such a 
system can be numerically equated with that of the dis­
junction of just that subset of E-models in which it holds; 
and that of its negation with that of the complement of 
that disjunction. The p-value of any assignment which 
holds in all models is, of course, 1. This account makes 
no explicit appeal to any literal notion of 'frequency*; 
though, of course, there will be many instances in which
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these principles will apply to extrapolations concerning 
the frequency of particular types of event in a system.
But it is difficult to draw a clear line between such a 
literal interpretation and a more figurative notion asso­
ciating the p-value of a pattern of assignment with "how 
often it occurs" in the theoretical structure of E-models; 
suggesting that any such notions can be somewhat liberally 
applied.
Patterns of probabilistic extrapolation of this 
general form, and many forms constructed by mathematical 
developments or modifications of it, are commonly asso­
ciated with patterns of R-theoretical readings by counting 
or measurement, such that both observational readings 
and structures of extrapolation are adopted in common by 
large L-groups sharing long-established contexts of 
theory - though individual gamblers may use highly idio­
syncratic systems of this type. The senses in which 
probabilistic systems of this kind may be considered "ob­
jective" will be discussed below.
(f) The broad, and perforce tentative, claim is made
that this account of the way in which the simplest forms 
of numerical p-valuation can be analysed in terms of 
relative strengths of commitment to members of CE-sets, 
involving assignments of values of V-characters or quan­
tities, can be extended in principle to all forms of such 
p-valuation which can themselves be analysed as develop­
ments, extensions or modifications of this form. One 
simple development which can be briefly mentioned is that
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that in which conjunctions of assignments of values of 
two specified quantities are extrapolated for a single 
set of idents; or similarly for X-characters or X-idents. 
If it is supposed under the commitments of © that, for 
each assignment of a value of each of the quantities to 
an ident, an equiprobable set of E-models exists in each 
of which one value of the other quantity is assigned 
to the same ident, then the total number of E-models is 
the product of the number of values assigned for each of 
the two quantities; and the p-value of a conjoined 
assignment of a value of each quantity to an ident is 
the product of the p-values of each assignment taken 
separately. The effect of specified restrictions on 
such a structure can often be given mathematical expres­
sion which reflects the commitments of the empirical 
theory of the context. Again, a simple modification of 
the simple case analysed above is one in which E-models 
are given unequal p-values designed to reflect the 
commitments of the (G)R-theory with respect to certain 
factors supposed to affect the R-theoretical readings 
on which the extrapolations are raised: these factors
being represented by numerical coefficients or 'weightings* 
so chosen that the total of all p-values remains unity, 
and all or most of the above conditions hold as for the 
equiprobable case, given care in the mathematical treat­
ment .
Moreover, recalling that the analysis so far 
has been restricted to systems of extrapolation for single
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frames of a (G)R-sequence, there seems no reason why 
extensions of these principles to extrapolations for 
sequences of two or more frames should not be given 
similar analysis in terms of strengths of commitment to 
E-models. These may include cases where mathematical 
expression can be given to the effect of chosen restric­
tions, excluding certain conjunctions of successive 
assignments for successive frames, associated with the 
C-theoretical concept of 'events' determining frame 
changes.
Something must also be said about proposals, 
first associated with the work of Ramsey, for numerical
I
valuations reflecting judgments of probabilities, by 
individuals or groups, in contexts where no basis exists 
for commitments to equiprobability or specific weightings 
on the lines just discussed. Such projects can be 
approached in two ways: first, as an account of what
should be supposed rational assessment of probabilities, 
independently of the vagaries of individual judgment; 
second, as an attempt to quantify (in the numerical sense) 
the actual strengths of commitment of individual Readers 
in particular empirical cases. In the terms of this 
study, the first approach would be seen as an introduction 
of fresh systems of commitment, over and above those 
involved in actual determinations of probability in prac­
tice, as to the structure of probability as a rational 
concept - which would be beyond our present scope. The 
second, on the other hand, must be classified as a form
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of psychological "measurement": a topic which will be
considered (in synoptic form only) under the head of 
non-physical quantification in Section R below.
No further analysis can be given here of pos­
sible developments or modifications; but it is hoped 
that enough has been said to give at least prima facie 
support to the tentative claim at the start of this note.
Before discussing the relevance of this analysis 
to some earlier accounts of probability, I want to draw 
attention to a few general points which will assist in 
this discussion.
(1) In the many cases in which E-models are so con­
structed that p-values are closely associated mathe­
matically with the numerical structures of the systems of 
idents and characters involved in the context (whether the 
results of counting, measurement, or calculated from such 
results), there is an insidious danger of conceptual con­
fusion about these relative theoretical levels. It is 
often convenient, for example, to plot p-values against 
values of the relevant quantities in the same graphic dis­
play. In ordinary contexts it is natural, and usually 
harmless, to regard the derived p-values as 'results' of 
the same kind as those on the basis of which they are 
arrived at. Our analysis draws attention to the need for 
care, in epistemological analysis, to distinguish between 
theoretical levels at which questions of meaning, truth.
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objectivity, etc., may arise.
(2) The aim has been to exhibit the conceptual frame­
work of probability as capable of a unified analysis over
a wide range of applications. So, although it is acknow­
ledged that all p-valuation has a psychological aspect, 
this account of the conceptual framework is taken to be 
independent of any psychological theories of its origins 
in human motivation. Variations due to psychological 
factors are reduced to a minimum for an L-group adopting, 
for whatever reason, a (G)R-theory of objective measure­
ment, with which is associated a probabilistic structure 
of E-models incorporating a well-defined logical and 
mathematical theory. Under this analysis, rather than 
distinguishing three kinds of probability - such as sub­
jective, mathematical and empirical - it is more perspi­
cuous to retain ’probability' as a concept common to all 
kinds of E-model valuation. We may then distinguish, 
on the one hand, psychological theories of the emotional 
drives or forms of subjective bias governing human use of 
this concept; and, on the other, logical and mathematical 
theories used in association with it in particular contexts
(3) It has been assumed that the concept of proba­
bility is definable only within a metatheory of concrete 
contexts, because it is in just such contexts that we 
have reason to form extrapolative commitments to alter­
native models in situations of which we have incomplete 
evidence from perceptual recognition. In the vernacular, 
the word "statistics" is generally used for assemblies of
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numbers derived from empirical investigations involving 
measurement or counting; or to calculations made on 
these numbers, under the commitments either of substan­
tive theory, or of the mathematical theory of associated 
p-valuation. In the present analysis this restricted 
sense appears the best and least equivocal.
(4) The objects to which probability values have
been assigned are E-models, and it has to be admitted that 
these are remote from general usage. But, if this is 
indeed the form of the underlying theoretical structure, 
it may account for the fact that usage, rather than acknow­
ledge this esoteric foundation, has attached the term to a 
wide and potentially confusing variety of objects, deri­
vable in various ways from theoretical models. I have 
pointed to particular sets of alternative assignments as 
the aspects by which alternative E-models are often most 
easily distinguished; and also said something about the 
cases in which pairs of such assignments can be recognized 
or understood as events., In more complex or vaguer cases, 
C-theoretical analysis of R-theories in general (in Part 
II) has provided a basis for reducing all aspects of 
potential E-models to structures of character assignments 
and their associated commitments - which can readily be 
extended to X-characters and the commitments of extrapo­
lative models. States of affairs may be analysed as more 
or less complex systems of assignment involving specified 
sets of idents or X-idents. Assignments, and many rea­
sonably closely-associated structures of related
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assignments, such as events, can be expressed by propo­
sitions (Section G, note (d), p. 186).
Some other objects which have been proposed 
for p-valuation need little modification to permit a 
translation into the language of E-models: for example,
hypotheses (e.g. by Parratt (1961), as one of several 
types); or multivalued implication (e.g. by Reichenbach: 
see references below). These terms plainly refer to
what we should here call alternative theoretical commit­
ments .
(5) The C-theoretical account of measurement leads
to the conclusion that all registered values (i.e., direct 
readings from the relevant comparison figure, as opposed 
to results calculated from these) are derived from 
integral numbers of standard m-intervals - though these 
may be expressed as rational fractions of conventional 
units. Again, the numbers of values actually registered 
in this way are necessarily integral; and the same con­
siderations apply with greater force where the results on 
which extrapolations are raised are arrived at by coun­
ting. Thus probabilistic extrapolations based on such 
registered values rest on an empirical foundation not 
involving irrationals. But note that, since E-models are 
supposed constructed as fictal, not recognized as datai, 
structures, there is no fundamental restriction to finite 
numbers for CE-sets, nor to rational numbers for p-values. 
Equally, since E-models may assign unrecognized X-charac­
ters as well as recognized characters, whether to idents 
or unrecognized X-idents, neither nor has been
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restricted by definition to a finite set. Plainly, 
the assignment of continuously variable p-values, and 
the consequent use of the mathematics of the real numbers 
on such values in terms, e.g., of differentiation or 
limits, is dependent on the extrapolation of infinite 
sets of E-models, or E-models containing infinite sets 
of X-idents or X-characters, and hence of non-measurable 
values of the relevant quantities. In such cases, 
inductive support for the validity of extrapolations may 
involve numerical (not metric) approximations to rational 
numbers which can be compared with measured values.
(6) There are some very exceptional but important
kinds of p-valuation (especially in the field of quantum 
theory) where the conditions for the construction of a 
single CE-set appear to be prohibited, in principle, 
under the overall theory of the context, including the 
associated theory of measurement and extrapolation.
Two main types of extrapolative context, classified accor­
ding to their AE-set structures, may be selected for 
attention here.
(a) Single AE-set,not closed: e.g., in conditions of
indeterminacy, where values of two quantities, say 
position and momentum, may be extrapolated for the same 
set of X-idents, say electrons; but the theory prohibits 
the assignment of values of both quantities to any one 
X-ident in the same (theoretically extrapolated) frame.
(b) Two mutually inconsistent CE-sets: e.g., in the 
measurement of "spin" for subatomic particles, where
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successive readings of what are held to be equivalent 
inputs into the same measuring apparatus [though in dif­
ferent conditions) yield two inconsistent probabilistic 
CE-sets, taken together; but either reading alone gives 
a good probabilistic distribution. The associated S- 
theory forbids, in principle, a means of reconciliation 
or choice between them.
Significantly for us, it is the nature of 
measurement itself - active not passive, theory-bound not 
theory-free - which justifies these theoretical prohi­
bitions. Conditions of either of these types would be 
excluded from our account of coherent structures of extra­
polation, the first as incomplete [or ’open’), the second 
as, at best, equivocal, if the idents and characters 
involved were in principle recognizable. But in these 
cases we are dealing with X-idents or X-characters which 
are wholly extrapolated under the commitments of S-theory, 
and distinct from any idents or characters recognized in 
the R-theoretical system of observation on which they are 
based. They are clearly articulated and inductively 
supported by recognized results in testing and use.
Some doubt must remain, however, as to whether we are 
entitled to regard such incomplete or equivocal accounts 
as coherent descriptions of actual conditions which can 
properly be held true: it seems more appropriate to
speak, with van Fraassen, of ’convenient myths’ on which 
useful extrapolations can be built (1980). Questions 
of this sort must be left for further discussion in Part
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IV; noting here only that any resolution in these cases 
may well depend partly on clear distinctions between the 
theoretical levels at which p-values are assessed and 
extrapolated assignments constructed.
(7) There is a simpler, perhaps more fundamental
sense in which no probabilistic account purports to be a 
true description of actual conditions; namely that any 
such account is an idealisation to which the system des­
cribed is not, in principle, supposed to conform exactly. 
For example, however many times a regular die is actually 
thrown, the occasions when exactly one-sixth of the throws 
yield, say, a six, are comparatively rare. The law of 
large numbers convinces us that perfect coincidence bet­
ween actual throws and our ideal extrapolations is 
approached as a limit with continued repetition, but 
this limit is never, in principle, reached for all rele­
vant outcomes. This being so, inductive support for 
probabilistic theory must appeal to strategies of tolerance 
and neglect which, though based on careful mathematical 
reasoning, differ from those of approximation in measure­
ment (as defined above) both in principle and in theo­
retical level. Thus, the results obtained may be sup­
posed accurate enough for differences between extrapo­
lations and actual conditions to be, in some cases, neg­
lected, and in others assumed with a certain degree of 
confidence to fall within certain limits: these esti­
mations being themselves idealisations based on supposedly 
equiprobable deviations from an ideal standard distribution
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In general, "randomness" as a property of empirical dis­
tributions is a theoretical idealisation:- the distinction 
between randomness and disorder, as a concept associated 
with related phenomena, was emphasized by Carnap (e.g., 
in Schilpp, 1963, p. 76), though without marking any dif­
ference in theoretical status.
(8) There are at least two senses, to be carefully
distinguished, in which objectivity can be attributed to 
probabilistic accounts: first, the sense of intersubjec­
tivity, associated with the strategy of creating conditions 
for p-valuation in which possible vagaries of individual 
judgment are eliminated as far as possible; second, the 
sense in which it may be supposed that such an account 
describes actual conditions involving real entities and 
properties. Objectivity in the first sense can be 
readily attributed to all cases of numerical p-valuation 
which are inductively well-supported (the sense of ’induc­
tion' here will be further explored in Part IV). The 
conditions may also be partly satisfied by less rigorously 
articulated forms of extrapolation based on common-sense 
understanding of regular patterns of behaviour, for 
example in natural kinds or artefacts: but the line here
is hard to draw. The second sense of objectivity may 
perhaps be extended beyond extrapolations of recognizable 
events like throws of dice to include, say, the unobserved 
molecules of classical statistical mechanics. But our 
analysis suggests it must be withheld from some of the 
extrapolated entities or properties constructed in
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incomplete or equivocal S-theories.
There may be a further sense in which E-models 
themselves may be thought of as having objective existence, 
along with their associated propositions; but not, in 
the absence of further theory, the strengths of commitment 
accorded to them. Such questions must be left open here.
(ii) Critical comparisons with other analyses
1. The general line of this discussion will be not
merely that, with few exceptions of detail, existing 
theoretical treatments of probability can be reconciled 
with the above account; but that many of the conceptual 
frameworks they use can only be given clear meaning within 
a metatheoretical structure of the kind there described.
In the case of Carnap, almost certainly the most influen­
tial writer on this subject in recent times, a great 
deal of the work has been done for me by Kemeny, who 
produced a formal structure, in collaboration with Carnap 
himself, for the latter's concept of 'degree of confir­
mation', or 'probability^' (P^). (See Schilpp, 1963, 
pp. 711 ff., and Carnap's broadly approving comments, 
ib., pp. 75, 974-80). Carnap's own main centre of 
interest in this context has been the construction of a 
logic of induction, on the basis of a concept of confir­
mation (for hypotheses, whose theoretical status is 
almost self-evident). It was therefore left to Kemeny 
to explore more deeply the possible formal (and meta­
theoretical) structure which such a concept might generate
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at the level of the hypotheses themselves. What 
emerged was the analysis of 'hypothesis’ and 'evidence' 
as elements of a system of wff. (well-formed formulae of 
a formal language), each identified with the set of 
models in which they are true (op.cit., 721). Models 
are defined, for this purpose, as semantic interpretations 
of a specified formal language, to which probabilistic 
weights may be assigned: the measure of each wff. being 
the sum of the weights of all models in which it is true 
(ib., 717). It is made clear that the formal language 
(or logistic system) under consideration is intended to 
be a scientific language, assumed to be "fully or in part 
empirically interpreted" (ib., 715): so that the whole
analysis is placed in the context of a scientific theory 
(though Kemeny's discussion indicated that the word 
'scientific' may be very widely interpreted: the emer­
gent principles are intended to hold for quite ordinary 
contexts, like "rain tomorrow", as well as Einstein's Field 
Equations). Indeed this empirical reference seems a 
necessary condition for the analysis to contribute to a 
logic of induction. We are plainly already close to my 
own style of analysis, but a number of loose ends need 
tying up.
Though Carnap himself uses the same formal style 
as Kemeny, the notion of 'models' is subordinated by him 
to that of 'state-descriptions' of the relevant language, 
which are in turn (eventually) reduced to systems of 
'families of predicates' (such that for each individual
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exactly one of each family holds). Although the reduction 
can be interpreted for C-theory in terms of propositions 
referring to assignments (concrete or extrapolated under 
S-theory), there is here a strong tug back towards the 
notion of probability as a property of sentences, which, 
although certainly a permissible reading of the formal 
system, tends to obscure the vital connection with the 
theoretical models in which the sentences (which may be 
extremely complex) may be embedded. Kemeny seems much 
clearer than does Carnap that sense can only be made of 
these families of predicates and their degrees of confir­
mation, in a context of fully understood theory in which 
'hypothesis’ and 'evidence' possess defined status, in a 
system of comprehensive and coherent models.
2. There is, indeed, a fruitful zone of confusion
around the question of what sorts of relation are supposed 
to hold between hypothesis 'h ' and evidence 'e ' in the 
Carnap-Kemeny system. The m-functions from which proba­
bilistic weights are derived are defined in terms of num­
bers of models in which both h and e have definite truth- 
values; as befits propositions of a formal logical lan­
guage. No formal restrictions are placed on the inter­
pretations of h or e, beyond their being defined as well 
formed formulae of the language in which models are con­
structed. Clearly, then, their distinct interpretations 
as hypothesis and evidence, respectively, must have some 
connection with their status in empirical interpretation. 
But it is not clear what this connection is. It seems
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plausible to claim that all examples offered in the Carnap- 
Kemeny account can be given a C-theoretical interpretation 
in which e refers to an assignment (or complex structure 
of assignments) under récognitive theory, while h refers 
to one of a number of alternative (structures of) assign­
ments extrapolated in a set of E-models constructed under 
some overall S-theory of the context. But, as far as I 
can see, nothing approaching this degree of explicitness 
occurs in the literature which has grown up around that 
account. Indeed, in answer to critics, Carnap has 
acknowledged that his earlier specifications in terms of 
’degree of confirmation’ or 'rational belief' are "vague 
and ambiguous"; offering in their place (or in further 
explanation) three other alternative formulations, in 
terms respectively of a fair bet, estimation of relative 
frequency, or rational calculation of utility (ib., 967). 
But, apart from remaining somewhat vague, these do not 
together make up a very coherent account of the notion of 
the probability of a hypothesis with respect to evidence, 
let alone of how we are to distinguish 'hypothesis' or 
'evidence' among the wff. of a 'logistic system'. (I 
am using single quotes to mark Carnap's technical terms; 
double to identify direct quotations.)
That this confusion is not confined to myself 
is amply confirmed in the literature. Reichenbach took 
the natural meaning of confirmation of hypothesis by evi­
dence to be that, if h logically implies e, and e is 
verified, h is (to some extent) probable; an inference
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which he attributes to "some logicians" (Neyman, ed., 
1945-6, p. 15; Carnap’s system stems from work in 1941). 
The theory of probability, he said, knows no such infer­
ence. Indeed, Carnap’s system employs neither this nor 
any other appeal to implication, other than the defined 
consequence that if e implies h, the probability (P^) of 
h on e is 1. This is logically equivalent to the state­
ment that in every ’permissible model’ where e is true, 
h is true, so that the definition is derivable from that 
of the ’model-function’; it tells us no more about the 
categories of evidence and hypothesis or their theoretical 
relationship. Reichenbach himself proposed a version in 
which probability is analysed in terms of many-valued 
implication; a concept to which he gives an interesting, 
weak form of axiomatisation under which his frequency 
principle is defined as a special case (ib., 1-2). This 
is also an early - perhaps the first - account which 
takes the objects of p-valuation to be classes of events, 
whose relations of inclusion define the implicative 
relations between associated sentences; most current 
accounts treat of ’event-sets’ in much the same way. From 
this he develops a probabilistic logic for sentences, 
pointing out that this can be interpreted under the fre­
quency principle "by the device of counting sentences 
about events instead of counting events" (ib., 6 ff.).
How he understands his notion of probabilistic implication 
is perhaps best expressed thus: "We shall not claim that
the individual assertion is true; we shall assert it in
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the sense of a posit ... A posit is a statement with 
which we deal as true although we have no knowledge about 
its truth ... The probability appears as a rating of the 
posit, which we call its weight." (his emphases, ib., 
p. 17). Though this notion is given clearest expression 
in the frequency interpretation, he claims that it is 
also defined for the more general case by his system of 
probabilistic logic (ib., 18). It may plausibly be 
claimed that this account can be given its clearest inter­
pretation in contexts of empirical theory as analysed above, 
and that there is here a considerable area of agreement 
with the C-theoretical account. Carnap seems not to 
have reacted at all to this notion of Reichenbach's,to 
whom he attributes only a form of what he calls the "fre­
quency theory".
Popper seems to have conducted a running paper 
battle with Carnap over the nature of probability and 
confirmation (which he equates with his own notion of 
'corroboration'). Carnap complains that he and Kemeny 
have repeatedly sought to explain to Popper just what 
they mean by these terras, without success (Schilpp, op. 
cit., pp. 995 ff.). Undoubtedly any problems caused by 
the admitted vagueness and ambiguity of the terras were 
powerfully exacerbated by the diametrically opposed views 
of the two men on the subject of induction, in the context 
of which Carnap's account is constructed. Popper fiercely 
rejected what he called "inductivism", and derived his 
notions of probability from an account of scientific
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theories as conjectures. More will be said shortly about 
the resulting analysis.
Brian Ellis also complained of ambiguity in 
Carnap's account of the status of evidence in probability 
(1966, pp. 179-80). His complaint is explicitly placed 
in the context of the logical/empirical (analytic/synthe­
tic) distinction which Carnap proposes as the main dif­
ference in theoretical status between his and P2 .
Part of the difficulty arises, I think, because Carnap's 
overriding interest in the relevance of the logical struc­
ture of P^ to induction leads him to neglect almost 
entirely the analysis of P 2 - to which he constantly refers 
simply as 'the frequency theory' - and its relationship, 
if any, to P^. Ambiguity is increased when frequency 
principles are apparently cited as integral parts of the 
definition of P^, as noted above (p. 370; the model- 
function itself is a frequency-based concept). Consider­
ations already noted lead to the view that Ellis is 
fundamentally right in feeling that the discrimination of 
evidence as evidence is intrinsically empirical. In 
Carnap's system, a sentence of the form, "on evidence e, 
the probability of h is p" is analytic (or linguistic- 
conventional) : and it is difficult to see how empirical
contexts are to be understood in these terms.
3. The idea that probability might be thought of as
a measurable quantity, even by analogy, seems to have 
arrived late in the long history of the subject. Brian 
Ellis is the first of the writers so far mentioned to
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consider it in the main context of a theory of measurement 
- which accounts partly for the importance he attaches to 
the concept of evidence. His argument rests on purely 
pragmatic reasoning from demonstrations that numerical 
values can usefully be assigned to probabilities. Although 
he clearly acknowledges the crucial role of theory in 
the assignment of p-values, seeing it as the basis of a 
choice between 'inductive rules and procedures' which in 
effect determine these values in many contexts, he declines 
to offer any theoretical account of p-valuation itself, 
seeming to doubt that one is possible (op.cit., pp. 176,
161) .
Ellis' pragmatic approach is typical of the 
literature where the association of probability with 
measurement is discussed. Neither from the practical 
point of view, nor from that of purely formal analysis of 
the resulting structures, are the crucial epistemological 
questions raised. Practical works on probability, like 
Parratt's (1961), tend to accept p-valuation as measure­
ment, on grounds similar to Ellis', without asking philo­
sophical questions of any kind. Pfanzagl (1971) can 
still write a theory of measurement in which the concept 
of probability appears only in association with wagers 
and subjective utility-judgments. The notion of an objec­
tive system of p-valuation appears here, not as a centre 
of interest, but only as a limiting case where subjective 
assessment is wholly constrained by the physical condi­
tions (as in tossing a coin). On the other hand, KLST,
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writing on the foundations of measurement in 1971, follow 
Ellis' pragmatic reasoning, quoting him with approval 
(p. 201): though they provide a very much more sophisti­
cated formal analysis, involving distinct structures of 
ordering for 'objective' and 'subjective' probability. 
Neither structure shows very close analogies with their 
analyses of orderings for measurement in the ordinary 
sense, and they give no clear account of the relative 
theoretical status of the different kinds of ordering.
One salient difference between p-valuation and 
measurement in C-theoretical analysis is that the entities 
being evaluated - strengths of commitment - offer no 
prospect of understanding in terms of 'incorporated S- 
theory' by which such notions as addition and multipli­
cation of numerical values can be given concrete meaning.
In this they have more in common with structures of 
valuation in non-physical schemes of quantification.
KLST acknowledge that their concept of 'concatenation' - 
on which they construct the relevant operations in the 
analysis of ordinary measurement - cannot be applied here: 
pointing out (correctly, but rather surprisingly) that 
they cannot be applied, for example, in many cases of 
length measurement either - and leaving it at that. It 
may be hoped that the present account offers at least 
some prospect of clearer articulation in these matters.
4. Before concluding this discussion of the proba­
bility literature with a consideration of Popper's position, 
there are two general topics connecting probability with
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measurement on which something more must be said: random­
ness, and the relationship of probability 'space' to the 
space-time of physics. To start with the second, it is 
interesting, for instance, to find A.I. Khinchin, in intro­
ducing the subject of statistical mechanics (1949, pp. vii, 
44 ff.), troubled about the legitimacy of using 'phase- 
space' averages (representing an indefinitely large distri­
bution of values of variables in many dimensions of proba­
bility- ' space ’ involving a number of physical quantities, 
including those of physical space) to replace time-averages, 
in computing extrapolated 'trajectories' of hypostatic 
entities in this space. It is clear, however, that the 
structure of phase-space is entirely probabilistic and 
therefore, if our analysis here is right, metatheoretical. 
Any use, or test, of this type of theory of molecular 
systems in a context of actual measurement involves the 
extrapolation from the measured evidence, using commit­
ments of the theory, of a very large number of unobserved 
(or partially or indirectly observed) X-idents, to which 
complex structures of extrapolated X-characters are 
assigned. Even if time does not appear, as such, in the 
systems of quantities in terms of which these assignments 
are made in the theory, it is clear that the whole basis 
of the theoretical structure rests on an underlying commit­
ment to the random distribution of these assignments over 
time - within the restrictions imposed by the conditions 
of observation.
I have already noted Carnap's insistence on the
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distinction between randomness and disorder, and inter­
preted the distinction for C-theory (p. 219). The status 
of randomness as a theoretical structure, with varied 
applications in probabilistic extrapolation, may be 
obscured by a tendency to regard it as a given physical 
property of particular systems. It is doubtful whether 
even Carnap appreciated this aspect of the distinction. 
Again, Parratt attributes it to the "whim or caprice of 
nature, both in errors of measurement and, in some cases, 
as an inherent characteristic of the measured property" 
(1961, pp. 4, 5). A remark of Campbell's, made in a 
different context, is interesting in this connection.
He says we regard a hand of thirteen trumps of a 'coinci­
dental' result of a 'fortuitous' deal, not because it is 
any less probable than any other 'named' hand, but because 
it is much more probable on the theory that the deal is 
not fortuitous but arranged (1928, p. 263). Two aspects 
of this remark call for comment. First, it points to the 
status of randomness, or the 'fortuitous deal', as one of 
a set of alternative theories, which is itself rendered 
improbable where observed distributions fail to conform. 
Secondly, it is evident that by 'named' hand, Campbell 
means a hand completely specified, except in terms of 
dealing order - temporal sequence being, again, arbitrary. 
This, I suggest, points to an important possible ambiguity 
in the sense of the term 'most probable distribution', 
which may not always be attended to. The description of 
the thirteen-trump hand as not specially improbable, on
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the fortuitous-deal theory, rests on the fact that every 
card of the pack individually named. If we neglect 
this aspect, and attend only to suits, for example, a 
thirteen-trump hand is obviously less probable than a 
hand of either (1) thirteen drawn from any one suit, or
(2) twelve trumps and one of another suit. In a typical 
context of probabilistic physics, such as statistical 
mechanics, findings rest precisely on the condition that 
the ident-elements are neither named nor separately identi­
fied. Their distinguishing space-time characters are 
systematically neglected; they are treated as synonymous 
sets (above, p. 239). This is one of the most important 
uses of the principle of synonymous sets, and helps to 
explain the attention I paid to it, and the so-called 
"Leibniz' Law" by which it is usually justified. It is 
a general feature of theories of random distribution in 
physics, and in many non-physical contexts.
5. Popper's approach to probability starts from
the opposite ground of interest: the structure and
status of the theories in which random distributions are 
posited, and from which p-valuations take their empirical 
meaning. He announces that it is an "elementary conse­
quence" of the mathematical structure that the probability 
of a theory varies inversely with its informational content 
(Schilpp, op.cit., p. 219; and generally in his writings). 
This principle can be fairly precisely translated into 
the language of C-theory if we equate the notion of 'infor­
mational content' with a function of the number of
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alternative sets of E-models, and the number of models 
in each set; such that the inverse of the product of the 
p-values of any set of assignments determines its content- 
value, and the content-value of the theory in any context 
is the sum of those of all its extrapolated assignments. 
This suggests that Popper's principle holds so long as by 
'content' we mean 'extrapolative content*. This will 
clearly be reduced by 'corroboration', i.e., by observed 
readings which (to an accepted tolerance) match values 
previously extrapolated under the theory. If I am 
right to propose the probabilistic assessment of rival 
theories in a context, in terms of the relative amounts 
of the deviations of their observed error-distributions 
from randomness, then increased corroboration will indeed 
increase the "probability" of a theory expressed in this 
way - while reducing its content. But the above analysis 
makes quite clear the difference in status between this 
type of assessment (which should, perhaps, be given a 
different name), and p-valuations of E-models within a 
single overall theory (above, p. 346). Increases in cor­
roboration do not increase p-valuations of particular E- 
models; rather they may raise the probabilistic assess­
ment of the theory as a whole by reducing the scope of 
probabilistic computation under that theory. Corrobor­
ation in this sense is clearly quite different from con­
firmation in Carnap's, which appears to apply (oddly, I 
think) to the evidence from which hypotheses are extrapo­
lated. But there is a sense in which Popper-corroboration
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of earlier extrapolations may become Carnap-confirmation 
for later ones.
I am not sure if this is the kind of result 
Popperians want, but the analysis is plainly more sympa­
thetic to Popper than to Carnap. This sympathy extends 
to Popper’s general charge that Carnap’s "inductivism" 
relies unduly on an insupportable principle of "unifor­
mity of nature": the apparent failure to see that
randomness is a theoretical posit, rather than a given 
property, is symptomatic. C-theory supports the Popperian 
stance, in saying that we cannot appeal to any general 
uniformity: we can only propose theories with respect
to particular, specified regularities and seek the verdict 
of nature through measurement. But it seems reasonable 
still to call this process induction.
Synopsis of further work
The principles outlined here are also relevant 
to the following contexts, which have been researched, 
but whose full treatment must be omitted.
(1) Analysis of the subsidiary notion of possibility: 
seen as relativised to extrapolative theory.
(2) Differences in theoretical properties of forms of 
extrapolation distinguished as (a) interpolation, where, 
e.g., extrapolated values are inserted between R-theoreti^ 
cal readings, and (b) ultrapolation, where assignments 
are extrapolated of values, or to entities, hypostasized 
beyond the limits of possible readings; with discussion 
of such associated notions as ’curve-smoothing’ and 
’degrees of freedom’.
(3) Further analysis of theoretical properties of commit­
ments to equiprobability (a) necessitated by ignorance or 
lack of control, (b) secured by close control in a strong 
theoretical framework.
(4) The importance of the notion of ’independence’ as
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between extrapolated assignments; and the introduction 
of the notion of 'probability amplitude' for cases (in 
quantum mechanics) where this cannot be secured - involving 
the introduction of irrationals among p-values.
(5) The roles and theoretical structures of Gauss and 
Poisson distributions as fictal approximations to ideal 
binomial distributions (in the sense given above, p.290).
(6) The application of probabilistic theory to the 
analysis of the structure of time, involving the concept 
of entropy; including criticism of a proposal for time- 
reversibility.
Q. The Concept of a Dimension (Synopsis)
Three different senses of the concept of a 
dimension are distinguished:
(1) Metric dimension, i.e., the set of numerical values 
of a specified quantity determined in a particular 
context by measurement, or by calculation from 
measured values, which may include extrapolation.
(2) Coordinate dimension, i.e., the set of numbers, taken 
as values of a specified quantity, as represented in 
any one coordinate of a coordinate space, in graphic 
or analytical geometry, in an abstract context of 
mathematical analysis; whether or not some or all
of the values represented are determined by measure­
ment .
(3) Analytical dimension, i.e., the abstract notion of 
a dimension itself as a numerical expression of a 
specified quantity; especially in contexts where 
the theory and technique of dimensional analysis are 
employed. (This technique is principally used as
a means of establishing or testing the theoretical 
consistency of any equation or set of equations 
expressing theoretical equivalences between functions 
of constants or variables taken to represent values 
of different physical quantities.)
Type (1) (metric) has been a major topic of this study, 
and further clarification is omitted from this synopsis. 
Type (2) (coordinate) is explicated as a form of mathe­
matical expression of the S-theoretical structures adopted 
in each context. Rigorous argument has been prepared 
in criticism of KLST's account of some such structures in 
terms of a formal system called 'additive conjoint measure­
ment', which is a major part of their analysis. This, 
too, must be omitted, since it cannot be effectively sum­
marised. It points to a serious danger that formal sophis­
tication, combined with neglect of precise empirical 
interpretations, may lead to grossly misleading assumptions 
particularly for contexts where the S-theoretical struc­
tures on which coordinate representations are based are 
themselves weak or absent (as in some of their cited 
instances).
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But the main purpose of this Section is to 
consider the relevance of the theory of measurement to 
type (3) (analytic). The principles of dimensional 
analysis of macrophysical quantities have been developed 
from the observation by Bridgman (1931, Ch. 1) that a 
large class of physical quantities are theoretically 
defined so that the values of each in any context are 
equivalent to a specified multiplicative function of the 
corresponding values of one or more of three 'basic* quan­
tities - mass, length (or distance) and time. The 
relationships of these quantities, or analytical dimen­
sions, whether complex or basic, are found to be in prin­
ciple independent of the choices of either metric or 
coordinate dimensions in any particular context. In 
spite of a certain vagueness in its fundamental concep­
tualisation, Bridgman's system proved extremely fertile, 
both for the critical analysis of proposed new 'laws' 
based on observation, and even for the creation of new 
laws a priori, subject to empirical .testing which was 
often favourable.
The promise which this observation seemed to 
hold captured the attention of seekers after fundamental 
principles, especially Ellis (1966) and KLST. But the 
strategic neglect by these writers of the precise require­
ments of empirical interpretation has prevented them from 
seeing the central relevance in this context of the limi­
tations on perception, and the consequence dependence of 
our understanding of observation on the incorporation of 
S-theories. This has led KLST to postulate six 'basic'
dimensions: adding electric charge, temperature and 
angle to Bridgman's original mass, length and time.
None of these is exhibited as of special significance 
with respect to the others; nor, it is argued, is there 
any clear, unified account of why just these quantities 
should occupy a privileged theoretical position.
For C-theory, just two quantities occupy special 
positions in this context: energy and space: the second
as that in which the recognition of structal interval 
series is directly available, uniquely. The domain of 
dimensional analysis, as here understood, is found to be 
just that in which a substantial body of S-theory has 
been built up (socially and historically) such that a 
unified account is given of the various indicator systems 
and schemes of calculation by which values of other quan­
tities in the field are read in terms of spatial intervals. 
Apart from the conceptual problems associated with angular 
measurement, the demonstration that all the key quantities 
concerned are simply related to forms of energy is not 
difficult. Time, like space,has been shown above to be 
measurable in terms of the structure of radiant energy. 
Temperature, electric potential (charge) and electro-motive 
force are unproblematic in this regard; and the relativis- 
tic identification of mass with a form of energy provides 
an essential link.
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With regard to angle, it has proved possible 
to propose a form of geometrical analysis (which cannot 
be reproduced here) in which angular intervals, along 
with those of space and time, are incorporated in a rela- 
tivistic account (already indicated in Section N), accor­
ding to which space and time intervals are distinguished 
in terms of the mode of reception of radiant energy by a 
recognizing system; and spatial intervals are distin­
guished as angle-like or distance-like under the incor­
porated S-theory. Thus, the total emerging picture is 
that dimensional analysis exhibits the structure by which 
our quantitative understanding of the macrophysical dis­
tribution of energy in the universe is mediated by S- 
theory through recognitions of spatial intervals.
The philosophical message that emerges from 
this account, constructed in the light of current scien­
tific insights, is that the structure of our recognitions 
of physical phenomena, and hence of our knowledge of the 
physical universe, is determined by the conditions of 
our participation in that universe, and not vice versa - 
or a priori.
R. Non-physical Aspects of Measurement
In contexts of physical theory, one of the prin­
cipal roles of measurement systems has been seen as the 
elimination of social or psychological factors from struc­
tures of recognition; in the sense of reducing variations 
due to such factors to the level at which they can safely 
be neglected in context, even though they cannot be removed 
from the total situation in any case. An immediate con­
flict appears to arise, therefore, as soon as we try to 
apply the concept of measurement to the evaluation of these 
factors themselves. The subject is enormous in scope, 
and its exploration has revealed many aspects in which C- 
theoretical analysis can suggest useful distinctions of 
theoretical level. All I can do here, however, is to 
reproduce the summary appended to my original exploratory 
account.
The use of analogues of measurement procedures 
may be appropriate where the intention is to assign 
numerical values to sets of responses by living organisms, 
in such a way as to describe (rather than represent) a 
structure of relationships between them; according to the 
commitments of some theory which gives specified empirical 
meanings to arithmetical relations between the numbers. 
These meanings, though always in these contexts recognized 
in, and assigned to, responses, may be taken under the 
theory to refer to relationships between the respondents, 
or the stimuli and conditions which elicit them, as the 
relevant idents of this theory.
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Such numerical value-assignments are analogous 
to measurement in that values are assigned to each of any 
relevant set of idents so as to describe the amount attri­
buted to that ident of some quantity (V-character) recog­
nized under the theory. They remain no more than ana­
logous, at best, primarily because of (1) a lack of under­
standing (generally even in broad principle) of the complex 
organic processes involved in producing the responses (if, 
indeed, these are wholly responsible); associated 
with (2) lack of control over these processes, and often 
also over stimuli and conditions. This lack of under­
standing and control is compounded in social contexts 
where cultural, historical, economic or political factors 
are involved. Another serious lack, arising out of the 
preceding, is of any basis for well-specified strategies 
of neglect, according to which the factors considered can 
be safely or rationally simplified. These deficiencies 
result in the absence (1) of precisely specified standard 
structures, as a basic for comparison, analogous to the 
structa of physical measurement; and (2) of theoretical 
structures in which empirical relationships are clearly 
expressed in arithmetical terms. The attempt to fill 
these deficiencies by sophisticated probabilistic struc­
tures, built on sets of numbers which themselves lack 
theoretical significance, leads to mystification, often 
covered by exaggerated (and uncheckable) claims.
Only in the simplest contexts of physiological 
mechanisms, animal behaviour, or human oerceptual or 
reactive response, does there appear to be any prospect of 
a firm enough theoretical structure to support confidence 
in the arithmetical properties of the assigned numbers as 
an element in precise description. Beyond this level, 
the most that can plausibly be asked of such analogues of 
measurement is the broad indication of relative values of 
comparatively well-understood non-physical characteristics; 
complemented, on a mutually corrective basis, by common 
sense and informed intuition. To the extent that mathe­
matical sophistication may interfere with this mutually 
corrective process, its use for apparent technical advance 
must be approached with caution. This caution is rein­
forced by the absence of sound theoretical grounds for the 
extrapolative principle implicit in all probabilistic 
reasoning. Formal analysis can do little or nothing to 
assist in stiffening the theoretical structure; it rather 
requires such stiffening as a prior condition of its useful 
application.
In any event, all thought of non-physical measure­
ment in the life or human disciplines as an analogue of 
physical science "in its infancy" - based always on an 
absurdly simplistic account of that science - is, fortu­
nately, misconceived. If it were not, there would be 
strong moral arguments for infanticide. The adult, if 
permitted to develop, would be dependent on a kind of
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control over one another which human beings show little 
sign of being able to exercise responsibly over the 
objects of physical science itself.
(Principal sources for the investigation, though 
not for the views expressed, are Cicourel (1964) , Coombs 
(1970), Lader (1975), Nunnally (1970), Pfanzagl (1971), 
Stephenson, W. (1953), Stevens, S.S. (1936, 1951, and in 
Stevens, G., ed., 1975).)
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PART IV. SOME GENERAL PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS:
the relevance of contextual theory
A. Language and Theory
(1) Knowledge, Meaning and Truth
From the point of view of more general philoso­
phical interests, the main insight which may be claimed 
for the line of reasoning developed in this study is to 
be found in the relatively detailed articulation of the 
structures of theory taken to be fundamental at least for 
the recognition and understanding of perceptual experience; 
including the way in which non-perceptual, substantive 
theories may be incorporated in the context. More 
generally, the concept of empirical knowledge at all 
levels has been exhibited as a structure of partial theories, 
interlocking to the extent that they are taken to involve 
the same elements, and accepted as true accounts of reality 
by those who adopt them as known. This view of the 
structure of empirical knowledge impinges on most aspects 
of philosophical inquiry, not only in philosophy of science 
where it is more or less common ground. Given our special 
concern here with theoretical structures at the frontiers 
between linguistic and non-linguistic elements in parti­
cular contexts, we may look for some contribution to the 
understanding of the relationships between knowledge, 
meaning and truth: regarded as fundamental by many philo­
sophers of language.
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A major distinction has to be drawn between my 
approach in this study, and that mainstream tradition in 
semantics associated primarily with Donald Davidson. That 
tradition has concentrated attention on the analysis of 
one side only of the frontiers which concern me: the
linguistic. That analysis has been carried out largely 
in terms of the syntactic or grammatical structures of 
particular languages or language-types (especially English) 
My own analysis treats the understanding of language in 
concrete contexts as just one structural element - though 
an exceptional and important one - in perceptual recog­
nition: appealing to the supposed construction of more
or less fully-developed empirical theories, from context 
to context, as the basis for the functional association of 
linguistic with non-linguistic elements in particular 
concrete situations. This approach has been found essen­
tial, in particular, for the clear understanding of 
measurement contexts.
From the point of view of the mainstream, the 
récognitive aspects of language itself are irrelevant: 
nor do I attach importance to these, except to facilitate 
a unified analysis by emphasizing that linguistic struc­
tures are, indeed, parts of perceptual experience for 
both utterer and interpreter. Within such a unified ana­
lysis I am nonetheless able to give some account of the 
structural properties which are required of language, if 
it is to fulfil its various roles in the reporting or 
recording of perceptual recognitions, and their associated
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theoretical commitments. This account is independent 
of the actual conventions of any historical language; 
but, as far as I can see, consistent with those of which 
I know anything.
Mainstream analysis, on the other hand, is 
forced to neglect non-linguistic factors in recognition 
(not only the recognition of language itself), except by 
reference, in general terms, either to typical forms of 
sentences supposed to speak of them, or to the understan­
ding of a 'natural language' as a whole. This prevents 
the introduction into the analysis of any structure, dis­
tinct from language itself, which may be involved in the 
formation of understood correspondences between linguistic 
and non-linguistic elements in experience.
It is,, of course, acknowledged that assessment 
of the conditions for the truth or falsity of many sen­
tences depends on some kind of knowledge of ''the way the 
world is", "the facts of the case", or the like; matters 
of which all our knowledge comes ultimately from perception 
One way of dealing with the difficulties for analysis gener­
ated by such vague global phrases, is to suppose that it 
is part of the linguistic competence of speakers of a 
given language to be able to determine just what non- 
linguistic conditions are, in such cases, relevant to the 
assessment of the truth or falsity of any particular 
utterance. The underlying intuition here is that of 
Tarski, whose recursive definition exhibited the concept 
of truth as a property of sentences. His own view was
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that the recursion could only be carried out for a rigor­
ously constructed 'object language', the truth-values of 
whose sentences were in principle determined. He held 
explicitly that this programme could not be carried out 
for natural languages, the precise forms of whose sen­
tences could not be exhaustively known, let alone their 
truth-values. Though he discussed the possibility of 
constructing suitable modifications of such languages, he 
did not attempt it - nor has anyone else. He was cer­
tainly aware of the relevance to this concept of questions 
of meaning; he freely used the notion of translation [as 
a meaning- and therefore truth-preserving transformation), 
and categorized his work as belonging to semantics. But 
it was left to Davidson to make the essential connection 
between knowledge, meaning and truth. Michael Dummett 
acknowledges that Davidson made a step forward in recog­
nizing that the problem of meaning is concerned with under­
standing - knowledge of meanings - but also asks what kind 
of knowledge this may be (What is a theory of meaning? in 
Evans & McDowell, 1976, esp. pp. 69, 70). Here, and in 
his (1978), he explores a number of approaches to an 
answer; and seems to set most store by the notion that 
it includes a "practical ability" which must be acquired. 
However much this acquisition may depend on innate capa­
cities, the conventional forms of any particular language 
must be learned, and Dummett argues for an investigation 
into the structure of meaning through the means of acqui­
sition. More will be said of this approach below.
391
Davidson, however, has introduced other factors
into the problem: context of utterance, and the notion of
a language community, both of interest for this study.
To quote a version of his formulation given in his Thought
and Talk (in Guttenplan, 1975, p. 17):
... for speakers of English an utterance of
'It is raining' by a speaker x at time t is
true if and only if it is raining (near x) 
at t. To be armed with this information, 
and to know that others know it, is to know 
what an utterance means independently of 
knowing the purposes that prompted it.
In order to make this account of the matter plausible, 
it is necessary to restrict illustrations drawn from 
natural languages to those which make limited, simple 
demands on the knowledge of the interpreter, beyond that 
of the grammar and syntax, and the most general and unprob­
lematic of the lexical conventions, of the language in 
use: 'Snow is white' and 'It is raining' are typical.
It is reasonable to say that all one needs to know to
assess the truth or falsity of an utterance of 'It is
raining', apart from English, are the two factors mentioned. 
Knowledge of the speaker's identity is generally enough, 
for this particular sentence, to raise an inference to 
the particular region of space referred to (but not unexcep- 
tionably: we need to know where the speaker is at the
time, and whether he refers to rain seen (heard, or felt) 
directly, or by telescope or even television). The pre­
sence, or not, of rain, such as determines the truth or 
falsity of the report, 'It is raining', is a phenomenon 
whose characteristics are exceptionally constant over
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different times, places and contexts of recognition.
Most other phenomena of which we commonly speak are less 
uniform in character, and the relevant utterances call 
for more complex contextual analysis, as we shall see.
It is, of course, possible to argue that any 
judgment associated with the use of language, whether by 
speaker or interpreter, is linguistic; and, indeed, it 
must be partly a matter of linguistic competence. But 
wherever assertions are made about non-linguistic subject- 
matter*, the context necessarily includes non-linguistic 
recognitions (past, present or future), and demands from 
utterer and interpreter the competence to make the 
relevant associations between these and the linguistic 
structure used. The way in which this competence depends 
on memory of past usage and its non-linguistic associations 
is quite fully discussed in Section IV.4 below. Mean­
while the simple claim is made that, however important 
linguistic competence may be (and this, too, is more fully 
discussed shortly), all use of language to speak of non- 
linguistic elements or structures, and all understanding 
of such use, calls also for non-linguistic récognitive 
competence. A person blind from birth lacks competence 
to speak of colour (or interpret colour-words) only from 
prior lack of visual competence: the nature of the lin­
guistic incompetence is independent of the person's lin­
guistic skills as a whole, and strictly determined by 
récognitive incompetence. Again, we may ask whether an 
English-speaking Eskimo who has never seen rain, or an
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English-speaking African who has never seen snow (even 
on television), can be fairly accused of linguistic incom­
petence if they do not understand "It is raining", or "Snow 
is white". In the terms of the present analysis, the 
claim is that the interpretation of linguistic elements 
in concrete contexts necessarily involves non-linguistic 
elements of the relevant R-theory in every case.
To take an illustration which reveals more of 
the factors likely to be involved, consider two possible 
uses of the sentence 'The water is clear', spoken by one 
of the crew of a boat entering harbour. Suppose, first, 
that the crew-member is looking forward from a position 
of vantage: he means that the surface of the water is
clear of large obstructions likely to call for changes of ' 
course. Second, suppose that he is holding a glass tube 
up to the light, containing a sample of water he has just 
hauled up from the bottom as part of a hydrographic sur­
vey: he means that the internal volume of the water in
the tube is free of visibly undissolved matter. The 
meaning is sharply determined in each case; the use of 
language typical and unproblematic; the further verbal 
description given here quite unnecessary in context.
At least three types of non-linguistic skill 
may be distinguished as involved in the acts of inter­
pretation here:
(1) restriction of attention, within the total perceptual 
field, to elements relevant to the supposed common GR- 
theory of the context. For example, in the first case.
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it is not enough for an interpreter to know that the 
speaker refers to the water ahead of the vessel - as any 
English-speaker might, from the direction of his gaze: 
he will be understood by a competent interpreter to 
speak of the channel, recognized by visible marks known 
from familiarity or marine convention. The competent 
interpreter will also know what kinds of possible obstruc­
tion are concerned in the statement that the water is 
clear.
(2) acknowledgement of the relevant commitments of GR- 
theory, both within the immediate frame, and sequential. 
For example, in the second case, it is reasonable to 
suppose that the competent interpreter will take the 
utterance to refer not only to the water in the tube; 
but also to that in the part of the channel from which 
the sample was drawn; and he will also draw proper infer­
ences, under the GR-theory, with respect to the signifi­
cance for the survey of the observation of clarity (the 
sense in which such an inference may be part of the 
meaning of the utterance is considered below).
(3) extrapolation from one’s own (past or present) recog­
nitions to those of which the utterer speaks. For 
example, extrapolation from the interpreter's knowledge
of the harbour, and of the rough position of the boat as 
judged, say, from a view through a porthole, to what por­
tion of the channel 'The water is clear' refers; or from 
past experience of taking and interpreting water-samples 
to the conditions of a particular case; or the kind of
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extrapolation we have supposed unavailable to our Eskimo 
to the perceptual truth-conditions for 'It is raining'.
Since no two people can make use of identical 
structures of récognitive experience, this third type of 
skill is taken to be necessary not only for any intelli­
gible use of language to speak of récognitive material, 
but for any coherent understanding of the non-linguistic 
behaviour of others. It plainly goes beyond the realm 
of linguistic competence, being independent in its form 
of the conventions of any particular language.
None of the skills or faculties attributed 
above to a competent interpreter are linguistic in any 
natural sense. They are certainly not possessed by the 
generality of English speakers. One way in which it 
might be argued, at most of the first two, that they are 
still within the domain of linguistic competence is by 
supposing that a group of people involved in such a con­
text are using a special language in whose interpretation 
they are, exceptionally, competent. But this means 
relativising not merely truth-conditions but languages 
to contexts (however defined); and almost all of us are 
exceptionally competent in some usages not familiar to 
all speakers of a language (in the ordinary sense). In 
the absence of any more clearly articulated structure 
either of a 'context' or a 'language', we are left with 
a loosely-constructed proliferation of "languages", with 
respect to which the notion of 'linguistic competence’ 
is arbitrarily, and indeed circularly, attributed.
396
Moreover, to define ’truth in English’, say, 
by recursion over a sequence of sentences chosen by 
reference only to the supposed competence of ’English- 
speakers', itself involves an element of circularity in 
its determination of the class of sentences with respect 
to the class of speakers. No prior theoretical struc­
ture is available to determine either class, except in 
terms of the other. Tarski's own 'object language' 
was, of course, formally constructed, so avoiding circu­
larity at a cost of remoteness from natural language.
My own analysis, by contrast, retains the vernacular 
notion of what constitutes 'a language' (apart from the 
idealised 'base-language' defined for a particular GR- 
theory): and defines contexts in terms of the theories
adopted by their participants. It relativises linguis­
tic structures to contexts only in terms of the ^-functions 
determining their local systems of reference: supposing
that the GR-theory of a context may draw freely, for its 
linguistic structures, on pre-existing language forms.
It is, of course, no part of the burden of 
my thesis that linguistic competence is unimportant, or 
that the analysis of particular types of linguistic struc­
ture in relation to truth or meaning can be neglected. 
Although the level of linguistic competence involved in 
the interpretation of such sentences as 'It is raining' 
or 'Snow is white' is minimal, we shall shortly consider 
forms of linguistic structure whose interpretation gener­
ates greater interest for analysis. But first I want to
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look at two aspects of interpretation which might be 
regarded as borderline cases with respect to linguistic 
or non-linguistic skills. ,
(a) The way in which the understanding of deictic 
gestures, directions of gaze, etc., affects interpre­
tation of accompanying words, or is affected by it.
Both cases occur. In the above example, direction of gaze 
helps to tell the interpreter which of several possible 
bodies of "water" is spoken of. In an illustration given 
earlier, pointing to an elephant will be differently inter­
preted according to whether the pointer says, "That is a 
rogue bull", or, "Look at the damage to that left ear".
(b) The way in which dispositions, habits or social 
role of the utterer may affect, or be affected by, inter­
pretations of his or her words. Again, both cases occur.
A West End model and a Scottish crofter could be under­
stood to have different standards about what counts as a 
truth-condition for 'It is raining*; but if the speaker 
adds '... on a broad front from Land's End to John O'Groats', 
we may infer that he or she is a meteorologist, and that
the truth-conditions of the utterance are not naïvely 
perceptual.
These two cases emphasize the interdependence, 
and sometimes mutually supporting roles, of linguistic 
and non-linguistic skills in the interpretations of 
utterances, of which more will be said in Section IV.4. 
However, some factors involved in such interpretations 
are unequivocally matters of linguistic competence with
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respect to the language in use (neither this list nor 
earlier ones are claimed to be exhaustive):
(1) Standard lexical conventions rooted in past usage.
(2) Syntactic or grammatical rules determining the con­
tributions to meaning of different elements in the 
utterance: . for example, those governing the for­
mation of compound sentences, or the effect of 
indexical elements such as pronouns, tense-forms
or demonstratives.
(3) Lexical or syntactic conventions determining the 
dependence of the meaning of any particular utter­
ance on the understanding of elements of previous 
discourse.
We shall see that the roles of these various 
factors in the determination of meaning and truth can 
best be understood in terms of various forms of meaning- 
dependence, analysable as occurring within the structure 
of a language, either within a context, or from context 
to context.
Meaning-dependence
It is sometimes said that no sentence has 
meaning in isolation from other sentences, and that this 
leads to a 'holistic’ view of meaning in a language: 
but this notion needs careful interpretation. There may 
be a sense in which, once we accept the interdependence 
of meanings of different sentences, our understanding of 
this interdependence cannot stop short of comprehending 
the whole language; or, conversely, that 'a language'
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is recognizable as such precisely in terms of the mutual 
meaning-dependence of its sentences. But, from the 
analytical point of view, what matters is the form of 
dependence we attend to.
The forms of meaning-dependence studied in main­
stream semantics have largely been those determined by 
syntactic relationships between sentences, parts of com­
plex sentences, or other types of sentential form, 
characteristic of particular natural languages, or groups 
of such languages. Developed from Davidson’s account of 
meanings in terms of the truth-conditions of sentences, 
this tradition can be traced back, through Tarski's defi­
nition of truth itself, to roots in Frege's and Russell's 
attitudes to language. These attitudes were more 
explicitly mathematical in inspiration than those of 
others of the period, even including Wittgenstein's.
Frege's original motivation, in particular, had been to 
assimilate the logic of operations on numbers to standard 
verbal logic. Tarski developed a notion drawn from ele­
mentary mathematics - that of the satisfaction of an 
equation by constant values of its variables - by giving 
it a recursive definition, in association with an enriched 
language capable of non-mathematical interpretations (see 
especially his (1966), pp. 190/1).
The mathematical genesis of these forms of 
analysis is reflected in their search for formulations 
which hold good independently of particular interpretations 
of some of their terms; in just the way that, in
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mathematics, algebraic formulations can be found to hold 
independently of substitutions over a given range of 
values for their variables (the notions of recursion and 
satisfaction). Algebraic forms are, indeed, often used 
in semantics: and, when particular sentences or sentential
forms are quoted, it is generally understood that many of 
their terms are to be regarded in the role of constant 
values belonging to a range or sequence over which recur­
sion is in principle possible. To take a very simple 
and familiar case, the structure of the meaning-preserving 
transformation from 'John hit Bob' to 'Bob was hit by John' 
is independent of the meanings of any terms replacing 
'John', 'hit', 'Bob' in such a way as to form intelligible 
sentences in each of the two syntactic constructions.
Thus, the forms of meaning-dependence revealed are those 
generated by operations of logic or reasoning generali- 
sable, without loss of truth, over a wide range of contexts 
just as, in mathematics, algebra is used to analyse and 
develop systems of mathematical logic and reasoning. 
Prominent amongst those structures studied have been:
(1) dependence of the meaning of a compound sentence (such 
as a conditional) on the meanings of its components, as 
revealed by the syntactic form; and (2) the extent to 
which the use of similar syntactic constructions with terms 
involving different ontological commitments (typically 
analysed within a recursive framework) may reflect simi­
larity between the systems spoken of. The most successful 
projects so far in this field, as it concerns natural
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languages, use a development of model theory, drawn from 
mathematical logic, and initially devised by Richard 
Montague. Hans Kamp has intimated that he is engaged in 
model-theoretic analysis of a third form of meaning-depen­
dence; namely (3) that obtaining within structures of 
integrated discourse involving two or more distinct sen­
tences in each instance. The logical relationships 
of each integrated set or sequence of sentences are shown 
to be reflected by those of specifiable syntactic devices 
(to take simple examples, the use of 'Thus ...', or 
..., therefore,...'). It is likely that this last form 
of analysis will be most relevant to the study of syntactic 
structures associated with chains of reasoning developed 
in contexts of empirical theory such as those considered 
here (though from a different point of view). The asso­
ciated definition of truth, in terms of the embedding of 
representations of fragments of integrated discourse in 
real-world models (which I shall not try to interpret), 
also points in this direction.
These forms of analysis are concerned primarily, 
then, with the effects of syntactic operations on the 
previously given meanings of elements of particular lan­
guages. It is plain that such a procedure does not 
exhaust the analysis of meaning. An equally important 
aspect of meaning is that which attaches to particular 
values of the semantic 'variables', which are not given 
in a general knowledge of the language, but derived from 
recognitions in context. For this purpose, the last thing
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we want is that the contributions to meaning of some of 
our terms shall be replaceable by those of others without 
loss of truth. This is especially obvious in the case 
of measurement, where a particular value of some quantity, 
recognized for some particular object, is what is to be 
captured in words. For the illustrated use of 'The 
water is clear', the interpreter's concern is with just 
what body of water is clear, and of what it is clear.
For 'It is raining', we want to know in each case just 
where it is raining: the time of utterance ("now"), like
the all-important position of the speaker at that time, 
is typically a matter of non-linguistic recognition, 
unique to the occasion. For these kinds of meaning, we 
must look for a different kind of dependence.
Dummett has shown interest in another form of 
meaning-dependence: that associated with what he con­
siders as the sentence-by-sentence process of acquisition 
of the ability to use a language (Evans and McDowell, 
op.cit., esp. p.79: see above, p.390 , and below. Section
IV.4). Like the syntax or grammar-based analyses 
already mentioned, however, this process seems to be 
understood primarily from the point of view of the rule- 
governed structures of the languages themselves.
But though more will be said about the relevance 
of such structures to the concerns of this study, the 
contrasting perspective of our primary interest, here, 
in récognitive structures leads directly to an analysis 
in terms of a quite different form of meaning-dependence.
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that between sets of sentences distinguished by being 
used in the contexts of particular empirical theories; 
especially GR-theories and their associated S-theories 
as adopted by particular L-groups on particular occasions. 
The contents, structures and limits of these sets are 
decided autonomously by the theories themselves, in terms 
of the more or less coherent systems of assignments and 
commitments adopted within them. The types of linguistic 
structure involved in this form of analysis are (1) utter­
ances stating particular assignments or commitments in the 
'base-language’; and (2) deductive systems of utterances 
whose truth-values are related in consequence of adopted 
commitments. More will be said later about the second 
type of structure, which consists essentially of systems 
of empirical conditions under which particular assignments 
are held true in accordance with the commitments of any 
given theory. At this stage I want only to point to the 
kinds of linguistic structure which are likely to figure 
in such an analysis. Recall, first, that the kinds of 
récognitive structure to be reflected consist of: (1)
assignments of particular characters to particular 
idents; (2) assignments of particular idents to resets 
determined by particular determinant sets of characters; 
and (3) implicative commitments which, it has been shown, 
are all expressible in terms of recognitions of the struc­
tures of intersection of Insets. It has been argued 
that the forms of all three of these types of récognitive 
structures are reflected precisely, through the 9-function,
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by the sentential forms of utterances of a base-language 
to which a large part of the linguistic structure of any 
récognitive context can be in principle reduced: in that
sense the analysis accounts for the fundamental status of 
sentential forms in all languages, independent of lexical, 
grammatical or syntactic convention. We may now further 
note that, as each D-set is typically spoken of by means 
of a single word or simple phrase (of suitable grammatical 
or syntactic type in the convention of the language in 
use, and independently of the degree of complexity of the 
determinant character-cluster), we may expect the struc­
ture of P-set intersection to be to some extent reflected 
in the lexicon of the language. Thus, while a 17th- 
century compendium lists 'whale' as 'the largest of the 
sea-fishes', a modern dictionary gives it as 'any of the 
large marine mammals of the order Cetacea ...' - reflec­
ting the intervening theoretical developments. An 
exchange between Quine and Davidson at the Woolfson lec­
tures of 1974 (not recorded by Guttenplan) revealed that 
they agreed that there was no hard and fast line between 
dictionary and encyclopaedia as an account of the current 
state of a culture's general knowledge. But we should 
not go too far in placing reliance on a language as encap­
sulating a society's "world view": it is only too easy
to construct totally opposing theoretical accounts in the 
same natural language of the same community, whose contra­
dictory statements are held true with utter conviction 
and at the highest levels of understanding of which people
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are capable, without any linguistic impropriety. The 
present analysis more closely parallels Putnam's (1970), 
in which he points to the force of specific empirical 
theories in determining 'stereotypes' - roughly, dic­
tionary entries for words referring to 'natural kinds', 
in terms of descriptions of their normal members: sharply
distinguishing the role in semantic analysis of such 
lexical forms of meaning-dependence, from that of grammar 
and syntax in the formation of sentences. More will be 
said of this in Section 4 of this Part.
The relationships between theoretical commit­
ments, Psets or classifications, and logic are subtle 
and interesting. Frege, for example, wrote (in an attack 
on SchrOder's account of classes), "... classes are deter­
mined by the properties that individuals in them are to 
have ... only so does it become possible to express 
thoughts in general by stating relations between classes; 
only so do we get a logic." (Geach and Black, 1969, p. 104: 
my emphasis). Tarski said of the 'general theory of 
classes', which he took as the basis for a 'language of 
infinite order', "... it suffices for the formulation of 
every idea which can be expressed in the whole language of 
mathematical logic. It is difficult to imagine a simpler 
language which can do this." (1966, p. 242). We might 
now say something similar of set theory. But Tarski's 
plan was for a less highly abstracted structure whose 
elements were unspecified objects classified according to 
their assigned properties: an infinitary system which
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might readily be supposed to have restricted interpre­
tations in the Pset structures of particular concrete 
contexts, according to C-theory. My own analysis leads 
to the view that, in any given context, theoretical 
commitments adopted by its Readers, in association with 
a 9-function fixing references, give meaning for those 
Readers to the system of assignments - and hence to the 
structure of Psets according to which classification of 
idents is carried out: these sets being the natural
objects of reference of the principal linguistic terms 
from which sentences are constructed. Logic governs the 
operations which build, from the meanings (so given) of 
the component elements of the discourse - the recognized 
assignments and commitments - a total structure of inter­
pretation for the context, especially the structure of 
reasoning from sentence to sentence within it. In the 
associated linguistic structure, the first aspect is 
likely to be mainly reflected in structure of classifi­
cation embodied in the lexicon, as suggested above: 
while the second is likely to be mainly reflected in the 
structure of syntactic and grammatical operations, under 
the rules of the particular language (or class of lan­
guages) for the relevant words and sentences. We might 
expect a full analysis of the linguistic structure of a 
given context to combine a syntactic analysis on the lines 
of Kamp's treatment of integrated discourse (mentioned 
above, p.401 ), with an analysis of lexical meaning- 
dependence between particular terms and expressions, under
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the empirical theory determining the relevant Pset clas­
sification. To extract the fullest meaning from the 
notion of 'classification' used here, it must be thought 
of not as a static taxonomy, but as a dynamic structure 
capable of reflecting sequential commitments, governing 
the understanding of motion or change, as proposed in 
Part II. (It will be recalled that recognitions by 
measurement have been exhibited as particular types of 
systematic classification.)
To illustrate the contrasting effects of the two 
approaches to analysis I have in mind, we need a relatively 
sophisticated example. If the doctor, after full 
examination, tells me I have infectious hepatitis, I know 
that it is true just in case I have infectious hepatitis, 
but that does not say I know what the sentence means. I 
may have no idea what 'infectious hepatitis' means. The 
point is that I cannot be given the meaning just by knowing 
the form of words. It may be that Davidson accepts this; 
he certainly accepts that we may know a speaker holds his 
utterance true, without knowing its meaning (Guttenplan, 
1975, p. 14). But if we point beyond the form of words 
to its meaning, the inference appears to become circular. 
The converse inference, from knowing the meaning to knowing 
the condition for truth (if any), seems safe; but hands 
us back our problem of what it is to know the meaning.
The analysis begins to become more tractable if 
we suppose that a condition for truth at each utterance 
may be a proper part of the meaning of any sentence
408
(which is capable of making a statement). It then follows 
that to know the meaning of an utterance of such a sen­
tence is to know the condition for its truth at that 
utterance; and that the converse is false - which fits 
the form of my intuitive account. To pursue the question 
what else may be contained in the meaning, we may ask 
what else we need to know, if we are to understand it.
We need to know enough of the language in which it is 
uttered to know that it is a sentence capable of making a 
statement; and to know enough about the past use of the 
words of which it is formed to know how, when put together 
in this form, they may be properly used in the immediate 
context of utterance. In C-theory, this last is to con­
struct an inductive theory of the 9-function of the context 
as applied to the particular utterance: giving an assign­
ment or commitment as the truth-condition, namely, that 
which is to hold iff the utterance makes a true statement. 
Plainly, this condition is context-dependent, as are all 
other aspects of the structure of meaning other than the 
form of words (which belong to the trans-contextual con­
ventions of the language, and now appear as distinct from 
the truth-conditions).
It is the 9-functional aspect of the meaning 
which I have supposed missing from my understatnding of 
the sentence in my example. I know at least that the 
doctor is uttering a sentence in English: this comes
from my general knowledge of the language. I may go on 
to infer that 'infectious hepatitis' is the name of a
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known disease, which has some relevance to what the doctor 
learnt in his examination, and from my answers to his 
questions: this flows from my theory of the récognitive
and social context, my understanding of the doctor's role, 
the kinds of things he is likely to attend to, and the 
kinds of S-theoretical commitment he is expected to make. 
Does this inference contribute to an understanding of the 
meaning? It certainly does not involve a knowledge of the 
conditions for the truth of the diagnosis. My memory of 
linguistic usage may give me the further information, that 
it means my liver is inflamed, and that I caught the con­
dition from someone else. If I am right, these are among 
the truth conditions, but seem to supply only a small part 
of the meaning: it does not amount to my knowing what
the diagnosis means to the doctor, with his (her) knowledge 
of the causes, symptoms, probable course, and treatment 
(if any). If he is a good doctor, he will tell me as 
much of these things as he thinks I can handle and will 
be useful to me. I may come to know that it means (as 
we normally say) that I picked up a virus from someone's 
excreta, probably in food prepared with unwashed hands; 
that I shall go yellow, or yellower than I already am; 
that there is no known treatment other than drinking a 
lot of water, and no alcohol; but that it does not mean 
- as some forms of hepatitis may - any association with 
cancer. But I shall still not know all that it means to 
the doctor.
The evidence on which he holds his diagnosis
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true is unknown to me, and of no importance so long as I 
am satisfied that he has good evidence, and a good theory 
by which to read the evidence. I may suppose, therefore, 
that the truth-conditions for his diagnosis are satisfied, 
without knowing what they are. But, after his expla­
nation, I do seem to know something of what it means to 
have infectious hepatitis: to me, the important aspect
of what it means is its consequences to me. It seems 
that the meanings of some sentences may have a number of 
different aspects, of which those given by their truth- 
conditions are not attended to in all contexts.
Where truth-conditions are attended to, how do 
they contribute to meaning, and how do they figure in the  ^
linguistic structure in a context of this kind? Suppose 
that the doctor's recognitions of a particular set of 
symptoms constitute a valid set of truth-conditions, under 
the relevant medical theory, for a particular diagnosis: 
how is this to be represented? In general, I take the 
following equivalences to hold, with respect to the English 
verb 'to mean', for English sentences X and Y:
(1) 'X' means that Y X Y
(2) 'X' means the same as 'Y ' X-4->Y
N.B. The implications indicated are, of course, to be read 
in each instance as strictly derived under the utterer's 
or interpreter's theory of the context, not as expressing 
some independent logical entailment (see Part II, p.410 ).
So read, they may be contributions to the GR-theory of the 
context. Condition (1) may at first sight seem an excessive
411
claim, since most analyses in this field have so far con­
centrated on the search for a theory giving the whole of 
the meaning of sentences. But the intention here is no 
more than to say that if X Y (under the relevant theory 
of the context), then 'Y ' is part of the meaning of 'X’ 
in context. The claim is that the expression ''X' means 
that Y' - often phrased 'If X, then it means (or, that 
means) that Y' - is commonly used as a way of stating the 
commitment. The fact that roughly equivalent construc­
tions can be found, at least in other European languages, 
may be thought to reinforce the claim. The relationship 
between this notion and more general notions of meaning 
and truth will be further explored below.
The equivalence proposed in (2) seems to me to 
conform with Tarski's use both of the concepts of logical 
equivalence (identity of logical consequences) and of 
translation, in general and in its application to the 
semantic analysis of truth.
To apply these equivalences to the chosen illus­
trative example, I introduce the following simplified ad 
hoc notation: let A,B,...,F be recognitions of a doctor's
R-theory assigning symptoms to a patient x; and let H 
be the commitment assigning a diagnosis of hepatitis to 
X - this last may be regarded as an S-theoretical commit­
ment of medical theory, incorporated into the relevant R- 
theory. A,...,E are supposed assigned at the "present" 
frame of the context: F is assigned at the present frame
for a "future" frame - for which it represents prognosis.
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In any case where utterances are understood 
under the 9-function to state any of these assignments or 
this commitment, implications hold between them under 
the theory, as between the conditions stated. I shall 
use to represent such utterances.
Initially, then suppose the doctor's R-theory 
to include the following commitments:
(3) H —>-Aa B a C a F
(4) (A A B)
(5) (A A C) H
(6) No implication holds under the theory from the single
conditions A,B,C, or F, to H.
(The converses of (4) and (5) follow from (3).)
It follows from (1) and (2) and the definitions - including 
those for the special notation - that "A A B" or "A a C" 
or "A A B a C" mean the same as "H"; and "H" means that 
"A A B A C A F". A,B,C and F are necessary, but not 
sufficient, conditions for H to hold - i.e., for "H" to 
be held true in the theory; they are, I say, parts of the 
meaing of "H". On the other hand, if any set of these 
conditions is both necessary and sufficient for "H" to 
be held true, then that set is logically equivalent to H; 
and has some special claim to be called 'a set of truth- 
conditions ' for "H" under the theory. This requirement 
is satisfied in the example by (A,Bj, {A,Cj, {A,B,C}, and, 
trivially, by {H}. Our illustration suggests, therefore, 
that it may not be untypical for a given utterance to have
more than one set of truth-conditions in a context.
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trivially including, in all contexts, the unit set com­
prising that condition which is taken to be stated by 
the utterance itself. We may call the set of all such 
sets of truth-conditions the 'truth-conditional set' for 
the utterance in context.
To bring out some of the critical consequences 
of this analysis, suppose now that a second opinion is 
called for, and that another doctor, observing the same 
symptoms in the same patient, diagnoses serum hepatitis 
- a disease with similar initial symptoms, but different 
aetiology and prognosis, from what is called "infectious" 
hepatitis (the terminology is, in fact, somewhat confused). 
We may represent this situation as yielding, in the first 
instance :
(7) (A A B a C ) (Doctor 1) (9) F
(8) ( A a B A C ) ^ H 2 (Doctor 2) (10) (F)
Where and H 2 diagnose mutually exclusive forms 
of hepatitis for x, having contrary prognoses. The doc­
tors agree on (9) and (10); and decide that they can 
settle the matter by a further test, under conditions 
to be set out below. That is, they revise their initial 
R-theories to adopt a joint GR-theory holding, in place of
(7) and (8) above:
(11) (A a B a  CaD) (12) (A A B a C a E) H 2 ;
and (13) “](Da E).
N.B., the doctors' GR-theory, whose commitments these con­
ditions set out, is much more comprehensive than the 
patient's; the patient need not understand all these
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aspects of the truth-conditional structure, in order to 
extract those parts of the meaning which concern him.
In terms of the equivalences (1) and (2), the 
doctors' GR-theory, "A AB a C a D" means the same as ;
"A A B A C A E" means the same as "H2” ; "A A B a C" means 
the same as v H2” , or "H"; means that F, and
"H2" means that ”|(F) - i.e., that x will not have the 
symptom assigned by F . Note also that, for example,
"A B C E" means that x will not have this symptom; 
is there, then any sense in which the naming of the disease 
by "H2" (or the simple assignment H2) carries a meaning 
beyond the recognition of the four present symptoms - or 
is it no more than a convenient shorthand, and something 
for the patient to tell himself and his friends? We 
might say that it specifies a particular virus associated 
with the name - an element which may be hypostasized 
under the incorporated S-theory, being itself not recog­
nized by direct perception, but by the symptoms it is taken 
to cause (as, we said, a fruit is recognized as "ripe" by 
its colour). In this case, the presence of the virus 
would itself belong to the truth-conditional set. Alter­
natively, we might say that in some sense the name "H2" 
specifies a particular, larger context of medical theory 
in which the immediate context of diagnosis becomes embedded 
in some way. This aspect will be considered further 
below (p. 462), in the context of certain proposals about 
the semantics of 'natural kind' terms; here I want only 
to note that the important part of the meaning for the
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patient - and for the doctor as therapist, rather than 
diagnostician - is the prognosis derived under the theory. 
This strikes me as a principle, with regard to the struc­
ture of meaning in concrete contexts of recognition and 
understanding, which is widely generalisable.
Note also that the structures of truth-conditions 
for the two possible diagnoses do not differ essentially 
in the syntactic or grammatical forms which would natur­
ally be generated for any utterances in which they might 
be stated. The critical difference resides in the struc­
ture of medical theory in context, and, therefore, to the 
extent that it is reflected in the linguistic structure, 
it will be in the lexicon - the medical dictionary or 
textbook. That is to say, the critical structure is that 
of meaning-dependence under the empirical theory of the 
context: again, I would claim, a widely generalisable
principle.
At the same time, it is plausible to insist that 
the syntactic structure of any fragment of discourse asso­
ciated with the context should, to be correct, reflect in 
some definite way the system of meaning-dependence taken 
to hold under the relevant theory - though each structure 
of meaning-dependence [syntax- and theory-based) is under­
determined by the other. If verbal argument were to 
develop between the differing doctors, critical analysis 
of their syntax may well reveal important aspects of their 
system of reasoning: these aspects of their meaning are,
however, to be read in conjunction with the lexical
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meanings of the words, and the associated theoretical com­
mitments. My own conclusion from the discussion so far 
is that it would be mistaken to look for a single, com­
prehensive Theory of Meaning; there is a sense in which 
we can say that each R- and S-theory of each context 
contains a theory of meaning for that context, comprising the 
^-function and the structure of commitments. Such a 
claim would belong to a partial meta-theory of meanings.
To complete such a meta-theory, we need at least some 
account of the structure of transcontextual meanings 
within particular language systems. This aspect lies 
mainly outside the present scope, but more will be said 
of it in Section IV.4.
It might be suggested that I have used 'meaning' 
in a different sense from that intended by Davidson - 
that I don't mean what he means. But this might mean 
(imply) that we have to look for a meaning (sense) of 
'meaning' which involves no implications or presuppositions 
appealing to background knowledge, beyond some minimal 
interpretation of the specified sentence. But can we 
really be said to attach meaning to a sentence which 
neither has any understood consequences, nor is itself 
a consequence of anything? I have noted that has been the 
search for inference-free constituents of experience which 
has inspired appeals to such elements as uninterpreted 
sense data, qualia, erlebnisse, etc.; but a main line of 
argument in this study has been that recognitions of even 
such apparently simple elements can only be understood in
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a framework of theory (in at least the weak sense defined 
in the introduction, p. 19 ). Quine and Ullian's 'obser­
vation sentences' may seem to offer an example of a 
parallel search for the inference-free, in the field of 
linguistic structures, in which case a similar argument 
would apply to them (see their (1978), passim). My 
treatment of the doctors' diagnosis suggests, rather, 
that analysis of sentences in terms of the theoretical 
structures of the contexts in which they are used yields 
a well articulated, and subtly graded, account of different 
aspects of the meanings of those sentences: in which the
relevant theory in each case determines the total meaning 
for each Reader in context, including his understanding 
of the relevant aspects of transcontextual meanings in 
any natural or specialised language on which he draws.
More will be said about this transcontextual 
aspect below (Section IV.4). Meanwhile we can say, 
briefly, that the meaning of a particular utterance is 
given by its contribution to the structure of theory in 
context. Davidson has explicitly rejected any project 
of 'relativizing a T-sentence to a proof or theory' (1973, 
p. 326). This rejection, which may be addressed to 
intuitibnistic accounts of meaning quite different from 
the present analysis, is not very strongly or closely 
argued. Two possible motives for such a rejection may 
be considered. At a superficial level, there may be a 
fear of producing unmanageable complexities for analysis; 
and I hope this study might do something to allay such
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fears. More deeply, it may be thought that relativizing 
concepts of knowledge or meaning necessarily leads to a 
relativist doctrine of truth or reality. This is not a 
consequence of C-theory; but I shall leave consideration 
of this point until I have dealt with some other approaches 
to such questions, including those of Popperian philosophy 
of science.
This much can, however, be said at this stage 
about the concept of truth. Tarski restricted his defi­
nition to formal languages for which it is possible to 
construct precisely defined metalanguages; expressing 
doubt that such a precise analysis could be extended to 
natural languages. Various important writers, including 
Davidson, Quine and Popper, have wished to suggest that 
such an extension is at least in principle possible.
But I have not found that this suggestion has ever been 
fully and formally argued, and the line of argument given 
above leads me to echo Tarski's original doubt, at least 
as it concerns any natural language, such as English, 
unrestricted by any well-defined structure of understan­
ding. The common formulation of the Tarskian equivalence: 
's' is true in L iff p ... (1)
(where 's' is the name of a sentence of language L, and 
p a proposition which it states, or which constitutes its 
truth-condition) is meaningless in any instance to any 
person who does not understand either s or p. If I am 
right in saying that meaning is given in every instance 
by a theory of the context of utterance, equivalence Cl)
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is context-dependent in just this way. In Tarski's 
own formal treatment, an abstract meaning with no external 
reference is given by his theory of the defined linguistic 
structure, in terms of the notions of substitution and 
satisfaction: this is the theory of the context of his
utterance (1956, passim). A much weaker version, based 
on that given above (Section II G)
s & is held true in 0 iff *(s) holds in 0 ... (2)
(where is an utterance of base-language L of group- 
theory0, of which 4» is the reference function) holds, at 
least for récognitive contexts, without restriction as 
to which (natural or other) language L may be drawn from. 
This equivalence relativizes the property 'held true' of 
utterances to particular theories, whatever their linguis­
tic structures, while reltaining a Tarski-like form.
This modification of his convention can thus be used rigo­
rously and rather unproblematically not only for the lan­
guages of scientific theories, as he hoped, but for much 
less sophisticated contexts using natural languages.
The sense here of the phrase 'held true' appears 
to be subtly but importantly different from that used by 
Davidson, when he says that "at an intermediary stage ... 
in giving form to a theory of interpretation ... the 
attitude of holding true ... , as directed towards sentences, 
must play a central role ...", and that "... it is the 
pattern of sentences held true that gives sentences their 
meaning" (Guttenplan, ed., 1975, p. 14 - his emphasis).
But he contrasts this property of sentences, as determined
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by individual attitudes, with that of being "socially", 
or "in fact", true (ib., pp. 17, 22): a contrast he
points more sharply in Synthèse (vol. 27, 1974, esp. 
p. 321) as that "between sentences held true by indivi­
duals and sentences true (or false) by public standards".
He thinks this distinction "essential to ... interpersonal 
... communication" (Guttenplan, op.cit., p. 22). In so 
far as a propositional attitude is involved in my own 
account of 'held truth', it is only that which is implied 
in the adoption of a particular empirical theory (such as 
an R-theory of a context): my method is to analyse the
theory independently of the attitudes or motives of those 
who adopt it. Where a GR-theory is adopted by the majority 
of some society, so as to acquire the status of a "public 
standard", it is no less appropriate to qualify its 
assignments or commitments as held true in that theory.
The relationship of this notion to a more general or abso­
lute concept of truth will be considered below, in 
Section IV.7, as part of a full discussion of theoretical 
structure in Part IV.B. This discussion goes far, I 
think, to articulate the concept of 'held truth', and to 
show why it is "central" to any account of meanings.
But something must be said at this stage, as part
of a specific discussion of the role of language, to
justify the introduction of the concept of 'theory' as
logically prior (in some contexts) to the understanding 
of language; which may be thought to accord too fundamen­
tal a status to that concept.
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(2) Theories as Fundamental Structures in Understanding
The notion being used here, of a 'fundamental 
structure in understanding', is to be sharply distinguished 
from the notion of conceptual or logical 'primitives' (as 
unanalysed components of a system); though closely asso­
ciated with it. It involves the prior intuition that we 
cannot be said to understand any aspect of experience 
merely in terms of collections of primitive entities or 
properties, regarded as constituting the subject-matter 
of our understanding (say, at a particular time and place). 
Understanding, on this view, necessarily involves apprehen­
ding some minimal array of relationships between these 
elements: the degree to which these relationships are
apprehended as forming related structures (as distinct 
from arbitrary sets or collections) may be plausibly put 
forward as a criterion of the extent to which these elements 
in experience are understood. This leads naturally to 
the notion of minimal structures, constituting the least 
complex systems of primitive relationships between primi­
tive elements, in terms of which an aspect of experience 
can be said to be understood. Frege's contention, for 
example, that the sense of a word is only determined in 
the context of at least one sentence, can be seen as a 
proposal to define the sentence as a fundamental structure 
in the understanding of language: involving the consequence
that not only the words, but the system of grammatical 
relationships in a language, according to which collections
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of words are formed into sentences, are essential primitives 
in an account of the language.
My analysis of the R-theories of concrete con­
texts can be seen as proposing the assignment [of character 
to ident) as a fundamental structure in this sense; which 
may be prior to, and even independent of, the introduction 
of linguistic structures into the context. Formally, a 
single assignment of a single character to a single ident 
constitutes a 'theory' - though a very weak one - since 
it satisfies the definition of an R-theory given at the 
outset of Part II, which itself satisfies the informal 
criteria for a theory given in the Introduction. The way 
in which such a minimal 'theory' might be constructed, and 
how it might be enriched by the introduction of a lin­
guistic structure, can now be illustrated.
Since such a one-assignment theory contains no 
linguistic structure, however, it cannot be brought into 
the context of this writing, by way of example, without 
being already extended by the addition of at least a one- 
sentence "language". I shall therefore form such a theory 
out of my own, immediate, wordless experience: and then
add a specific sentence, drawn from English for convenience 
- 'There is a red patch'. But this is not enough to form 
a complete GR-theory within which you, as reader, can 
understand the one assignment which formed my original 
R-theory. We need also a ^-function associating the 
utterance constituted by my writing the sentence above, 
with the original assignment. This involves, in some way, 
the further tacit implication, "... here, near me as I
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write" - a sort of Gricean implicature. In so far as we 
now have a GR-theory, its one commitment is to the assign­
ment of "redness" to some "patch". The existential com­
mitment carried by the words, 'There is is implicit
in the definition of an R-theory, so that its introduction 
in order to complete a grammatical sentence adds nothing 
to the structure (this aspect is discussed further under 
'ontology' below. Section IV.5.)
I am not characterizing the red patch as a sense 
datum, quale, irreducible percept, or any other type of 
entity belonging to any theory other than an R-theory in 
the terms of this study. I could as well have written 
'There is a red bus'. But my aim here is maximum simpli­
city and minimum restriction on the potential generality 
of the R-theory in the context of a more extensive theory. 
Nevertheless, in trying to bring my one-assignment theory 
into the public domain, I have had to introduce further 
elements into the context: the language, English, from
which my one descriptive sentence is drawn; the paragraph, 
and indeed the whole study, in which its meaning is located; 
yourself as reader. There appears to be some meaning in 
the sentence in this extended context, since we both know 
the lexical meanings of the words. This knowledge, I 
suggest-, comes for each of us from his or her experience 
of the use of English, alongside our own experiences of 
"patches" which can be called "red": which, in your case,
does not include the patch I meant. The particular shade 
of red, the shape and texture of what I mean in this case
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by a patch, all of which are precisely recognized in my 
original one-assignment theory, are not determined by the 
words. Someone with me in the room as I write, on the 
other hand, would have access to another source of infor­
mation, that of immediate perception. For her (let us 
suppose) this may be enough to complete, with the single 
sentence alone, a coherent GR-theory adopted by her and 
me as L-group (neglecting differences between our percep­
tual experiences). To make more certain, I might point, 
add further description, ask questions: none of which
will greatly assist a reader remote in time and place 
from this immediate context, who has access only to the 
linguistic elements and their transcontextual meanings.
My main point is that the R-theory I instanced 
above - before its linguistic enrichment - was extremely 
simple. As a fundamental structure, it was simpler than 
the same structure enriched by the addition of even one 
sentence and at least one other Reader. Nor do I see 
any reason to suppose that the linguistic enrichment in­
creased my own understanding of the original one-assign­
ment theory. The sentence by itself is also very simple 
as a fragment of language: a natural example of a funda­
mental structure in linguistic theory. But its meaning 
in isolation from actual recognition is only partially 
determined. Linguistic theories - lexical, syntactic 
or semantic - are concerned with aspects of meaning speci­
fiable for all contexts, or at least a large class of 
contexts. The missing component, with respect to the 
meanings of particular uses of sentences as récognitive
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reports, is the aspect of complexity, subtlety and detail 
in perception which varies from context to context, and 
from frame to frame: whose understanding is supplied not
by the words but by perception itself. We are close 
here to the problems raised by Wittgenstein's questions 
about the possibility of private experience or a private 
language: and these must be addressed before we attempt
further analysis of the contributions of language to con­
crete contexts.
(3) The Private Language Question and the Limits of Language
(References to 'PLA' in this subsection are to
The Private Language Argument, ed. O.R. Jones. The
initial quotations are from the late Notes of Wittgenstein,
translated and edited by Rhees.)
It is as though, although you can't tell me 
exactly what happens inside you, you can 
nevertheless tell me something general about 
it. By saying, e.g., that you are having 
an impression which can't be described.
As it were, there is something further 
about it, only you can't say it; you can only 
make the general statement.
It is this idea which plays hell with us.
(PLA 233)
Can one say: 'In what I say of someone else's
experience, the experience itself does not 
play a part. But in what I say of my 
experience the experience does play a part.'?
I speak about my experience, so to say, 
in its presence.
(ib. 235)
It seems that Wittgenstein continued, at least 
until very late, to be troubled by the common suggestion 
that there are some elements or aspects of experience
426
which cannot be expressed, or at any rate told to others, 
in language. One way in which he addressed the problem 
was through the question whether, if some experiences are 
inexpressible in ordinary language, there might be some 
other form of language in which they are expressible.
This immediately raises the further question 
how such a language might differ from ordinary languages. 
Wittgenstein's own first and simplest idea seems to have 
been that it differed in that the objects of reference 
of its referring expressions belonged exclusively to the 
experience of its user, so that these expressions would 
be meaningful to him but meaningless to others. These 
objects of reference were thought of as 'private sen­
sations'; hence the supposed language was called a 
'private language'. It is clear that Wittgenstein wished 
to dispose of the common belief in the first - which 
fitted ill with his general position - by showing that 
the supposition of the second is incoherent. The 
project failed: partly because showing that particular
accounts of a private language are incoherent does not 
prove the general principle; but, more seriously, because 
even the general principle would not dispose of the idea 
of inexpressible sensations, which most people find 
quite easy to grasp, if hard (of course) to put more 
explicitly into words. But the resulting explorations 
have generated much interest, and throw light on various 
possible accounts of the relationship between language and 
the rest of our experience.
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One obvious objection to the idea of a private 
language is that it would lack the most important property 
of languages, a power to communicate. Is this objection 
answered by pointing to languages of private record, such 
as da Vinci’s notes, or Ayer’s notion of a language 
invented, Adam-like, by Crusoe to name the unknown 
creatures of his island? Such examples largely miss the 
point, since we may reasonably expect that, in general, 
records which are ’private’ in such ways as these will 
nevertheless speak of publicly recognizable objects and 
properties, and to this extent could be made public by 
being translated or taught to others. But the question 
remains whether there might be residues in such a language 
which speak of areas of experience inaccessible to others 
(because in principle uninterpretable in terms of common 
experience, perceptual or other): so that their des­
criptions in that language would be untranslatable into 
communicative forms. If the idea of a private language is 
to be made coherent, then it must surely take the form of 
language of private record. This notion has been 
attacked (by Wittgenstein and others) on the ground that 
it places undue reliance on an individual memory, not only 
of the apposite use of an expression, but of earlier 
private experiences supposed to correspond with that for 
which it is immediately used (see e.g. Kenny, PLA 217).
But this weakness also undermines the use of public lan­
guage to describe experience remembered by isolated indi­
viduals. I shall later discuss further the ways in which
428
memory is involved in the construction of the linguistic 
elements in récognitive contexts generally.
One possible source of confusion is the use of 
the term 'private' both for experiences and for the language 
in which they are described, when it is by no means clear 
whether the concept of privacy applies to both in the same 
way. Kenny, for example, offers two interpretations of 
the term (ib. 215 f.). The legal word 'inalienable' 
suggests a property vested permanently in a named indivi­
dual. Of experience, it might be read as saying that it 
cannot be given or transferred, in itself, to another.
This is contingently true in our own world, at least for 
the generality of our sensations (to use Wittgenstein's 
term). I shall not explore the intriguing possibilities 
of a capacity, say, to feel the pain of others, whether 
in this world or some other. Sensations which could be 
literally shared could become public objects describable 
in public language, and would not present Wittgenstein's 
problem in the way our own world does so. Of language, 
'inalienable' has no obvious meaning, but might suggest 
the impossibility of transfer by teaching or translation. 
Kenny's second interpretation, 'incommunicable', seems 
equivalent to 'inexpressible' for experience: for
language, unless it is an odd way of saying 'useless for 
communication', it can, I suggest, only point to something 
like a silent language of thought - which will be briefly 
discussed below. An interpretation of privacy of 
experience we have already noted is that such experience
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is inaccessible to, or unrecognizable by, people other 
than those to whom it occurs. It does not follow that, 
to describe such experience for its "owner", a language 
must be inaccessible to others (in the sense given above 
p. 427 ), or even unrecognizable as language. In C- 
theory, we can point to the special case of a GR-theory 
consisting of just one R-theory, the L-group consisting 
of just one Reader adopting that theory, and the base 
language being a language of private record devised by 
that Reader as a means of maintaining and monitoring 
theoretical consistency throughout an extended R-sequence. 
There can be no a priori basis for an argument that such 
a language should be inaccessible to inspection by others; 
or even that they could not recognize it as a language, 
especially if the Reader tells them that is what it is. 
They still may not be able to learn to understand it, if 
some or all of its objects of reference are in principle 
publicly inaccessible or unrecognizable.
A model of such a language is provided by H-N. 
Castaneda's "Privatish"; a language which makes use of 
logical and other auxiliary terms from ordinary language, 
but all of whose concepts associated with objects of 
reference and their properties, and entailments involving 
these concepts, are publicly inaccessible (PLA 137 f.). 
Possibly to fend off such a development, Wittgenstein 
had progressively imposed restrictions on his own version 
of a private language: that it should share no terms with
public language, and even perhaps have a different logic
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(ib. 136, 158). Our analysis must lead us to agree with 
Castaheda that such restrictions are arbitrary, and make 
nonsense of the whole idea. It is impossible to see how 
such a language could be constructed or understood by 
anyone; moreover, the restrictions are quite unnecessary 
for a language merely to speak of publicly inaccessible 
subj ect-matter.
In its most extreme form the notion of a private 
language could, as I suggested above, be applied to a 
silent language of thought - which might most easily 
accommodate publicly inaccessible subject-matter. This 
would almost certainly not meet Wittgenstein's requirements, 
since he presumably would not have accepted that anything 
could be 'expressed' in such a language. Such a lan­
guage is indeed "private" in the sense of "inaccessible 
to others", given above, but the public attribution of 
thoughts to ourselves and others is common, and forms 
the basis of at least two existing approaches to the ana­
lysis of thought in terms of language: by Davidson (in
Guttenplan, (1975), S.C.Brown, ed., and Synthèse, vol. 27;
(Tboth of 1974) and Gilbert Harman (1973). Davidson con­
tends that the attribution of thought by one individual to 
another requires that both shall be interpreters of lan­
guage - though apparently not necessarily the same lan­
guage. This contention is raised in the context of a 
broad programme of 'radical interpretation' of the beha­
viour of others in terms of attributions of beliefs and 
desires: which sees this task as one of establishing
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correlations between such attributions and observed 
behaviour (i.e., intentional action). Loose analogies 
are offered with Ramsey's analysis of correlations between 
attributions of beliefs and desires, as expressed in 
terms of 'evidence' and 'perceived utility', in observations 
of betting behaviour. The central proposition is that 
only the interpretation of verbal behaviour can yield any 
"detailed" understanding of another's beliefs or desires 
(Synthèse, op.cit., p. 312). Davidson himself does not 
hold out much hope of a practical issue for such a pro­
gramme, as he frames it, and cannot claim it as more than 
a broad indication of a possible rationale supporting 
our common attributions of thoughts to people.
My own strategy, seen in this context, is to 
concentrate analysis on beliefs (in terms of theories 
adopted from time to time by individuals or groups): 
leaving motivations (desires) to be understood only as 
expressed in terms of the choices of elements, assignments 
and commitments for attention in context. Attributions 
of thoughts to others enter this scheme only peripherally, 
except to the extent that a Reader assumes that he and 
other members of an L-group are adopting a common GR- 
theory in some context: a policy dependent on the availa­
bility of a rational strategy of neglect of differences 
of belief and motivation (which can hardly be absent in 
any normal context). This account may be thought to 
give some precision to Davidson's firm acknowledgement 
of "... the need to view others, nearly enough, as like
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ourselves" (Brown, op.cit., p. 52; my emphasis).
But, if extrapolations from our own thoughts to 
those of others may be rationally undertaken, the argu­
ment that detailed understanding of others' thoughts depends 
on language, which is in general reasonable enough, does 
not involve the denial of non-verbal thought to others. 
Davidson is silent on this point, as far as I have been 
able to discover. But there is nothing in his analysis 
to exclude the possibility of non-verbal thought: he
denies only that it can be precisely attributed to others.
He points out, indeed, that all "standard ways of testing" 
interpretations of decision or preference make use of lan­
guage (Guttenplan, op.cit., p. 15): but it must be common
ground that attempts - however successful or otherwise - 
to construct quantified theories of such matters must 
employ verbal instructions, and verbal (or verbalisable) 
responses: together with that crucial assumption of near­
enough likeness between human beings.
Harman, by contrast, though he restricts analysis 
on pragmatic grounds to attributions of verbal thought, 
contends only that we sometimes think in words, saying 
explicitly that "... not all human thought is in words.
Our conception of ourselves in the world is more like a 
map than a story; and in perception our view of the world 
is more like a picture" (op.cit., p. vii; and see also 
pp. 84, 182/3). He rejects, as I would, Ayer's pronounce­
ment that it is "analytic" for him that unless a thought 
were expressed in words he would not allow that it was a
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thought (Ayer (1969), quoted op.cit., p. 58). It may be 
that less visually-minded people will find Harman's 
account strange. But I am in no doubt that if I try to 
work out a way to reorganise the furniture in my room for 
some practical or aesthetic purpose, and even to consider 
changing or adding items, I do so wholly or largely without 
using words; and that this activity is properly called 
thought. If I wanted to make my thoughts accessible to 
others, it would be natural to supplement words with plans 
or drawings, to bring out aspects not readily or precisely 
captured in words: "I thought of something like this."
Nor need non-verbal thought, on this account, be restricted 
to visual subject-matter; the "something I thought of" 
might be a musical phrase (if I were talented that way).
At first sight, however, it may seem impossible 
to carry out a serious analysis involving non-verbal 
thought, rather than merely to seek to invoke general 
intuitions about it. Harman, indeed, makes no such 
attempt, confining himself to speaking "as if" a language 
of thought exists, whose "sentences" are "niental states" 
attributable by statements about attitudes of belief, fear, 
questioning, etc., with respect to publicly utterable 
sentences, supposed to represent thoughts (I shall not 
discuss his notions of 'representation' or 'symbolism').
He claims, plausibly, that the logic of such attributions 
clearly follows that of attributions of attitudes with 
respect to sentences which are quoted from actual public 
utterance by those (including oneself) to whom these
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attitudes are attributed.
But it is a short step from the lines of argu­
ment considered here, to a less than bold supposition 
that the relationships between linguistic and non-linguis- 
tic structures in thought are logically parallel to those 
between similar, publicly perceptible structures of which 
they think, in any particular context. Broadly speaking, 
these relationships have been exhibited, for what I have 
called concrete contexts, in terms of a function, formed 
as part of each particular GR-theory, from conventional 
rule-governed structures (drawn from one or more socially 
and historically constructed languages), into structures 
of assignment and commitment built of elements not 
belonging to such languages. Both sets of structures are 
understood as perceptually recognized in context. If, 
as I suppose, we typically rely in such contexts on verbal 
and non-verbal sources to supplement each other in our 
common understanding (each potentially providing infor­
mation not given by the other), the same may be reasonably 
assumed typically true of thought about verbal and non­
verbal aspects of concrete situations. (This assumption,
I can say from personal experience, is fundamental to film­
makers' understanding of their craft. We think of - and 
in - pictures, sounds, words and music as distinct and 
complementary resources from which to generate and assemble 
meanings.) Thus, many recognized assignments or commit­
ments in a typical context are not functionally associated 
with any utterance: and, where some utterance is
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functionally associated with a non-verbal condition, it 
is typically used to impart additional information deri­
vable from further associations with past uses of the 
words. I take this to hold for thought as for perceived 
conditions.
Being conventionally constructed, the linguistic 
structures and their potential relationships with other 
structures must be learned, whether by practice or from 
instruction - whatever innate faculties may be involved 
in the process. In any particular context, the precise 
functional correspondence must be specifically constructed 
within the relevant GR-theory, using the participants' 
memories of past usage.
In this account of the role of language with 
respect to non-linguistic recognitions, anything which might 
be called a 'private language' would appear as a special 
case: in which the social 'group' constructing and using
the language would consist of just one person. While 
this may strain the use of the word 'convention' - inter­
preting it as a set of decisions by this person to stick 
to certain rules of association on all occasions of using 
the language - there seems to be no obvious principle, in 
what has so far been said, to exclude this case. While 
interpersonal communication is unquestionably the most 
important role of language, private record is also a per­
fectly valid one: not depending in any obvious way on
previous use of the same structures in communication.
Learned associations with past usage are no less available 
in such a case.
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I should be inclined to follow those who, like 
J.F. Thomson (PLA 168) suggest that Wittgenstein himself 
did not take private language very seriously. He just 
wanted to deny the possibility of private experience, 
but found that every argument against forming a coherent 
theory asserting this possibility was also an argument 
against a theory denying it (ib., 103). The most he 
could do was to point to the apparent hopelessness of trying 
to discuss it. But discussion does not seem to be as hope­
less as he thought (and perhaps Davidson, also). The 
essential question, in the light of the above considerations, 
is whether some (especially perceptual) information, which 
is part of individual experience, is in principle irre­
coverable from past associations with the use of language 
(public or private, uttered or thought) - whether or not 
the language is being used, in its presence, to fix atten­
tion on it, allowing perception to supplement the verbal 
information. If so, we may go on to ask in what sense it 
may be appropriate to regard these non-verbal aspects as 
contributing to the meanings of the words or sentences 
involved. How, for example, do we know whether a 
colour-word 'means' the same colour for different Readers, 
or for the same Reader at different times? The answer 
seems to be that we do not: but that we find that in many
cases we can neglect whatever differences of meaning there 
may be, without being faced with contradictions. Now sup­
pose that in some cases the difference cannot be safely 
neglected: how would contradictions show up, and what.
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if anything, would they tell us about the meanings of the 
associated linguistic structures? I shall draw an illus­
tration from the context of colour-blindness, a phenomenon 
which is quite well understood.
Colour-blindness is not a form of blindness any 
more than tone-deafness is a form of deafness. It 
means only that the affected person fails to distinguish 
certain colours from one another, either as well as those 
with optimum colour vision, or, in extreme cases, at all. 
The commonest form is red-green blindness, which affects 
about 8% of European males to some degree, 2% of males 
totally, and females less frequently. To screen candi­
dates for jobs where colour discrimination is important, 
there is a system called the Ishihara test, consisting of 
a set of cards each of which is printed with an all-over 
pattern of small patches of colour so that, to take the 
simplest case, someone with optimum colour vision will 
distinguish one outline, say a letter A; while someone 
with total red-green blindness will see another, say a 
letter B. (Incidentally this brings out something about 
boundary discrimination which is relevant to my general 
thesis about the recognition of ident boundaries by 
character-differences: its explanation may also help to
make sense of the example. To distinguish a particular 
segment of visual boundary it is necessary that both (a) 
there is a perceptible difference, e.g. of colour, between 
the regions on either side; and (b) on at least one side 
there is enough perceptible similarity between different
438
sub-segments for the boundary to be seen as continuous.
If Bill is red-green blind he will fail to see the A on 
our Ishihara card because he fails to see that the colours 
on one side of its outline are on the whole redder, and 
on the other generally greener. Less obviously, Alf, 
with good colour vision, will fail to see the B that Bill 
sees, because his discrimination breaks up the boundary 
into irregular reddish or greenish blobs which are lost in 
the general mixture of colours.)
For my example I suppose a possible world which 
is like our own in almost every way, except that there is 
only one red-green blind person. Bill. Everyone else, 
including Bill's friend Alf, has perfect colour vision. 
Since they have no trouble with colour-blindness, there is 
no Ishihara test in this world. Bill, not wishing to 
seem stupid, has so far got away with pretending to see 
like other people, having learned that leaves are called 
'green' and bricks 'red', and so on (as many people do in 
our world). Then an Ishihara card drifts into this world 
from a passing space-ship, and Bill picks it up.
ALF: 'What is it?'
BILL: 'It's a funny-coloured card with a B on it.'
ALF (looking): 'That's not a B, it's an A.'
What do they make of that?
1. The example brings into sharp focus something
that Wittgenstein refers to when he says, "... people, 
as we say, sometimes see different things, colours, e.g., 
looking at the same object" (PLA 271/2, my emphasis).
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(He goes on to argue that ’sense datum’ language is unhelp­
ful in such a context.) In my example we should surely 
say, quite naturally, that Alf and Bill are both seeing 
the same object, the card; but that they see on it not 
merely different colours but different things, the A and 
the B. (In the language of C-theory these would be idents; 
the A in Alf’s frame and the B in Bill’s.) This suggests 
to me that the ordinary language of ’seeing’, perfectly 
adequate for most ordinary contexts, neglects a great deal 
of information about what, when we study the matter, we 
find to be involved in visual recognition; information 
which may be important, and therefore not to be neglected, 
in particular contexts. Generally, apart from pure 
research, it is only when things go wrong - as with Alf 
and Bill - that we need to go beyond simple statements of 
who sees what, to more sophisticated theories to account 
for apparent discrepancies between individual recognitions.
Sense datum language belongs to a vague philoso­
phical theory about the structure of perception, including 
vision. Its relationship, if any, to current scientific 
theories - psychological, physiological, physical - is not 
at all clear. It would presumably say of Alf and Bill 
that their dialogue becomes easier to understand on the 
supposition that they each construct their perceptions on 
distinct sets of sense data, such that they agree that 
they see a variously coloured card, but disagree about a 
major feature of it, namely the letter to be seen printed 
on it. Wittgenstein rightly says that we should not speak
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of 'seeing a sense datum' (same, or different, for that 
matter - see PLA 273); the alternative, 'having a 
sense datum, and saying ...' (ib.), leaves out anything 
the theory may have to say about how propositions about 
objects, etc., may be constructed upon sense data. That 
is to say, this alternative language neglects the main 
thesis on which the theory is built; understandably, in 
Wittgensteinian terms, since there seems little or nothing 
to be said about it, except to assert that it occurs, as 
Russell did.
Wittgenstein further suggests (272) that if we 
use a 'theory of sense data' to explain discrepancies in 
the 'language-game of seeing', we ought to apply it in all 
cases, whether or not there is a discrepancy. This is 
misleading if it is taken to mean that, if we accept the 
theory, we must modify our language of seeing for all con­
texts. It is as if, after Copernicus, we could not 
admire a sunrise without saying, "How beautifully the 
earth's rotation reveals the sun's disc this morning."
We use the simplest language that meets the needs of the 
context, neglecting irrelevant complications. He is also 
wrong to imply (if I understand him) that the adoption of 
a sense-data theory would generate some doubt or systematic 
scepticism which is not already implicit in the ordinary 
language of seeing. If we sometimes see different 'things' 
while looking at the same 'object', why not always? 
Theoretical entities like sense data are introduced into 
the context not to generate doubt, but to make sense of
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situations where doubt has already been generated.by dis­
crepancies in the naïve account. There are arguments 
against sense-data theories - in particular their vagueness 
and lack of empirical content - but the creation of doubt 
is not one of them.
There is nothing, indeed, to prevent us from 
forming theories about each other's sensations involving 
publicly inaccessible entities. Whether we call them 
sense data, retinal images, stimulations of the visual 
cortex and corpus collosum, or whatever, will depend on 
what theory we are using; as will whether or not we think 
it relevant to call them 'private'. Evidence for their 
recognition, or for the truth of statements about them, 
may be thinner than for simple public objects; and will 
vary in doubtfulness with different theories about dif­
ferent types of sensation. In this they are on a par 
with theories about the atoms, quarks, etc., of which all 
public objects may be supposed physically constituted. 
Current theories of perception or sensation, rich in 
entities which are not publicly accessible in any ordinary 
sense, are now increasingly well established. They do 
nothing to disturb our ordinary use of the language of 
seeing, or to sow doubt of our capacity to see, but help 
us to understand the structure of visual recognition, 
including the phenomenon of colour blindess; even if they 
do not say just what 'sensations' are.
Wittgenstein himself seems not to have been 
averse to speaking of 'sensations' as distinct from public
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objects. If Kenny is right (PLA 224) he thought the 
language-game to be ’precisely the game of expressing sen­
sations'. What he thought he should forbid was any 
reference to them apart from their public expression, by 
means of propositions claiming to be 'pictures' of them, 
or perhaps facts about them. I shan't discuss his reasons 
for the present, but return to Alf and Bill in their 
troubles.
2. They quickly establish that Bill has not gone
crazy, and that he can still tell A's from B's in the
ordinary way. He is driven soon to admit that he has
always had a little difficulty in understanding what 'red' 
and 'green' were about. So they go to a local science- 
teacher who sets up a few tests. They reveal that Bill 
can't distinguish what other people call red or green, or, 
for that matter, their mixtures in the yellow-brown range, 
though he can distinguish any of these from blue.
Released from his pretence, he invents the word 'gred' 
for what he sees when others say they see red, green, etc.: 
Bill's colour-world consists of gred and blue, and inter­
mediates which he calls greddish-blue and bluish-gred.
His readings of blue are close to those of the general popu­
lation (judging by his reports under test), and he can of
course distinguish light from dark in gred as well as in 
blue. His use of these terms is consistent.
Alf, then, can soon learn to use 'gred' correctly, 
and talk to Bill about it: he just uses it for any colour
which is not blue or neutral (white-grey-black). But does
443
he know what Bill means when he says "gred"? As I 
understand it, Wittgenstein would have to say No. At 
least Bill can surely not be said to know what others 
mean by "red" and "green". But even he is eventually 
taught to use these words appropriately, with the help 
of a pair of filters prepared by the science-teacher and 
marked R and G. If a patch of gred is darkened by looking 
through R and not G, he calls it "green"; if by G and not 
R, "red"; if equally, "yellow" or "brown" according to 
whether it is initially light or dark. With practice 
he astonishes everyone by coming up, correctly, with 
"olive-green", "reddish-brown", "orange", and even "purple" 
(bluish-gred darkened by G). But does he now know what 
others mean by these words? And if not, how can he know 
what the words mean? For Wittgenstein, this would induce 
an odd mismatch between 'meaning' and 'use'. We must 
look further for the full account of meaning.
But Bill surely knows what he means by 'gred'.
Is he speaking a private language? Certainly not one 
which meets all Wittgenstein's stated criteria; but 
one which could count as a very diluted 'privatish', à 
la Castaneda, relying heavily on public elements, but 
fully understood only by Bill himself. The full meaning 
of Alf's colour-language is equally inaccessible to Bill. 
Bill's language counts as privatish and Alf's as public 
just because Bill is in a (very small) minority. Of 
course the reasoning in this account depends critically 
on empirical conditions (contingent truths) found in our
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own world, and transferred selectively to Bill's. But 
it is the role of language in worlds which are like our 
own, in respect of the determination of meanings, which 
concerns us here.
3. If I am rightly convinced by Kenny's analysis,
the 'picture' theory gives the relevant account of Witt­
genstein's own understanding of what he called the 'fit' 
between language, and 'facts' in the extralinguistic world. 
It relies on an analogical notion of comparison; we 
compare our sentences with features of the world just as 
we compare (representational) pictures with the features 
they represent, to see if they are "true pictures".
Another analogy he uses is that of measurement : "Propo­
sition and situation are related to one another like the 
yardstick and the length to be measured" (Notebooks, 29 
Nov. 1944, quoted by Kenny, PLA 221). Even "the sense in 
which an image is an image is determined by the way in 
which it is compared with reality" (Blue Book, quoted by 
Kenny, ib., 223: my emphasis). But the analogies are
very loose. A proposition is typically perceived in 
quite a different way from the perceptual situation, if 
any, to which it may refer. We cannot lay one against 
the other and register correct matching even as directly 
as we do between a picture and what it represents; which 
is less directly than we match a yardstick with anything 
it may be used to measure. The case of the image is the 
more tricky for being more plausible, at least in some 
senses of 'image'; a visual image, say on the retina, may
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be very like a picture. But even this cannot be compared 
alongside that which it may be supposed to represent 
(though there are some interesting cases in which visual 
recognitions can be compared, in some sense, with, say, 
tactile recognitions of what are taken to be the same 
objects). But Wittgenstein was in fact considering an 
"image" of remembered pain. His implication is that this 
example is radically more problematic than the image called 
up by the expression 'a black eye' (or, perhaps, the 
expression itself, considered as an image). Suppose 
the visual image is meant: how is it compared with reality?
The expression 'the letter on the particoloured card' 
calls up different images for Alf and Bill. They yield 
different referring expressions, 'A' and 'B'. To check 
(as if they wouldl) they compare with 'reality' - presu­
mably the card. They still differ. Are they both right? 
How could they be wrong? What sort of a test is this?
It seems natural to say that, in some sense, they per­
ceive different 'images' of the card; what each checks 
is a remembered (evoked) image against an immediately per­
ceived image. But how are these compared? And what 
does the result tell them? There seems to be no way 
in which either image can be compared with any reality 
beyond the perceived images of Alf and Bill - each of them 
comparing only his own images. If we call these images 
'reality*, we have to say that reality is different for 
Alf and Bill. If anything is logically impossible, this 
is. We are, I suggest, inevitably thrown back on some
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theory which provides a structure linking features of 
reality, images and expressions as different types of 
elements; restricts ’comparison’ at most to elements of 
the same type; and explains the ’fit’ or correspondence 
between elements of one type and another in some other 
way.
In scientific contexts, it is reasonably well 
understood that correspondences in each context are 
recognized within the framework of a chosen theory of that 
context, with explicit assumptions and internal rules. 
Comparisons may be made between perceived images, of 
carefully selected features in rigorously controlled con­
ditions; and between expressions. Three kinds of expres­
sions are of special interest here; particular statements 
about image-comparisons, which we may call ’readings’; 
more general statements about the (supposed) 'real* situ­
ation, which we may call 'findings'; and statements of 
the hypothetical assumptions or 'commitments' of the 
theory (generalized over a class of contexts). In the 
terms of this study, readings are to be understood in 
terms of a base-language of a GR-theory of which the rele­
vant perceptual image-comparisons are carried out within 
the récognitive structure of the context (with all its 
incorporated commitments). Connecting these three types 
of statement are the logico-mathematical rules of infer­
ence. Higher-order terminologies integrate the base- 
language of the readings into the total language of the 
theory. Comparisons occur (inter alia) between readings.
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between findings, and most critically between findings 
and readings, especially where findings entail 'predic­
tions' for readings.
The more developed and sophisticated the theory, 
the longer and more complex, in general, are the chains of 
reasoning between readings and findings. My suggestion 
is, of course, that a similar structure, greatly simpli­
fied, informs our ordinary contexts of recognition, 
reasoning and inference, and our use of the expressions 
of ordinary language in these contexts: the place of
'images' being taken by non-linguistic recognitions.
4. In the light of this suggestion, we may go on to
explore Wittgenstein's problems about the special status 
of pain. How does the récognitive evidence for the 
finding 'Bill is in pain' differ in principle from that 
for 'Bill sees gred' - or, for that matter, 'Alf sees 
red'? It seems to me that the steps to 'Bill is in pain' 
from 'Bill says he is in pain', 'Bill looks [or sounds) 
as if he is in pain', or 'Bill is having 150 volts put 
through his arm' have precisely similar theoretical 
structures to those for 'Alf sees red' from 'Alf says he 
has a sensation of red', 'Alf is looking at a red object', 
or 'Alf is having light at 55°A shone on his retina'.
(Note that the case of the 150 volts would require no 
expression of pain from Bill.) In respect of inacces­
sibility to outside inspection. Bill's sensations of 
colour do not differ as proper subjects for theoretical 
findings from his sensations of pain, or, for that matter.
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the state of his liver - or the contents of a closed book 
or box. The critical differences are between the struc­
tures of theory used in each case to reach these findings.
As has been pointed out, some aspects of others' 
sensations are covered by theories (of more or less tech­
nical sophistication, or just commonsensical) which are 
more or less secure. Verbal reports by the "owners" 
of sensations are the largest single class of sources of 
evidence for these. These may be supplemented or super­
seded to a greater or less extent by collateral obser­
vations (say, of neural electricity or retinal chemistry) 
for whose relationships to sensations some causal or 
statistical theory has been developed; they do not only 
relate to non-verbal 'expressions' or behaviour by the 
owner. Pain is more problematic than most sensations 
in this respect, for purely contingent reasons. The 
rules of the corresponding language-games aim to conform 
with the relevant theories of the contingent 'facts' in 
each case. No such theory, however, can rule out the 
existence of aspects of others' sensations not covered 
by that theory. This bears out the common intuition 
(which Wittgenstein seems to have unwillingly shared) that 
there are some aspects of our own sensations - in what­
ever sensory mode - which are not caught by either our 
own verbal-reports, or correspondences with other theore­
tical correlates.
This restriction presumably applies to our own 
verbal reports to ourselves (memories, records, diaries, 
etc.) as well as to others'. Nor can non-verbal memories
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or records (including photographs or sound recordings) 
be exempted from this limitation. My analysis suggests 
that all these, too, can only be understood at any frame 
of any context in terms of the state-of-the-theory at that 
frame. Such a theory may, presumably, be "private" in 
the sense that at least some of the entities and proper­
ties with which it deals are in principle inaccessible to 
others. If, as this would imply, there are typically 
aspects of our own sensations which are not covered by any 
such "private" theory, the problem (in this world) of the 
inaccessibility of all sensation to any but immediate 
individual inspection is both vastly greater in scope, 
and much less disturbing, than Wittgenstein thought. 
Notwithstanding this limitation, we have been able to con­
struct a considerable network of more or less coherent 
and reliable theories about the world, including theories 
about other people's sensations. We are forced to use 
our own sensations as the only evidence for the character- 
structure of others’. But the cumulative evidence for 
the recognition of an apparently objective and consistent 
structure of idents, in all contexts, by virtue of these 
character-structures (with rare anomalies like the case 
of Alf and Bill) strongly supports confidence in these 
theories. Other theoretical structures, especially in 
psychology and biology, do much to reinforce this confi­
dence.
It must be faced, I think, that nothing but our 
individual direct experiences of them is available to
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inform us of what these récognitive character-structures 
consist, or how they are generated (presumably in the 
brain). But one avenue remains for fruitful exploration: 
the question how, within these experiences, reliable 
theoretical correspondences are built up between verbal 
and non-verbal structures.
(4) The Understanding of Language in Concrete Contexts
In a paper on Grades of Theoreticity (in Foster 
and Swanson, 1970, pp. 2,3) Quine offers a 'black box' 
theory of human observation in which the 'input' to the box 
consists of neural 'stimuli', and the 'output' of 'testi­
mony' - in the form of 'observation sentences'. The 
process of observation itself takes place inside the box, 
inaccessible and unanalysed (elsewhere he uses the same 
fairly well-known metaphor for the hypostasis, in physics, 
of unobservable entities like neutrinos or quarks). He 
prefaces this proposal by excluding from consideration, 
as the raw material of observation, the kinds of units 
of sensation, "red patches" and so on, we have already 
met as features of various attempts at the ultimate 
atomic analysis of perception or appearance. His argument 
against them (one also used by Anthony Quinton in Warnock, 
1967, p. 68) is that they do not usually figure, as such, 
in our understanding of what we observe; they tend to be 
recognized only in rather specialised contexts of art, 
psychology - or even philosophy. But this argument does
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not go against the account of perceptual recognition given 
in this study, where the structure of récognitive 'atoms’ 
is determined by the R-theory of the context in each case. 
"Red patches" appear here, as do "red buses" or "red 
traffic-lights", each in their appropriate contexts, 
functioning as 'R-atoms' if and only if the Reader neglects 
their proper enclosures as distinct elements. No exper­
tise is needed, for example, to recognize a red patch on a 
white shirt, in a suitable context, as evidence for a wound 
From this point of view, it may come to seem perverse to 
regard the elements of ordinary perceptual recognition as 
more abstruse than neural stimuli, which only occur in 
rather specialized neurological or psychological contexts. 
Stimuli are themselves unobservable, the evidence for their 
recognition depends on sophisticated instrumentation and 
incorporated theory. We do not see or hear stimuli any 
more than sense data; most of us do see red patches, hear 
dogs bark - and must use our eyes to read, or our ears to 
hear, sentences before we can even recognize them as lan­
guage, let alone as statements reporting observation.
It is neither gratuitous nor unhelpful to distin­
guish the perceptual from the theoretical factors in the 
recognition and understanding of language. In concrete 
contexts - where each individual's learning of language 
begins, and language itself almost certainly originated - 
this analysis places language alongside the structures of 
which it speaks, as parallel but recognizably distinct 
aspects of the same general type of experience. The
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black box is still there, but its input and output are 
now more theoretically compatible; language occurs both 
as input (heard, read) and output (spoken, written).
This, of course, is how the system has been presented 
above (Part II, Section G ). The relationship between 
verbal and non-verbal experience has been exhibited, not 
as comparison in Wittgensteinian terms, but as the recog­
nition and adoption of a reference function 4* between 
elements of these two types of structure, from context 
to context. The 'practical ability* we learn, as 
Dummett put it, is not some overall function 4»; though 
part of it is the capacity to form 4>-functions for con­
texts as they arise and develop. Dummett accepts, more 
than most, the dynamic aspects of meaning. "Not every 
aspect of use is sacrosanct," he says; all usages are 
"open to revision". Further, "the grasp of the content" 
of a statement "is not, in general (a matter of) verbali- 
sable knowledge" (1978, p. 220). We learn to use lan­
guage as we learn to use other constructional materials 
- to choose their elements and to put them together - to 
serve each new purpose of our own; and to recognize the 
purposes and meanings of these assemblies when put 
together by others.
Materials and methods of assembly vary from cul­
ture to culture, as well as from context to context.
Within each culture, most of the materials and methods 
of construction for language (its lexicon and grammar) 
become a matter of conventional agreement, though the
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system is not static. It is a conventional structure of 
this kind, developed for use over a wide variety of con­
texts, which has come to be called ’a natural language'. 
Each individual's understanding of such a language is 
built up from nothing - except perhaps an innate capacity 
to construct such an understanding - starting, as I said, 
from experience of parallel recognitions of verbal and 
non-verbal structures. Though much is common, each 
individual's experience of language use is different, 
and associated with different structures of non-linguistic 
experience. Most important, each new context, and to a 
lesser extent, each new frame of each context involving 
language use, calls for an appropriate form of the #-func- 
tion to be at least reconstituted from memory, and fre­
quently extended by analogy with previous usage. Non- 
linguistic experience plays at least as fundamental a role 
as linguistic in this process of constant construction and 
reconstruction. Communication between speakers of the 
same natural language becomes increasingly difficult as 
their non-linguistic experiences diverge; in spite of 
the power of convention, linguistic usages tend also to 
diverge. It seems inevitable that large parts of non- 
linguistic experience escape capture in the resulting 
structure. What might rather surprise us is that linguis­
tic convention builds strongly and consistently enough to 
allow the foundation of philosophical theories of human 
understanding on the results. Where, on this account, 
are we to look for these foundations?
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An early casualty of this somewhat Heraclitean 
account of the development of language, coupled with an 
almost Protagorean insistence on learning from the world 
of sense, might be thought to be any Platonic or realist 
approach to the forms of language. The relevance of such 
an approach to the theory of meaning is critically dis­
cussed by Dummett in a paper of 1963, published in his 
Truth and Other Enigmas (1978), but partly repudiated in 
the introduction (ib., xxx). He identifies it in the 
original paper with a contention that meanings, especially 
those of mathematical statements, may be known indepen­
dently of any evidence for their truth. Such a position 
does not appear to be wholly excluded by the above analysis 
We could say that Platonic forms, or their modern equi­
valents, belong to an ontology of substantive theory 
which claims to be an account of aspects of the reality 
underlying and informing the world as experienced through 
the senses: not to the ontology of récognitive theories
of the contents of sense experiences themselves. There 
could be some sense in which knowledge of such substantive 
theory could be shown to be constructed independently of 
the evidence of sense, as pure speculation constrained 
only by reason and the honest search for truth. But 
empirical knowledge is taken in this study to consist of 
systems combining substantive and récognitive theory, re­
lating the elements of the two corresponding ontologies 
by accounting for recognized appearances in terms, often, 
of unrecognizable, hypostatized structures claimed as real. 
Ideally, these last exhibit principles of constancy.
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conservation and rational perfection, typically expressed 
in mathematicl form, and reconciled with recognized 
appearances only by strategies of approximation and neglect 
of minor error. This relationship between two kinds of 
knowledge is not far remote from the thought of Plato 
himself; though he only allowed Socrates to accord the 
title of knowledge to an idealised form of the first.
This emerges clearly in the Theaetetus (where idealised and 
measured equality of lines are specifically contrasted), 
and in the Sophist. More must be said later about the 
two kinds of theory we have distinguished, how they may be 
combined and to what extent one may be independent.of the 
other (esp. Section IV.5). At this point we are concerned 
only with the relevance of such an analysis to our under­
standing of language.
We may suppose a fully developed natural language, 
as understood by suitably educated speakers, to include 
terms and constructions appropriate to both kinds of theory 
- which we may for the moment call substantive and récog­
nitive language respectively. Some terms and many con­
structions are likely to belong to both. But we might 
expect to find some terms or constructions of substantive 
language to speak only of elements of the ontology of sub­
stantive theory, and relationships between them, and so to 
be understood independently of any understanding of récog­
nitive language (but not independently of sense experience 
of substantive language itself). No natural language, 
however, can be supposed to consist only of substantive 
language, excluding all terms or constructions of récognitive
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language: and, if not, no platonic-realist theory of meaning
of the kind criticised by Dummett could be expected, even 
at best, to apply to more than a restricted part of natural 
language. This is not the place to discuss a possible
world in which a substantive language could be not only
understood, but formed, independently of sense experience 
of the forms of language themselves; not surprisingly, it 
is easier to frame the proposal in words than to imagine 
its fulfilment. Our business here is with the language 
of concrete contexts, and for this purpose we can find some 
aspects of the intuitionist account (as discussed by Dummett, 
op.cit., 215 ff.), which we should readily adopt, though 
we are not directly concerned with the mathematical ques­
tions it was devised to deal with.
We must agree with the intuitionists that language
is to be considered first and foremost (of not exclusively) 
as a means of communication between individuals; and that 
much insight is gained by looking at the ways in which it is 
learned by individuals. But most important for us is 
Dummett's insistence that it is implicit in the intuitionist 
account that the ultimate foundations of meaning are to be 
found outside language itself, if we are not to become 
trapped in an infinite regress (ib., 217). To put it 
slightly differently, they are to be found at the interface 
between language and extralinguistic experience.
This last implies that, at least for the language 
of concrete contexts, the ultimate structure of meaning 
resides at its interface with non-linguistic récognitive
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structures (whether or not analysed in the precise terms 
of this study); and it is here that we might therefore 
look for any fundamental restrictions on possible struc­
tures for language itself. These restrictions will cut 
across all particular conventional systems of natural 
language, in so far as they speak of perceptual recog­
nitions. Two complementary approaches suggest themselves, 
corresponding to those discussed in Section IV.1: start
with particular languages (or groups of languages, such as 
the indo-european) and hope to discover a common structure 
suggesting how their speakers organise their under­
standing of concrete experience; or start with the analysis 
of récognitive structures, including the recognized forms 
of language in context, and investigate their systems of 
correspondence between linguistic and non-linguistic 
elements.
Consider the well-known situation described by 
Quine: an anthropologist goes to live with a previously
isolated tribe and sets out to learn their language. If 
he sees his task as primarily one of compiling a dictionary 
matching terms of the unknown language with those of his 
own, he is already assuming certain similarities of struc­
ture which may or may not obtain. Beyond what might be 
called the rock-bottom theory of meaning, that the natives' 
vocalisations (or some of them) are meant to say something 
about the content of their experience, including percep­
tual recognitions, just how much, and what, similarity of 
structure is he entitled to assume? I am not about to
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attempt anything like a comprehensive answer to this 
question, but certain pointers based on C-theory may be 
of interest.
So far my account of the structure linking lan­
guage with non-linguistic experience has been limited to 
the supposition of a function 4 taking statements of an 
ideal base-language into (simple or complex) assignments 
or commitments in the non-linguistic structure of the GR- 
theory of any particular context. These statements have 
further been supposed to have a fundamentally sentential 
form, which has remained unanalysed except for the proposal 
that it should be understood as normally constituted, at 
the simplest level, of a suppositive and appositive phrase 
in each atomic statement (not necessarily in that order). 
The suppositive phrase is that part of the utterance which 
will have the effect of picking out and drawing attention 
to a set of one or more idents for each R-frame of which 
the statement speaks; the appositive phrase, that which 
either adds or subtracts one or more characters to or from 
the set previously assigned to the set of idents picked 
out; or expresses a more general commitment with respect 
to the characterization of idents so picked out, over one 
or more R-frames. (I am neglecting, in this general 
account, the complications regarding negation, discussed 
above, pp.212f.)
From the linguistic point of view the most impor­
tant aspect of the analysis is the resulting claim that all 
structures of assignment or commitment can be shown equi­
valent to recognitions of specified structures of
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intersection between F-sets (of idents), each of which is 
completely determined at each R-frame of a context by a 
specified set of characters (or character-cluster). The 
suppositive phrase of any utterance must determine a suf­
ficient cluster in context to pick out what may be loosely 
called the "subject" I^set: while the appositive phrase
in that utterance determines one or more Insets and their 
structures of intersection with the subject set (together, 
if necessary, with elements determining a time-sequence 
structure) so as to constitute a "predicative" construction. 
It has been claimed that all relevant syntactical cate­
gories (such as the nouns, adjectives, verbs and adverbs 
of indo-european languages) may be in principle subsumed 
in such an analysis. Thus, the main task of constructing, 
developing or learning a language for récognitive contexts 
is seen to be the progressive association in memory with 
each of a chosen set of terms (or expressions) of a chosen 
set of characters.
The construction of this set of terms (that is, 
those directly involved in characterizations) and of the 
set of characters associated with each term will be generally 
(but not exclusively) cumulative; as will the construction 
of a set of R-theories which will be (more or less well) 
remembered as having determined particular subsets of the 
characters associated with each term as being involved in 
particular ways in certain kinds of context. (In Section 
IV.1 it was argued that the subset or cluster of characters 
associated with any term in a particular context is
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typically only a small part of the totality of its asso­
ciated characters; nor is such a totality necessarily 
consistent or unequivocal, for any one term, except under 
contextual restrictions.) This kind of memory-structure, 
together with the recall of associated forms of syntactic 
construction, is here supposed to be essential to the 
fulfilment in practice of any individual's native capacity 
to form 4-functions for récognitive contexts involving 
language use, as they arise and develop. [Any individual 
may, of course, acquire memory-structures of this kind for 
elements of two or more natural languages, with or 
without associated schemes of translation; and for more 
specialised languages.)
There may be a loose sense in which an indivi­
dual's memory-structure for a particular language may be 
called a 'theory of meaning' for that language. But, 
except perhaps in the case of a specialized technical 
language, the structure is likely to be very diffuse, and 
never held in the mind as a complete or coherent system. 
Completeness and consistency of understanding is reserved 
at best for the linguistic structures of particular con­
texts, as parts of entire GR-theories of those contexts. 
Such understanding is not, in any case, to be regarded as 
a philosophical theory of meaning, which should rather, I 
suggest, be concerned with principles governing relation­
ships between linguistic and non-linguistic structures in 
general; complemented by philosophical studies in the 
semantics of particular languages or language-types.
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These considerations direct attention imme­
diately to the nature of language as a social enterprise: 
implicit in the intuitionists’ emphasis on its function 
as a means of communication. Our interest here in the 
structures of meaning in particular récognitive contexts 
has thrust this aspect rather into the background; 
though it was acknowledged, for example, in the analysis 
of GR-theory, by the stated assumption that the individual 
Reader draws upon pre-existing resources of language which, 
to some degree at least, transcend particular contexts. 
Mainstream philosophical semantics has also, for different 
reasons, had little to say about the social aspects of 
language construction or development; accepting existing 
languages rather as ready-made structures, specified in 
terms of the competences of particular speakers or inter­
preters. I have suggested that this specification is 
circular (above, p.396 ): in that speakers and interpreters
are defined for this purpose only as members of communities 
using the relevant language in each case.
The more purely linguistic aspects of the pattern 
of social and historical construction involved are beyond 
the scope of this study. But enough has already been 
said to suggest ways in which C-theory might offer a new 
perspective on such questions, leading to a greater stress 
on the relevance of the associated historical development 
in a community of systems of empirical theory (in the 
broadest sense). This relevance seems to have been most 
clearly invoked, so far, in Putnam’s account of ’natural
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kind terms’ (1970, cited above, p. 405 , where it was 
emphasized that these developments are expressed in the 
lexical rather than the syntactic structures of a lan­
guage) . It is in terms of such a developing body of 
theory, associated with particular lexical terms, that we 
should account for Kripke’s observation that certain 
properties can come to seem necessarily true of any object 
describable by a given natural kind term (Davidson & Harman, 
eds. 1972). But our emphasis on contextual variations 
in the level and content of theories associated with 
particular lexical terms would point to a looser association, 
placing less universal reliance on ’experts’ than Putnam, 
and restricting Kripke’s concept of necessity to certain 
special contexts - a position closer in spirit to Searle’s 
account of the associations of proper names with ’clusters’ 
of characteristics forming a ’descriptive backing’ (1969, 
pp. 170/1). Natural kind terms are distinguished - 
explicitly by Putnam - as those which are most closely 
associated with well-established bodies of theory; and 
the specially tidy patterns of meaning which thus accrue 
cannot be generalized to other types of usage.
Again, Chomsky's important observations on the 
facility with which infants acquire linguistic skills, 
pointing to possible genetic factors in the construction 
of languages, would be understood in C-theory rather in 
terms of innate capacities to form theoretical structures 
in which words and sentences have specific tasks to per­
form, embodied in 4-functions : the requirements of these
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tasks being seen as the only universal restriction on 
actual linguistic forms (apart from certain motor and 
récognitive skills). Some indications of the way this 
might work have been given, but I can pursue the matter 
no further here. The topics which remain for discussion 
will therefore be considered not so much in terms of lin­
guistic structures, as of the relationships between the 
theories expressed.
B. The Understanding of Theoretical Structures
(5) Ontology
I take the ontology of a theory to be the struc­
ture of elements of whose relationships it undertakes to 
articulate an understanding, and whose existence it there­
fore either presupposes, or deduces under its logical 
system. (It is convenient to speak of 'a theory' doing 
all these things, although in this study we must never 
quite forget the persons who acquire these commitments 
in adopting particular theories.) Ontology, as a philo­
sophical topic, would thus be the study of theories in 
terms of the types of elements they seek to account for, 
and the broad relationships supposed to obtain between 
different types, in the case of any theory which concerns 
itself with more than one. It is in principle possible 
to distinguish different kinds of existence, according 
to the kinds of theory concerned. For example - remem­
bering Kripke's interest in the question - there seems no
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reason to discriminate against the notion of a fictional 
existence, accounted for in works of fiction by more or 
less well articulated theories whose structures are much 
like their counterparts in non-fiction, or in ordinary 
attempts to understand what is going on.
C- and R-theories are concerned solely with what 
I shall call objective existence. This may be subdivided 
into récognitive and hypostatic existence, our interest 
in the second being restricted to the hypostasis of 
elements involved in explanations of récognitive struc­
tures. Extrapolated or fictal elements may be récognitive 
(in principle recognizable, if they exist) or hypostatic. 
The claim to objective existence is taken to be always 
present in these theories, though its strength depends on 
the structure and performance of the (G)R-theory in each 
case, and the relevant characteristics of the Reader or 
L-group adopting it. R-theories are concerned only with 
récognitive existence, except in so far as hypostatic 
elements may be treated as recognizable in virtue of incor­
porated S-theory (e.g., the counting of electrons in a 
Geiger-counter). C-theory is committed to the existence 
of R-theories constructed by Readers in all well-understood 
récognitive contexts (each with its own ontology): in
the special conditions of the writing of this study, this 
involves extrapolation from my own experience, which is 
claimed to be objectively analysable in this way as far 
as it is relevant. The question of the relationship of 
objective existence, as understood in C- and R-theories,
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to any suggestions about what 'really exists' in an abso­
lute sense - and therefore located in some ultimate theory 
of reality - will be briefly considered at the end of this 
study.
Particular ontologies are on this account com­
pletely relativised to theories; but so as to lead to 
some different general conclusions from those of Quine's 
account of 'ontological relativity' (1969). Quine, 
presumably wishing to dispel any illusion that some 
absolute, theory-independent categorization of ontic 
commitments is possible, says at the outset that "... it 
makes no sense to say what the objects of a theory are, 
beyond saying how to interpret that theory in another ..." 
(p. SO). This might appear to rule out not only any 
extra-theoretical statement of "what" the objects of a 
theory"are", but also any statement of this sort within 
the theory itself. If this is to hold good, some restric­
tion must be placed on the kinds of categorization to 
which the rule applies, or we shall prohibit any theory 
from classifying its own elements, which cannot be 
intended. If one theory is used to comment on the ele­
ments of another, the ontologies of the two theories may 
overlap or not. Theory A may say that, for A, none of 
the objects of theory B exist; that some do, but not all; 
or that all do (as is the case with C-theory's treatment 
of R-theories). A can say nothing more about those 
elements of B that do not exist for A - though there is, 
of course, nothing to prevent anyone who understands both
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theories (or thinks he does) from saying which B-elements 
do not exist for A, and why, or even attempting "trans­
lations" (as it were ) of B-elements into A-elements, if 
necessary in some third theory whose ontology is understood 
to cover both. The question of overlapping ontologies 
can obviously generate great theoretical complication, 
especially where different forms of existence may be in 
question; but it is unproblematic for C- and R-theories.
But although (for example) the elements of the 
ontologies of instantiating R-theories exist, in prin­
ciple, for C-theory, C-theory says nothing about them in 
the language (if any) of these R-theories, except by way 
of illustration. Nor does it adopt, as commitments of 
its own, the commitments of these R-theories with respect 
to their elements, many of which could be in contradic­
tion as between one R-theory and another. This would 
exclude from the obligatory commitments of C-theory, amongst 
other things, R-theoretical classifications : C-theory
can compare R-theories in which "a whale is a fish" and 
"a whale is a mammal (and therefore not a fish)", without 
being involved in contradiction, although whales, fish 
and mammals all belong (in principle) to the ontology of 
C-theory as elements in its analysis of these theories.
If (as seems plausible) we can generalise from this to all 
metatheoretical analysis of ontologies, it is only in the 
contents of their ontologies that analysed theories need 
be 'subordinate' (Quine, op.cit., p. 51) to the analysing 
metatheory: not in terms of their classifications of
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elements of these ontologies. The language of the meta­
theory is typically more abstracted (as is C-theory), 
using general terms or variables for which elements of 
subordinate theories are in principle substitutable in 
particular instances. These substitutions are governed 
by the ontic commitments of the 'subordinate' theories, 
which to this extent determine the ontology of the meta­
theory. On this account we should look for ontological 
analysis to sophisticated theories of this kind - mostly 
in philosophy books - rather than, in Quine's terms, the 
"full interpretation" of a theory"relative to our own 
words and ... to our overall home theory" (op.cit., p. 51) 
or, in an earlier version, our "over-all conceptual scheme, 
which is to accommodate science in its broadest sense" 
(1960, p. 17). These notions seem to owe much to the 
idea that natural languages somehow encapsulate definitive 
systems of theory, of which I have already noted that it 
would prevent people from arguing for opposing theories 
in the same language [so putting philosophers out of 
business).
On the other hand, the ontic commitments of 
empirical theories generally involve more than questions 
of language. We may suppose that the ontologies of par­
ticular theories can be analysed out by so formalising its 
statements that we can identify those variable-predicate 
pairs which come under the scope of existential quanti­
fiers. But the implication is clear: to find the values
of the variables and the meanings of the predicates, we 
must look outside the language of the theory, to the
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structures of elements it seeks to account for (unless it 
is a metalinguistic theory whose ontology includes only 
linguistic elements - which excludes nearly all science).
But the relationships between the language and other 
aspects of a theory are not clearly articulated by Quine, 
nor are those between broad phenomenalistic, physicalistic 
or other conceptual schemes and particular theories with 
different ontologies which may be formed within them.
If these aspects of our intellectual resources are kept 
distinct, it becomes clear that a theory may draw freely 
on common natural, or even scientific, languages without 
being thereby restricted to any prior commitment, ontic 
or otherwise; and that it may appeal to any available 
conceptual scheme, or invent one of its own, to categorize 
the form of existence it claims for its elements. This 
is not, of course, to say that a theorist can hope to be 
taken seriously, or even to increase his own understanding, 
if he builds without close attention to accepted language 
uses and the relevant theoretical claims of others. But 
the flexibility of language - the extensibility of its 
meanings through analogy and metaphor, in particular - is 
a condition of human creativity, including the invention 
of new and possibly better theories to account for objec­
tive phenomena. It carries the price that the most deter­
mined pursuit of the unequivocal cannot succeed outside 
narrow limits. It will be argued that much of the authority 
of physical measurement comes from its relative success 
in this pursuit. Leaving questions associated with more
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sophisticated theories till later, we must now return to 
the consideration of ontology at its simplest, récognitive 
level.
It seems to be common ground for many that the 
ontology of a theory can, indeed, be determined by analysis 
revealing the scope of existential quantification in that 
theory. To this, Lesniewski adds the interesting claim 
that any simple predicative statement (or 'thesis') of 
any theory can be shown, when analysed in terms of the 
canonic language of his systems, to carry some existential 
commitment for that theory. It is on this ground that 
he categorizes a system of predicate logic, carried out in 
this canonic language, as an 'ontology' (Luschei, 1962, 
esp. 144 ff.). The underlying intuition here seems to 
be that it makes no sense, within a theory, to make simple 
predicative statements about entities which do not exist 
for the theory. To capture this intuition, the canonic 
language ('L') of the system has certain special features: 
(1) A basic semantic category of terms whose reference 
is unequivocally fixed by the context, so that each is said 
to 'name' a 'distributive class' of one or more entities 
which exist for the theory under analysis (not for the 
predicate logic itself, which carries no ontic commitment). 
Though called 'nouns', these cut across all syntactic 
categories capable of determining appropriate classes.
This suggests a sympathy with the view, expressed above, 
of the partly arbitrary structure of many syntactic forms, 
as actually developed; and an emphasis, accordingly, on
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the structure of what is described rather than that of 
natural languages. (2) A simple predicative statement 
is of a higher semantic category, being formed from two 
nouns of the first category by the use of a ’verb' term 
as functor. This verb-term effectively acts as copula, 
so that the first-named class is stated to be included in 
(or identical with) the second. (3) Though for conven­
ience (and within the canonic rules) I have used the 
language of 'class' here, it can be dispensed with in L 
without loss of meaning; all classes named in this way 
are also 'individuals' of the system. A predicative 
statement need not mention classes, and its interpretation 
does not necessarily involve concern with them. (4) The 
'distributive' class named by a noun has as elements 
just those elements named; in this, it is contrasted with 
a 'collective' class, which includes as elements or 'ingre­
dients' all parts of those named elements without restric­
tion. Lesniewski's system of mereology concerns only 
collective classes. (5) In line with Lesniewski's exis­
tential claim, no empty distributive or collective class 
is permitted in the system. Although L contains an 
expression for 'null concept', which has the status of a 
noun, it names neither individual 'non-entity' nor 'empty' 
class (Luschei, op.cit., p. 164). It cannot, therefore, 
appear in any simple predicative statement of L.
I give here this highly condensed account of 
some of Lesniewski's principles (which are explicitly 
'constructivist' and 'contextualist^) because they draw
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attention to certain points of common interest, in a 
framework which combines the utmost rigour with some 
intuitions shared by C-theory. In this study, the 
attempt has been made to reflect these intuitions in the 
language of standard set theory. The F-sets of C-theory 
are to all intents and purposes distributive classes of 
Lesniewski’s system, and although no terms of a contex-
n
tual base-language L correspond with his canonic nouns,
c
the sentences of L are taken to state assignments or 
commitments which are in principle analysable in terms 
of intersects of these F-sets - although, like the state­
ments of L, they need neither be stated nor interpreted 
in these terms. Further, for all x, every simple state­
ment of the form P/x must be read with the axiomatic 
conditions that f(x) is non-empty, and (VP)^x)(xeS a P/x ); 
so that every such statement brings with it existential 
commitments, and an utterance stating the assignment carries 
the same commitments for the utterer. Though the sentence 
'The rose is red' does not in itself entail the existence 
of any rose or any property of being red, its truth con­
ditions in any context include the existence of some rose 
and a character red which satisfy it, so that their exis­
tence is part of its meaning; and use or utterance of it 
is standardly understood, and intended, to imply that 
existence. Again, where the expression '0' appears in 
a commitment as analysed in terms of Insets ("No rose is 
blue": ^ose  ^  ^lue  ^ » this cannot require the
existence of any recognized empty set (0 is not a F-set,
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no F-set is empty). What is meant is that a F-set inter-. 
section formula which under some specifications determines 
a set of idents, under some particular specification in 
some particular context determines what it is formally 
convenient to call a 'set', but with no members, hence 
the 'empty set'. No ident so specified is recognized in 
context; either no such entity is present, or, if present, 
it is neglected; either way, no such ident exists for 
the R-theory concerned, so that the use of '0' carries no 
existential commitment. '0' never appears in any simple 
assignment.
Though this analysis is restricted here to con­
texts of perceptual recognition, carrying commitments to 
objective existence for their elements, there seems no 
reason to doubt the possibility of extending a similar 
analysis to theories of other kinds, as it affects their 
ontologies. In comparison with Lesniewski's systems 
(which, to some extent at least, were invented to exorcise 
Russell's paradox), what stands out is that analysis of 
the whole/part structure (that of 'composition', espe­
cially of F-sets) is carried out within the logic of what 
he calls distributive classes - in contrast with his 
mereology (of collective classes) which he categorized 
as 'extralogical'. Again, though Lesniewski claims that 
his two systems can be used together in the analysis of 
many kinds of structures, including what I here call 
concrete contexts, he provides no indication, such as is 
given here, of the structure of contextual theory relating
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composition to characterization.
A special feature of the ontology of C-theory 
which may, finally, call for further justification, is 
its use of two distinct types of primitive elements: 
the idents and characters. It is unusual (but not 
unique) to quantify over properties, and even more so over 
both entities and properties. There has been a natural 
impetus towards a single fundamental class of elements 
in terms of which all others are defined, whether ident- 
like 'objects’ or 'individuals' (in Quine's term, physi­
calistic), or character-like 'qualia' (similarly, pheno­
menalistic) . Some pragmatic justification has already 
been offered for the dual system; but something more 
fundamental is needed, specially as I have now explicitly 
claimed for both the same, objective, form of existence.
The ultimate basis of justification lies in the distinct 
form of relationship of these two types of elements 
with respect to time and space.
Given that R-theories are to a large extent 
inductive, like all empirical theories, and that induction 
appeals to past experience for the understanding of present 
and future, many commitments of these theories by neces­
sity attach themselves to structures recognized as time- 
persistent. All major implicative commitments of an R- 
theory - those which give it meaning and internal cohesion 
- are attached to (sets of) idents, and rest on the pri­
mary commitments to the identity through time of these 
idents. (The form of these primary commitments will be
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further considered in the next Section.) Structural 
commitments with respect to (sets of) characters serve 
only to determine the boundary structures of idents, frame 
by frame. Although many characters are indeed recog­
nized as "the same" in successive frames (or in different 
idents), it was pointed out above (p.97f.) that this same­
ness is not to be interpreted as strict identity, but as 
recognized by neglect of differences. This neglect was 
further justified (ib.) by reference to the logical conse­
quences of assignments of the relevant characters to 
idents, as carriers of inductive commitments. These 
assignments typically vary from frame to frame; time 
sequence itself being recognized in terms of changes in 
character-structure associated with persistence of 
ident-structure.
Spatial structure, on the other hand, is recog­
nized solely by discrimination of characters. The des­
cription of idents as 'spatially-bounded entities' is not 
to be read as implying that spatial-boundedness is some 
sort of additional, universal property of idents; rather 
that we gain our notions of extension in space from recog­
nizing the manner in which these entities, whose boun­
daries are determined by their changing character-clusters, 
are distinguished, disposed and separated from one another 
at any one time. Since the set of idents assigned a 
given character, and the set of characters assigned to a 
given ident, both vary, no attempt at reducing either to 
the other promises an increase in formal elegance to balance
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the certain loss in intuitive clarity.
The way in which this dual structure of recog­
nition has in practice affected the structures of asso­
ciated languages is far from simple. I shall give only 
brief indications here. It has been argued above (p. 459) 
that words are integrated into the structure of recog­
nition by association with clusters of one or more charac­
ters. Since the function of language includes the hand­
ling of temporal as well as spatial information, semantic 
categories (where these are clearly distinguished) tend to 
be developed accordingly. Some terms become associated 
with large clusters of characters such as are typically 
assigned to only one, or a few, ident(s) in each context 
of their use; others with clusters of one or a few 
character(s), typically assigned to larger sets of idents; 
yet others with typical changes of character-assignment, 
including that of positional character, to one or more 
idents. Syntactically, in indo-european languages, the 
first are, broadly, names or nouns; the second, adjec­
tives or process-verbs; the third, verbs of change or 
motion, and their modifiers, including adverbs. Time- 
related information may be partly handled, as in indo- 
european languages, by use of the third category; or, as 
in sino-japanese languages, Lesniewski*s semantic/syn­
tactic categories of terms (like 'in two years' time', 
'yesterday', or 'at Easter') which modify whole sentences 
rather than particular words; or by means of more complex 
constructions. It is perhaps for this reason that the
relative simplicity of the récognitive structure, suggested
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by its analysis in terms of the dual ontology of idents 
and characters, has to some extent become obscured. In 
particular, the structure of individual characters is 
not generally or readily reflected in words; hence the 
borrowing of the term ’character' from zoology, where 
(as pointed out above, p. 100 ) pictorial illustration is 
often used to complete the vaguer indications of the 
written word.
6. Identity
The relativising of the concept of identity, as 
it appears in this study, to particular contexts of theory, 
in which stress is laid on the theoretical autonomy of 
the individual Reader, may seem to involve a denial of the 
important metaphysical role accorded to it by many philo­
sophers. Special interest has recently been stirred by 
David Wiggins (1980); and I have devoted attention to 
many of the questions he raises, as they impinge on my 
analysis. A full account of the emergent issues would go 
beyond my present scope. But a few of the main points will 
now be discussed.
(1) The apparent relativism of my account is purely
epistemological. Within each context of theory the pro­
posed structure of identity is strictly Leibnizian - more 
strictly, it seems to me, than most in the literature. 
Underlying the rigour of this account is an intuitive com­
mitment to the view that it is a precondition of the truth
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of any theory as an account of any aspect of reality that 
its understanding of the structure of identity, for the 
elements of its ontology, is fully articulated and self- 
consistent. The account takes on a relativistic aspect 
because our theories handle only the contents of very 
limited fields of awareness and attention, in each of 
which our understanding is partial and fallible.
This aspect is largely irrelevant to Wiggins, 
who is primarily concerned to elucidate the concept as it 
affects the proper use and understanding of language in 
statements of identity, whatever the epistemological 
grounds (if any) of such statements. Nevertheless, there 
are considerable areas of common interest, and much agree­
ment in these areas. One of Wiggins’ main motives is to 
defend a strictly Leibnizian account against what he 
categorizes as a form of ’identity relativism’, but one 
very different from my own. This view, originating with 
Geach, supposes, roughly, that it may be proper to say of 
two entities (or one entity?) x and y that they are (it is?) 
identical under one concept and not another. To take the 
classic case, something called ’Cleopatra's Needle' may be 
the same "landmark" or "monument", but not the same "piece 
of stone" as occupied the same place 100 years ago - if 
the stone has since been replaced, gobbet by gobbet, with 
concrete.
Such a proposition, for me as for Wiggins, is an 
example of the way language can be used to generate con­
fusion. I would agree with him that it is to be elucidated
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by pointing to an ambiguity in the use of the name. If 
by 'Cleopatra's Needle' we mean an archaeological relic, 
whose importance as such reposes in its continuity of 
material and precise shape, then today's Needle is not 
the same as the one originally brought from Egypt. If 
we mean only a structure recognizable more or less by its 
striking outline, whose property is to stand continuously 
in the same place as a guide to mariners and other visitors, 
then it remains the same.
The difference between our perspectives leads me 
to be less surprised or concerned than Wiggins and others 
in face of such ambiguities. Our use of language gener­
ally relies heavily on surrounding clues (récognitive or 
otherwise) to determine which of many characters associated 
with each of the principal terms we use are to be under­
stood as selected for attention under our theory of the 
context. In difficult cases, this may call for a good 
deal of qualification or explanation: "This is the same
monument, but its material has been completely replaced.
We still call it 'Cleopatra's Needle'."
(2) It has already been pointed out that 'natural
kind' (NK) terms are specially distinguished as those with 
which, at any particular social/historical juncture, a 
well-understood common theory is typically associated.
It is therefore to be expected that they will be relatively 
unambiguous when used in a straightforward, non-figurative 
sense. Thus, a statement understood to assign any parti­
cular ident to membership of a NK goes a long way toward
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determining the whole of its relevant characterization in 
any context (independently of which specific characters 
are selected for attention). It does not, however, 
precisely fix its identity, if more than one ident of the 
context is a member of the kind. Wiggins' arguments 
against 'identity relativism' lead him to concentrate on 
the point that an assertion of identity under one NK 
concept is inconsistent with its denial under any other 
concept: and to propose that, for every properly formed
identity statement, there is some 'substance sortal' (NK 
term or not) with respect to whose concept this principle 
holds.
From the epistemological standpoint of C-theory, 
however, characterizations associated with such substance 
sortais are neither universally necessary nor generally 
sufficient for complete identifications in concrete con­
texts. They are not necessary in all cases, since an 
entity unique in the universe, and identifiable over time, 
may well fail to fall under any concept other than one so 
broad as to be inadequate for Wiggins' purpose (such as 
'heavenly body' or 'art object'). More generally, they 
are insufficient where they characterize more than one 
ident in context. Here, it is obvious that characters 
shared, e.g., by members of a natural kind, cannot serve to 
tell members of the kind apart; we may often have to fall 
back on positional characters or their associated values 
in such cases (above, p.llSf). Generally, we are led 
to distinguish very carefully between different aspects of
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.the structure of characterization which may be involved 
in considerations of identity: such as 'individuation'
(short of distinctions between individuals); 'genidentity' 
(where more than one term picks out the same entity); 
spatio-temporal continuity; and unique characterization 
as strictly recognized or understood. C-theory yields 
clearly distinct formal structures for each of these; 
but they must be omitted here.
(3) In the case of sortais denoting artefacts (like 
"pots" or "clocks") the background of common theory is 
much more context-dependent than is the case for NK sortais 
Wiggins acknowledges some of the difficulties, but his 
emphasis in such cases on "either a principle of activity, 
a principle of functioning or a principle of operation" 
suggests potential sympathy with an analysis in terms of
a theory of the context (op.cit., p. 70, his emphasis: 
later, this is glossed to include the purpose an artefact 
is made to serve).
(4) Another area of sympathy between Wiggins' 
analysis and my own is an overriding concern with spatio- 
temporal continuity, and the notion of a unique 'life- 
history' as central to the concept of identity. In both 
accounts, this concept is taken to be primitive, prior to 
an analysis which can only elucidate or articulate the 
manner in which it is found to enter understanding. The 
fact that in C-theory the 'life-history' of a given ident 
is shown as relative not only to a particular (G)R-theory, 
but to the changing state-of-the-theory over time, merely
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reflects the necessary concern of epistemology with the 
partiality and fallibility of our understanding. Again, 
the underlying commitment is that any true theory must 
determine a unique life history, unique over time, for 
each spatio-temporally continuant entity (ident) of its 
ontology. Questions about the 'truth' of theories or 
their statements are considered in the following Sections.
(5) A similar effect of the difference of perspec­
tive may serve to protect my account, at least partially, 
from Wiggins' condemnation of analyses which present time 
as 'cut up into slices' - which he regards as inconsistent 
with a primitive notion of identity involving temporal 
continuity. The 'R-frames' shown as constituting time- 
successive aspects of the structures of (G)R-theories are 
purely heuristic devices of the metatheoretical account, 
designed to reflect the way in which people seem to have 
to organize their understanding of changes in characteri­
zation, even where they are perceived as continuous, into 
successive intervals or instants. It is, in fact, totally 
neutral with respect to any ultimate physical or metaphy­
sical theory of the structure of time itself: and any C-
theoretical account of time measurement is likely to exhibit 
it as a means (similarly neutral) of organizing this under­
standing of succession in a mathematically regular way.
(6) Where C-theory is likely to diverge most markedly
from Wiggins' account is in its handling of problems of 
identity associated with changes of part/whole structure 
over time, of which Cleopatra's Needle is only one of the
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simplest. These have attracted a great deal of attention 
from Wiggins and many earlier philosophers, from classical 
Greek times onward. My analysis of such structures in 
terms of 'composition' makes such cases relatively easy 
to articulate - reflecting the ease with which most of 
them are handled in ordinary life - provided we allow the 
concept of identity to be associated with composites and 
their bound-idents, as well as individual idents. This 
has two main consequences of a novel kind. We must be 
prepared to extend to composites the capacity to preserve 
their identity through changes in structure and character, 
already granted freely to individuals (like caterpillars 
and butterflies): and, secondly, we must be prepared to
accept for identification some unfamiliar aggregates 
(provided their composition and life history is clearly 
understood), without being surprised that they are not 
associated with any tidy pre-existing concept, or conven­
tional covering term of language.
(7) Truth, falsity; held-truth, held-falsity; and error
I have argued that meaningfulness is a precon­
dition for the truth, or held-truth, of a sentence; and 
that the meaning of a sentence, as uttered or understood 
in any particular context, is in general dependent on a 
theory of that context involving that sentence. That 
is to say, the truth of a sentence, at least in a concrete 
context, is dependent on an empirical theory of the parti­
cular context, and not only on a general theory or
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understanding of the language from which the sentence is 
drawn (as would be widely accepted).
In attempting to analyse the appropriate logical 
structure for the truth or held-truth of utterances, we 
therefore start from the position that, in the conditions 
of this analysis, no sentence can be true without also being 
held true or false in some well-formed theory: but the
converse, of course, fails. Some special cases will help 
to elucidate the consequences of this position. I shall 
confine myself to the consideration of simple 'statements', 
as this term was explicated in Part II, Section G: that
is, sentences understood by utterer or interpreter as 
stating some simple assignment or commitment of the rele­
vant theory.
Plainly a statement may be held false in some 
theory and nevertheless be true exactly in the meaning in 
which it is understood in the theory: if we come to know
this, the theory will be to that extent falsified. An 
intriguing consequence of this is that I may utter a sen­
tence, holding it to be false, as if it were true - inten­
ding to deceive - but my utterance may nevertheless be 
true. I shall fail in my intention to lie; and although 
I have not in the ordinary sense been "speaking the truth", 
my hearer may hear the truth. He may safely adopt what 
he hears as 'held true' in his own theory of the context, 
and need never know that I am morally a liar. In due 
course I may learn of my error, and revise my theory, but 
will not thereby become truthful.
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Equally subtle may be the case where a statement 
is held true in one theory, while the same words, as under­
stood in another theory, are held false (and may be either 
true or false). In the example given in Section IV.4, the 
crew-member on the boat might shout, "The water is clear," 
meaning the hydrographic sample in his hand; while the 
skipper, thinking him to mean the channel, and that there- 
forewhat looks to him like an obstruction must be a trick 
of the light, may ring full speed ahead - placing the 
boat, unknowingly, in the hands of fate.
The subtlety of such cases increases if one of 
the alternative meanings of an ambiguous phrase can be 
thought 'better' than others, or indeed a 'standard meaning'. 
If someone says, "Socrates is not dead", meaning his old 
English sheep-dog, we might say he should make his special 
meaning clear, if he is not to be accused at least of 
speaking fancifully. But my analysis suggests that the 
notion of 'standard meanings' - especially of proper names 
- is treacherous.
A good candidate for a sentence with a fully 
determined standard meaning is the stated commitment,
"(All) whales are mammals": it could fairly be said that
anyone saying this, even with false or inadequate know­
ledge of what it means, would be uttering a sentence with 
a unique standard meaning, which in that meaning is - 
perhaps even 'necessarily' - true. Two points must be 
made here about cases of this kind. The first is that 
they are special cases precisely because their terms 
(usually scientific or technical) do point specifically
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to particular contexts of theory: and that no general
account of truth can be based on special cases. The 
second is that not even our best theories are completely 
watertight, and that no clear borderline can be drawn 
between those theories we may hold absolutely or certainly 
truth-determining, and the rest. A general account of 
truth in concrete contexts should not, therefore, draw 
the line between one empirical theory and another, but 
between truth and held truth relative to theories in 
general. With this in view, we can go on to consider 
the appropriate logical structure, distinguishing between 
the different concepts concerned. For this Section only,
I shall write 's' as a variable ranging over statements 
of a base-language L of any given empirical context,
'T(s)' for ' s is true', *”^ (T(s))' for ' s is false', '0(s)' 
for ' s is held true', and ’”](9(s)J' for ' s is held false' 
in a given theory of the context. The following axioms 
are proposed for a theory of the logic of these expressions 
tl. 1  (T(s) A "]T(s)) 
tZ. 6(s) V ~]e(s) 
t3. 1  (8(s) A l6(s))
Corollaries: given s such that 0(i) ->-* ”l0(s),
(i) 1  0 (s) 0(s) -M- 0 Cs)
“ | 0 ( s )  V ~ l 0 ( 5 )
I— “1 0 (s A s)
Notes :
(a) The expressions “| (T (s)) and “] (9(s)) have been used,
rather than distinct expressions for s false or held-false
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since, assuming tl - 3, the logical relations between 
truth and falsity are such that this captures more simply 
and perspicuously what is to be understood. The broad 
intuition is that it is senseless to hold the same utter­
ance at once true and false - meaning its negation is 
true - and that, although it is possible to have different 
strengths of commitment to the (held) truth (or falsity) of 
an utterance, it is senseless to be totally or partially 
committed to its partial truth, or partial falsity.
(b) Two kinds of relationship can be derived from
tl - 3 between held-truth under a given theory and truth 
tout court (in some sense, 'absolute* truth - see note (c) 
below). The first comes from taking tl - 3 together and 
concluding that, for its truth or falsity to be in question 
under tl an empirical utterance must be held-true or held- 
false in some well-formed theory whose logic is governed 
by t2,3; but that any utterance may be held true or false 
without being either true or false. I.e., the theory 
concerned may fail of a grasp of reality in such a way 
that some utterances properly made within it nevertheless 
do not make statements which are absolutely either true 
or false. Intuitively it seems clear that this frequently 
occurs in empirical theories (it has certainly done so in 
the past) in cases which cannot be recognized in the terms 
of the relevant theory. This does not say that such 
utterances are meaningless. Indeed, they cannot be utter­
ances of a well-formed theory if they lack meaning; but 
their meaning is associated with a structure of held-truth, 
and not of absolute truth.
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Bivalence, then (following Dummett's terminology 
in his (1978), pp. xix ff.), holds for empirical utterances 
in terms of held-truth under t2, but not in terms of 
absolute truth. At the same time, no third value is 
allowed in tl - 3, so that the principle of 'tertium non 
datur* is built into the system a priori. Allowing for 
minor differences in notation and subtle differences in 
interpretation, Dummett's intuitionistic formulation of 
this principle emerges in corollary (iii) above. It 
cannot, of course, be claimed that any argument here rules 
out valid analysis using a range of true-to-false, or 
held-true-to-false, values: only that a full, subtle and
well-articulated analysis of varying strengths of commit­
ment to held-truth can be achieved without this compli­
cation, in terms of mutually inconsistent extrapolations 
each consistent with a master-theory (see the treatment of 
probability above. Section III P).
(c) The second, and more fruitful, form of relation­
ship which can be proposed between truth and held-truth. 
under this analysis is that, at least with respect to 
empirical matters, the structure of absolute truth is to 
be seen as an idealisation of that of held-truth - an 
ideal form to which all theory aspires. In this version, 
standard logical analyses are interpreted as theories of 
the logical structure of omniscience - of a total theory 
of some universe or other, in which all questions of truth 
and falsity are determinate and settled. What knowledge, 
exactly, is to settle these questions is left open. It
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is usually said, rather, that such analyses are independent 
of knowledge of these matters or the means by which it may 
be obtained. Logical theory indeed is not, and must not 
be, dependent on particular structures of empirical know­
ledge or the means by which it is obtained. But this 
should not, I think, mean that its relationship to knowledge 
and its construction can be ignored, and I can certainly not 
ignore it here.
On this second interpretation, then, we shall 
find that in the ideal, "limiting" condition which I have 
called omniscience, T-values and 0-values become one and 
the same: tl and t3 collapse into a single axiom: bivalence
and tertium non datur hold for truth as for held-truth.
There can be no place for half-truths, varying strengths 
of commitment, or probability-values.
Meanwhile we must expect that actual empirical 
theories will continue from time to time to breach either 
t2 or t3. Breaches of t2 will show up, if at all, as 
cases of meaninglessness or ambiguity: utterances which
fail to make a clear statement properly held either true 
or false under the theory as it develops. Breaches of 
t3 will similarly show up only as error within the theory 
- to be dealt with in one or other of the ways outlined 
above (pp. 228 ). We have noted that much uncertainty
can be contained by systems of alternative extrapolations 
(note (b) above). Much that eludes our grasp can be 
managed by systematic neglect: a rational refusal to hold
certain possible utterances either true or false. These
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are devices to keep t2 and t3 inviolate while construction 
continues.
This account is, of course, quite incomplete, 
leaving many important questions open, but it would be 
inappropriate to attempt to take the matter further here.
It has seemed necessary, however, to give some indication 
of the way in which these topics could be approached from 
the standpoint of this study. It remains to say something 
about the structure of theories within which the logic of 
held-truth is thought to apply; and the status of measure­
ment contexts in this structure.
(8) The structure and foundations of empirical theory
The central philosophical question about empirical 
theory concerns the rational basis for claims to recognize 
and understand aspects of reality. I shall use the term 
'induction', following widespread usage, to describe the 
method on which I take all such claims to rely: accepting,
at the same time, that all attempts to extract a distinctive 
system of 'inductive logic', alongside standard prepo­
sitional logic (or the logic of 'held-truth' as just pro­
posed) , seem fated to founder for lack of what Popper calls 
empirical content. This critique will be further invoked 
and examined later. The same applies to attempts to found 
induction on some form of logic of probability: dis­
cussions of this subject above suggest that their failure 
may be due to misunderstanding of the concept of probability
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itself, which seems to have more to do with strengths of 
commitment to alternative models within a given theory, 
than with the inductive structures of that theory. Faced 
with the evident historical success of inductive method 
in physical science, in apparent disregard of an absence 
of sound logical structure, some have sought to provide 
philosophical justification, short of logical rigour, for 
the recognition of this success. My own instinctive res­
ponse to this situation is to accept the success as its 
own rational (not moral) justification; in the sense 
that it is rational to suppose that the success has a 
rational explanation. It justifies not only the method, 
but the continued employment of philosophers in trying to 
analyse its structure.
It seems perverse, for example, to appeal to 
some a priori principle of regularity in the universe as 
a support for induction; rather, the success of induction 
in a particular field of inquiry is evidence for regu­
larities in the field investigated (even if these regur 
larities turn out to be a matter of the statistics of 
randomness). Some phenomena are found to exhibit regu­
larities - of one sort or another; others appear irregular 
We are ourselves amongst the more rule-governed products 
of the universe, and our inductive theories (especially 
in science) amongst our own most rule-governed products.
An important question, therefore, is the one raised by 
Kant: to what extent are the regularities exhibited those
of our own interactions with our environment? Kant
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effectively answered, totally: impressed by the obedience
of the stars to Newton's "laws". Popper initiated a 
directly contrary approach, in which our theories are 
taken to be rational conjectures, under constant threat 
of contradiction from the refusal of nature to conform: 
contradiction we should court, since it teaches us about 
nature. Though his original pure doctrine of falsifi­
cation by critical experiment has been much modified, 
the thought behind it stands: "... our theories can clash
with reality; and when they do, we know that there is a 
reality" (Popper, 1965, p. 117). This is the principle 
I like to call "the authority of the unexpected". Our 
expectations are constructed in a framework of theories.
When they are disappointed, we reject or revise our 
theories (if we are wise); preferring immediate recognition, 
taken as objective, to extrapolation under commitment.
This principle is not invalidated by the histor­
ical observation that some theories are more robust than 
Popper's first account suggested. They do not collapse 
at the first critical contradiction. Just as Kant was 
unduly impressed by Newton, Popper may have been influenced 
by the timely occurrence of Eddington's observations of 
1919, decisively favouring an interpretation under Einstein's 
(already well-developed) theory over a Newtonian account. 
Newton's physics continues to inform workaday technology 
(including moonflights): although a prime example of a
'normal science' in Thomas Kuhn's terms, it is sustained 
not by the social power of its proponents, but because it
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obeys the logic of held-truth (set out in Section IV.7), 
using appropriate strategies of approximation, tolerance, 
and probabilistic extrapolation, and is still developing 
new structures. Innovation (seen by Popperians as a 
central interest of philosophy of science) is certainly 
concentrated in the more advanced applications of rela­
tivity and quantum theories; these theories have taken 
over only at scales where classical theory throws up 
contradictions. But perhaps nowhere else are we likely 
to find such a clear picture of different theoretical 
structures working side by side in what the workers in 
each would recognize as the same general field: each
with its own inductive system, and with a "sphere of 
influence" determined almost entirely by the nature of 
the tasks in hand - and in particular their metric aspects. 
If this picture is less clear outside physics, it is not 
because other fields are more unified; but rather, on the 
contrary, that the fields of attention of the different 
theories tend to be less easily related to one another, 
metrically or otherwise, in terms of the elements with 
which they deal.
Without denying the importance, in their own 
terms, of the social and historical factors to which Kuhn 
points, our concern here is more with what Lakatos calls 
the "objective reconstruction" of Kuhn's concept of rival 
scientific "paradigms", in terms of "research programmes" 
(see Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970, esp. 179 n.). ' These last, 
for us, are seen as constructed upon theoretical systems.
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each of which is ideally coherent and consistent inter­
nally as a deductive structure. On the basis of their 
essays in the quoted collection, I think it is possible 
to suggest without undue strain that Lakatos and Kuhn 
would agree, with radically different emphasis, that no 
theoretical system which is empirical, in the sense of 
facing the challenge of possible inconsistency of readings 
with findings, can survive on social prestige alone.
Least of all is this possible, I suggest, when a theory 
emerges from the research laboratory to face the challenge 
of practical use.
My own account of induction, then, is relati­
vized to particular theoretical structures: including
not only those which inform programmes of research, in any 
academic or technological sense, but those in regular 
workaday and personal human use. The relationships of 
one theoretical system to another are to be understood in 
terms of their inductive structures: showing themselves
most obviously in their respective ontologies - their 
selections of elements of experience for attention. The 
degree to which such relationships can be coherently stated 
depends largely, indeed, on the extent to which their 
ontologies can be understood to overlap: the degree to
which, in Feyerabend's terminology, they are 'commensurable' 
(a term which, perhaps significantly, connotes measurement). 
Given a region of common ontology, and only in such a 
region, does it seem possible to form a logical structure 
within which commitments and their consequences, associated 
with different theories, either enrich the system or
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introduce contradictions. Where (as in my analysis) 
ontologies include valuative, configurative and positional 
characters, we have seen how a rich structure of sequential 
extrapolation can be built leading to findings ("predic­
tions" or "expectations") subject to later corroboration 
or contradiction: i.e., an inductive structure. Our
principal interest at this point, especially with regard 
to philosophy of science, is in the logical properties of 
an inductive system involving a GR-theory sharing all or 
part of its ontology with one or more S-theories.
We can isolate, conceptually, three phases in 
the life-histories of inductive theoretical commitments; 
though these phases follow one another in logical sequence, 
and ideally also in time, there is often overlap or minor 
confusion (if it ceases to be "minor", the structure col­
lapses - a self-determining criterion). First, the adop­
tion of one or more new commitments (sometimes involving 
the rejection of old ones); second, theoretical develop­
ment by the construction of findings on readings in obe­
dience to the new totality of commitments in context, under 
the logic of held-truth; third, the use or testing of 
the new theoretical structure, during which any contra­
dictions between findings and readings emerge. If 
these contradictions are sufficiently frequent or severe, 
the pressure is on to start the cycle again by the inven­
tion and adoption of new commitments. The search for new 
récognitive 'data' may well form part of the ensuing 
effort; and we might be tempted to distinguish this as a
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fourth phase, appearing at the start of end of the cycle. 
However, this procedure is not logically related to the 
other three in any distinctive way. New data (whether 
or not recognized as regular in some way) may or may not 
appear in association with any phase; and are perhaps 
best thought of as a general stimulus to theory construc­
tion, use or testing. Nor are new data essential to 
start the cycle, which (as with relativity theory) may be 
triggered by pure curiosity or puzzlement.
Phase (1) has often been spoken of in terms of 
discovery; but always involves an element of invention.
The invention of a new pattern of commitment may draw 
attention to new aspects of récognitive material which have 
always been present in relevant contexts, but either neg­
lected or misread - and to this extent are discovered in 
the new context. Popper cites William Harvey's obser­
vations of the blood system, which, in the light of his 
new approach, made key use of aspects which had previously 
been seen but ignored. Again, a newly invented pattern 
may trigger research which leads to discovery of com­
pletely new material. Untypically, the discovery of new 
material may, conversely, trigger the invention of a new 
theory to account for it. Darwin's experiences on the 
Beagle give a striking historical illustration: Einstein's
invention of relativity theory representing the opposite 
case. I have spoken of the adoption of 'one or more new 
commitments' rather than 'a new theory', since in no case 
that we can actually expect to meet does this phase occur
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in a theoretical vacuum - especially if we accept the 
theoretical status of all recognitions in the terms of this 
study (Duhem was already making this point in the context 
of the history of physical theory in his (1914), Ch. 7: 
see discussion by Watkins in Lakatos et al. (1970), p. 37). 
Though philosophers of science have tended to concentrate 
on major "revolutions" associated with what may be thought 
of as completely new theories, even these have taken over 
many pre-existing commitments; I am anxious to emphasize 
that the process of theoretical innovation (and consequent 
obsolescence) operates on the same principles at all 
levels, down to and including day-to-day récognitive 
theories. Whether what emerges is called a new theory, 
rather than a new development within existing theory, 
seems a matter of historical judgment rather than meta- 
theoretical principle. (The notion of a theoretical 
’commitment’ can probably be translated in most cases into 
’hypothesis’; but I have not found that the distinction 
or relationship between hypothesis and theory is clearly 
or consistently marked in the literature. I have tried 
to isolate the forms of particular commitments within a 
total theory which defines a context; allowing for pos­
sible overlaps, or not, of ontologies and commitments of 
sub-theories and sub-contexts within the whole; and for 
the case of a theory having only one commitment.)
I take the term ’induction’ to describe the pro­
cess as a whole: a process of continual construction,
revision and reconstruction, but also of continual use in
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the service of understanding and practical purposes.
Its logic is that of held-truth, as applied to the state- 
of-the-theory at the current frame in each context.
The attempt to impose a specific 'inductive logic' on 
Phase (1), in the manner of the crude 'inductivism' 
attributed by Popper to the Vienna Circle (especially 
Carnap), is on this analysis to be rejected not only 
because it does not reflect the actual form of theory- 
construction, but because it would restrict or indeed 
prevent invention. Its naïve form is the tenet that 
(in certain unspecified cases) sufficiently repeated 
observation of like cases logically founds a generali­
sation from these particular cases to a universal law; 
its great weakness being that any attempt to specify 
which cases are relevantly alike turns out to lead to 
circularity. Quine and Ullian have a slightly modified 
version which categorizes 'induction' (described in more 
or less the above terms) as just one of several methods 
for constructing hypotheses (rather than 'laws') (1978, 
p. 90). They justify retaining the special term for 
this method on the ground that we already have good terms 
for other methods they propose: but we already have a
good term for this one, the one they use, 'generalisation' 
It has the advantage that it' also covers generalisation 
from the single case, no less (and no more) reliable; the 
child burnt by one fire generalises his fear to all fires 
(for some reason they distinguish this as 'analogy').
But we have no other term which covers all three phases
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of the process as I have described it (the term ’hypothe- 
tico-deductive method' is used by Popper to cover only 
phases (1) and (2)). For this reason I propose to 
adopt 'induction' for all instances of the total process, 
independently of the means by which new commitments are 
arrived at. 1 shall say more shortly about why I think 
Quine seems not to appreciate the need to mark this more 
comprehensive concept, by one term or another. My main 
point here is to argue for a firm refusal to place any 
restrictions whatever on conceptual invention in phase (1): 
no taxonomy of methods should claim to be exhaustive.
This view seems to be in the spirit of Feyerabend's call 
for a "tolerant attitude towards meanings" during a 
period in which "competing conceptual systems" are asso­
ciated with possible new theoretical departures (he 
instances changes in the understanding of "impetus" to 
accommodate Newton's account of the nature of inertia:
Reese (1963), p. 30 f.). The discipline which controls 
the process comes (in principle, if not in time) later, 
in phases (2) and (3): the demand for logical consistency
of findings and readings in testing and use.
A more holistic view of a possible logic of 
induction is that considered by Hempel (1966, Ch. 5), in 
what may be seen as an attempt in the positivist tradition 
to overcome the failure of the more naïve version, men­
tioned above, to yield convincing analyses of historical 
cases. It is located, however, in our phases (2) and (3); 
he rejects the 'inductivist' poisition for phase (1),
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and describes the rational structure of the later phases 
as 'induction in a wider sense' (op.cit., p. 18). For 
this he proposes what he calls a *nomological-deductive' 
analysis, for which, in a situation governed by a given 
set of 'laws' (which we may read either as commitments 
or theories), a given set of 'initial conditions' logi­
cally determines a specified 'event', or outcome. It 
has led to discussion as to whether it may be possible to 
extract hierarchical patterns amongst laws or conditions 
in such a way as to produce simple and comprehensible 
analyses for particular cases. But we must expect, in 
the light of the present study, that no such analysis would 
reveal any additional logical principle beyond that of 
held-truth as applied to patterns of commitment of the rele­
vant theories; in association with 'initial conditions' 
taken to be a particular set of readings under these 
theories in a rather arbitrarily restricted context. So, 
although one can hardly quarrel with the intuitions under­
lying this approach, it seems to have little explanatory 
power.
Quine's view of the structure of empirical theory 
is also holistic - he is fond of talking of 'the whole of 
science', 'our beliefs ... in a body'. It is possible, 
however, to find in his work at least three aspects of 
internal structure, as seen from different perspectives.
One is the account of induction, analogy, etc., just men­
tioned. Another, prominent in his (19 53) and later, is 
a view of theory as a structure of sentences, classified
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in principle only in terms of their conceptual distance 
from reports of observation. The main thesis is that 
the 'core' of any theoretical system, the central fea­
tures of its account of some aspect of empirical truth, 
is grossly underdetermined by its logical relationships 
to its accounts of observations, located at the 'peri­
phery'. A corollary is that moves can be rather freely 
made which have the effect of altering the truth-values 
of sentences located anywhere in the system (including, 
critically, observation sentences) by adjustments else­
where (Lakatos attributes a similar view to Duhem:
Lakatos et al. (1970) p. 184 f.). There is, however, 
an admission that some kinds of sentences, especially near 
the periphery, are more "recalcitrant" than others: later
given the form, "As dissident theorists converge towards 
observation sentences they converge to agreement" (Quine 
and Ullian, 1978, p. 28). A hint, about the kinds of 
restriction that might be expected to determine which sen­
tences are likely to resist manipulation, and how, is to 
be found in the context of a third approach, from the 
perspective of ontology, already mentioned. This is the 
notion of a 'fully interpreted theory', whose 'internal 
deductive system', and the ranges of values of whose 
variables, are determined (1969, p. 51).
As we have seen, it is relatively easy to trans­
late this last notion into the language of C-theory, in 
which a closer analysis of internal structure is possible, 
at least in contexts of R-theory and associated S-theory:
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the first being naturally interpreted as Quine's 'peri­
phery', the second including his 'core' and intermediate 
structures. In this interpretation, the ontologies of 
peripheral R-theories appear as parts of those of S- 
theories, in such a way that the same elements are 
clearly specified so that their structures of assignment 
are governed both by récognitive and substantive commit­
ments. We must agree at once that, in such a structure, 
S-theoretical commitments (which may bring hypostatic 
elements into play) are underdetermined by R-theoretical 
structures. We can indeed point to R-commitments which 
are virtually (if not totally) independent of all S-theore­
tical inventive variation: the famous 'snow is white' 
might suggest one of them. We can also point to R-commit-
ments which incorporate prior S-commitments, such as those 
involved in recognitions of length in terms of angle, or 
temperature in terms of length (and there are plenty out­
side measurement too) . Such analysis may help to illu­
minate a slight threat of ambiguity in Quine's accounts 
of 'observation sentences': as to whether they are inference
free (and hence, presumably, theory-free), or subject to 
manipulation of their truth-values by theoretical adjust­
ment.
We can note, further, that different S-theories 
will typically draw attention to different systems of R- 
theory; and may be expected to differ in their adoption 
of S-theoretical commitments governing the assignment 
structures of R-elements in such a way that doubt arises
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whether or not the R-systems of different S-theories deter­
mine recognizably (some or all of) the same elements.
This is Feyerabend's problem of the possible 'incommen­
surability' of theories which superficially appear to 
account differently for the same phenomena. Our R- 
theories can be readily interpreted as versions of the 
'observation theories' distinguished by Lakatos, within 
higher-level theoretical structures, partly to throw light 
on this problem. Taking Feyerabend's choice of term 
somewhat literally, it does appear that strictly specified 
metric assignments in the physical sciences are accepted 
in many cases ad independent of rival S-theoretical inter­
pretations of the relevant récognitive structure; and 
hence as a sound basis for adjudications between them in 
these cases. There seem, however, to be nothing to pro­
hibit cases where two theories which appear to describe 
broadly the same complex of phenomena, draw attention to 
different sets of elements (idents or characters), each 
necessarily (under its own rules) neglecting some of those 
whose assignment structures are governed by the commitments 
of the other. In such a case there may be no set of 
metric assignments to found commitments under which they 
can be shown either to conflict or to support one another; 
or to be strictly complementary (in the sense of describing 
the complex completely, between them). In such a case, 
it might be natural to call them 'incommensurable'.
Indeed, in some such cases there may be one C-scale at 
which both theories pay attention to elements recognized
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as the same (or theoretically similar) about whose assign­
ments they agree; while mutual neglect of elements is 
adopted at another scale. They are not "rivals", each 
is a partial account which may be consistent in its own 
terms.
It has become recognized in the Popperian tradi­
tion that falsification of a theory by a single critical 
experiment is not such a simple matter as at first it 
seemed. The 'logical symmetry' which determines that a 
general hypothesis (S-theoretical commitment) may be deci­
sively falsified in a single case, but never completely 
verified for all cases, has remained in principle unassail­
able as a tenet of the tradition. But, to be decisive, 
a falsifying observation must be protected as strongly as 
possible from the fallibility which the tradition acknow­
ledges as infecting all empirical propositions: it must
be 'fortified' by a 'well-corroborated ... hypothesis' (see 
Lakatos et al. (1970) p. 108). Much does indeed depend 
on the strengths of commitment invested in rival theoretical 
interpretations of a concrete context; and these depend not 
only on the social or intellectual prestige of their propo­
nents (where this is a factor) but also, rationally, on 
their inductive performance. In everyday conflicts of 
R-theory it may take very little to upset one interpretive 
commitment in favour of another. But philosophers of 
science - in a search for optimum conditions for the con­
struction of certain empirical knowledge - tend to concen­
trate attention on well-established systems with highly- 
developed S-theoretical structures. These rely heavily
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on metric assignments governing well-controlled systems 
of elements, permitting the progressive incorporation of 
levels of S-theory with a hierarchical structure, each new 
level treating the previous one as 'observational* (R- 
theoretical): some illustrations of this process were
given in Part III. Such systems become of interest for 
this tradition only when they have accumulated a consi­
derable history of inductive success (in use and in 
research); and it is extremely rare for a single obser­
vation (such as Eddington's observation of 1919, a for­
tuitous date for Popper) to have more than a minor cor­
rective effect. However, it is clear that for an obser­
vation to be decisive at all in such contexts it must 
take place in well-controlled and understood conditions 
for measurement.
At the same time, it is the absence of well- 
controlled conditions for measurement in most of the life 
sciences (the reasons for which were discussed in Section 
III) that militates, for better or worse, against either 
firm adjudications or hierarchical constructions of 
incorporated theory in these fields.
After nearly all of this study was written, a 
new philosophical account of science came to hand with 
which I think I may claim close kinship, so that I cannot 
deny myself the opportunity of pointing, however briefly 
and inadequately, to the more obvious similarities and dif­
ferences. Van Fraassen (1980) mentions Popper only on 
probability, though he does seem to share some of Popper's
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intuitions - as in the observation that "... any 
scientific theory is born into a life of fierce competition 
... only the successful ones survive - the ones which in 
fact latched on to actual regularities in nature" (op.cit., 
p. 40). He may think the Popperian analyses of ’theory’ 
just too vague to generate an effective account of its role 
in science (or elsewhere). If so, my position is analogous.
Where this study touches the fringes of topics of 
which van Fraassen gives a full and rigorous account, there 
is much evidence of common outlook. His demonstration of 
the context-dependence of explanation, as a role of scien­
tific theory, chimes harmoniously with my own account, 
though the sense of ’context’ is different. His analysis 
of probability in science as a structure of "ideal (repeated) 
experiments" , closely related to "the theory under consi­
deration" (191, his emphasis), and intimately involving 
extrapolation (160), is evidently in sympathy. Van 
Fraassen's own breakdown of the concept of 'theory' itself, 
drawn from model-theoretic semantics, differs from my own 
less sophisticated analysis ^uch of which, from his point 
of view, may perhaps be taken for granted); but not so as 
as to seem irreconcilable at any point. Importantly, its 
location in semantics does not prevent him from sharing a 
belief that exclusive concern with the language in which 
each theory is expressed may blind analysts to the real 
nature of more general relationships between our theories 
and the world. More deeply, we both see theory-building
506
as an organically evolved structure, generating appropriate 
responses: a basis of commitment for the regulation of
action (in science, further research).
A genuine difference is that van Fraassen, 
wishing to rebut objections that his empiricism leads to 
"self-defeating scepticism", appears to place what seems 
to me a dangerous reliance on a firm, theory-independent 
distinction between what is and is not ’observable', as 
having special relevance to questions of the truth of theo­
retical statements. He stops short of saying that no 
theoretical account, which goes beyond what (in its own 
terms) is observable, can be true; but only just (pp. 70 ff) 
Two features of C-theory may be of use in this difficulty 
(if such it is). The first is that the language of this 
theory allows us to display internal distinctions within 
theoretical contexts, between what is and is not taken to 
be observed (or in principle observable), as autonomous; 
without thereby being hopelessly adrift from rational control 
Autonomy may be exercised by successive, fully 'objective', 
incorporations of S-theory: this incorporation extends,
step by step, the scope of what is accepted as observed.
The second is our emphasis here on 'held-truth' within a 
given theory: on this account, all well-formed held-truth
is a candidate for truth, whether or not its subject matter 
is supposed to be observed, or observable.
Given the areas of agreement, it seems reasonable 
to hope that my account could be developed to yield pre­
cisely similar models of the kinds of structure in which 
recognition-from-observation takes place (in my terms.
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R-theories) in any context which may also include repre­
sentations of 'unobservables' ( -theoretical structures).
That is to say, in his terms, our philosophical theories 
may be 'empirically equivalent' in certain applications.
In my terms, however, all such structures are candidates 
for truth provided they tell a complete, unequivocal story 
essentially involving their récognitive elements. R- 
theories are not, of course, infallible, but their roots 
in an evolved system of perception are our best guarantee 
that our theory-building is part of that 'dialogue with (the 
rest of) nature' we all agree is the only source of empiri­
cal knowledge.
Amongst alternatives to total, stultifying 
scepticism is not only indiscriminate belief in any parti­
cular theory or set of theories (however categorized or 
restricted), but also a broad commitment to the belief 
that there exists a unique real system to which we belong, 
of which many of our best founded and constructed theories 
give true, partial descriptions: at the price of acknow­
ledging that we can never tell just which parts of these 
theories (scientific or not) are false. Belief is not to 
be bestowed on grounds of the mere reasonableness of 
Realist explanations. Attached too firmly to our own 
(collective or individual) theories it can discourage 
development and bring on rigor consensus - a fatal condition, 
not only in science.
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